



# Procedural conflict and conflict resolution: a cross-national study of police officers from New Zealand and South Australia

Ross Hendy  
Churchill College  
University of Cambridge

This dissertation is submitted for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

May 2018



# Declaration

This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the preface and specified in the text. It is not the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution. I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution.



# Abstract

This research takes a cross-national approach to explore how police officers attempt conflict resolution in their day-to-day activities. Using comparisons of the behaviour of routinely armed officers from South Australia and routinely unarmed officers from New Zealand, this thesis chronicles a research journey which culminates with a new theoretical framework to explain police-citizen encounters.

The research took a grounded theory approach and employed a mixed methods design. Quantitative data revealed that officers from South Australia used verbal and physical control behaviours more frequently and for a higher proportion of time during encounters than during the encounters observed in New Zealand. There were no clear explanations for the differences, although there were variations in law and the profile of event-types between the research sites. The qualitative enquiry found that officers from both jurisdictions followed a similar diagnostic and treatment procedure during police-citizen encounters. Moreover, officers in both jurisdictions experienced conflict from procedural frustrations or goal blockages arising from interaction with citizens.

Findings provided the context for the construction of a substantive ‘procedural conflict’ theory. This theory (1) illustrates how procedural conflict can cause a strain for officers, (2) posits that officers take corrective actions to overcome the conflict using control behaviour, and (3) explains that while officers may use force to regulate police-citizen encounters, other behaviour for resolving conflict during encounters is more common. Accordingly, procedural conflict theory provides a new framework for the explanation of the police use of force. Further theoretical propositions about police-citizen interaction are set out in the final chapter and further research to test the validity of the theory is proposed.



---

# Contents

---

Declaration.....	iii
Abstract .....	v
Contents .....	vii
Figures .....	xi
Tables .....	xii
Nomenclature .....	xiv
Acknowledgements .....	xvi
 1. Introduction.....	 1
1.1 Police-citizen encounters as teachable moments.....	3
1.2 The present research .....	5
1.2.1 The dissertation .....	7
 2. Policing in an Australasian context .....	 9
2.1 The Australasian context .....	10
2.1.1 The policing of free and penal populations .....	10
2.1.2 Contemporary policing .....	16
2.1.3 Summary .....	20
 3. Conflict and conflict resolution during police-citizen encounters .....	 21
3.1 Police-citizen encounters.....	21
3.1.1 The ritual of the police-citizen encounter.....	21
3.1.2 Variety of police-citizen encounters.....	24
3.1.3 Control behaviour .....	27
3.1.4 Summary .....	30
3.2 Conflict during police-citizen encounters.....	30
3.2.1 Normative explanations.....	31
3.2.2 Justice and fairness.....	35
3.2.3 Strain and corrective action .....	38

3.2.4 Behavioural explanations .....	39
3.3 Conflict resolution .....	45
3.3.1 Deutsch's law of social relations .....	45
3.3.2 Police-led conflict resolution .....	48
3.3.3 Summary and discussion .....	49
4. A mixed-method approach .....	53
4.1 Research sites .....	53
4.1.1 Cross-national police research .....	53
4.1.2 The present research – the Australasian dyad .....	57
4.2 Research design .....	60
4.2.1 Mixed method approach .....	61
4.2.2 The quantitative study .....	62
4.2.3 The qualitative study .....	65
4.2.4 The pilot study .....	67
4.3 Data collection methods .....	68
4.3.1 Encounters .....	69
4.3.2 Officers .....	72
4.3.3 Citizens .....	73
4.3.4 Pilot study evaluation .....	73
4.4 The sample .....	76
4.4.1 Research access .....	76
4.4.2 Sampling: shifts and patrols .....	76
4.4.3 Officers .....	79
4.4.4 Citizens .....	83
4.5 Reliability and validity .....	86
4.5.1 Practitioner-based research .....	86
4.5.2 Reliability of the present research .....	88
4.6 Research ethics .....	90
4.7 Data analysis .....	93
4.7.1 Quantitative study .....	93
4.7.2 Qualitative study .....	93
5. Police-citizen interactions .....	95
5.1 Interactions between police and citizens .....	96
5.1.1 Encounter behaviours .....	96



5.1.2 Exchange and control .....	100
5.1.3 Summary .....	105
5.2 Differences of investigative and enforcement encounters .....	106
5.2.1 O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> Investigative encounters .....	107
5.2.2 O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> Enforcement encounters.....	110
5.3 Discussion.....	116
5.3.1 Officer behaviour at NZC.....	116
5.3.2 Cross-national comparison.....	118
5.3.3 Reliability of findings.....	120
5.3.4 Emergent issues .....	121
6. Officer decision-making during police-citizen encounters.....	123
6.1 Intervention: the perceived harm, legality, and acceptability.....	123
6.1.1 Perceived harm .....	125
6.1.2 Assessment of legality or illegality .....	126
6.1.3 Acceptability .....	128
6.1.4 Discussion .....	131
6.2 The diagnostic phase .....	133
6.2.1 Encounter initiation.....	134
6.2.2 Narrative diagnosis .....	137
6.3 The treatment phase .....	146
6.3.1 Citizen response to the CoA.....	147
6.4 The police-citizen encounter – the officer’s procedure .....	152
6.4.1 Summary .....	154
7. Conflict and conflict resolution during police-citizen encounters.....	155
7.1 Procedural conflict.....	156
7.2 Responses to procedural disturbances.....	163
7.3 Variances in verbal and physical control behaviour.....	169
7.3.1 Variances of officer skill and preference .....	171
7.3.2 Pre-emptive actions .....	176
7.4 Discussion.....	179
7.4.1 Summary .....	180
8. Discussion and conclusion.....	181
8.1 How do routinely unarmed police behave during police-citizen encounters? .....	181

8.1.1 Necessity and proportionality .....	182
8.1.2 Prevalence of control .....	184
8.1.3 Summary .....	185
8.2 Do routinely unarmed police officers behave differently to routinely armed police officers? .....	187
8.2.1 Differences in law .....	187
8.2.2 Situational differences .....	189
8.2.3 Summary .....	191
8.3 How do we explain how conflict resolution is managed by routinely unarmed police officers? .....	192
8.3.1 Theoretical frameworks .....	193
8.4 Conclusion .....	197
8.4.1 General findings .....	197
8.4.2 Limitations .....	199
8.4.3 Further research .....	200
8.4.4 Final words .....	201
9. Towards a new theory of conflict .....	203
9.1 Procedural conflict theory .....	203
9.1 Conclusion .....	213
End matter	
Appendix .....	215
References .....	237

---

# Figures

---

Figure 1. Tyler’s Model of “Process-Based Regulation” .....	36
Figure 2. Wilson and Braithwaite’s behavioural model .....	40
Figure 3. Braithwaite’s model of conflict resolution .....	46
Figure 4. Data collection methods.....	69
Figure 5. Screen captures of Noldus’ Pocket Observer .....	70
Figure 6. Screen captures of Qualtrics and Evernote.....	71
Figure 7. Officer participation nomination and opt-in process.....	79
Figure 8. The PCE as a diagnostic and treatment process .....	153

---

# Tables

---

Table 2.1 Cross-national comparisons of population, staffing, annual expenditure, recorded offences, responsibilities, and armament .....	17
Table 4.2.1 Braithwaite's Taxonomy of Conflict Resolution Behaviours .....	63
Table 4.4.1 Patterns of shifts observed.....	77
Table 4.4.2 Basic demographic information of officers.....	81
Table 4.4.3 Personality test scores for officers .....	81
Table 4.4.4 Resistance scores for officers.....	82
Table 4.4.5 Basic demographic information of citizens .....	84
Table 4.4.6 Citizen characteristics.....	85
Table 5.1.1 Braithwaite's Modified Taxonomy of Conflict Resolution Behaviours .....	97
Table 5.1.2 Frequency and duration of encounters .....	98
Table 5.1.3 Encounter initiation sources.....	98
Table 5.1.4 Encounter event-types at dispatch, arrival, and end of encounter .....	100
Table 5.1.5 Analysis of behaviours during all O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> encounters.....	102
Table 5.1.6 Occurrence of control behaviours during all O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> encounters .....	103
Table 5.1.7 Analysis of behaviours during all O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>2</sub> encounters.....	104
Table 5.1.8 Occurrence of control behaviours during all O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>2</sub> encounters .....	105
Table 5.2.1 Occurrence of control behaviours during O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> victim-encounters.....	108
Table 5.2.2 Occurrence of control behaviours during O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> suspect-encounters.....	109
Table 5.2.3 Occurrence of control behaviours during O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> field-arrest-encounters.....	112
Table 5.2.4 Occurrence of control behaviours during O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> field-action-encounters.....	113
Table 5.2.5 Occurrence of control behaviours during O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> field-warnings-encounters ....	114
Table 5.3.1 Ratio of the frequency of information exchange to verbal control and physical control at New Zealand City .....	117
Table 5.3.2 Ratio of the frequency of information exchange to verbal control and physical control .....	119
Table 6.2.1 The role of citizens during encounters .....	138
Table 6.4.1 PCE-types and officer-goals .....	154

## APPENDIX

Table A4.1 Sample ethnicities.....	215
Table A5.1 Event-types of all O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> encounters .....	216
Table A5.2 Event-types of all O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>2</sub> encounters .....	217
Table A5.3 Event-types of O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> victim-encounters.....	218
Table A5.4 Analysis of behaviours during O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> encounters victim-encounters.....	218
Table A5.5 Event-types of O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> suspect-encounters.....	219
Table A5.6 Analysis of behaviours during O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> suspect-encounters.....	219
Table A5.7 Event-types of O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> field-arrest-encounters.....	220
Table A5.8 Analysis of behaviours during O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> field-arrest-encounters .....	220
Table A5.9 Event-types of O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> field-action-encounters.....	221
Table A5.10 Analysis of behaviours during O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> field-action-encounters.....	221
Table A5.11 Event-types of O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> field-warning-encounters.....	221
Table A5.12 Analysis of behaviours during O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> field-warning-encounters .....	222

---

# Nomenclature

---

A common difficulty of cross-national research is finding a shared nomenclature for similar objects, roles, or customs. Those working in policing are often confounded by acronyms, Appendix colloquialisms, and jargon specific to local custom. In this dissertation, an attempt has been made to reduce police-specific jargon and build a common nomenclature.

Police agency	an organisation that has an official capacity to maintain public order and/or investigate crime, within a legal jurisdiction, such as a nation-state, state, province, county, or metropolitan area. These include constabulary, police force, police service, police department, bureaus of investigation, crime agencies, and sheriff departments.
Police officer	a sworn or constabulary officer who has the powers of arrest, including constables, deputies, officers, agents, special agents. Not including police employees with limited powers such as authorised officers (New Zealand), police community support officers (UK), protective security officers or protective service officers (Australia).
Routinely armed	taken to mean routinely armed with firearms, where officers routinely wear a sidearm in a holster always while on duty. In most jurisdictions, this means that officers wear a sidearm (handgun, pistol). Some specialist police units may be routinely armed with semi-automatic rifles.
Routinely unarmed	taken to mean not routinely armed with firearms, but where firearms are available to officers if officers need to be armed.

## ABBREVIATIONS

IOI	Disorder incident code (SAPOL)
IX	Suicide attempt or related incident code (NZPOL)
AMT	Authority Maintenance Theory
BFI	Big Five Inventory (personality measure)
CED	Conductive electronic device (i.e. a TASER)
CoA	Course of action
CPD	Convergent parallel design
ESF	Encounter Situational Factors (form)
GDP	General duties patrol team
GST	General strain theory
ICF	Informed consent form
IN	Incident narrative
IR	Interaction ritual
NRT	Norm resistance theory
NZC	New Zealand City
NZC officers	Officer participants from the NZPOL research site
NZC station	Station at the NZPOL research site
NZPOL	New Zealand Police
O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub>	Two officers, one citizen
O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>2</sub>	Two officers, two citizens
Officer	Police officer
PCE	Police-citizen encounter
PCT	Procedural Conflict Theory
PIS	Participant information sheet
PJT	Procedural Justice Theory
PST	Public safety team
PO	Participant Observation
POPNI	'Project on Policing Neighborhoods' research project
RAP	Routinely armed police
RUP	Routinely unarmed police
SAC	South Australia City
SAC officers	Officer participants from the SAPOL research site
SAC station	Station at the SAPOL research site
SAPOL	South Australian Police
SSO	Systematic Social Observation
TASER	A common brand of CED

---

# Acknowledgements

---

Support for this research has come from a variety of people and places. I would like to acknowledge the supportive environment within the Institute of Criminology at the University of Cambridge. I have benefited most greatly from the guidance and wisdom of my supervisor Dr Justice Tankebe and other academic members of the Institute, including Professor Lawrence Sherman, Professor Loraine Gelsthorpe, and Dr Heather Strang. Equally, I have drawn strength from my fellow doctoral candidates Jenni Barton-Crosby, Beth Hardie, Alice Ievins, and Peter Neyroud CBE QPM; the regular conversations with these colleagues has sharpened my work. I would also like to acknowledge the support of the team at the Radzi-nowicz Library, led by Stuart Stone, which demonstrated unwavering hospitality and patience sourcing new volumes resulting from my numerous book requests.

I have also benefited from support from the wider academic community. I would like to acknowledge the moral support from the Dawes Trust, particularly Sir Stephen Lander KCB and Professor Mike Hough. I have also received advice and inspiration from Professor PAJ Waddington (thanks, Tank), Professor Johannes Knutsson who introduced me to complementary Scandinavian perspectives (and cuisine) and Professor Rob Ayson who warned me of the perils of doctoral study. Additionally, I have benefited from the support and encouragement from various senior members of Churchill College.

*Kia ora rawa atu.*

My studentship at the Institute of Criminology was generously supported through funding from the Wakefield Scholarship and the Dawes Trust. The present research has been supported by funding from Churchill College, the Department of Anglo-Saxon, Norse and Celtic, the Smuts Memorial Fund, the Institute of Criminology, and the University Field Work Fund. Furthermore, I am indebted to New Zealand Police who supported my efforts to undertake the doctoral research at the Institute of Criminology through the generous provision of three years of study leave and a study grant. I would like to acknowledge Deputy Commissioner Viv



Rickard, Assistant Commissioner Andy Coster, Catherine Petrey, Superintendent Paul Basham, Sergeant Ian Osland, and Dr Darren Walton, all of whom supported my application for leave and provided encouragement to strive for professional development. I am grateful for the support from members of the South Australian Police who provided access to research within their jurisdiction including Commissioner Gary Burns (since retired), Assistant Commissioner Bronwyn Kilmier and Cynthia Manners.

Many have written about the toll that doctoral study takes on the personal life of the candidate and family. And while a doctoral dissertation embodies many years of thought and work adventured by the candidate, it also evidences the support and guidance of those who are special to the researcher. As such, I am indebted for the love and tolerance from my family during this very fine academic adventure—my wife Rebecca O’Brien, my parents Michael and Elizabeth Hendy, and my cheeky fox-terrier cross Poppy, thank you.

*Ross Hendy, 2018*

*Dawes Trust Scholar,*

*Wakefield Scholar 2013-2016*

*Churchill College*



## FUNDING

This research has been supported by the generous funding of studentships and research grants from the following sources:

*Studentships*   Dawes Trust Bursary

## Tennant Studentship

## Wakefield Scholarship

## Grants Institute of Criminology

New Zealand Police Study Grant

Scandinavian Studies Fund (University of Cambridge)

Smuts Memorial Fund (University of Cambridge)

Tennant Fund (University of Cambridge)

University of Cambridge Field Work Fund

---

## Introduction

---

The impetus for this research arose from an earlier cross-national study of routinely unarmed police officers from Norway and routinely armed officers from Sweden, which revealed that officers from Sweden and those from Norway did not agree that routine firearm armament affected police-citizen interaction (Hendy, 2014). It appeared, at the time, that the perspectives of Norwegian officers were influenced by operational and cultural circumstances—except during emergencies, Norwegian officers policed without wearing a firearm. Indeed, as a practitioner from another routinely unarmed police agency, I had reflected about changes in my demeanour during armed emergency events. Were any changes in my demeanour as a result of contemplating the risks associated with the task at hand or consequent to the sense of physical and cognitive empowerment associated with being armed with a firearm? Indeed, could it be possible that citizens, especially those present while routinely unarmed police are temporarily armed to respond to an ‘armed and dangerous event’, might attribute change in officer demeanour to be a consequence of how officers responded to the complex nature of such an event?

Accordingly, the present research sought to devise insight of behavioural differences between routinely armed and routinely unarmed officers: if differences were found with the behaviour of routinely armed and routinely unarmed officers as they attempted to resolve interpersonal conflict arising during police-citizen encounters, then hypotheses may be posited as to the broader effect of how routine armament influenced police-citizen interaction. Curiously, while variances in behaviour between the two research sites appeared during research

fieldwork, other factors arose to explain the behavioural variances—explanations that appeared unrelated to the question of firearms. Indeed, during this research, firearms were only ever ‘used’ in two occasions (although not presented at citizens), when officers from the routinely unarmed New Zealand police deployed with rifles and sidearms to ‘weapons’ incidents. In contrast, South Australian officers never ‘used’ (or unholstered) their sidearms. As such, this dissertation is more of a discussion about how the routinely armed/unarmed status affects the ‘character’ of encounters, as opposed to the ‘use’ of firearms.

Taking a grounded theory approach to the research enabled the observation of how controlling behaviours were used to overcome procedural conflicts and goal-blockages during police-citizen encounters. Consequently, this dissertation chronicles a research journey that culminated in theoretical insight. It provides a narrative to contextualise the formation of the new theoretical framework, and in doing so, illuminates a new frame to theorise police-citizen interaction by applying Agnew’s general strain theory (1992; 2006) to decision-making during police-citizen encounters. Taking this approach provides an opportunity for the impact of verbal interaction, officer decision making *and* the use of physical control behaviour to be incorporated together to provide a context for officer behaviour. This approach is the foundation of a new theoretical paradigm for understanding conflict and conflict resolution during police-citizen interaction: procedural conflict theory. It advances Sykes and Brent’s use of general systems theory (1980; 1983).

It should be noted that this research conforms to Deutsch’s framework of conflict-resolution, namely that “a *conflict* occurs whenever *incompatible* activities occur” (1973, p.10, original emphasis). Unlike more common applications of conflict in the policing literature, the present research frames conflict and conflict resolution as activities that are concerned with goal attainment or blockage as opposed to more overt forms of violence that might be ‘resolved’ with the application of force. *Procedural conflict theory* suggests that conflict originates from citizen deliberate or non-deliberate actions which frustrate or block officers’ ability to achieve their goals. Thus, conflict may be resolved, or indeed prevented, through the minimisation or avoidance of goal blockage. The merit of this approach is revealed when applied to all police-citizen encounters. Previous theoretical approaches have been limited to understanding deliberate disruptive behaviour (such as citizen disobedience) to explain why officers use force. However, procedural conflict theory provides a context for explaining officer control behaviour (as corrective actions) in situations where citizen disobedience is not always

present, yet their behaviour frustrates officer goals. This is born from the observation that New Zealand officers used a higher frequency and proportional duration of control behaviours during encounters with victims than with suspects. Such behaviour appears to be counterintuitive: it would be expected that officers would confront more conflict from suspects than with victims. The analysis herein shows that officers used controlling behaviours to overcome conflict from procedural frustrations and blockages found during ‘routine’ police-citizen encounters.

## 1.1 Police-citizen encounters as teachable moments

As Tyler *et al.* (2014) explain, routine police-citizen encounters are socializing experiences—teachable moments that build or undermine legitimacy. Furthermore, exploring such interactions is critical to building an understanding of how individual police-citizen encounters affect police-society relations (Herbert 2006). Consequently, there is value in the pursuit of developing a further understanding of how police-citizen encounters play out.

The degradation of public order following two recent fatal police-citizen encounters signals the value in understanding the factors which influence how police-citizen interactions play out. Indeed, media coverage of the shootings of Mark Duggan at London, England in 2011, and Michael Brown at Ferguson, Missouri in 2014 claimed that these fatalities were the triggers for prolonged periods of general disorder and criminal behaviour (Taylor 2017; Swaine 2014). Michael Brown’s encounter with police was spontaneous and procedurally routine; it began as an officer spotted Brown walking on the road and subsequently identified him as a person of interest for a recent theft. The interaction deteriorated, and a fight ensued between Brown and the officer, tragically culminating with the officer firing at Brown. Like many other routine encounters, it started as an investigative street-level interaction without an expectation that behaviour might deteriorate and rapidly ended as a fatal encounter. The case of Mark Duggan was also routine. Duggan was under investigation for offences relating to organised crime and was being actively surveilled by officers from London Metropolitan Police (Waddington 2012). The police operation changed from surveillance to enforcement when police suspected that Duggan possessed an illegal firearm. Within four seconds of a controlled vehicle stop, Duggan was shot by an armed officer. The subsequent IPCC investigation failed to find evidence to counter the firing officer’s belief that Duggan was in possession of a firearm

and that he honestly believed that Duggan's actions put his life and his colleagues in imminent danger (IPCC 2015).

Both cases were 'flashpoint'<sup>1</sup> events where demonstrations of anger, rioting, and other public order offending arises in response to injustices and/or broader grievances with police and the state (Newburn *et al.* 2016; Moran & Waddington 2016) in addition to the demonstration of the outrage felt at the death of a citizen by police. Moreover, these cases became the topic of intense media and judicial scrutiny, with some media drawing on the disproportional nature of fatal police-citizen interactions in America compared with the United Kingdom (Lartey 2015). The behaviour and actions of the firing officers were examined by the media in detail; drawing on an examination of police culture, institutional racism, police brutality, and human rights. Indeed, Brown and Duggan were portrayed by media as undeserving victims of police violence and brutality (Taylor 2017; Swaine 2014) whereas the officers were portrayed negatively. However, while the actions of the officers were described as criminal, neither officer involved in the shootings were found to be criminally liable for the deaths, nor have juridical inquiries established fault on the part of Brown or Duggan.

The functions and responsibilities of police agencies vary from one jurisdiction to another, but police officers perform the same core role within civil society: they are deputised sworn agents of the state with *core* functions to regulate behaviour and enforce legislation (Reiner 2010). Officer behaviour is formally regulated by statute law, common law, and agency policy, yet officer behaviour has been shown to be influenced by agency organisational culture (Reiner 2010; Wilson 1968). Furthermore, officers remain individual actors whose gender, personal life and professional experiences, and individual personality influence their behaviour (Muir 1977). While society seeks a transparent and consistent level of service from police, interpretation and officer practice is invariably affected by officer individuality and interpretation. Indeed, the function of police discretion and devolved authority to act is a defining principle of Anglo-Saxon common-law policing-by-consent jurisdictions: the decision to arrest and prosecute must originate from the investigating officer, not the complainant (citizen, corporate or government). Such practices are the constitutional bedrock that protects the citizenry from totalitarian rule. Thus, as previous scholars have remarked (e.g. Lipsky 1980; Loftus 2009; Reiner 2010), understanding officer behaviour and decision-making processes are of high importance. Moreover, as evidenced in the aforementioned fatal police-citizen en-

---

<sup>1</sup> See Newburn *et al.* (2016) and Waddington *et al.* (1989) for further discussion and definition of flashpoint events that act as the precursor of disorder.

counters, there is a great deal at stake: interactions between officers and citizens during an encounter not only have the potential to lead to conflict among participants within the confines of the encounter but in some extreme cases have the potential to undermine the peace and stability of ordered society.

Is it possible that routinely armed officers behave differently to non-routinely armed officers? Political rhetoric (e.g. Locke 2008) and some academic theorists (e.g. Buttle 2010; Sarre 1996b) suggest that practice and behaviour does differ between routinely armed and routinely unarmed officers. A small amount of literature compares the practice of routinely armed with routinely unarmed police with some research indicating that routinely unarmed police officers perceive risk differently to routinely armed officers (Hendy 2014; Waddington *et al.* 2009) and that responses to firearm-related incidents differ (e.g. Knutsson & Norée 2010). Waddington *et al.*'s (2009) exploration of police behaviour found that German routinely armed officers behaved quite differently to routinely armed officers in Brazil.

Within Australasia, officers from one jurisdiction are increasingly deployed in support of another. For example, officers from New Zealand and Australian police agencies have been deployed together in post-conflict environments of Afghanistan, Timor-Leste, and the Solomon Islands (New Zealand Police 2017b; New Zealand Police 2017a). Officers have also been deployed to assist with natural disasters and large-scale operations within Australasia. In the aftermath of the 22 February 2011 Christchurch, New Zealand earthquake (where 185 people were killed), police officers from many Australian jurisdictions were deployed into Christchurch to assist New Zealand Police (McLean *et al.* 2012) with disaster recovery, provide reassurance policing and respond to general calls for service without being routinely armed. Similarly, a contingent of New Zealand officers that was deployed to assist the Queensland Police to manage the 2014 G20 world summit in Brisbane (New Zealand Police Association 2014) became routinely armed for that operation. If differences are identified in the present research, then the utility of the interoperability of routinely armed and routinely unarmed police officers requires consideration.

## 1.2 The present research

This dissertation contributes to a deeper understanding of the differences between the operational behaviour of routinely armed and routinely unarmed officers proposed in Hendy

(2014), Knutsson and Norée (2010), and Waddington *et al.* (2009). The research examines the behaviour of officers as they attempt to resolve interpersonal conflict arising during police-citizen encounters and considers the following analytical questions:

- (a) How do routinely unarmed police behave during police-citizen encounters?
- (b) Do routinely unarmed police officers behave differently to routinely armed police officers during police-citizen encounters?
- (c) How do we explain how conflict resolution is managed by routinely unarmed police officers?

The findings of this study make a significant addition to the criminological and policing literature in several ways. First, this is the first examination of officer behaviour in a comparative context between New Zealand and South Australia. The study observes officer interaction with citizens within New Zealand and compares these interactions with those from South Australia. This research provides an addition to the wider collection of cross-national studies of police behaviour. Second, the study is the first to directly compare operational behaviour *in situ* between officers from a routinely armed police agency and a routinely unarmed police agency since Banton's (1964) study of American and Scottish officers during the 1960s. However, while Banton's study was largely ethnographic, the present study is the first to quantitatively measure behavioural interaction comparatively. Previous cross-national studies of police behaviour have provided opportunities to measure and quantify differences in police practice across jurisdictions (Bayley 1990; Waddington *et al.* 2009). This was achieved in the present study by measuring participant behaviours, using a modified version of Braithwaite's (1998) conflict resolution behavioural taxonomy, coding *in situ* and in real-time. This approach was also advantageous as it helped to reduce the risk of researcher bias—and perhaps unfamiliarity—when measuring behaviours of officers at each research site.

Findings from the present research indicate that although officers from both jurisdictions followed a similar procedure during police-citizen encounters, RAP officers from South Australia used controlling behaviours more frequently and for a greater proportion of time during an encounter than RUP officers from New Zealand. This was consistent when observing investigative, and enforcement encounters. However, while the findings suggest differences in the use of control behaviour, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the differences were determined by the jurisdiction's armed status. It is a more compelling explanation that



the behavioural differences are related to legislative differences among the jurisdictions. Legislation in South Australia equips officers with a general power to demand the identification particulars of any citizens whom an officer believes had witnessed an offence. Consequently, normative officer behaviour appeared different between South Australia and New Zealand. This conclusion provides a basis to reframe one of the widely-held beliefs that RAP officers are more ‘aggressive’ than the more ‘approachable’ RUP police; the present study suggests that officer behaviour is influenced more by legislative powers rather than armed status.

### 1.2.1 THE DISSERTATION

This dissertation consists of nine chapters. The next chapter introduces the context for the research; it outlines the evolution of policing in Australasia, including colonial history and contemporary structures of the South Australia and New Zealand police agencies. The third chapter discusses relevant literature. The fourth chapter describes the QUAN(qual) embedded mixed methods design, using quantitative data to measure variations in officer behaviour between samples of RUP officers and RAP officers, and qualitative data to explore the phenomena of officer conflict resolution behaviour during police-citizen encounters.

The research findings are reported in three chapters. The fifth chapter details the findings of the quantitative study of 278 encounters ( $n_{NZ}=136$ ,  $n_{SA}=143$ ) spread between enforcement encounters<sup>2</sup> ( $n=133$ , 48%) and investigative encounters<sup>3</sup> ( $n=142$ , 52%). The analysis of the frequency and duration of conflict-resolution behaviours reveals an unexpected incidence of control behaviour used by officers during victim-encounters, and a variance in the use of verbal and physical control behaviours between the New Zealand officers and South Australian officers. At this point, the focus of the dissertation shifts to the emergent *procedural conflict theory*. Chapter six examines the decision-making process used by officers when they engage in encounters with citizens and draws upon observational data from participant observation and officer-participant interviews. Chapter seven explores these data in the contexts of general systems theory (Sykes & Brent 1983) and general strain theory (Agnew 1992). The analysis suggests that police-citizen conflict arises from procedural problems such as goal blockage and it proposes that control behaviour is used by an officer in response to a procedural conflict. Chapter eight draws together findings from the qualitative and quantitative studies and

---

<sup>2</sup> Enforcement encounters included field arrest-, field action-, and field warning-encounters.

<sup>3</sup> Investigative encounters included victim-encounters and suspect-encounters.

forms the general conclusion of this research. The last chapter explores the emergent procedural conflict theory through an essay that considers its key theoretical propositions.

## 2

---

# Policing in an Australasian context

---

This chapter outlines the development of the New Zealand (NZPOL) and South Australian (SAPOL) police agencies to provide an insight into their contemporary practices. The following accounts are drawn from the *History of Policing in New Zealand* (Hill 1986; Hill 1995), published in association with the New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs, and a history of the South Australian police by former officer and member of the South Australian Police Historical Society (Clyne 1987). As such, Hill and Clyne largely come from what Reiner describes as orthodox history (see Reiner 2010, p.40); they come from ‘cop-sided’ and hegemonic perspectives. Notwithstanding the inherent bias of orthodox perspectives, Hill and Clyne demonstrate the significance of Peel, Rowan and Mayne on the formation of policing in both jurisdictions. For instance, Hill writes:

the outcome of half a century of policing debate, experimentation and evolution in England and its territories was to be transplanted to the new colony of New Zealand. (Hill 1986, p.10)

It will become apparent that while the development of policing in Australasia differs from other British colonial and frontier efforts (such as North America, India, or Ireland), there is utility in not conflating policing in an Australian-wide perspective. For instance, South Australia faced different problems from her neighbouring colonies, as did the fledgling colony of New Zealand. Furthermore, the evolution of civil policing in New Zealand appears to have been hindered by their focus on quelling insurrection by Māori during the New Zealand Wars and it was not until 1886 that military and civil functions were devolved to separate agencies of the state.

## 2.1 The Australasian context

### 2.1.1 THE POLICING OF FREE AND PENAL POPULATIONS

Contemporary policing practice in Australasia is influenced by English policing of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Early policing was shaped by the challenges arising from the combination of colonial demands of the frontier and nation-building (Nettelbeck & Smandych 2010; O'Brien 1960), establishing police for the safety of free settlers (Hill 2012b; O'Brien 1960) and controlling the penal population of incarcerated and freed convicts (O'Brien 1960; South Australian Police Department 1972).

Strategies informing the English colonisation of Australia and New Zealand in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth-centuries were not consistent. Following the arrival of English explorer Captain James Cook at New Zealand in 1769, and Australia in 1770, the initial colonisation of Australia was driven by Britain's policy of forced convict emigration (Finnane 1994; Hill 2012a; King 2004). Conversely, British colonisation of South Australia and New Zealand were not convict-centric, rather, 'free' settlers were encouraged to emigrate from Britain to profit from the natural resources abundant in the new frontiers (Clyne 1987; Hill 2012a).

British approaches to native peoples across the colonies were similarly inconsistent. While Australian aboriginal tribes were thought "too weak and dispersed to offer significant resistance" (Hill 1986, p.29), the Māori tribal-groups of New Zealand and the Moriori of the Chatham Islands were seen as more formidable (Hill 1986). Indeed, Belich (1996) remarks that when the British were planning the location of Antipodean penal colonies in the 1780s, New Zealand was eliminated because the British perceived Maori to be 'dangerous and blood-thirsty'. Relations between Māori and the British Crown were later codified in 1840 through *Te Tiriti o Waitangi* (the Treaty of Waitangi) which recorded the cession by Māori chiefs to the British Crown. In exchange, Māori became British subjects and were afforded the protection of the Crown (King 2004). As New Zealand historian King observes:

While that Treaty was in part a product of the most benevolent instincts of British humanitarianism, and those who signed it on 6 February had the highest possible hopes for benign outcomes, the document would turn out to be the most contentious and problematic ingredient in New Zealand's national life (2004, pp.156-157)

No such arrangement was sought from the Aboriginal peoples of Australia (see Clyne 1987) or indeed other indigenous peoples that had been “conquered, enslaved, or killed by European firepower and epidemic diseases” (Ward 1999, p.8).

### *British policing of the colonies*

British-styled policing came to Australasia with the arrival of the ‘First Fleet’ at Botany Bay, Australia in 1788. Among the convicts and settlers were the continent’s first constables and night-watchmen (O’Brien 1960). Population growth and crime pressures resulted in regular policing reform, including the marshalling of constables and night-watchmen of the First Fleet under the provost marshal in 1801, with control passing to magistrates in 1804, the establishment of the *Sydney Police Act 1833* [NSW], and failed attempts during the remainder of the decade to adopt the principles and reforms espoused by Sir Robert Peel which formed the basis for the London Metropolitan Police (O’Brien 1960).<sup>1</sup>

As the police in New South Wales were occupied with policing the convicts and emancipists—believed to be 63% of the Sydney population at the time (O’Brien 1960)—the colonists of the newly-established South Australia became concerned for their safety due to the ‘wickedness’ of convicts from New South Wales. South Australia—not established as a penal colony—was initially free of convicts and populated with ‘free settlers’ from England who had emigrated of their own ‘free will’ (O’Brien 1960). This contrasted with the forced transportation of convicts to the penal colonies of New South Wales and Queensland.

South Australia had been established, optimistically, without formal police as police were not initially thought to be required in the utopic colony of the free (Clyne 1987). Instead, the colony relied on a small number of marines who had accompanied the arrival of the first Governor in 1836 to provide security for the colony (O’Brien 1960). However, in response to the concerns of colonists about the risk of convicts ‘flooding in’ from the other colonies, Governor Hindmarsh requested the establishment of a police force from the Colonial Office in 1838 (Clyne 1987). Evidence of this is noted by the South Australian police:

They planned to set up a respectable society; peopled by responsible and hardworking men and women whose tranquillity and safety would be secured by the absolute ban on the entry of convicts. In November 1837, Governor Hindmarsh wrote to the Colonial Office that “the number of bad characters arriving daily from Encounter Bay, and suspected to be runaway convicts, make it necessary that a strong police body should exist” (South Australian Police Department 1972, p.25).

---

<sup>1</sup> O’Brien comments that Sydney Police Commissioner William Miles’s attempt at reforms were stymied by lack of personnel, both in quantity and quality. He writes: “Although Miles favoured the appointment of free men, migrants and soldiers, the force still had a convict element, which materially added to the extent of crime as these men tended to collaborate with the criminals they were supposed to apprehend.” (O’Brien 1960, p.21). Finnane (1994) concurs but cautions that the involvement of convicts in policing at the time should not be overstated.

Similarly, escaped and freed convicts from the penal colony at Port Jackson, New South Wales settled sporadically in New Zealand: those who became involved with the trade of seals, whales, flax and other commodities (King 2004). The first British representative posted to New Zealand, James Busby, requested formal protection of naval ships and two British constables in 1835 from the Colonial Office (Carpenter 2009), however, this was dismissed as a “whining request” (King 2004, p.155) at the time by the Governor at New South Wales. The Treaty of Waitangi formally established the British colony of New Zealand (Belich 1996; King 2004).<sup>2</sup> Initial policing for the colony was provided by members of the New South Wales mounted police (Hill 2012a). However, over the next 46 years, policing in New Zealand journeyed through several reforms: the creation of an armed police force (Hill 1986), the formation of decentralised independent provincial police forces in 1853, and the establishment of an armed constabulary in 1867 (*Armed Constabulary Act 1867* [NZ]).<sup>3</sup>

Provincial police forces in New Zealand unified in 1877 when they were merged with the armed constabulary. Before this time, forces were occupied with military conflict (such as the Māori Land Wars from 1845–1872) and civil and criminal conflict (such as problems associated with the Gold Rushes of the 1860s). The conflation of military and civil policing personnel was the antithesis of Peel’s reforms English policing: his ‘new police’ were to be independent of military authority (Reiner 2010). However, legislative reforms later disestablished the armed constabulary and created a unified national police force of civilian constables under the enactment of the *Police Force Act 1886* [NZ] (Hill 1986). Hill (1986) argues that the style of policing in colonial New Zealand transformed from order imposition (such as that of the Irish Constabulary) to order maintenance (modelled on the British ‘new police’). As a defacto standing army, the Armed Police Force and the Armed Constabulary served under the command of New Zealand governors utilised to impose ‘colonial’ order and resolve internal conflict. At the same time, mounted police became responsible for the higher crimes of civil conflict and insurrection including the suppression of conflict arising from the Māori Land Wars, where the foot-based ‘civil’ police concentrated on ‘low’ crimes committed by the citizenry.

---

<sup>2</sup> Financiers and directors of the New Zealand Company, also incorporated in 1840, were associated with the South Australian Association (Fairburn 1990).

<sup>3</sup> There was no specific reference to arming constables or officers in the Act. However, it is apparent from S.25 of the *Armed Constabulary Act 1867* [NZ] that constables were armed: “... And if any constable shall be so dismissed or shall otherwise cease to belong to the Armed Constabulary, all powers and authorities vested in him by virtue of this Act shall cease and determine[.] And if any constable shall within one week after he shall be dismissed from or shall cease to hold and exercise his office deliver over all and every the arms ammunition and accoutrements horse saddle bridle clothing and other appointments whatsoever...” (New Zealand Parliament 1867, p.453).

South Australia faced similar staffing problems. Unlike New Zealand, South Australia policing was structured as a single force (with mounted and foot divisions) that did not serve military or quasi-military functions. As such, the South Australian police were structurally consistent with Peel's model of civilian-police. However during a period of civil unrest in 1841, Governor Grey sought further manpower to assist the civil unrest and the fear of rioting (Clyne 1987). Clyne (1987) notes the unpopularity of military involvement:

... a military presence in the colony may well have been practical and expedient, but deeply disturbed many colonists .... South Australia was not a penal colony requiring soldiers to supervise convicts; martial law had not been declared; the colony was not at war with either a foreign power or lawless natives; and the unemployed were peaceful, if resentful. No doubt the troops could be used in an emergency; but they were ill equipped and untrained for civil policing duties (p.71).

Unlike in New Zealand, the police force of South Australia was not concerned with insurrection. From 1844, policing in South Australia was governed by a Police Act and a Commissioner who sought to professionalise and civilianise policing further. The Police Manual published in 1845 states that the principal objective of the police was to “prevent and detect crime” (Clyne 1987, p.83). Further guidance instructed officers to “conduct themselves with prudence and humanity, as well as promptness in dealing with native crime or conflict” (Clyne 1987, p.86).

#### *Routine armament/disarmament*

Both the South Australian and New Zealand colonial police forces were established as armed forces. Hill (1986) notes that the disarmament of the ‘civil’ police officers in New Zealand occurred in 1878, before the disestablishment proper of the armed constabulary in 1886. At that time, the armed constabulary consisted of mounted officers and foot officers. Routine carriage of firearms by foot officers (those known as the ‘police branch’) ceased at the same time as other provincial police forces were amalgamated into the armed constabulary. Discontinuation was not because of legislative change; the decision was one of policy. Likewise, the disestablishment of the armed constabulary of 1886 did not prohibit the use of firearms by officers. The *Police Force Act 1886* (NZ) simply authorised the Governor<sup>4</sup> to:

from time to time may make, alter, or revoke such regulations respecting the training, arms and accoutrements, clothing, and equipment of such force (New Zealand Parliament 1886, p.75)

---

<sup>4</sup> This power transferred from the Governor to a Commissioner of Police in 1913 (New Zealand Parliament 1913).

The civilianisation of policing was most likely to have been influenced by domestic political concerns and the reorganisation of colonial affairs (Hill 1986; King 2004). Up until 1885 (the time of the Russian war scare) New Zealand had not faced any external threats to its security. While the armed constabulary had acted as the colony's 'defacto standing army', changes were required to address the threat of invasion by foreign forces. However, the influence of Rowan and Mayne's reforms of London's Metropolitan Police on the evolution of New Zealand's should also not be overlooked. Hill draws attention to the publication of Rowan and Mayne's British policing maxims in the *New Zealand Police Gazette 1880* (1986). Moreover, while there was no legislative prohibition of the use of firearms, customary practice mirrored that of British police forces where the use of firearms was discretionary. Hill observed:

Until the First World War [the Police Force] maintained links with the new military organisation out of the Field Force, but in circumstances it was essentially an unarmed force (Hill 2012a).

Curiously, Hill's assertion is representative of nomenclatural confusion: while the police force was no longer called an 'armed constabulary' it did, in fact, remain an armed force, with officers able to draw firearms if the circumstances permitted. Indeed, although officers ceased to carry firearms routinely, officers remained armed with other weapons. The change of name of the force coincided with the 'professionalisation' of police through the formal division of policing and military operations spelt out in the 1886 Act. Hill notes that from 1905, only senior officers and detectives were to be routinely issued with Smith and Wesson revolvers; all new constables would cease to be issued with firearms when enrolled (1995). Firearms remained available to all officers, but only for use during emergencies. The 'routine unarming' of police officers had begun. Perhaps representative of the social attitudes of the time, an unarmed Sgt McGuire (who was shot by a thief and later died from a stomach wound in 1910) responded to criticism of his unarmed state:

I am glad I didn't [have a firearm]. I would not have used it, at any rate. I might have shot him, but I am better pleased that he shot me (Hill 1995, p.193)

The practice of the non-open carriage of firearms occurred earlier in South Australia than in New Zealand, by way of the *Police Act 1884* [SA]. Slee (1998) noted that South Australian mounted and foot officers were first armed in 1839 with flintlock carbines and rifles. However, while the South Australian 1883 *Manual of Instructions* (Peterswald 1883) authorises officers to be armed (with a combination swords, firearms, and other weapons) the foot police should only carry firearms when circumstances dictate:



The Mounted Police are armed with swords and revolver carbines; the Foot Police with Martini-Henry rifles and staves, *the former being only carried as occasion requires*<sup>5</sup> (1883, p.12).

Peterswald's instruction parallels the practice of the New Zealand forces: mounted officers retained firearms on duty, but the foot-police carried firearms only when necessary.

There are some references in the historical literature discussing the progression of how South Australian officers adopted the open carriage of firearms. Since its inception, South Australian officers were expected to show restraint when facing conflict. The Governor's instructions to police of 1841 included the following advice:

Not to make use of firearms or other weapons except for self-defence, and then only to the extent that may be absolutely necessary, or the capturing of prisoners, or the recovery of sheep (O'Halloran 1904).

Similarly, instructions of 1845 instructed officers to show restraint:

In general, the plea of self defence is the safest, but this can only be substantiated when acting against armed men or superior numbers and must in all cases appear that no other means would have been sufficient to effect the apprehension of the party (Clyne 1987, p.92).

Some sixty years later, Commissioner Madley's instructions published in the 1903 *Police Gazette* instructed officers that in 'ordinary' cases only batons were to be used, not firearms.<sup>6</sup> While some firearms were available at suburban stations, officers were not personally issued with side-arms (although some carried their side-arms on night duty). The death of two unarmed constables in 1908 and 1909 prompted negative "public outcry" (Clyne 1987, p.233) and criticism from the Coroner who investigated the second constable's death. While Madley publicly protested at the criticism, he ordered a new consignment of revolvers so that the foot police could be armed at night (Clyne 1987).

More recent accounts of the police carriage of firearms include O'Brien's (1960) description of Australian police forces during 1960 where he noted that police on normal duties were not armed with a firearm, although he observed that elite officers from the Victoria police deployed in 'Wireless Patrol cars' carried pistols. Sawyer noted that during 1968, while South Australian detectives were routinely armed, constables on the beat during night shifts were too, but their arms were not to be prominently displayed (Hawkins & Ward 1970).

Sarre (1996a) noted the 1979 announcement by South Australian government member W.A. Rodda stating that the policy relating to the carriage of firearms was to change to allow

---

<sup>5</sup> Italics are this author's emphasis.

<sup>6</sup> These instructions originated after the arrest and trial of several 'armed criminals' who shot at an Adelaide constable while evading arrest in 1902.

officers in the metropolitan area to have ‘hand guns’ available at all times during their patrol. While the policy at the time did not suggest that handguns would always be carried, policies from 1992 onwards required officers to use discretion as to whether handguns were to be *overtly* carried. In fact, a serving SAPOL member in the present research recalled that during the early parts of their career revolvers were either kept in the patrol vehicle glove compartment, an officer’s trouser pocket, or a covert holster sling (Interview Transcript A82).

Slee (1998) concurs, noting that the practice of wearing concealed firearms changed to permanent overt carriage on the hip after the shooting of two officers in 1977. Before the shooting, the public attitude towards routine overt carriage was one of complacency:

Notorious crimes or incidents requiring the use of police handguns were rare and the low level of violent crime involving firearms had created an attitude of complacency that was shared by both police and public alike. It was understandable in such a relatively peaceful community that the public had even begun to equate their police, even though they were ‘secretly’ armed, with the unarmed English ‘Bobby’ (Slee 1998, p.93).

After the 1977 shooting, a committee of departmental and union members recommended that all officers on patrol should be armed with a revolver worn in an exposed hip holster. This recommendation was rejected by the Commissioner at the time. It was not until 1979, under a new Commissioner, that it was agreed that revolvers were to be worn in an exposed holster. Subsequent procurement and uniform redesign problems delayed their introduction, and it was not until 1982 that all operational officers became routinely armed (Slee 1998).

### 2.1.2 CONTEMPORARY POLICING

Today, policing arrangements differ between Australia and New Zealand. Policing in Australia comprises of eight policing agencies: six state agencies (New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, Western Australia), one territorial agency (Northern Territory) and a federal agency (which also provides service for the Australian Capital Territory). The South Australian Police has jurisdictional responsibility for general policing and criminal investigation in the state of South Australia, investigating and prosecuting offences under state law where offences under federal law in South Australia—including crimes against national security, immigration law, and drug trafficking—are investigated by the Australian Federal Police (Keane & Bell 2013). The New Zealand Police, however, is the sole agency responsible for policing within New Zealand. In addition to territorial policing responsibilities of public safety, order maintenance, criminal investigation and road policing, NZPOL have

responsibilities ranging from emergency/disaster response, coronial investigation, firearms regulation, and high policing activities relating to organised crime, national security, and counter-terrorism (New Zealand Police 2005).<sup>7</sup> Other variations between NZPOL and SAPOL are shown below in Table 2.1—comparisons with the largest Australasian police agency New South Wales Police (NSWPOL) and the London Metropolitan Police Service (MET) are also included to provide context.

Table 2.1 Cross-national comparisons of population, staffing, annual expenditure, recorded offences, responsibilities and armament of the London Metropolitan Police, New South Wales Police, New Zealand Police, and South Australian Police as of the 2014–2015 financial years, or as otherwise stipulated.

	New Zealand <sup>8</sup>	South Australia <sup>9</sup>	New South Wales <sup>10</sup>	London Met <sup>11</sup>
Jurisdictional Population	4,596,700	1,698,600	7,565,500	8,633,000
Total Constabulary officers	9,048	4,683	16,693	31,877
Police to Population ratio	1:508	1:362	1:453	1:270
Annual expenditure per officer (NZ\$ converted)	NZ\$161,881	NZ\$195,137	NZ\$234,763	NZ\$151,308
Annual expenditure per citizen (NZ\$ converted)	NZ\$319	NZ\$538	NZ\$518	NZ\$558
Total recorded offences per annum, per constabulary officer	38.7	34.8	42.0	23.6
Total recorded offences per annum, per 10,000 citizens	818	960	927	871
Differential characteristics				
Responsible for national security	Yes	No	No	Partial
Responsible for general crime and disorder	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Routinely armed with firearms	No	Yes	Yes	No
Routinely armed with CED (e.g. Taser)	Yes	No	No	No

NZPOL has fewer officers per citizen among the four agencies (e.g. 1:508 *cf.* 1:362 of SAPOL). SAPOL has the lowest ratio, except for MET (although MET does assume certain national lead responsibilities including counter-terrorism, royal protection, which are not the responsibility of SAPOL). NZPOL has a lower rate of recorded offences than SAPOL, but fewer constabulary staff per population results in a higher rate of offences per constabulary officer. SAPOL serves approximately one third of the population served by NZPOL but has more officers per population, higher annual expenditure per sworn officer, and a higher annual expenditure per citizen.

<sup>7</sup> New Zealand has separate enforcement or regulative agencies for aviation, customs, immigration, fisheries, maritime, and military matters, and maintains separate security intelligence agencies.

<sup>8</sup> Data sourced from the New Zealand Police Annual Report 2014/2015 (New Zealand Police 2015a).

<sup>9</sup> Data sourced from the South Australia Police Annual Report 2014–2015 (South Australian Police Department 2015) with currency conversion from NZFOREX (New Zealand Foreign Exchange Services Limited 2017).

<sup>10</sup> Data sourced from the NSW Police Force Annual Report 2014–2015 (New South Wales Police Force 2015), the Local Government Area Crime Trends Tool for the year ending June 2015 (Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research 2017) with currency conversion from NZFOREX (New Zealand Foreign Exchange Services Limited 2017).

<sup>11</sup> Data sourced from the London Metropolitan Police Statement of Accounts 2014/15 (Metropolitan Police 2015); Home Office (Home Office 2016); Crime in England and Wales data tables for the year ending September 2016 (Office of National Statistics 2017) as no earlier data was available.

At the time of the present research, officers from South Australia were routinely armed with a semi-automatic sidearm. New Zealand first response officers were deployed with firearms locked in patrol vehicle strongboxes: a standard response patrol vehicle contained one semi-automatic rifle, two semi-automatic side arms, and one CED Taser. It was ironic that although New Zealand officers were not routinely armed, they had immediate access to a greater quantity of firearms than their routinely armed SAPOL colleagues. Officers from both jurisdictions were armed with handcuffs, OC Spray, and expandable batons.

### *New Zealand Police*

The literature concerning the contemporary practice and behaviour of NZPOL is scarce. There is a growing body of research in relation to the policing of domestic violence (Cross & Newbold 2010); officer experiences of workplace stress (Akurangi & Evans 2006; Brough 2005; Thoreau & Lobb 2005; Howard *et al.* 2000; Stephens & Long 1999); staff retention (Lynch & Tuckey 2008); officer personality (Lobb & Packman 2005); restorative justice (Winfree 2004); and community policing (Winfree & Newbold 1999). There are some data available from NZPOL regarding police-citizen encounters. For the annual report on the use of ‘tactical options’<sup>12</sup> ending December 2014, police officers (excluding Armed Offender Squad and Special Tactics Group officers) reported the use of 7,162 tactical options at 4,823 police-citizen encounters (New Zealand Police 2015b). While NZPOL also reported that 99.9% of “recorded face-to-face interactions with the public” (New Zealand Police 2015b) did not involve reportable use of tactical options, mandatory reporting is not required for all uses of coercive force such as handcuffing or physical searches. Handcuffing, for instance, is only reportable if used in association with pain-compliance or used in combination with another tactic. Verbal control behaviour, such as verbal threats of force, are not required to be reported and thus are not captured in these statistics.

The initial trial and subsequent introduction of CEDs<sup>13</sup> for all front-line officers in 2010 created controversy (Robb *et al.* 2009; O’Brien *et al.* 2011). NZPOL report that from 2010 to December 2014, CEDs were deployed in 12.6% of ‘tactical option encounters’, fewer than empty-hand tactics (27.7%), handcuffing<sup>14</sup> (25.0%), OC spray (22.2%), but more than dog

---

<sup>12</sup> NZP define ‘tactical options’ and report according to the following: “Handcuffs with pain compliance, or without pain compliance when used with another reportable tactical option; other restraints; OC sprat bursts; empty hand tactics; baton strikes; dog bites or other dog-related deployment injuries; weapons or opportunity; sponge rounds; shows and discharges of a TASER and/or firearm” (New Zealand Police 2015b, p.7).

<sup>13</sup> Taser

<sup>14</sup> See note 26

deployments (4.3%), or firearm show/use (4.3%). Over this reporting period, the total number of CED deployments amounted to 0.5% of all recorded apprehensions (New Zealand Police 2015c).

While NZPOL has been spared the misfortunes of systemic corruption endemic in some Australian police forces, it has faced criticism for problems associated with organisational culture. A commission of inquiry in 2007 established in response to sexual misconduct of officers during the 1980's found that although misconduct emerged in the mid-2000's, that such conduct was relatively rare (Bazley 2007). However, Rowe (2009) points out that although the occurrence of misconduct is low, scandal arising from the misconduct perpetuates in contemporary media narratives.

### *South Australia Police*

Less is known about the contemporary practice of South Australian officers. Indeed, much of the literature that discusses 'Australian' policing attempts to, perhaps unhelpfully, construct a national narrative. However the absence of SAPOL from enquiries into systemic police corruption (such as the Fitzgerald Commission into Queensland Police, the Wood inquiry of the New South Wales Police, the Beach Inquiry in the Victorian Police, and the Kennedy Inquiry of the Western Australian Police (Office of Police Integrity 2007)) suggests that systemic or serious corruption is either non-existent or undiscovered. Prenzler (1997) observes references to 'police culture' found in the Wood and Fitzgerald inquiries, in a discussion of police culture in Australian policing, and concludes that 'police culture' behaviours described in the classic police literature (e.g. Reiner 2010) are observable in Australian police officers. Perhaps the most enterprising research into police behaviour of South Australian police officers originates from the work associated with the former National Police Research Unit. Research conducted in association with the unit includes psychological research into the incidence of suspect resistance experienced by officers (Wilson & Brewer 1991), how officers deal with conflict (Wilson & Brewer 1993) and differences in the conflict resolution behaviour between male and female officers (Braithwaite & Brewer 1998). While officers from SAPOL were not always the direct subject of the research, these outputs provide a picture of officer behaviour within South Australia.

Aside from colonial and contemporary history, there is little in the policing literature that helps to identify qualities that might differentiate the practice or behaviour of the South Aus-

tralian Police with other Australian police agencies. One analysis of the force's approach to customer service indicates that SAPOL has the highest rating of community satisfaction indicators of professionalism and supporting community programs between 2005-2008 compared with the other Australian Police forces (Baker & Hyde 2011). The absence of any inquiry into police conduct within the jurisdiction (such as those investigating corruption in the forces of New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, and Western Australia, and the conduct of New Zealand) suggests that disreputable behaviour and practice either does not exist, or not sufficient to generate a commission of inquiry, with contemporary South Australian Police.

### 2.1.3 SUMMARY

While the colonies of South Australia and New Zealand were not settled as penal colonies, they both suffered the risks associated with the proximity of ex-convicts and soon requested colonial support to establish policing systems. Clyne (1987) Hill (1986) and O'Brien (1960) show the influence of the reforms of British policing by Peel, Rowan and Mayne of the nineteenth century, seen at South Australia in 1844 and later in 1886 with the disestablishment of the New Zealand armed constabulary. From then onwards, policing in both jurisdictions followed the British tradition of unarmed policing, albeit with SAPOL officers discreetly routinely armed, until 1982 when SAPOL officers were overtly routinely armed.

# 3

---

## Conflict and conflict resolution during police-citizen encounters

---

This third chapter considers key components of the literature that are relevant to the present research. The first section is concerned with the ritualistic nature of police-citizen encounters. Applying Goffman (1961) and Collins (2004), the discussion considers the impact of power, authority, and deference asymmetries inherent in police-citizen interaction. This is followed by a discussion of factors relevant to investigative and enforcement encounters and use of control behaviour by officers during encounters. The second section considers normative, structural, and behavioural explanations for conflict during police-citizen encounters. The closing section considers Deutsch's theory of conflict resolution and other empirical research on police conflict-resolution behaviour.

### 3.1 Police-citizen encounters

#### 3.1.1 THE RITUAL OF THE POLICE-CITIZEN ENCOUNTER

The present research relates to the interaction between officers and citizens within public-facing zones in the field. Punch (1979) observed how a police officer's workplace is demarcated into two zones: a Goffmanian 'backstage'<sup>1</sup> that incorporates parts of the police station which ordinarily excludes citizens; and an operational 'frontstage' which includes public zones inside

---

<sup>1</sup> See Goffman 1959, p.133.

the station (such as the front-counter, interview rooms, and the custody suite) plus all public and private places outside of the station. The research is concerned with the behaviour of officers who respond to calls for service—those in the ‘front-line’.<sup>2</sup> They are officers who do ‘something about’ “something-that-ought-not-to-be-happening-and-about-which-someone-had-better-do-something-now” (Bittner 1974, p.161).

Policing agencies describe these officers with varying nomenclature; they are referred in the literature as beat, patrol, patrolmen (in older literature), emergency response, first response, front-line, or general duties officers. It is common that when these officers are not responding to calls for service they are ‘on patrol’ partaking in some level of ‘preventative’ action to deter offending (Brown 1981). Patrol officers differ from their investigative colleagues, sometimes known as detectives, who are non-uniformed, use unmarked vehicles and investigate serious crime. On the other hand, patrol officers are highly visible, use marked patrol vehicles, wear uniforms, focus on order maintenance and are the first responder to emergency calls for service. While on patrol, officers are confronted with situations which cause them to come face-to-face with citizens (Muir 1977; Brown 1981).

### *The focused gathering*

Goffman differentiates between face-to-face gatherings which are focused and un-focussed (1961). As a unit of social organisation, a focused gathering occurs between two or more actors who are in each other’s immediate physical presence where they share a “visual and cognitive focus of attention” (1961, pp.17-18):

“... [a] type of social arrangement that occurs when persons are in one another’s immediate physical presence, to be called here an *encounter* or a *focused gathering*. For the participants, this involves a single visual and cognitive focus of attention; a mutual and preferential openness to verbal communication; a heightened mutual relevance of acts; an eye-to-eye ecological huddle that maximises each participant’s opportunity to perceive the other participants’ monitoring of him.” (Italics are original) (Goffman 1961, pp.17-18)

Collins advances Goffman’s original construct, adding that encounters or interaction rituals (IR) are such that participants become engaged in each other’s “bodily micro-rhythms and emotions” (2004, p.47). IRs occur when “two or more people are physically assembled in the same place, so that they affect each other by their bodily presence” (2004, pp.47-48), they exhibit “boundaries to outsiders so that participants have a sense of who is taking part [in the IR] and who is excluded” (*ibid*), “people focus their attention upon a common object or ac-



tivity ... and become mutually aware of each other's focus of attention" (*ibid*) and "they share a common mood or emotional experience" (*ibid*).

### *Power rituals*

Goffman (1961) draws attention to the importance of *role* and *power* during frontstage face-to-face interaction: during encounters with citizens, a professional behaves according to the role of that profession, and this differs to the role that the professional plays in the backstage. Policing scholars who have applied Goffman's encounter/interaction ritual framework to police-citizen interaction observe that a 'police-citizen' encounter differs substantially from a 'normal' citizen-citizen encounter as the former feature asymmetric levels of power and authority and often violate the principle of reciprocity (Alpert & Dunham 2004; Collins 2004).

As the distribution of power among participants is asymmetrical, Collins (2004) posits that police-citizen encounters are 'power rituals'. In a power-ritual framework, officers take the role of *order-giver*, and the citizens become the *order-taker*. Order-givers fulfil the role of those who have the power and authority to instruct order-takers while order-takers are those who have no choice but to defer to order-givers. Order-givers display a frontstage personality which is closely aligned to an 'official-self' (portrayed in the frontstage) and less aligned to a 'private-self' (reserved for the backstage). Order-takers portray a frontstage personality which hides their backstage personality (or any cynicism developed toward the order-givers). Collins also suggests that order-givers are susceptible to influence according to their personality: actors who have high mechanical solidarity are more likely to conform to tradition and are less likely to tolerate outsiders (who violate group norms); whereas actors who have low mechanical solidarity are less conforming to tradition and more likely to be more tolerant of violators.

Alpert and Dunham (2004), Manning (1977), and Lipsky (1980) consider the impact of normative behaviour on police-citizen encounters. Police-citizen encounters, through the function of legislation, have an 'official' nature (Manning 1977). Alpert and Dunham (2004) suggest that the official nature of police-citizen interactions 'overshadow' social status, age, race, or gender that often regulate interaction during citizen-citizen encounters. Sykes and Clark (1975) found that officers mostly encounter citizens of a lower sociological order than officers, such as working-class or lower-class citizens, and in many instances, citizens appeared to be socialised to *show* deference to officer's authority, and officers were equally socialised to *expect* deference from citizens.

Such imbalances of authority, power, and deference illustrate how police-citizen encounters appear to be distinct from citizen-citizen encounters through the violation of reciprocity (Alpert & Dunham 2004). Reciprocity occurs where participants of an encounter have equal status: “typical interactions involve a standardised exchange of actions and reactions or dialogue in which both actors receive ritual support” (Alpert & Dunham 2004, p.180). Reciprocity is also violated with respect to officer use of coercion and force. Citizens have limited legal entitlement to use force to achieve goals during citizen-citizen encounters. But while citizens have a right to use force in self-defence against other citizens (see *Crimes Act 1961* [NZ], S.48), officers have common law and statutory rights to use force during police-citizen encounters. Indeed, the act of resisting an officer in the execution of their duty constitutes a criminal offence (e.g. *Summary Offences Act 1981* [NZ], S.23).

As such, police-citizen encounters fit within Collins’s power ritual construct within limits. While officers may control the physical actions and movement of citizens in certain situations, officers cannot control the information they might require. While they may elicit information, officers are not empowered to retrieve information from a noncompliant citizen in a parallel manner to how officers may physically control citizens. Such a dilemma creates a power asymmetry in favour of the citizen: officers become *information-seekers* and citizens become *information-givers*. Aside from negotiating with citizens, or “cajoling, requesting, threatening, ‘bullshitting them’” (Rubinstein 1973, p.274), officers are unable to *force* citizens to provide information. Even in circumstances where officers have lawful authority to *demand* information from citizens, non-compliance is remedied through the prosecution of an offence rather than further attempts to extract the required information (*Policing Act 2008* [NZ] S.32). Consequently, citizens may withhold information or not possess the information which officers seek.

### 3.1.2 VARIETY OF POLICE-CITIZEN ENCOUNTERS

Bayley (1990) categorised the functions of police into crime-based situations (crime emergency, criminal complaint and investigation, crime prevention) and non-crime-based situations (non-crime emergency, non-crime investigation, care of incapacitated/incompetent persons, disputes/quarrels, advising, traffic, crowd control). Police agencies commonly structure their workforce accordingly, to provide a responsive service for emergency and non-emergency calls for service, and an investigative service to investigate serious crime (Reiner 2010; Young

1991). Some jurisdictions organise their policing agencies to provide policing responsive or investigative agencies (such as American investigative bureaux). In the case of Australasian policing, agencies include both responsive and investigative divisions, structured to provide a 'general duties' or 'patrol' branch and a detective branch (New Zealand Police 2016a; South Australian Police Department 2015). Within the context of front-line response policing, investigative encounters can be seen to differ from enforcement encounters. Investigative encounters are those which are predominantly concerned with the collection of information from a citizen. This may include the collection of a field statement from a victim or witness or an informal field interview of a suspect. In contrast, *enforcement* encounters differ in that the purpose of the encounter shifts from *information-seeking* to *action-taking*. Accordingly, investigative encounters may transform into enforcement encounters, should sufficient information be established to justify a criminal justice sanction (such as a prosecution or field action).

### *Investigative encounters*

Investigative encounters include focused gatherings with citizens who are complainants, witnesses, and victims (Westley 2005). The policing literature considers the effectiveness of investigative encounters with victims and witnesses (e.g. Loftus & Palmer 1996) including investigative interviewing techniques of victims and witnesses (e.g. Clifford & George 1996). Revealingly, research has identified a differential nature of officer attitude towards victims; such as the 'worthiness' of victims, particularly female victims of domestic violence (e.g. Westmarland 2002) and the legitimacy of victims (Wilson 1968).

Officers fulfil the role of 'information-seekers' to collect information (Sykes & Brent 1980). Citizen cooperation with police has been shown to be affected by the cognitive capacity and emotional demeanour of the witness/victim (e.g. Watson *et al.* 2014), the citizen's perception of procedural fairness and police legitimacy (Reisig *et al.* 2007; Sunshine & Tyler 2003), police effectiveness (Tankebe 2009), police responsiveness trust and confidence (van Craen & Skogan 2014), personal experiences of treatment by officers (Skogan 2006). As previously noted, the asymmetric nature of power in favour of the officer is unclear: although an officer keeps their role-based authoritative stature (as police officers), and citizens may continue to feel compelled to defer to the officer, the officer's ability to collect information is contingent on citizen cooperation. Officers may attempt to 'cajole, request threaten, or bullshit' (Rubin-

stein 1973), but officers rely on the cooperation of the witness or victim to collect relevant evidential and intelligence information.

The policing literature considers encounters between officers and those citizens *suspected* by the officers of having committed an offence (suspects) and citizens who officers believe there is sufficient evidence against to justify an arrest or prosecution (arrestees). Studies of officer behaviour in these circumstances consider the legal justification (e.g. Bowling & Weber 2011; Epp *et al.* 2014), officer decision-making when evaluating evidential sufficiency (e.g. Bynum *et al.* 1982), decision-making at domestic conflict situations (e.g. Dai *et al.* 2011) application of constabulary discretion (e.g. Mastrofski 2004), use of force (e.g. Alpert & Dunham 2004; Terrill 2005; Terrill & Mastrofski 2002), mental or emotional state of citizens (e.g. Watson *et al.* 2014), and officer prejudice of interactions with suspects (e.g. Westmarland 2002).

Relevant themes emerge from the Anglo-American literature about investigative police-citizen encounters with suspects. Prominence is given to the efficacy of ‘stop and search’ (UK) and ‘stop and frisk’ (USA). Bowling and Weber (2011) best represent the critical approach to such encounters, warning that this practice targets disadvantaged ethnic minority communities which may result in threats to police legitimacy, damaging community relations though targeting ‘law-abiding’ citizens who may be targeted by police, which in turn may lead to the erosion of social solidarity. Epp *et al.* (2014) consider the impact of vehicular ‘investigatory stops’ in the United States as evidence of implicit intergroup bias. Indeed, Bradford and Loader (2016) argue that police use stop and search as a process to assert order and management of social marginality such as the routine process to regulate young working-class males evidenced in Scotland. While, Bowling and Weber (2011) and Epp *et al.* (2014) warn that such injustice experienced by ethnic minority group may threaten police legitimacy, it is important to note that investigative encounters do not *necessarily* lead to an erosion of police legitimacy or social cohesion. Research on the effect of procedural justice messaging during investigative stops for testing alcohol indicates that such police practices can *increase* police legitimacy among resident populations (Mazerolle *et al.* 2012).

### *Enforcement encounters*

The policing literature considers the impact of officer decisions and methods when taking action. As noted previously, the literature provides evidence of links between officer behaviour and legitimacy, and how perceptions of fairness affect legitimacy (e.g. Sunshine & Tyler 2003;

Bottoms & Tankebe 2013; Dai *et al.* 2011). The literature also explores the method and proportionality of regulation during police-suspect encounters. While Sykes and Brent (1980) noted that officers regulate police-citizen interaction through conversational, imperative, or coercive regulation to achieve particular goals, the literature tends to focus on the utility and proportion of force used by officers (e.g. Alpert & Dunham 2004; Terrill *et al.* 2003; Terrill 2005; Terrill 2001).

### 3.1.3 CONTROL BEHAVIOUR

It is accepted that in certain circumstances officers have the legal authority to control the physical movement of a citizen: a search, detainment, or arrest (see *Policing Act 2008* [NZ]; *Search and Surveillance Act 2012* [NZ]). The policing literature that considers these control behaviours explore why officers use force (Alpert & Dunham 2004; Sykes & Brent 1980; Worden 1996), how officers use force (e.g. Alpert & Dunham 2004; Alpert & MacDonald 2001; Hickman *et al.* 2015; Myhrer & Strype 2010; Kraska 2001) and the role of police coercion (e.g. Terrill 2001; Terrill *et al.* 2003; Terrill & Mastrofski 2002; Muir 1977). Some scholars agree that the literature lacks robust theoretical explanations for police coercion and the use of force (Terrill 2014), excessive use of force and police brutality (Worden 1996), perhaps because of definitional inconsistencies with regard to coercion<sup>3</sup> (Klockars 1996; Terrill 2001) force and excessive use of force (Geller & Toch 1996).

#### *Coercion*

Predominant definitions in the policing literature consider coercion as a conflation of physical and verbal actions (Terrill 2001). Muir defines coercion as “a means of controlling the conduct of others through threats to harm” (1977, p.37) and posited that police-citizen interaction are coercive relationships which comprise of ‘extortionate transactions’. Muir explains that extortionate transaction relies on a *victimiser* possessing extortionate power over a *victim* where the victim fears some level of injury from the victimiser and thus becomes the victimiser’s hostage, and in order to prevent injury, the victimiser demands a ransom from the victim. In the case of a police-citizen encounter, the ransom is compliance. The extortionate transaction relies on the citizen fulfilling the role of a victim; but a citizen will be free from officer coercion if the victim is ‘dispossessed’ (defined as “those who have nothing to lose, the life prisoner in

---

<sup>3</sup> Terrill helpfully observes that Klockars’ construction of coercion is limited to physical action (Klockars 1995; Terrill 2004).

solitary, the deadbeat, the bankrupt, and the visionary whose life is worth less than his martyrdom” (Muir 1977, p.37)). It is Muir’s thesis that officers use the extortionate relationship as a principal method to control citizen behaviour.

Bittner (1974) argued that although officers have the power to use coercion/force, a skilled officer avoids the use of coercion/force. Muir considered the utility and variability of how officer personality affected the use of coercive control. The *professional* is not afraid to use coercion/force, but only when necessary, and prefers persuasion. The *enforcer* lacks empathy towards citizens, takes a binary view towards the citizenry (identifying the good and the bad) and, in contrast to the professional, is all too ready to use force. The *reciprocator* is hesitant and reluctant to use coercion/force and concentrates less on ‘fighting crime’ and more ‘helping people’. The avoider is uncomfortable with coercion/force and avoids frontline duties (Muir 1977; Hochstedler 1981). The variability of personal preference towards coercion/force indicates that officers may choose to *avoid* using control behaviour during police-citizen interaction.

### *Control behaviour and encounter goals*

Sykes and Brent (1980) take a similar approach to Muir. Applying a general systems framework, they incorporate coercive, definitional, or imperative actions as regulators of citizen behaviour. Definitional regulation includes officers asking questions: such behaviour focuses the citizen’s cognitive attention on the officer’s “domain of consequence to his professional activity” (Sykes & Brent 1980, p.184). Imperative actions are defined as those which directly impact the behaviour of the citizen, for instance: “Do this or arrest!” (Sykes & Brent 1980, p.185). In contrast to Muir, Sykes and Brent separate ‘nonviolent threats’ from active ‘coercive threats’ (which they define as verbal statements accompanied by a physical action to reinforce the officer’s determination to take coercive action).

Sykes and Brent (1983) deconstruct encounters into utterances and strings. A single statement or action was defined as an utterance. Utterances relating to a topic may be grouped together for analysis as a string. This approach aided the analysis of situational determinants of encounter processes and outcomes. For instance, strings provided an opportunity to analyse conversational transactions to investigate officer decision-making (Sykes & Brent 1983) through the construction of officer-citizen interaction maps (Sykes & Brent 1980). Similar approaches have since been used to analyse police use-of-force transactions (Terrill &

Mastrofski 2002; Terrill *et al.* 2003) and measure the effect of one utterance on the outcome of the encounter (Braithwaite 1998; Braithwaite & Brewer 1998). Equally, strings may be used by either actor in the encounter to control the interactions to achieve an ‘encounter goal’. Sykes and Brent (1980; 1983) argued that officers used control behaviour to achieve four goals during a police-citizen encounter: collect information, assert or maintain order, achieve respect from citizens, and achieve an acceptable resolution.

Utterances—and strings—have been analysed to measure the effect of how the action of one actor affects another actor. Toch (1969), Sykes and Brent (1983), and Terrill (2005) apply this transactional approach to the analysis of police-citizen encounters. Transactional frameworks have been used to explain models of interpersonal communication (Wood 2010) but they are not limited to verbal exchanges: the ‘listener’s’ body language is as important as the subject of the ‘speaker’s’ verbal communication. As such, effective communication is a shared process; both the listener and speaker “share the responsibility for effectiveness” (Wood 2010, p.24); or indeed as Sykes and Brent propose, “both actors in a relationship share responsibility for how the relationship develops” (Sykes & Brent 1983, p.253). Toch tested the transactional nature of police-citizen encounters with an examination of ‘violent’ police-citizen encounters. He concluded that citizens and officers were equally responsible for the tactics used by officers as the behaviour of the citizen determined the police officer’s response (1969). Sykes and Brent (1983), too, hypothesised that interactions between police and citizens are a “process in which acts of each participant at each point in time are, at least in part, contingent upon past acts” (1983, p.110). They conclude that police-citizen encounters are second-order Markov chains (where actions reflect the nature of the current state and the previous state).

Sykes and Brent constructed a typology of utterance actions: *definitional* acts were those used by either actor to define or construct an understanding of the situation or topic of discourse; *controlling* acts were those which attempted to alter the behaviour of the other actor, such as physical actions (accusations, handcuffing, or the use of weapons) or making an arrest; *resistant* acts were those actions used by actors when they refused to answer a definitional or controlling question; and lastly, *confirming* acts are those such as acquiescence to control, following a direction (or order) or answering questions.

### 3.1.4 SUMMARY

Within Goffman's framework of face-to-face focused encounters, Collins identified the influence of asymmetric power relationships between officers and citizens. The predominant perspective focuses on the asymmetric relationship in favour of the officer: as agents of the state they operate as official street-level bureaucrats and have legal protections to use force to achieve their goals. However, this perspective underestimates the difficulties faced by officers when collecting information from citizens. In some adversarial common-law jurisdictions, where the right to silence is protected in law, citizens are protected from coercive actions by agents of the state to elicit information (see *Bill of Rights Act 1990* [NZ]). In this manner, power asymmetry may reverse in favour of the citizen: officers become information seekers and citizens become the information givers.

As such, officers traverse between the modes of information collection and taking enforcement actions. While Bayley observed that the police function varies between crime-based and non-crime-based events, a goal-approached focus indicates how coercive and control behaviour provides insight into how officers regulate police-citizen encounters. The next section (3.2) addresses literature that considers how normative, structural, and behavioural influences explain the cause of conflict during police-citizen encounters.

## 3.2 Conflict during police-citizen encounters

A difficulty of policing within democratic, pluralistic societies is the inherent risk that where there are competing groups, or indeed individuals, police action which advantages one party will disadvantage another. As Herbert (2006) explains, an important role of the police is to intercede during conflict, using a combination of problem solving, persuasion and coercive power to find a resolution. But in doing so

[t]he quest for police legitimacy will be forever ongoing because the coercive power that officers possess will never be symbolically understood in like fashion across the populace. When an exercise of police power comforts one group of citizens, it may simultaneously alienate another (Herbert 2006, p.481).

Indeed, the 'taking of sides' places police in conflict with those who are alienated. This is apparent in the common law adversarial prosecutorial process: police act on the side of the victim and leads the prosecution of the suspect, but in advancing the victim's cause, police become adversaries of the suspect's cause.



Deutsch's '*crude law of social relations*' (1973) considers the impact of cooperative and competitive behaviour. He stipulated that "characteristic processes and effects elicited by a given type of social relationship (cooperative or competitive) also tend to elicit that type of social relationship" (Deutsch 1973, p.365). In other words, cooperation among actors fosters further cooperation whereas competition among actors breeds further competition. Deutsch explains that cooperative relationships emerge from the use of strategies of mutual problem-solving, persuasion, and openness (1973). Conversely, competitive relationships form if parties adopt strategies which involve power or use coercive tactics, threats, or deception. Cooperative situations between actors arise from the *perception* that the goals of the actors are positively linked whereas competitive situations arise when goals are incompatible and negatively linked (Deutsch 1973; Braithwaite 1998).

In a policing context, it could be argued that officers alternate between behaving with predominantly cooperative behaviour (interacting with victims, complainants, community groups, and informants) and predominantly competitive behaviour (interacting with suspects, offenders, or groups who are in opposition to police goals and values). Herbert (2006) identifies the complexity of these police-community relations and police function: officers navigate among the modes of subservience (collaborating with the community on community-based problems), separation (*enforcing* the law on community members) and generative (*improving* the community by leading change).

Explanations to help understand how conflict develops between officers and citizens are discussed below. Sociological perspectives, including theories of norm resistance, deference and authority explain how structural and normative influences affect conflict. Theoretical frameworks including procedural justice, organisational justice, and defiance theory consider the impact of fair and unfair behaviour by officers on police-citizen interaction.

### 3.2.1 NORMATIVE EXPLANATIONS

#### *Norm resistance theory*

Turk (1969) envisaged that conflict between police and citizens occurred at a structural level. Norm resistance theory (NRT) concentrates on the proposition that criminality can be seen through a lens of relations between those in authority (such as legislators or enforcers) and those subjected to authority ('acceptors' or 'resisters'). Within this relationship, Turk suggests

that conflict arises from the issue of authority rather than from class, power, or wealth. NRT distinguishes between cultural norms and social norms: the former are those defined in law whereas the latter are those associated with how the law is enforced (Turk 1969; Vold & Bernard 1986). NRT explains that the potential for conflict is inherent in all encounters between authorities and parties whose cultural norms are at odds with the norms of authorities. Indeed, cultural differences between both groups are expected:

Authorities are less likely to tolerate cultural differences when their cultural norm is strongly supported by their social norms. If their symbolisation is really important to them, they are likely to assume that those who see things differently are equally committed, and therefore to see a genuine threat in the different symbolisation (Turk 1969, p.56).

As such, norm resistance is most likely to occur when parties are acting “in accordance with their cultural norms” (Weidner & Terrill 2005, p.86) whereas conflict is least likely when “neither party acts in congruence with their cultural norms” (*ibid*). The closer the degree of cultural consensus between parties, the less likely that conflict will arise (Turk 1969).

Turk sees that social order is regulated by authorities through a consensus-coercion balance (1969; Vold & Bernard 1986), and that:

Authorities must prevent this balance from shifting to either an excessively coercive power relationship or an excessively consensual egalitarian relationship (Vold & Bernard 1986, p.280).

Turk argues that criminality and police-citizen interaction are dependent on the structural relationships of authority rather than social psychological influences.

The application of NRT provides a valuable insight into the arrest process. The arrest of a citizen demonstrates the most extreme degree of congruence between cultural and social norms: not only has the arresting officer identified that the citizen has breached the cultural norm (law) but also decided that it was *appropriate* to take action to initiate a criminal justice sanction. NRT also suggests that conflict (norm resistance) can be predicted. Pro-arrest situations are predictive of higher overt conflict between the officer and citizen, as the chance of resistance and injury is higher than when compared with more tolerant or permissive approaches to citizen incongruence with cultural norms. Similarly, citizens with a prior record of criminality pose a higher risk of resistance as their history indicates a willingness to act in opposition to authority and cultural norms.

Turk considers the effect of organisation within cultural groups during police-citizen interaction is another predictor of conflict, positing that conflict was more likely to occur between parties when one of the parties has a higher level of ‘social support’ than the other:

[a subject] who has group support for his behaviour is going to be more stubborn in the face of efforts to make him change (Turk 1969, p.58).

Social organisation affects officers and citizens alike. Officers have the advantage of routine organisation through the virtue of their existence. In the field, officers receive social support from the presence of patrol partners or indeed the presence of citizens whose norms are congruent with the officers cultural and social norms. Group support provides fewer opportunities for officers to stray from their cultural and social norms. Conversely, citizens may receive social support from members of their family or other social groups present during an encounter. For instance: individual protestors gain support from their peers; organised criminals from their criminal 'gangs' (Turk 1969).

Turk also predicted that higher levels of sophistication, training or experience of the parties decreases the likelihood of conflict. Weidner and Terrill (2005) tested the influence of participant organisation and sophistication during police-citizen encounters. They found that an officer's knowledge of a citizen, location, the presence of bystanders during an encounter, or proactive police action (not responding to a call for service), was positively correlated with the occurrence of overt conflict. Similarly, high levels of citizen intoxication were positively correlated with high levels of conflict, and low levels of officer education were negatively correlated with high levels of conflict.

### *Deference*

Further applications of NRT have considered the role and function of deference during police-citizen encounters. Lanza-Kaduce and Greenleaf (1994) considered the function of deference within a North American context. They posited that normative deference in American culture includes patterns of females deferring to males, younger persons deferring to older persons, and ethnic minorities deferring to white ethnic majorities and tested for deference reversals (Lanza-Kaduce & Greenleaf 1994). Their research found that conflict was more likely when race and age counter the positional authority of officers. In other words, norm resistance occurred in situations such as when a young officer did not show deference to an older citizen. Sykes and Clark (1975) also considered the nature of deference during police-citizen encounters but from a perspective of status asymmetry. Sykes and Clark proposed that officers had a higher status within society (as the arbiters of authority) and therefore expect deference from citizens. Conflict, then, would emerge when citizens failed to show deference to officers.

### *Authority maintenance theory*

However, Alpert and Dunham (2004) suggest that deference exchange theory alone does not adequately explain officer behaviour; instead they construct a framework based on authority. Authority maintenance theory (AMT), like NRT, takes a normative and an interpersonal approach to encounters. AMT applies interaction ritual theory to a policing context arguing that this ritual focuses on officer authority and citizen deference/resistance (Alpert & Dunham 2004). The focus of AMT is to explain how and why officers use force during police-citizen encounters. Simply, AMT explains that force is used to overcome efforts to resist or undermine officers' authority during police-citizen encounters. Drawing on Sykes and Brent, Alpert and Dunham expand AMT into seven key propositions: police-citizen encounters (PCEs) must be understood as an interaction process rather than as discrete events where interaction is regulated through the balance of authority or power among actors; PCEs are more asymmetrical with respect to authority than when compared with most other types of interactions; and thus, expectations and behaviours often violate the principle of reciprocity. In a similar vein to NRT, AMT explains that conflict occurs when the goals of citizen or officer are disrupted or blocked. Officers respond with varying degrees of regulation depending on the type of blockage; citizens, in turn, respond with varying degrees of resistance; and a resistance/force interaction escalates until one party changes their sought goal(s) voluntarily or involuntarily. In sum, AMT suggests that during police-citizen interactions, when the goals of officers and citizens are incompatible officers make choices to use force to assert and maintain their authority over citizens.

### *The rational actor*

A weakness of AMT, and indeed other constructs that rely on cognitive decision-making and assessments by the citizen, are their reliance on the capacity for citizens to make 'rational' assessments during the encounter. Research has revealed that cognitive impairment due to mental illness, intoxication or emotional distress inhibits citizen 'rationality', and that impaired citizens lacked the ability to correctly recognise the officer's intent, accurately assess the consequences of their actions, and caused them to behave with a heightened level of irritation (Link *et al.* 1999; Mastrofski *et al.* 2015; Reisig *et al.* 2004). Research has also revealed that officers may misinterpret situational cues and have difficulty distinguishing mental impairment from intoxication (McTackett & Thomas 2016; Rossler & Terrill 2016) and that some

citizens with ‘impaired rationality’ experience difficulties when assessing the procedural ‘fairness’ of officer behaviour (Mastrofski et al. 2015). These findings illustrate the weakness of theoretical frameworks that rely on bounded rationality decision-making by citizens during police-citizen encounters.

Alpert & Dunham explain that “reciprocity breaks down when one or both of the parties *determine* that their goals are not being realised due to the behaviour of the other” (2004, pp.184, emphasis added). As shown by Mastrofski *et al.* (2015), cognitive processes are dependent on the citizen’s ability to coherently interpret visual or auditory stimuli. In the present case of AMT, the citizen’s determination of goal achievement can be susceptible to impairment. Furthermore, the ability of a citizen to determine an officer’s intention is critical to maintaining social order. Because officers respond to resistance using regulation (controlling behaviour), the likelihood of officer use of force or citizen resistance increases when reciprocity breaks down.

A central tenant of exchange theory suggests that participants in an encounter “respond in kind to the rewards or punishments they receive” (Wiley & Hudik 1974, p.120). Thus, the ability of the citizen to recognise the likelihood of reward or punishment, or indeed the citizen’s ability to accurately determine the intention of the officer, is instrumental in the other theoretical frameworks devised to explain citizen behaviour.

### 3.2.2 JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS

#### *Procedural justice theory*

A significant body of literature considers citizen cooperation with police through the framework of procedural justice theory (PJT). The central tenet of PJT is that the respectful and fair treatment of citizens by police officers facilitates their cooperation during and after police-citizen interaction. Such behaviour promotes a level of compliance with the law (Reisig *et al.* 2007; Dai *et al.* 2011; Sunshine & Tyler 2003; Bottoms & Tankebe 2013). Tyler’s model of process-based regulation illustrates how ‘process-based judgements’ positively influence citizen-level cooperation and compliance (see Figure 1). This, in turn, promotes positive acceptance of the legitimacy of regulatory authorities, and compliance with regulation.




Figure 1. Tyler's Model of "Process-Based Regulation" reproduced from Bottoms and Tankebe (2013)

A variant model of process-based regulation for policing incorporates public judgement of police legitimacy through the display of 'procedurally just' practices of officer decision-making, and the quality of treatment of citizens by officers (Bottoms & Tankebe 2013). Simply expressed: the quality of treatment by officers and the quality of officer decision-making during police-citizen encounters enhance citizens' obligation to obey the law and increase their trust in police officers, resulting in compliance and cooperation. Sunshine and Tyler argue that "legitimacy is a social value that is distinct from performance evaluations" (2003, p.534). As such, police-citizen relations can be influenced by a citizen's subjective assessment of the 'fairness' of their treatment by officers.

Hough *et al.* (2010) draw attention to the influence of cultural values when constructing understandings of legitimacy, noting Tyler's research that North American public perceptions of legitimacy are more aligned with fairness of the criminal justice system than its effectiveness (see Tyler & Huo, 2002). This observation highlights the difficulties of theory transferability across diverse cultures. However, while Roberts and Herrington's (2013) systemic review of procedural justice literature contends that procedural justice theory holds "for the most part" (2013, p.120) across different cultures and nations, they draw attention to several deviations. In Australia, for instance, procedural justice was less effective in fostering cooperation among ethnic minorities than ethnic majority groups (Murphy & Cherney 2011).

Mazerolle *et al.* (2012) observed that the policing literature is replete with empirical evidence in support of the principles of process-based policing. In contrast to the previous methods, they took an experimental approach to investigate processed-based policing. Their randomised control trial of roadside alcohol breath-testing in Brisbane, Australia, found that

“perceptions of procedural fairness, police respect, and trust and confidence in police, ... were all significantly higher” (2012, p.17) when officers used a pre-defined script that incorporated legitimacy-enhancing statements. While instructive, this study suffered from a 13% response rate to the post-roadside encounter survey.

To the contrary, Dai *et al.* (2011) found that some procedural justice factors had limited impact on citizen behaviour during police-citizen encounters. Specifically, only the effect of *officer demeanour* and officer consideration of *citizen voice* showed an increase in citizen cooperation (for officers) and compliance. Dai *et al.* also found that qualities of police interpersonal treatment (care, disrespect, force) were insignificant factors in the explanation of citizen noncompliance. The only significant indicator found to impact citizen noncompliance during police decision-making was *voice consideration* (defined when officers “gave full consideration of the citizen’s request” (Dai *et al.* 2011, p.163)). Perhaps most importantly, the Dai *et al.* study revealed that a citizen’s ‘irrationality’ had a positive effect on *citizen disrespect* and *non-compliance*, which is consistent with other research on the effects of mental impairment and intoxication (e.g. see Reisig *et al.* 2004). Dai *et al.* also caution against drawing conclusions from citizen-based subjective assessments of fairness: “citizen perceptions ... may not accurately reflect what they received from the police” (2011, p.166). Indeed, the same caution was raised when investigating the racial prejudices of Norwegian police officers (Sollund 2005).

### *Organisational justice*

There is also a growing body of literature that considers the ‘inwardly facing’ application of organisational justice theory (Roberts & Herrington 2013). Procedural justice in these contexts factors “workplace procedures are perceived as being fair ... free from bias, ... applied consistently between different people over time, with decision makers using accurate and timely information to make their decisions, and there is the availability of a mechanism to correct decisions that are flawed” (Roberts & Herrington 2013, p.116). In research that considered the impact of organisational justice in the workplace of American correctional officers, staff perceptions of unfair outcomes in the workplace increased work stress leading to irritation (Lambert *et al.* 2007). Most importantly, Wolfe and Piquero (2011) found that officers who held perceptions of just and fair organisational justice (through management practices) were

less likely to agree that justifications of police corruption in ‘noble pursuits’ were in fact justified and were less likely to participate in under-reporting of police misconduct.

Procedural and organisational justice theories provide further opportunities to define the source of conflict between police and citizens. Certainly, within the North American context, poor perceptions of fairness in police-citizen interaction contributes to citizen dissatisfaction and results in low levels of cooperation with police. Indeed, Engel (2003) and Sollund (2005) established that citizens from ethnic minorities perceive the police practice of traffic stops as disproportionately unfair, when white/European citizens do not, even in situations where practices are routine or legally justified. In this manner, citizen perception of unfairness results in a prejudice of injustice. Consequences of injustice include decreases in cooperation, which ultimately affects officers’ ability to collect information from victims, witnesses, and suspects (Roberts & Herrington 2013) thus limiting the ability of officers to achieve their investigative goals.

In a similar vein to the procedural justice approach, Sherman (1993) explains that fairness, or indeed unfairness, contributes to an individual’s propensity to defy ‘sanctioning agents’ during police-citizen interaction. Citizens’ perception of unfair officer behaviour relates to disrespectful behaviour to the citizen, or to the group they identify with, or the officer sanction is perceived to be arbitrary, excessive, unjust or discriminatory (Sherman 1993). Defiance is the “net increase in the prevalence, incidence, or seriousness of future offending against a sanctioning community caused by a proud, shameless reaction to the administration of a criminal sanction” (1993). Sherman explains that defiance occurs when all of the following conditions apply: (a) the citizen defines that a criminal sanction as unfair; (b) the citizen is ‘poorly bonded’ to the ‘sanctioning agent’; (c) the citizen perceives the ‘sanction’ as stigmatizing; and (d) the citizen refuses to acknowledge the shame which the sanction causes (1993, p.460). In the context of a police-citizen encounter, disgruntled citizens will act with defiance if they perceive that they have been treated unfairly in the past or indeed believe that they are being treated unfairly at the present time.

### 3.2.3 STRAIN AND CORRECTIVE ACTION

General strain theory (GST) evolved from Merton’s theoretical work of anomie and strains associated with the failure to meet aspirations of financial security (Agnew 1992). While strain theories have previously been applied to explain criminal delinquencies (Sherman 1993), Ag-



new suggests that a general strain theory (GST) can explain goal-driven conflict outside of criminal contexts (1992, 2006). GST explains that the failure to achieve goals leads to negative emotions and necessitates corrective action.

Strains are those “events or conditions that are disliked by individuals” (Agnew 2006, p.4) and are grouped by Agnew (2006) in three types: (1) strains resulting from situations where individuals are treated in a negative manner by others; (2) strains occurring from circumstances where individuals lose something they value; and (3) strains occurring from circumstances where individuals are unable to achieve their goals. Agnew explains that strains increase the likelihood of crimes through the impact of negative emotions such as anger, depression, and fear. When affected by negative emotions, individuals take corrective actions to alleviate the strain with some individuals partaking in criminal activities. Agnew suggests that individuals who have successful coping strategies have the capacity to manage their negative emotions through non-criminal activities such as legal action/remedies, or utilising support systems.

While GST emerged as a framework to understand criminal offending, it is helpful for the present research. The policing literature indicates that social actors in police-citizen encounters set objectives to achieve particular procedural goals (e.g. Sykes & Brent 1980). In a GST framework, strain originates from the “failure to achieve positively valued goals” (Agnew 1992, p.51). GST explains that a negative emotion experienced by an individual can result in the individual taking a corrective action to alleviate or overcome the negative emotion. Agnew proposes that corrective actions of individuals who have low self-control or lack social support include violence and other criminal offending (2006). Accordingly, officers who have high self-control, and indeed have access to social support systems, are less likely to use violence or criminal offending as corrective actions. However, officers use ‘control behaviour’ to overcome goal blockages and regulate behaviour (e.g. Sykes & Brent 1980; Terrill 2001).

### 3.2.4 BEHAVIOURAL EXPLANATIONS

The effect of personality traits and preferences on behaviour is often underdeveloped in structural and normative explanations of behaviour. While Turk’s theory of norm resistance considers the impact of participant sophistication, Muir’s (1977) typology of officer style illustrates how different personalities—or perspectives—affects police-citizen interaction. For example, Muir posits that the ‘professional’ officer is less likely to use coercive power in con-

trast to the ‘enforcer’. Wilson and Braithwaite (1995) incorporated findings from the policing, social psychological, and psychological literature to explain suspect resistance with officers from a behavioural perspective. Their model, shown below, demonstrates how suspect resistance is influenced by the personality and interaction skills of each actor, situational influences, and social psychological factors.




Figure 2. C. Wilson and Braithwaite's behavioural model (Wilson & Braithwaite 1995, p.6)

### *Social psychological influences*

Wilson and Braithwaite identify deindividuation and deference exchange as social psychological influences. They suggest that officer behaviour is affected by group norms in addition to an individual's preferences or characteristics, and in some cases, group norms can override individual preferences. Deindividuation emerges in circumstances where group unity is accentuated, and outgroup differences become prominent; this results in a reduction of self-awareness and concern with the evaluation of others, leading to a “weakening of restraint against the expression of undesirable behaviour” (Wilson & Braithwaite 1995, p.8). Deindividuation may occur across all types of police activities, but the likelihood of occurrence is greater in situations that have high arousal: disorder at licensed premises (such as bars, hotels, or clubs), high-speed pursuits, foot-chases, or mass disorder (Wilson & Brewer 1993). Their hypothesis was corroborated by research that found officers who worked in pairs used more confrontational methods to resolve conflict (e.g. resolving by making an arrest rather than issuing a warning) than those working alone. Furthermore, encounters that occurred in conjunction with a large number of bystanders (6 or more) influenced officer experience of resistance (1993).

### *Situational factors*

Drawing on situational antecedents to aggression discussed in the psychological literature, Wilson and Braithwaite (1995) identify that situational factors influence participant behaviour during confrontation encounters. Some situational factors are not controllable or readily influenced by police agencies: environmental factors, the nature of the event officers are called to, and alcohol or drug impairment of the citizen. Wilson and Braithwaite draw upon the work of Mulvihill *et al.* (1969) who considered differences in the tolerance of violence and aggression among cultural groups. Mulvihill *et al.* suggested that there is a high acceptance of violence and aggression in 'American culture' and that aggressive behaviour may be perceived as a more acceptable response to situations than other cultures. This perspective is consistent with the views of Reiss (1971) who noted differences in tolerance between American, English and Scandinavian countries. In Mulvihill *et al.*, the behaviour of sub-cultures in cities of Mexico and Columbia were offered as examples of the influential sub-cultural behavioural codes: these "may dictate the probability that coercion will be seen as a viable conflict resolution tactic" (Wilson & Braithwaite 1995, p.12).

Weather and noise were also identified as environmental factors that influence participant behaviours. Drawing from research that indicated correlations between warm summer weather with violent crime and excessive noise that induces stress and aggressive behaviour (Geen & O'Neal 1969), Wilson and Brewer indicated that some influences of participant behaviour may be outside of the control of officers. Similarly, the type of incident that officers responded to affect the display of aggressive citizen behaviour. Incidents such as 'domestic arguments' or 'fighting at a licensed premises' had higher levels of resistance. Moreover, the likelihood of resistance at incidents such as domestic arguments, requests for urgent backup, or street assaults increased significantly if the police response occurred at night (Wilson & Brewer 1991).

Wilson and Brewer (1991) draw attention to positive correlations between the level of citizen intoxication and citizen aggressive behaviour but omit a discussion of the citizen's level of 'rationality' (rational behaviour) or 'irrationality'. Social interactionist theory suggests that the social exchange between parties involves situational factors, including the use and interpretation of body language, the presence of other people who might participate or witness the exchange, and the class status of each party (Reisig *et al.* 2004). It also suggests that where two parties are of equal status, and one disrespects the other, the disrespected party is more likely to reciprocate than if the disrespected party is of higher status. Reisig *et al.* (2004) found that

intoxicated suspects were neither more or less likely to act disrespectfully towards officers when issued with oral commands or threats from officers. This was not the case for coercive tactics directed towards intoxicated or ‘emotional’ suspects; such actions increased the likelihood of disrespect. However, emotional suspects responded differently to verbal commands issued by officers: these reduced the level of disrespect.

Wilson and Braithwaite (1995) highlight the influence of departmental or police agency ‘style’ on officer behaviour. Unlike the preceding situational factors, police agencies can influence their policing approach. J. Wilson (1968) proposed that American police agencies could be characterised according to a three-part typology: watchman, legalistic, or service organisational style. Agency style becomes relevant as J. Wilson found agencies with more legalistic orientations (prioritised enforcement activities) had higher arrest rates than service-orientated agencies.

### *Influences of personality*

Wilson and Braithwaite (1995) propose that both officer and citizen influence the progress and outcome of the encounter. They suggest that high levels of authoritarian behaviour, say from officers, will be interpreted as confrontational behaviour by citizens. Similarly, officers holding conservative and dogmatic traits will expect or demand deference to a higher degree than more liberal officers.<sup>4</sup>

The literature examines the extent of the influence of officer personality on interactions between officers and citizens. As discussed, Muir (1977) proposed the existence of four ‘personality types’ and considered how each type influenced police-citizen interaction: professional, reciprocating, enforcement, and avoidance. ‘Professional’ officers are those who work within the law (i.e. do not break laws, rules or policies), utilise persuasive tactics to overcome conflict but also use coercion when required. ‘Reciprocating’ officers are less comfortable using coercion or force but prefer to provide help: “His standard of success is his client’s happiness” (Muir 1977, p.28). ‘Enforcers’ embody cynicism, and views citizens either as good or bad; they have no hesitation to use force or coercion; often they are single-minded in catching criminals. ‘Avoiders’ are passive and unintimidating, are uncomfortable using coercive tactics, and lack an “empathetic understanding of human motivation and suffering” (Hochstedler 1981, p.458). Muir contended that each officer personality type had a distinct

---

<sup>4</sup> Wilson and Braithwaite define authoritarian personalities as “a dependence upon clearly delineated lines of authority” and have traits including “conservative/conventional, dogmatic, and cynical attitude[s] or approach[es] to others” (1995, p.16).

perspective on the morality and utility of coercive tactics. Thus, officers from one type may approach the same situation differently: enforcers may be more prone to enforce a coercive solution to a problem than avoiders or reciprocators. While the personality types are not deterministic, Muir suggested each type may correlate with an officer's propensity to use coercive behaviour during encounters with citizens. This becomes pertinent when considering the transactional nature of police-citizen interaction, and influential factors associated with the cause of conflict. Conflict may not only originate from a normative standpoint; incompatible personalities may also be potential sources of conflict. While Muir's work is held to be influential by some (Abrahamsen & Strype 2009), its validity has been challenged by others (Hochstedler 1981; Snipes & Mastrofski 1990). Hochstedler (1981) included Muir's typology in a test of five police personality typologies<sup>5</sup>, but was unable to find any empirical evidence to support that such typologies existed. Moreover, Snipes and Mastrofski (1990) attempted to replicate Muir's study but failed to generate Muir's findings.

In contrast to the ethnographic approaches of Muir, and Snipes and Mastrofski, Abrahamsen and Strype explored officer personality using a scenario-based questionnaire. As a result, they were able to generate a larger sample ( $N=322$ , responses  $n=179$ ) than Muir ( $N=28$ ) or Snipes and Mastrofski ( $N=9$ ). Abrahamsen and Strype incorporated the Big Five Inventory personality measure (John *et al.* 1991; 2008) to assess personality and asked officers to rank their preference of nine conflict resolution techniques across seven scenarios. Their findings identified differences between the personalities of police officers and members of the public<sup>6</sup>. Officers scored higher in *agreeableness*, *conscientiousness*, and *emotional stability* than a sample of the general population and scored lower in *openness to experience*. Curiously, there were no significant variations when controlling for officer gender (*cf.* Braithwaite & Brewer 1998). There were significant differences among officers as to the effectiveness of different tactics in scenarios. There was no consensus among the officers as to an effective tactic for each scenario: some officers dismissed the utility of certain types of tactics while others rated some tactics as suitable for particular scenarios.

Terrill *et al.* (2003) compared the use of coercive behaviour of officers during PCEs with how those officers identified with the personality traits that are traditionally understood of police culture and found that not all officers matched with the narratives espoused by police culture literature (lack of trust of citizens, the lack of engagement with supervisors and man-

<sup>5</sup> These included the studies of Coates, Broderick, White, and O'Neill.

<sup>6</sup> Abrahamsen and Strype caution that the general population sample was not representative of the general population.

agement, overlooking procedural and legal requirements, aggressive control and selective enforcement). Using cluster analysis, officers were classified pro-culture, con-culture, or mid-culture based on their use of coercion during encounters: those who aligned as pro-culture were found to have used coercive tactics more often than those who were aligned as con-culture. This analysis raises questions about many commonly-held views of police culture. First, those traditional views of police culture are not pervasive throughout police workforces; not every police officer, for instance, distrusts citizens or detests upper police management. Second, that while police cultural attitudes might play some part in an officer's decision to use coercive tactics—pro-culture officers used coercive tactics in 61.3% of the encounters observed when con-culture officers used 50.4% of encounters—force was still used in over half of all encounters, despite the officers' culture classification.

### *Interaction skills*

Wilson and Braithwaite drew from the broader psychological literature, that “individuals vary greatly in the skills that they bring to any task” (1995, p.19). They contend that officers who are more persuasive or more adept at communication will thus be highly skilled in conflict resolution. This is a similar approach to Turk (1969): the degree of a social actor's sophistication influenced the likelihood of conflict arising between the parties. Weidner and Terrill (2005) tested Turk's hypothesis and found that officers who displayed skills in conflict resolution were less likely to cause conflict. This was consistent with an earlier study of officers from the New York Police Department where Bayley and Garofalo (1989) found that officers who were identified as skilled in conflict resolution were more likely to attend conflict-prone situations (47% compared to 37%) and when they were in attendance they were more likely to take charge of those situations (57% compared to 34%). Officers from the skilled group were more likely on arrival to use force to control a conflict encounter in progress (20% of instances compared to 4.4%) and favoured authoritative or confrontational tactics (such as taking verbal control or asking suspects to “explain themselves”). There were no significant differences in how skilled or regular officers concluded the encounter: the rate of arrests, citations, or summonses was equal between the two groups. As noted (Sykes & Brent 1980; Braithwaite & Brewer 1998), Bayley and Garofalo showed that officers used more than one type of tactic during police-citizen encounters. Their dataset included 1,905 officer behaviours recorded during 311 encounters, with officers from the skilled group using more behaviours during an encoun-

ter (1.9) than those from the regular group (1.4) and was less likely to rely on a single course of action (44% vs 73%).

The selection of ‘skilled’ officers from the research sample are curious. Bayley and Garafalo noted that officers who were considered to be superior performers (thus selected as ‘skilled’) were those who were adept at managing conflict situations but also those who had a propensity for violence. Braithwaite followed the same process to identify officers skilled in conflict resolution. Like Bayley and Garafalo, Braithwaite found that those officers used more controlling behaviours than cooperative tactics (1998, pp.240-241). However, Braithwaite dismissed the results, querying the utility of the nomination process to identify skilled officers. While it may be questionable to accept that the actions of the ‘skilled’ officers identified in these two studies—to illustrate best practice to resolve overt conflict—it is valid to conclude that the studies represent the views of how officers in the sample perceived best practice to resolve overt conflict.

### 3.3 Conflict resolution

This last section focuses on practical applications of conflict-resolution theory in the context of police-citizen encounters.

#### 3.3.1 DEUTSCH’S LAW OF SOCIAL RELATIONS

Deutsch (1973) posed that goal interdependence influences three social-psychological processes. Braithwaite (1998) summarises these: ‘Substitutability’ is the “willingness to replace one’s own actions with those of another” (Braithwaite 1998, p.10). Promotive independence between the goals of actors are positively correlated<sup>7</sup>, successful actions of those actors, regardless of the instigator, encourage actors to become closer to goal achievement. Contrient independence relates to goals which are negatively correlated; those which reduce the likelihood of goal achievement. ‘Cathexis’ relates to the development of positive or negative attitudes between actors. When goals are positively correlated, one actor is more likely to develop positive attitudes towards the other party and value their behaviour towards goal attainment. Negatively correlated goals generate negative attitudes (Braithwaite 1998). ‘Inducibility’ relates to an ac-

---

<sup>7</sup> Deutsch refers to promotive goals as those “linked in way that their probabilities of goal attainment are positively correlated: as one’s chances increase or decrease so does the other’s chances” (Deutsch 1973, p.366). Conversely, contrient goals are those “linked in such a way that their probabilities of goal attainment are negatively correlated; as one’s chances increase, the other’s decrease” (Deutsch 1973, p.366).

tor's willingness to be influenced by another actor. For instance, positive situations facilitate the actions of others whereas negative situations block the actions of one actor (Braithwaite 1998). In simplistic terms, Deutsch's proposition was that cooperative actions breed cooperation, and competitive actions breed competition: cooperation is to be encouraged, and competition is to be discouraged (Braithwaite 1998). Competition leads to destructive conflict: a situation where conflict expands and escalates to the point where it becomes independent of the source of conflict.

*Braithwaite's test of Deutsch's theory of conflict resolution*




Figure 3. Braithwaite's model of conflict resolution (Braithwaite 1998, p.271)

Deutsch aspires that a mutually cooperative approach is the most effective for combating and resolving conflict. But he also acknowledges the difficulty in resolving conflict in an asymmetrical relation. This occurs when one party is motivated to resolve the problem, but the other party is unaware that the problem exists or is unwilling to resolve it. In these asymmetrical situations, mutual competition takes over from mutual cooperation. Deutsch proposes that some behaviours encourage resistance or alienation: illegitimate actions, negative or inappropriate sanctions, or influential behaviour that is excessive in nature. Conversely, there are behaviours that promote cooperative conflict resolution. These include: setting out clearly the expectations of actions required by the motivated actor; an expression or appreciation of the difficulties or problems faced by the reluctant party should they offer



compliance; depict the advantages that the reluctant actor will achieve; outline the harmful consequences that are inevitable if a positive response is not forthcoming; or display an expression of power of the motivated actor's resolve (Braithwaite 1998).

Braithwaite (1998) tested Deutsch's approach using an utterance-by-utterance analysis of conflict resolution behaviour used by police officers in South Australia. Utterances were coded using a model of five behavioural dimensions: *information exchange*, *legitimacy*, *power*, *coercion* and *antisocial strategies* (see Figure 3 above). Braithwaite used lag sequential analysis to test changes in the probability of sequential events and found that supportive statements from one party led to supportive statements from the other. The analysis lends support to Deutsch's approach that cooperation breeds cooperation, but Braithwaite considered that "while it is *likely* that competition breeds competition, it is not *necessarily* so" (Deutsch 1973). She posited that those 'skilled' in verbal communication might be able to "utilise competitive tactics and manage to avoid the intensification of conflict" (Braithwaite & Brewer 1998; Braithwaite 1998).

Braithwaite tested Deutsch's theory using a comparison of officers who were identified as being skilled at conflict resolution and those of 'average' ability. She hypothesised that skilled officers would use cooperative tactics, rather than competitive tactics. However, the findings did not support her hypothesis: the officers who were identified as 'skilled' were more controlling than the control group (of 'average' officers) using coercive and threatening behaviour. Braithwaite concluded that findings were a product of poor methodology (as she relied on referrals from police officers to nominate colleagues who they perceived to be skilled at conflict resolution). But a further analysis revealed that female officers took a less 'competitive approach' (Braithwaite & Brewer 1998)<sup>8</sup>; male officers were found to use tactics that included control, threat and physical action whereas female officers, on the other hand, used more 'supportive' tactics than males. Females used tactics encouraging mutual power more often than coercive tactics (resulting in less physical resistance from citizens). Both male and female officers used controlling tactics to respond to abuse given by citizens. Findings also revealed that use of coercive tactics by males tended to result in verbal abuse by the citizen.

---

<sup>8</sup> Braithwaite and Brewer cautioned about the generalizability of these results. The sample set consisted of only four male and four female officers.

### 3.3.2 POLICE-LED CONFLICT RESOLUTION

#### *Conflict resolution, resistance-prone officers and personality*

As noted, some literature has proposed correlations between officer personality and their operational style (Muir 1977). Wilson and Gross (1994) tested English and Australian officer responses to 16 conflict-prone scenarios according to a typology of 12 conflict resolution tactics.<sup>9</sup> Participants scored the effectiveness of each tactic for each scenario: from (1) for low effectiveness to (9) to high effectiveness. The most highly rated tactic was *confrontational discussion* ( $M = 6.31$ ,  $SD = 1.31$ ), followed by *mutual discussion* ( $M = 5.38$ ,  $SD = 1.29$ ) and *bargaining/compromise* ( $M = 5.08$ ,  $SD = 1.35$ ). These ‘conciliatory’ tactics rated higher than the ‘competitive’ or ‘coercive’ tactics of *physical force* ( $M = 3.37$ ,  $SD = 1.43$ ) and *verbal force* ( $M = 2.99$ ,  $SD = 1.72$ ). There were also correlations between the choice of tactics and the level of citizen resistance they previously experienced. Officers who reported a high ‘resistance-prone’ operational experience chose arrest as a highly effective conflict resolution tactic whereas officers who had a lower frequency of resistance in their experience preferred bargaining and compromising tactics over arrest. Officer preference also depended on situational factors including citizen age, gender, and behaviour. It is curious that there were no statistically significant differences between the selections the English and Australian officers (officers who are routinely unarmed and routinely armed respectively) unlike the differences observed in Waddington *et al.* (2009).

Similarly, Abrahamsen and Strype (2009) surveyed Norwegian police officers ( $n=179$ ) to measure their tactical choice in response to a conflict-prone scenario and to establish the existence of differences between officer personalities and those of the public (using a modified version of Wilson and Gross’s (1994) conflict resolution tactical scale and the BFI scale to measure personality<sup>10</sup>). They found that the personalities of the officer sample differed with citizen population: officers scored higher than the general population regarding *agreeableness*, *conscientiousness*, and *emotional stability*; and officers scored lower than the population in *openness to experience*. There were significant differences in officer preference and effectiveness of different tactics in scenarios: some officers dismissed the utility of certain types of tactics while others rated some tactics were suitable for specific scenarios. However, consistent

<sup>9</sup> Tactics included: *wait and see*, *accept*, *diffuse*, *third party*, *physical coercion*, *bargain/compromise*, *manipulate*, *argue*, *confrontational discussion*, *exchange information*, *call for assistance*, *arrest*.

<sup>10</sup> The BFI test was translated into Norwegian. The researchers compared the police sample to a previous sample of Norwegian university students (Engvik & Føllesdal 2005) which was collected to test the reliability of Norwegian translation.

with Wilson and Gross (1994), officers preferred conciliatory tactics instead of coercive tactics: *confrontational discussion* ( $M = 6.22$ ,  $SD = 1.55$ ), followed by *mutual discussion* ( $M = 6.58$ ,  $SD = 1.51$ ) and *bargaining/compromise* ( $M = 5.22$ ,  $SD = 1.64$ ). There were no significant variations when testing by gender (*cf.* Braithwaite & Brewer 1998).

### *Burn out*

Euwema *et al.* (2004) found a positive correlation between officer ‘burnout’ and their tactics used to resolve conflict. They hypothesised that “burnout coincides with less dominant behaviour” (Euwema *et al.* 2004, p.33) and that “burnout in police officers is negatively related to dominant behaviour in conflict situations” (2004, p.28). They observed 110 Dutch police officers involved in 769 police-citizen encounters. Observers coded the level of dominance used by officers at the commencement and during the management of the encounter. Effectiveness was measured using the level of officer satisfaction and citizen satisfaction of the encounter—during the first engagement of the encounter and then of the solution reached—as well as measuring the level of escalation or de-escalation of the conflict. They concluded that officer burnout contributed to a reduction of dominant behaviour during the encounters and that those officers who were less dominant during encounters were more effective in resolving conflict. Euwema *et al.* suggest that more cooperative, less confrontational behaviour is a more ‘effective’ approach to conflict resolution. This behaviour differs to the style of behaviour judged by officers to be effective in the Braithwaite, and Bayley and Garofalo studies. In those studies, officers believed to be ‘skilled’ within their cohort demonstrated the more frequent use of authoritative or confrontational behaviour.

### 3.3.3 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Extant empirical studies of police-citizen interaction tend to focus on the police use of force and coercive tactics, yet few concentrate on conflict resolution techniques. However, because much of this literature originates from the examination of North American policing, it is prudent to consider its degree of transferability and generalisability. While United States and Canadian policing have been influenced by Peelian tradition (Euwema *et al.* 2004), they differ in structure and operational doctrine with other contemporary Peelian-influenced agencies. Differences such as decentralisation and routine armament pose potential vulnerabilities in the generalizability across other Peelian-influenced police jurisdictions. Similarly, while some

of the literature considers British police-citizen interaction, this tends to focus on the *legitimacy* of ‘stop and search’ encounters, specifically *why* a stop and search encounter is initiated as opposed to *what* happens during the encounter (Euwema *et al.* 2004).

Nevertheless, the policing literature includes some studies that examine the personal attributes of police officers and their propensity to use certain styles of conflict resolution tactics. These studies are instructive: they reinforce the capacity of an individual’s personality to influence the transactional nature of police-citizen interaction and affect the degree of competition or cooperation that occurs during encounters. Braithwaite’s test of Deutsch’s general theory of conflict resolution is instructive. While it failed to show if ‘skilled officers’ responded to competitive actions without the use of a competitive response, it evidenced the utility of taking an utterance-by-utterance approach to examining conflict in the field. Indeed, it advanced Sykes and Brent and offered a sophisticated framework for understanding the fluid and transactional nature of encounters.

Deutsch’s theory of social relations is consistent with Turk’s theory of norm resistance, concerning conflict *prevention* and *mitigation*. Turk outlined ways in which the likelihood of conflict can be reduced. Similarly, Turk’s mitigating factor of *sophistication* resembles Deutsch’s proposition that skilled conflict resolvers use conflict constructively. This perhaps has the potential to be operationalised. Turk suggested that police officers that have higher education qualifications or have longer levels of police experience will be more skilled at conflict resolution than others. Braithwaite, too, hypothesised that ‘skilled’ officers would display “more conflict mitigation sequences, ... use tactics associated with conflict less frequently ... and would experience higher levels of cooperation” (Manning 2011) than averagely skilled officers.

However, the question of a citizen’s degree of ‘rationality’ (e.g. Quinton 2011) poses a problem for the utility of Deutsch’s theory of conflict resolution: impaired citizens might not be able to work cooperatively during conflict situations. This observation might account for Braithwaite’s dismissal of her ‘skilled officer’ findings: practitioners might define conflict in a different manner and assume that coercive tactics might be appropriate when dealing with impaired subjects. Further, it was found that officers who use their ‘authority’ to take ‘control’ are significantly less likely to receive disrespect (Braithwaite 1998, p.188) in return.<sup>11</sup> And, cu-

---

<sup>11</sup> The size of the police presence (the number of officers) did not affect the level of disrespect shown by a suspect. They also found that police were more likely to receive disrespect from African American and low-income males than from any other minority groups (Reisig *et al.* 2004).

riously, Dai *et al.* found that forceful behaviour by officers *decreased* the likelihood of citizen disrespect. This effect appears to be inconsistent with Deutsch and Braithwaite's contention that competition breeds further competition and Braithwaite and Brewer (1998).

Several other themes have emerged from research of police-citizen encounters. First, that there are differences in how officers approach conflict resolution; the studies have shown these can be affected by personality type (e.g. Reisig *et al.* 2004; Dai *et al.* 2011), gender (Reisig *et al.* 2004, p.254), occupational burnout (Abrahamsen & Strype 2009; Terrill *et al.* 2003), and skill (Braithwaite & Brewer 1998). Second, the social, class and socioeconomic status of citizens have an influence on the behaviour of both the officer and citizen (Euwema *et al.* 2004). The findings from the cross-national study of Australian and English officers found that there were no significant differences in how police officer *preferred* to resolve conflict encounters (Braithwaite 1998; Bayley & Garofalo 1989). This is particularly relevant to the proposed research as the Australian officers are routinely armed and the English officers are not routinely armed. Yet, while both Wilson and Gross (1994), and Abrahamsen and Strype (2009) are instructive, their utility is limited. Previous studies of PCEs in situ and in real time have established that there are many different conflict resolution tactics are used during encounters (e.g. Sykes & Clark 1975).



# 4

---

## A mixed-method approach

---

### 4.1 Research sites

The present research examined police behaviour at New Zealand and South Australia. O'Dwyer and Bernauer (2013) explain that for experimental research, conditions surrounding the test group and the control group are tightly controlled to support propositions of causality. Despite the present research not being experimental, the routinely armed status of officers simulated an 'independent variable'. At the outset of the design of the research, it was presumed that it would not be possible to stage the research within a single jurisdiction as not one of the four OCED countries that routinely deploy RUP officers also deploy RAP officers outside of specialist roles. Similarly, due to the politicised nature about the merits of RUP/RAP practice within RUP jurisdictions (Hendy 2012), it was considered unlikely that police agencies would consider deploying RUP and RAP units for the purpose of research—nor was it likely that a RAP agency would deploy RUP officers for the purposes of research. Consequently, a cross-national study remained the logical and practical approach to answer the research question.

#### 4.1.1 CROSS-NATIONAL POLICE RESEARCH

The extant Anglo-American policing literature is heavily weighted towards perspectives and comparisons of police behaviour among agencies from the United Kingdom and the United States, with the majority of research focusing on behaviour within a single jurisdiction. Such

studies are instructive (Bayley 1999), but their transferability and generalisability are weakened by their failure to consider how the predominant culture of the researched population affects normative behaviour (Høigård 2011) or indeed the utility of comparing policing across metropolitan, urban or rural settings (Goddard & Jaeger 2005). Notwithstanding the Anglo-American bias, previous cross-national research including that of Banton (1964) and Reiss (1971b), and the postulations of Manning (1977) illustrate the value in taking a comparative approach when exploring policing and police officer behaviour.

### *Cultural identity and symbolism*

Banton's (1964) cross-national study of American and Scottish police officers illustrates the merit of cross-national policing research. In the narrative below, Banton describes how cultural identity, sometimes represented through symbolism, can be linked to contemporary practice:

Another feature of the place of crime in American society which affects police work is that the stakes are high. A great deal of money can be won or lost on particular operations, so the temptation to use violence is much greater. Certain kinds of violence were already legitimized by the tradition that the American hero is a frontiersman, cowboy, hunter or soldier, with his gun ready to hand. The greater tolerance of violence and the gains to be won by it have meant that the policeman in the United States is much more exposed to the risk of violence than his British counterpart, and it would be strange if this did not affect his conception of his occupational role and the way in which he performed it (Banton 1964, p.88).

Banton's remarks are those of a Briton observing a North American context and brings insight. First, his narrative illustrates differences of officer behaviour: the American 'gun-ready hero' in contrast to the British officer. Second, he comments about how American officers have a legacy of using violence in the manner in which the British officer does not. Manning alludes to the same:

Emerging from a frontier society with great emphasis upon self-protection, individualism, violence and an almost fierce clinging to weapons as a means of ensuring safety, policing in America has always been action orientated, involving weaponry, and has viewed the public as a dangerous adversary. ... As has been repeatedly emphasized in recent revisionist writings on the history of the United States, the use of violence is a traditional means of solving problems in America (Skolnick, 1969) (Manning 1977, p.96).

The value of these narratives lies in the authors' perspective of the importance of the symbolism enshrined in police uniform. Uniform and equipment vary across jurisdictions, with the practice of routine armament and carriage of firearms arguably the most significant variation between North America and Britain. Muir connects utility with symbolism: "...the policeman, accompanied by his gun and other symbols of his authority" (1977, p.159) as does Manning (1977) and Reis (1971b); however, while the image of an armed officer is synonymous



with American policing, it is the antithesis of the unarmed English ‘benign bobby’ so epitomised in the British literature (Waddington 1988).

### *Public perception, trust, and confidence*

Banton’s research also established differences in the citizenry’s perception of and expectation of police in Scotland and the United States. Below he describes how North American officers might be perceived to be more approachable than those from Britain:

Some American police officers would wish their men to be more dignified and impersonal like their British colleagues. [...] If British constables were to patrol an American town the public would probably think them stuffy and unfriendly; they might resent their detachment preferring the American-style policeman who seems ‘human’ and approachable (Banton 1964, p.125).

While Banton’s research originates from some 50 years previous, his observation that cultural differences exist among similar cultures remains instructive. For instance, the recent research of trust and confidence in police across the policing jurisdictions of Scandinavia provides some contrasting insights. Kääriäinen (2008) found that trust in police was affected by variation of the expectations of different communities. While there was some evidence for consistent measures of trust across the communities (such as perceived problems of crime, the proximity of the police in the community, and the quality of policing provided), the findings indicated that the utility of a visible police presence was dichotomous: the sight of police in Finland was associated with positive responses from the citizenry, but it was associated with negative responses in Denmark.<sup>1</sup> Both Banton (1964) and Kääriäinen (2008) illustrate how cross-national comparison *may* inform the explanation of phenomena and are indeed instructive for the present research: what is perceived to be optimal in one jurisdiction may not be in another.

### *Variation in the acceptability and tolerance of violence*

Cross-national research has also illuminated the acceptability and tolerance of violence among different nations. Reis (1971b) identified differences among American, English, and Scandinavian society over the utility and acceptability of violence:

In England and Scandinavia, the use of violence is sanctioned negatively more or less universally in the society. ... If anything, in police and citizen relations, it is more serious for the citizen to behave with violence towards the police than the other way around, because the police may legitimately use force. ... Equally important for a civil society is the granting of legitimacy to the police in their intervention. American society is more

---

<sup>1</sup> Kääriäinen revealed that Danish responses to visible police presence resulted in the sense of unease in the citizenry as it indicated something dramatic or dangerous had or was about to occur (2008).

inhospitable towards its police than most societies[.] (Reiss 1971b, pp.182-185)

This theme is explored further in other notable cross-national studies. Manning (1977) also draws attention to the perceived legitimacy of violence as a ‘problem-solving’ response to conflict in American cultural contexts. Of relevance to the present research, Norris *et al.* (2006) explored officer disposition towards use of force; they revealed that officers from Texas were more disposed to use force against citizens than officers from other research sites in Mexico and Venezuela. Waddington *et al.* (2009) explored how officer perceptions of resistance or violence differed in the cross-national study of police agencies from England, The Netherlands, Germany, Australia, Venezuela, and Brazil. They found that German officers did not perceive the same degree of risk<sup>2</sup> as officers from Brazil, and most saliently were the differences in the responses from English authorised firearms officers and routinely unarmed response officers.

Likewise, the research of Knutsson and Norée (2010) and Hendy (2014) found differences among Scandinavian police forces with regard to officers’ use of firearms. Variances were found among the Danes, Finns, and Swedes (where officers are routinely armed) regarding the use of warning shots, the proportion of firearm presentation with verbal threats, and actual shots fired.

### *Utility of cross-national research*

However, cross-national research may suffer from weaknesses in transferability and generalisability. If culture differs to such an extent (indeed the *predominant* culture in a multicultural setting), then can the insights found in one jurisdiction apply to another? Is it possible to determine whether culture can explain why American police officers are routinely armed where the Scottish officers are not? Or, could it be that America is a more violent culture and therefore there is a greater necessity? In other words, phenomena commonplace in one cultural context should not necessarily be expected to be found in another context.

On balance, the political and cultural similarities at nation-state level of these Anglo-American policing agencies present an opportunity to learn from the activities of the constituent agencies. However, findings that originate from one jurisdiction should not be considered to *necessarily* translate into another jurisdiction. And in some cases, while agencies from

---

<sup>2</sup> Waddington et al. (2009) measured officer perception of risk from written responses to a ‘routine’ police scenario.

different jurisdictions will share characteristics and have common social values, consideration needs to be given to the *applicability* and *transferability* of findings from the literature.

#### 4.1.2 THE PRESENT RESEARCH – THE AUSTRALASIAN DYAD

It was presumed that if two nations shared cultural histories and legal frameworks, then the effect of extraneous variables affecting the comparison might be reduced or mitigated. Manning (2011) distinguishes New Zealand, together with North America, the United Kingdom, and Australia, as exemplars of democratically-policed nation-states through the influence of ‘Peelian’ policing principles: “visible, reactive, bureaucratically organized means of state-based resolution of conflict with minimal force” (Manning 2011, p.3). Yet while the policing agencies from this group may have more similarities in heritage and doctrine than the continental ‘gendarmerie’-styled policing of Western- and Central-Europe (see Bayley 1990), or the ‘repressive-styled’ policing of Eastern-Europe (Mawby 2011), these Anglo-American police agencies differ. The organisation of policing in the United States is complex: it is decentralised with multiple uncoordinated agencies, some with overlapping responsibilities and jurisdictions (Bayley 1990). Policing in Australia, Canada, and Great Britain are decentralised, but while they have multiple coordinated agencies, there is little jurisdictional overlap (Bayley 1990). In contrast, New Zealand has one centralised national police agency (New Zealand Police) but incorporates a decentralised structure.<sup>3</sup>

New Zealand and South Australia appeared to be a good fit for cross-national research sites<sup>4</sup>. Both jurisdictions shared a common language (a factor which would have added complexity for the research with a Nordic comparison); they shared common colonial histories, but neither jurisdiction was established as a penal colony; they shared a common legal framework; and both lacked the widespread systemic corruption endemic of other Australian police agencies. In addition, the NZ/SA dyad had the advantage that all officers deployed for duty in New Zealand and South Australia were *trained* and had the *capacity* to use firearms. This was

<sup>3</sup> Bazley (2007) states that NZP has a high level of regional autonomy concerning interpretation and implementation of national policy. As a result, district commanders (the equivalent to a British chief constable or an American police chief) have been delegated “substantial responsibility for daily operations” (Winfrey & Taylor 2004, p.246).

<sup>4</sup> Agencies from Australia, North America, and Northern Ireland deploy their officers routinely armed with a sidearm whereas officers from England and Wales, New Zealand, and Scotland were routinely unarmed. All deployable officers from New Zealand were trained and certified to use firearms, whereas only a small proportion of officers from England and Wales, and Scotland were authorised to use firearms. Similarly, agencies differ with regard to ‘non-lethal’ weapons: all officers from New Zealand were routinely armed with the CED TASER, whereas only selected officers were in Australian agencies or the United Kingdom. Thus, suitable comparative dyads were identified as England and Wales with Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland, Norway with Sweden, or New Zealand with a state of Australia.

not the case in England and Wales, as only a small proportion of officers are authorised to use and receive firearms training.

### *Choice of research sites*

The selection of research sites within New Zealand and South Australia was influenced by the following factors. The choice of South Australia as the comparative jurisdiction influenced the selection of the appropriate city within New Zealand. There was a deliberate strategy to over-sample conflict-prone encounters. Both the literature (Bayley & Garofalo 1989; Braithwaite 1998) and experience of the researcher supported the view that interpersonal conflict was more likely to occur during toward the end of the working week, in late afternoons, evenings and night-time. For this reason, a metropolitan entertainment area was selected as the preferred locale for the research in South Australia. The selection of *South Australia City*<sup>5</sup> (SAC) was influenced by these sampling requirements. The choice of the police station to site the research was subject to the operational requirements at the time of the South Australia Police.

The selection of the New Zealand site was influenced by practicality. Factors influencing the suitability of *New Zealand City* (NZC) included the cost of staging the fieldwork, availability of a suitably sized metropolitan city that had an entertainment quarter, and the ability to afford the researcher anonymity. The latter consideration was to avoid risks for data contamination; staging the research in a city where the researcher had worked as a practitioner and had knowledge of the research participants may have introduced bias. A further consideration for the choice of research site was to attempt to achieve a balance of citizen-participant ethnicity between the research sites. It was desired that the percentage of indigenous peoples (Māori and Aboriginal) was in some balance at each site.

### *New Zealand City*

NZC was one of the larger cities situated in the South Island of New Zealand. Its population was in excess of 100,000 and was less ethnically diverse than other urban areas of New Zealand, with fewer migrants but a larger proportion of tertiary students. The proportion of students affected its age demographic, with a higher proportion of people aged 15-24, but a lower proportion of 25-64-year-olds, than at other areas within New Zealand. The high pro-

---

<sup>5</sup> The cities for both research sites have been anonymised to *South Australian City* and *New Zealand City*.

portion of students were also associated with a higher proportion of one-person and multi-person households.<sup>6</sup>

NZC had a central police station which serviced the municipal area (central business district (CBD), industrial zones, and outer residential suburbs). It was located at the heart of the central business district. Although there were several community policing centres throughout the municipal area, the 24/7 emergency response units were centralised at the central station. The station was situated in the CBD and was within walking distance of the heart of the city. The CBD comprised of retail shopping and entertainment zones, the tertiary education precinct (university and polytechnic), student accommodation, a hospital campus, and sporting grounds. Within a 10-minute drive from the CBD were residential areas including the 'student quarter', lower-socioeconomic, and affluent residential areas.

NZC emergency response officers predominantly deployed as vehicular-based units, as the furthest area of responsibility was a 25-minute drive from the central station. Typical officer workload commonly consisted of responding to domestic disputes, shoplifting, trespass, mental health events, and disorder. During the 2016 calendar year, the four most frequently reported offences included 'public order offences' (20.6%), 'theft related offences' (15.1%), 'unlawful entry, burglary, or break and enter offences' (8.2%) and 'property damage' (7.6%).<sup>7</sup> Other policing groups not party to the research were located at the central station, including criminal investigation, community policing, and road policing teams.

### *South Australia City*

SAC was a large provincial city within the state of South Australia. The SAC environs occupied a larger geographic area with a greater population than that of NZC. Consequently, policing in SAC was divided into four zones. The station subject of the research was situated in the central business district policing zone. It was within walking distance of the central shopping and entertainment area of the city, the business district, park environs, and inner-city high-density accommodation. Like at NZC, there were several tertiary educational campuses within the station's jurisdictional area. There was a large proportion of resident tertiary students within the patrol area of the station, their accommodation was largely apartment-styled, unlike the detached or semi-detached dwellings at NZC. The population that frequent-

---

<sup>6</sup> Statistics New Zealand 2013 census data.

<sup>7</sup> Demand and activity data for the 2016 calendar year, accessed from <http://www.police.govt.nz/about-us/statistics-and-publications/data-and-statistics/demand-and-activity>.

ed the SAC station's jurisdictional zone was transient; the CBD attracted workers and shoppers by day and revellers by night. Visitors from outer suburbs were well serviced with a public transport system. The four most frequent criminal offences recorded in SAC for the year ending June 2016 included 'theft related offences' (20.5%), 'property damage' (21.8%), 'assaults' (17.1%), and 'serious criminal trespass'<sup>8</sup> (12.8%).<sup>9</sup>

The station subject of the research was located within the heart of the CBD and was staffed by foot-bound beat officers. Vehicular-based units were stationed at a nearby patrol base. Being beat-based, officers were in close proximity to citizens: SAC officers walked among citizens whereas NZC officers drove past citizens. Consequently, SAC officers were more likely to detect minor offences that were non-dispatched. NZC events were dominated by domestic violence, minor assaults and investigative enquiries, whereas SAC events were largely street disorder, liquor offences and traffic offences (refer to section 5.1 for further detail).

## 4.2 Research design

### 4.2.1 MIXED-METHOD APPROACH

The strategy for using a mixed method approach was to provide methodological triangulation. Morse (1991) defines methodological triangulation as the use of qualitative and quantitative methods to address the same research problem. The design for the present research fits a QUAN(qual) embedded model (Creswell 2014) where an ethnographic study is staged in parallel with the collection of quantitative data. The QUAN(qual) approach differs from other methodological triangulations like sequential designs (i.e. QUAL→quan) or convergent designs (i.e. QUAL + quan) (Morse 1991). Parallel designs are beneficial as they allow for timely, efficient and cost-effective data collection compared with sequential designs (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011). In the present case, the practicalities of conducting field research in two countries resulted in the requirement of cost and time efficient data collection. Additionally, the strength of triangulation lies in the premise that "the weaknesses in each single method will be compensated by the counter-balancing strengths of another" (Jick 1979, p.110). A further ben-

---

<sup>8</sup> These are similar offences to the 'unlawful entry, burglary, or break and enter offences' categorised by NZPOL.

<sup>9</sup> Crime statistics for the 12 months ending June 2016 accessed from <https://data.sa.gov.au/data/dataset/crime-statistics/resource/19beeceb-a870-4424-b533-43c774bcb03e>. These statistics are SAC-wide offence data; localized data specific to SAC station were not available.

efit of triangulation was the presumption that the combination of methods would limit any potential researcher bias inherent in practitioner-based research.

The present research design combines ethnographic and quantitative methods. Ethnography is an established method of the development and construction of academic perspectives of police behaviour. Ethnography is a research approach used by social scientists to develop written descriptions of cultures (Manning 2014). Many ‘classic’ policing studies have incorporated participant observation to build narratives about police operational culture and work methods (e.g. Banton 1964; Cain 1973; Holdaway 1983; Muir 1977), and it has continued to be used in recent studies (e.g. Herbert 2006; Loftus 2009; O’Brien-Olinger 2016). Ethnographies often incorporate in-depth interviews with participants (Heyl 2007) to supplement the descriptive observational accounts made by the investigator. Systematic social observation is a further observational method used by police researchers (Reiss 1971a; Reiss 1971b; Mastrofski *et al.* 2002; Schulenberg 2012); it provides researchers with a framework to measure the occurrence of pre-defined variables in an observational setting. The combination of these methods is sympathetic to the generation of theory: the grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss 1999; Corbin & Strauss 2014) provides an opportunity for the data to transform the narrative from one of description to one of explanation (Corbin & Strauss 2014).

A challenge with qualitative research—especially ethnography—is that it is time-consuming, it can be difficult for the researcher to infer from ‘complex and confusing’ materials, and can be ‘engaging and engulfing’ (Manning 2014). Conversely, quantitative approaches may provide opportunities to simplify rich qualitative data (Maruna 2010) or offer robust processes to measure phenomena with objective variables (O’Dwyer & Bernauer 2013). Indeed, Braithwaite (1998) evidenced this through the measurement of human behaviour among different groups to establish variation in the frequency and duration of particular behaviours.<sup>10</sup> Thus, the present research combined both approaches: a quantitative study to measure officer behaviour and a qualitative study to explore a theoretical basis for officer behaviour in conflict-prone situations.

Situational and demographic data were collected in support of an analysis of the comparative nature of the study. Such data included demographic information about the participants, officer personality and resistance measures, and encounter situational variables. As such, the

---

<sup>10</sup> When Braithwaite and Brewer (1998) compared the use of conflict resolution behaviours between female and male officers, they found that male officers used coercive tactics more frequently than female officers.

mixed method approach allowed for the robust collection and analysis of data through a quantifiable description of police officers behaviour during police-citizen encounters simultaneously with the exploration of theoretical constructs. Together the methods were complementary: they “increase[d] the interpretability, meaningfulness, and validity of constructs and inquiry results by both capitalizing on inherent method strengths and counteracting inherent bias in methods and other sources” (Greene *et al.* 1989, p.259).

#### 4.2.2 THE QUANTITATIVE STUDY

Previous empirical inquiries of police behaviour—including the use of force—have used scenario-based questionnaires (e.g. Waddington *et al.* 2009), experiments (e.g. Sousa *et al.* 2010) participant observation (e.g. Muir 1977; Hochstedler 1981) and systematic social observation (e.g. Reiss 1971b; Mastrofski *et al.* 2002; Schulenberg 2012). Studies of police encounters *in situ* (e.g. Sykes & Brent 1983) suggest that encounters can be deconstructed as an aggregate of many different behavioural interactions. For example, Braithwaite (1998) found that during a single conflict-encounter, officers used a variety of different resolution tactics. This presents a problem for scenario-based questionnaires: they may lack the ability to accurately test the interactive nature of encounters. Generally, previous studies using questionnaires only allow for the examination of a singular police tactic; that one chosen by officers because of their interpretation of the *likely* behaviour of the subject as portrayed in the scenario narrative. Similarly, questionnaires do not necessarily allow for variation or unpredictability of citizen behaviour; the test relies on the officer’s perception of citizen behaviour.

##### *Braithwaite’s taxonomy*

The quantitative study adopted Braithwaite’s approach to measuring the conflict resolution behaviours of officers and citizens during police-citizen encounters. Braithwaite’s method relied on an operationalisation of Deutsch’s (1973) theory of conflict resolution, measuring the frequency and duration of the behaviours of each participant involved in police-citizen encounters. Braithwaite’s taxonomy of behaviours, shown in Table 4.2.1, is mutually exclusive and exhaustive: a participant must be at one behavioural state at a time. The behaviours are grouped into those shared by officers and citizens, those exclusive to officers and those exclusive to citizens. Adjacent to each behaviour are her description and examples of the types of verbal statements or behaviours.



Table 4.2.1. Braithwaite's Taxonomy of Conflict Resolution Behaviours, with descriptions and examples

	Braithwaite's description (Braithwaite 1998, pp.101-108)	Example statements or questions
<b>Officer and Citizen behaviours</b>		
<i>Informational seek</i>	Questions that elicit information about the parties involved, events that have taken place, or proposed solutions	"Where are you going to now?" "How are you feeling?"
<i>Information give</i>	Information provided in response to a question	
<b>Officer behaviours</b>		
<i>Support Statement</i>	Statements which communicated empathy towards the citizen, positive reinforcement, or compliments	"That must be very hard for you." "You did absolutely the right thing."
<i>Accept statement</i>	Statements which indicated acceptance of the citizen or agreement with the citizen	"You're right." "I hear what you are saying."
<i>Control statement affect</i>	Changing the affective state or emotional behaviour of the citizen	"Keep your voice down." "Don't shout at me."
<i>Control statement conversation</i>	Statements which directly controlled the flow of conversation	"Don't interrupt when I'm speaking to you." "Go back to the beginning and tell me again."
<i>Control statement environment</i>	Statements that attempted to change the environmental setting of the interaction	"Can you people please leave." "Sit down."
<i>Reject statement</i>	Statements that the other party's position is not accepted	"Do you expect me to believe that?"
<i>Threat statement</i>	Insulting or derogatory remarks that were more extreme than reject statements and statements threatening negative consequences or warnings about future behaviour	"Do you want to be locked up?" "If you continue swearing you will be arrested." "Stop behaving like a fuck-wit."
<i>Physical act</i>	Any physical touching or handling of the citizen	Punching, striking, pushing, or handcuffing. Pat-down search.
<b>Citizen behaviours</b>		
<i>Information refuse</i>	Verbalised statement refusing to give information, or no comment made in response to an <i>Information seek</i>	"No comment." "That's none of your business."
<i>Information excuse<sup>11</sup></i>	Defensive statements that justified or provided excuses for citizen behaviour	"I didn't do anything, it wasn't me." "I had no choice, I had to fight him."
<i>Refuse control</i>	Actions, statements, or behaviours when the citizen refuses or ignores the control statements behaviour used by officers	Speaking over an officer's control statement. Refusing to abide by an officer's control statement. Resisting physical action or handcuffing.
<i>Verbal abuse</i>	Verbally aggressive statements that were insulting, derogatory or undermining. Also included shouting or threatening statements.	"Fuck you pig." "I'll get you for this." "You obviously got nothing better to do."
<i>Physical abuse</i>	Any physical action directed at or against officers.	Punching, striking, pushing, spitting or other assaultive behaviour.

### Systematic social observation

Systematic social observation (SSO) provides a framework for a field researcher to gather data on subjects in their natural environment and the occurrence of natural phenomena in a consistent manner (Reiss 1971a; Worden & McLean 2014). SSO was pioneered by Reiss (1971a) and has been shown to be versatile in large and small research settings. The 1977 Police Services Study captured 5688 encounters and the 1996–97 POPN study captured 5600 encounters (Worden & McLean 2014). Both studies relied on research assistants to observe the encounters and code data. Smaller-scale studies have also used SSO including a recent Canadian study of

<sup>11</sup> Braithwaite called this behaviour "self defence" but it has been changed in the present research so that not to be confused with a physical action of self-defence.

406 police-citizen encounters conducted by a single field researcher (Schulenberg 2012). In the present research, SSO was used to collect situational characteristics about the police-citizen encounters. While Braithwaite's taxonomy provided an opportunity to gather granular data about participant behaviour, SSO allowed the collection of situational variables relating to encounters.

### *Psychometrics*

Two psychometric tests were administered to officer-participants to identify differences among officers from the research sites. Previous research had explored the relationship between the personality of an officer and their behaviour during police-citizen encounters (e.g. Muir 1977; Abrahamsen & Strype 2009). Indeed, Abrahamsen and Strype (2009) found that personality test scores of a cohort of Norwegian officers, derived from the Big Five Inventory (BFI) (John *et al.* 1991; John *et al.* 2008), were related to differences in preference for conflict resolution tactics. As such, the present study incorporates the BFI to provide a basis of comparison between the two research samples of officers.

The relationship between the level of experienced resistance and officer decision-making had also been considered. Wilson and Gross (1994) found that 'experienced' officers who had experienced a high level of resistance from citizens tended to favour arrest as a highly effective means of conflict resolution. Measuring officers' exposure to citizen resistance in the present study was advantageous. First, it provided a useful alternative to measuring an officer's length of service as a police officer. Length of service does not necessarily capture the type of incidents that have been attended by an officer: an emergency response officer will likely have different operational experience and exposure to conflict than an investigator. Second, it provided an opportunity to measure the magnitude of the exposure to conflict and if this was correlated with the style of preferred conflict resolution tactics used by an officer.

Levels of physical resistance were measured using Wilson and Brewer's Resistance Questionnaire (1991). Their instrument was designed to test officer and citizen behaviour, aggression and deindividuation during high-anxiety patrol activities (Wilson & Brewer 1993). It prompts the officer to score the level of physical resistance experienced during the most recent occurrence of a police event. The questionnaire contained 32 patrol activities. For example, one question asks if the officer had attended an incident where offenders were found in the process of committing a burglary and if so, to indicate if an arrest was made, the num-

ber of other officers and citizens present, and the level of any physical resistance used by the citizens present. In addition to calculating a *resistance score*, responses were used to calculate an *incident count* and an *injury score*. The incident count was used to compare officers' level of experience: a high count indicated a more experienced career. Similarly, the injury score was used to measure the frequency and severity of injuries suffered.

### 4.2.3 THE QUALITATIVE STUDY

#### *Participant observation*

The qualitative study ran concurrently with the quantitative study. While the latter was designed to measure participant behaviour during encounters and collect situational variables, the former was designed to collect descriptive encounter narratives using participant observation. The purpose of generating a narrative account of conflict resolution was to build a deeper understanding of why officers chose to behave in a particular way during encounters. The quantitative study measured behaviour in an abstract sense. While it provided an opportunity to measure variances between the practice of RAP and RUP officers in the study, it did not provide an opportunity to explore the motivation, rationale, or inherent prejudice that may be present in officer behaviour.

#### *Participant Interviews*

The qualitative study incorporated in-depth interviews with a proportionate number of officer-participants from each research site. The selection of interview questions followed Wengraf's CRQ-TQ-IQ algorithm: where the central research question informs the selection of theory-questions (TQ) which are then used to inform the interview questions (IQ) (2001, pp.63-64). In the present research, eight interview questions were derived from three theory questions.

The first TQ considered the findings of Muir (1977) and Hochstedler (1981) (and others), who proposed that police officer personalities can be grouped into typologies. Three interview questions were framed to prompt interviewees to consider if there were correlations between officer personality and behavioural preferences when dealing with conflict situations. These questions are as follows:

IVQ1: What kinds of incidents give you the most satisfaction as a police officer? What is it about these incidents that makes them satisfying?<sup>12</sup>

IVQ2: When you are on patrol, either on foot or in a vehicle, what type of event would cause you to stop and intervene?

IVQ3: Do you see any differences in the way you attempt to resolve conflict compared to the way other officers you work with?

The second TQ was linked to the proposition that officers behave in a manner which they think is the ‘best’, ‘effective’ and/or ‘appropriate’ way to resolve conflict (e.g. Bayley & Garofalo 1989; Braithwaite 1998). The following interview questions were designed to elicit a response to establish their individual preference for ways to react to conflict situations.

IVQ4: How did you learn to resolve conflict when dealing with members of the public?

IVQ5: Describe an encounter where you witnessed effective conflict resolution tactics being used. (This can be either your own encounter or an encounter you have observed).

IVQ6: Describe an encounter where you witnessed ineffective conflict resolution tactics used. (This can be either your own encounter or an encounter you have observed).

The third TQ related to the proposition that the manner of an officer’s initial approach to a citizen was pre-determined based on an officer’s assessment of service-entitlement and this will change if an officer’s assessment of entitlement changes (e.g. see Lipsky 1980). For instance, the service-entitlement for a victim of a crime, a witness to a crime, and a suspect of a crime will differ, as will the situation when a witness becomes a suspect and vice versa. Do officers, then, attempt to resolve conflict differently when they deal with victims, witnesses, or offenders?

IVQ7: From time to time, police officers run into situations where someone is a bully. What do you think is the best way to deal with a bully?<sup>13</sup>

IVQ8: When thinking about when you attempt to resolve conflict, please provide an example when you think it would be appropriate to use communication tactics (such as talking) and when it would be appropriate to use coercive tactics (such as physical force)?

It was intended that all officer-participants would be interviewed at the end of each shift. However, this proved to be problematic during the pilot study. Not only was it difficult to generate enthusiasm among the officer-participants at the end of shift (with times varying be-

---

<sup>12</sup> Adapted from Snipes and Mastrofski (1990).

<sup>13</sup> Adapted from Snipes and Mastrofski (1990).

tween 1am and 7am), officers appeared to be mentally fatigued. As a result, officer answers to the questions were short and sometimes lacked depth. During the research proper, only a selection of officers were interviewed.

#### 4.2.4 THE PILOT STUDY

As outlined above, the present research incorporated a pilot study prior to staging the research proper. Pilot studies provide an opportunity for researchers to practice the skills required to collect empirical data, provide an opportunity for the researcher to become familiarised with the research environment, and provide an opportunity to test the suitability and effectiveness of the chosen research methods (Sarantakos 2012). Furthermore, the pilot study provided an opportunity to test the suitability of the stations at the research sites. The pilot also provided an opportunity for the researcher—as a practitioner-researcher—to identify any emergent issues for the researcher as ‘an employee’ of the research environment, such as risks to the researcher’s independence and freedom, risks associated with involving work colleagues as research participants, and any ethical or legal issues.

##### *Testing of Braithwaite’s taxonomy*

A primary consideration of the pilot was to test the suitability and utility of Braithwaite’s system to measure participant behaviour. During the research pilot, it became apparent that changes were necessary. The first variation reflected the need to create a behavioural state to mark the absence of an officer (when an officer left the encounter) and the absence of any behavioural tactic (i.e. “doing nothing”). As the coding structure was exhaustive and mutually exclusive, a participant’s absence or inactivity needed to be recorded in an event log. The absence of an officer was a common occurrence during the encounters—such as when an officer left to speak to another party involved in the incident. Similarly, it was difficult to find an applicable behavioural code when neither of the citizens or officers was engaged in any ‘overt’ behaviour. This frequently occurred when officers and citizens were waiting. For example, two officers and a citizen were waiting in a hospital lobby for a medical practitioner; all three waited together in silence. The citizen was not in custody but had agreed to be transported for a voluntary mental health assessment. Officers stood in silence not displaying any controlling behaviour (other than the implicit control exercised through their presence). As such, new

behavioural states of *citizen-passive* and *officer-passive* were added to the taxonomy.<sup>14</sup> Similarly, an ‘absent’ behaviour was added denote when any of the participants left the field of observation. The second variation reflected the need to record the complexity of control statements adequately. During the New Zealand phase of the pilot, the three control statements (*control affect*, *control conversation*, and *control environment*) were coded under the single category *control statement*. But after reviewing the data before the South Australian phase of the pilot, the conflated category was too broad. These categories were separated into the original three variants for the South Australian phase.

The presence of multiple citizens at an encounter was problematic. For instance, when officers responded to a domestic incident there were times during the PCE when they would often interact with both the victim and the suspect simultaneously. When officers spoke to one citizen, then to another, the encounter had to be divided into two sequential encounters in *Pocket Observer*. When officers had to deal with more than one citizen concurrently, the coding became more cumbersome. These situations occurred in public spaces where incidents involved large numbers of people. As a result, v1.2 of the *Pocket Observer* protocol was amended to allow the provision to code the behaviour of two citizens concurrently.

Nonetheless, the measurement of behaviour frequency and duration by each participant during encounters provided a quantifiable description of conflict resolution behaviour used by officers. From these data, datasets were created to compare the behaviours between the two research sites (NZC and SAC) and among the different encounter types (such as investigative and enforcement encounters). Variations in behaviour among these groups informed the analysis.

### 4.3 Data collection methods

The research design incorporated several methods to collect data from three data sources: encounters, officers and citizens. Quantitative encounter data was collected using Braithwaite’s system to measure conflict-resolution behaviours and SSO to record situational variables. These data were supplemented with qualitative data sourced from participant observation. While these encounter narratives included descriptions of officer and citizen behaviour, quantitative data were also collected using SSO. Participant demographics and characteristics were

---

<sup>14</sup> The “passive” state is now referred to as “inactive” in subsequent chapters.

captured using SSO. Further officer data were collected using participant interviews and psychometric testing. The relationship between the methods and sources are shown in Figure 4.




Figure 4. Data collection methods

#### 4.3.1 ENCOUNTERS

##### *Encounter behaviours - Pocket observer*

Encounter behaviours were collected using Noldus' *Pocket Observer* v.3.2<sup>15</sup> (Noldus Information Technology 2014b). It was a mobile application designed to be used in the field to code behavioural interactions (Noldus 1991). It served as a datalogger slave to the desktop computer program *Observer XT* (Noldus Information Technology 2014a) and coded data in real-time according to the behavioural schema that had been programmed into *Observer XT*.

*Pocket Observer's* interface provided the user with options to start, suspend, or stop an observation. At the beginning of an encounter, the user touched the start button on the touch screen to create an event log. Each line of the event log stored a subject code and subject behaviour; the first entries recorded the initial behaviour as <INITIAL CIT> for a citizen-participant or <INITIAL OFF> for an officer-participant (as shown in the left-hand image at Figure 5). The

<sup>15</sup> Pocket Observer is an application that runs on the Android platform. During the pilot study, and the subsequent quantitative study, the application was used on a Samsung Galaxy Pro 5 device.

next action required the allocation of the subject for which the behavioural state was observed—shown as <OFFICER 1>, <OFFICER 2>, <CITIZEN 1> or <CITIZEN 2> in the bottom half of the left screen image of Figure 5. After a subject was selected, the program displayed the possible behavioural states (centre image of Figure 5). The program indicated the current state displayed as a blue box. To change the behavioural state, the operator touched the appropriate grey box. This action coded the behaviour to the event log (shown in the right-hand image of Figure 5) and completed the subject-behaviour coding sequence. Once coded, the program reverted to the subject selection screen (left image) and stayed ready for the next subject-behaviour to be coded. The subject-behaviour sequence coded to the event log included a timestamp and remained active until another behaviour was coded to the log or the encounter was stopped.




Figure 5. Screen captures of Noldus' Pocket Observer: subject selection (left); behaviour selection (centre); event log (right).<sup>16</sup>

Behaviours were coded in the same sequence which they were observed. Thus, the event log contained a continuous sequence of behaviour data which included the subject identifier, the behaviour of the subject, and the start time of the coding entry. The subject-behaviour coding took approximately 1–5 seconds from the time the researcher observed the behaviour, decide on how to code the observed behaviour, and select the correct sequence of the application's subject and behaviour buttons. It was also possible to code ad-hoc comments to the event log (such as the “searching” comment shown above). Once the encounter had ended, a further

<sup>16</sup> Screen shots captured from the author's device.



input screen was displayed to record independent variables to the event log. Variables included the unique identifying code number of the “ride along”, the encounter, and the citizen and officer codes for those present. At the end of an encounter, the data can be transferred from *Pocket Observer* and imported into *Observer XT*.

### *Encounter variables and narratives*

At the end of the encounter, situational variables relating to the encounter and subjects were recorded on a second hand-held device using the *Qualtrics Surveys* mobile application (Qualtrics Labs, Inc. 2014).<sup>17</sup> Variables included time, date and location details, event-type variables, occurrence variables, and actions taken (see Figure 6). *Qualtrics Surveys* functioned as a slave to *Qualtrics Research Suite* website (Qualtrics Labs, Inc. 2002) transferring data directly to the Qualtrics website through the Vodafone data network. When there was insufficient data network coverage to transfer the data, it was held pending on the device and transferred later.

Figure 6. Screen captures of the Qualtrics Offline Survey Application screen (left) and Evernote's note screen (right)

Narrative information was annotated electronically using the computer program *Evernote* (Evernote Corporation 2007). *Evernote* comprised of two parts: a mobile application installed on a smartphone device and a computer program located on a laptop computer. Data entered

<sup>17</sup> At the beginning of the pilot study, situational variables were annotated on a paper form ESF-EF (see Appendix). However, it was discovered that an electronic form was more convenient and durable than the paper form. It was difficult to handwrite annotations on the paper form while travelling in the rear of the patrol vehicle, but the electronic form was easily completed during vehicular travel. The paper form also required lighting to read the form. The electronic form did not need a light source and text entry was easier to “tap” in using the application onscreen keyboard.

into one automatically synchronised to the other through a wireless or mobile network connection. *Evernote* was used at the completion of an encounter to store a short narrative of events (as shown on the right in Figure 6). This document also included a timestamp and GPS location data. When the shadowed patrol returned to the police station (i.e. at the end of the shift or if working inside the police station), the researcher was able to expand the narrative sketch into a detailed case narrative.

The purpose of the case narrative was for it to act as the contemporaneous field note of the events which occurred during the encounter. As Marks (2003) described, field-notes comprise of observations and reflections on the interactions observed during the research, as well as the personal reflections, thoughts and emotions of the researcher. Indeed, the latter may contain theoretical discussion or insights described such as those described as memos by Glaser and Strauss (1999). Details relating to the patrol shift being observed were recorded on a paper form (see the ESF-SIF paper form in the appendix). A new form was used for each shift and recorded the shift code number, the codes of participating officers, the shift date, start and finish times, and listed the identification codes of any encounter that was coded for behavioural analysis.

#### 4.3.2 OFFICERS

##### *Officer psychometrics*

The BFI and Resistance tests were self-administered using *Qualtrics Research Suite* (Qualtrics Labs, Inc. 2014). A project portal was created within *Qualtrics Research Suite* to administer the tests. The project portal was protected by a password only known to the researcher. *Qualtrics Research Suite* operated on the internet using the encrypted https protocol. Once an officer agreed to participate, their code number and email address were inputted into the *Qualtrics Research Suite*. On activation, a unique link was generated and by email to the officer. Each test was presented as a separate questionnaire. Officers chose which questionnaire to attempt first. They began with an instruction page, requiring officers to enter their unique code number and a password before commencing the questionnaire. At the completion of the questionnaire, the officers' responses were saved to the researcher's project portal.

The BFI used 44 questions to assess a participant's personality across five factors: extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to experience. Participants

responded using a 5-part Likert scale. For each question the participant responds with one of the following answers: disagree strongly, disagree a little, neither agree nor disagree, agree a little, or agree strongly. The 44 questions were arranged in four blocks of 11 questions; each block was displayed to the participant by *Qualtrics Research Suite* randomly.

The second test asked officers to identify levels of physical resistance experienced during encounters with citizens throughout their police career. The resistance questionnaire prompted the officer to score the level of physical resistance experienced during the most recent incidence of a police-orientated event. The question asked if the officer had attended such an event and if so, to indicate if an arrest was made, the number of other officers and citizens present, and the level of any physical resistance towards the officer used by any citizens present. The questionnaire contained 32 different patrol activities which were displayed by *Qualtrics Research Suite* in a random sequence.

### *Officer interviews*

Interviews were held in a private room. They followed a semi-structured format and comprised of eight questions (as shown in the PIS attached in the Appendix). The interviews were recorded on a digital audio recorder and stored on a secured server.

### 4.3.3 CITIZENS

#### *Citizen demographics*

Data were collected about each citizen involved in the encounter using *Qualtrics Surveys*. All citizens involved in an encounter were given a unique identifier. These data included citizens' demographic information, as it appeared to the researcher, actions of the citizen made towards the officer(s), officer(s) actions towards the citizen, emotional states of the citizen, and the final police actions taken with the citizen.<sup>18</sup>

### 4.3.4 PILOT STUDY EVALUATION

As mentioned above, one of the primary functions of the pilot study was to test and evaluate the research methods chosen and data collection processes. The pilot was successful and

---

<sup>18</sup> As with the encounter situational variables, paper versions of the ESF-CIF forms used at the beginning of the pilot study were converted to electronic form. Citizen codes began with CA001 for those at SAC and CN001 for those at NZC. The CN prefix was applied after the fieldwork as the previous prefix was closely associated with the actual name of the research site. "N" was adopted to denote New Zealand.

proved that Braithwaite's system could accurately measure differences between officer behaviour (despite the need for modifications to the behavioural taxonomy and the *Observer XT* setup).

### *Pocket Observer*

The collection of behavioural data followed a similar approach to Braithwaite (1998). Each encounter observed during the pilot was observed *in situ*. Before the beginning of an encounter, the researcher activated *Pocket Observer*, and it remained in a ready state awaiting the 'start observation' command. Once an encounter began, it was easy to start the observation in *Pocket Observer* and assign initial behavioural states. This worked well when officers responded to an event that had been dispatched; activation was possible before the initial behaviour being observed began without loss of time or behavioural state changes. The process was also successful for officer-initiated encounters as the application as *Pocket Observer* could be activated before the first behavioural exchange. However, this process was problematic when citizens approached officers without forewarning. This occurred regularly when officers were on foot patrol at SAC. In one example a citizen behind an officer called out to an officer for assistance. In these circumstances, a latency of 1–5 seconds was incurred in the event log while the *Pocket Observer* was activated, and the observation initiated.

At the time of the New Zealand pilot, the researcher had not used *Pocket Observer* in the field. As there was no objective test that measured competence, or an alternate researcher to compare coding decisions (such as an inter-operator reliability test used by Braithwaite), the assessment of competence was measured subjectively. Aside from a lack of familiarity with the mobile application, the most significant risk to reliability identified by the researcher was coding latency. Coding latency was the time lag between the researcher's observation of a participant's behaviour, the cognitive assessment required to identify the appropriate or best match to the behavioural taxonomy, and the selection of the appropriate touch screen button on the handheld device (Grieco *et al.* 2015). Latency was minimal for coding initial actions and physical actions; it was easy to visually determine that a physical action had occurred. However, the researcher regarded latency to increase when interpreting non-*information-exchange*-type conversations, such as control statements. At times, the determination of the behaviour was not apparent until a question or statement had been made.

While latency posed problems for the accuracy of temporal measurement, it was not problematic for frequency data; a lag in the coding of a behaviour did not interfere with an accurate count of a behaviour. Similarly, as *Pocket Observer* had an <UNDO> button, mistaken coding could be corrected. While a correction would not affect frequency data, it did result in the temporal delay of inserting the timestamp of the new coded behaviour on the event log. Frequency data, though, could be corrupted if there was a rapid change from one behavioural state to another if the researcher was unable to correctly log the behaviours due to error, confusion, or ‘missing’ the occurrence of the behaviour. This became an issue in one encounter in the New Zealand pilot during an intense argument between two officers and one citizen.

Despite the absence of a documented competency and accuracy test, the researcher determined that the New Zealand pilot had provided an adequate period of familiarisation with the mobile application and competency in coding the observed behaviours. This was confirmed at the beginning of the South Australian pilot where the researcher did not identify any further coding complications or dilemmas.

### *Officer interactivity*

At the beginning of an encounter, there was uncertainty as to whether one or both officers would interact with the citizen or citizens. In some encounters, one officer acted as the primary point of contact with the citizen with the other officer in an inactive role: ‘officer 1’ questioned the citizen while ‘officer 2’ remained silent. Yet in some other encounters both officers would interact directly with a citizen or citizens, or ‘officer 1’ started questioning a citizen but then left the encounter leaving a silent ‘officer 2’ to take over questioning. In Braithwaite’s analytical framework, officers were seen as separate functional agents: “target officer” and “partner” (1998, p.130). However, in the present pilot study, officers did not necessarily—or exclusively—interact with citizens in a primary or secondary manner. As the behaviour of ‘officer 1’ and ‘officer 2’ does not represent actions of specific roles (such as primary/secondary or contact/cover dyad) analysis of the present research combines the behaviour of ‘officer 1’ and ‘officer 2’ as cumulative ‘patrol’ behaviour.

### *Officer workload*

The initial research protocol assumed that officer-participants would complete the two psychometric questionnaires at the beginning of the shift before being dispatched or

commencing their patrol. However, one of the disadvantages of the sampling approach—oversampling busy shifts to increase the likelihood of conflict-prone encounters—is that often there was little spare time between the completion of the briefings before the shadowed patrol was required for service. As such, the protocol was changed so that officers completed the questionnaires during their downtime. Similarly, attempting to conduct an interview at the end of each shift was difficult. Not only was it difficult to generate enthusiasm among the officer-participants at the end of shift (with times varying between 1am and 7am), officers appeared to be mentally fatigued. As a result, officer answers to the questions were short and sometimes lacked depth.

## 4.4 The sample

### 4.4.1 RESEARCH ACCESS

At the time of the research, access to New Zealand Police data and personnel was governed by the Research and Evaluation Steering Committee. Access was subject to an internal peer-review and an assessment of the merit of the research, and the identification of an internal sponsor to host the research. A request was submitted to the committee in July 2013, which was provisionally accepted subject to refinement. A further submission was later rejected in August 2014, but final permission was provided in January 2015. The research was sponsored by a ‘southern’ police district. Similarly, research access to South Australian police was subject to an application to the research committee. Permission was provided in January 2015 for a pilot study, and full access granted in April 2015. Research access was limited to foot-based patrols within a metropolitan area of a provincial city.

### 4.4.2 SAMPLING: SHIFTS AND PATROLS

#### *Pilot study*

The pilot was staged over a four-week period during January and February 2015. It began in New Zealand and incorporated eight shifts at NZC: six evening-shifts and two night-shifts from Wednesday to Saturday over two weeks. A two-week break followed the shifts at NZC to review the initial data and consider the research method. The second part of the pilot com-

menced at SAC and incorporated four shifts: two evening shifts and two night-shifts from Wednesday to Saturday over one week.

The pilot involved 11 officers from NZC drawn from the public safety team (PST) at NZC station and 10 officers from the general duties patrol team (GDP) at SAC station. PST and GDP officers were general duties patrol officers whose primary aim was to respond to emergency calls for service and provide some proactive preventative patrols. Officers were selected according to the protocol shown in Figure 7. The pilot also involved 28 citizens from NZC and 15 from SAC.

### *Study proper*

Over a 21-week period from February to August 2015, 45 officers at NZC and 46 officers at SAC were shadowed during their routine patrol activities. The qualitative study continued the oversampling approach of the pilot to maximise the potential number of encounters which might provoke conflict resolution behaviour from the officers. During the NZ phase of the study proper, 48 shifts were observed: 42 evening shifts and six night-shifts; Thursdays, Fridays and Saturdays were the most frequent. The SA phase comprised of 37 shifts: 33 evening-shifts and four night-shifts;<sup>19</sup> Thursday, Friday and Saturday were the most frequent nights observed (see Table 4.4.1).

Table 4.4.1. Patterns of shifts observed

		New Zealand City		South Australian City		
		N	Percent	N	Percent	
Shift Team	NZC A	8	16.7	SAC T	4	10.8
	NZC B	11	22.9	SAC U	4	10.8
	NZC C	8	16.7	SAC V	5	13.5
	NZC D	12	25.0	SAC W	5	13.5
	NZC E	9	18.8	SAC X	7	18.9
				SAC Y	5	13.5
				SAC Z	7	18.9
Weekday	Wednesday	8	16.7		1	2.7
	Thursday	11	22.9		11	29.7
	Friday	11	22.9		11	29.7
	Saturday	11	22.9		11	29.7
	Sunday	7	14.6		3	8.1
Shift type	Evening	42	87.5		33	89.2
	Night	6	12.5		4	10.8

<sup>19</sup> These totals include the SAC segment of the pilot study.

### *New Zealand City*

The New Zealand phase of the field research involved 11 weeks of participant observation with officers from the public safety team (PST) at NZC.<sup>20</sup> Their primary role was to respond to emergency calls for service, but they were also expected to perform some pro-active preventative activities. Members of the PST at NZC were arranged into five teams to provide a 24 hour, seven days per week service. Their shift pattern followed a 10-day pattern: officers worked two day-shifts, two evening-shifts, and then two night-shifts. At the completion of the six-day pattern, officers were rostered to have four days' rest. This ten-day pattern repeated over a 5-week period. The research occurred from Wednesday to Sunday during the evening- and night-shifts. Two shift selection patterns were used: five consecutive evening-shifts from Wednesday to Sunday (Pattern A), and two evening-shifts on a Wednesday and Thursday followed by two night-shifts on a Friday and Saturday (Pattern B). This two-week pattern repeated three times over the first six weeks. The observation of night shifts (Pattern B) was discontinued at that point when demand for service reduced. Pattern A recurred each week for the remaining portion of the NZC study.

### *South Australia City*

The South Australian phase of the field research comprised of 10 weeks with officers from the general duties patrol team (GDP) at SAC. Like the PST officers at NZC, the role of GDP officers was to respond to emergency calls for service. However, SAC officers were tasked to provide a foot-based 'beat' presence: officers in most cases would walk—or run—in response to calls for service. There were some occasions where SAC officers would respond by vehicle, such as responding with a 'custody vehicle' to transport an arrestee to custody.

GDP officers were organised into seven teams on a 24-hour, seven days per week roster. The shift cycle covered a seven-week pattern combining morning, afternoon, evening, and night shifts. At the beginning of the SAC phase, observational research occurred with a 'cover' shift that started in the late afternoon and ended after night shift had commenced. The research occurred from Thursday to Sunday.<sup>21</sup> This pattern was modified after the first week so that the Saturday observational period extended into early Sunday morning. This meant working half of the evening shift with one GDP team and switching to a new GDP team at the

---

<sup>20</sup> PST officers (formally known as General Duties Branch officers) played a similar role to those of North American 'patrol officers'.

<sup>21</sup> The roster of the cover shifts usually involved the following times: Thursday 1800–0230 hrs; Friday 1700–0130 hrs; Saturday 1500–2330 hrs; and Sunday 1500–2330 hrs.



start of the night shift at 2300 hrs. On four occasions, observations occurred during the complete night shift to coincide with scheduled extraordinary events. Observations were made of officers from all seven GDP teams.

#### 4.4.3 OFFICERS

The policing literature identifies the difficulties in ensuring voluntary participation of research subjects when the research subjects are sworn police officers (e.g. Marks 2003). The difficulty lies in that officers are obliged to accept lawful requests and directives of their direct supervisors. In the case of the New Zealand Police, such obligations are legislated (*Policing Act 2008* [NZ], S.30). In some police workgroups, where there is a high degree of informality, a supervisor's polite request can be interpreted as a directive, 'Constable, would you like to participate in some research?' As such, care has been taken to ensure that potential research officers are aware that their participation is voluntary.




Figure 7. Officer participation nomination and opt-in process

The officer selection process incorporates a nomination process and an 'opt-in' process as shown in Figure 7. At the beginning of each week, the supervisor of each rostered shift was

notified by the station senior sergeant (at NZC) or station inspector (at SAC) by email that their team roster coincided with a research project and invited the supervisor to nominate two officers to participate in the study. This email included the participant information sheet (PIS) and informed consent form (ICF). Supervisors then nominated two officers whom they believed would be interested in participating in the research.

At the beginning of the first shift, each patrol team was given an introductory briefing by the researcher. This briefing lasted about 10 minutes. After the team briefing, a further briefing occurred with the officers who had been nominated to participate. Advice that participation in the research was voluntary, and that although they were nominated by their supervisor, they did not have to participate in the research. The nominated officers were given a further opportunity to read the PIS and complete the ICF. Once the officers had consented to participate, their email address was added to the Qualtrics website application to generate hyperlinks to the two psychometric questionnaires.

The nomination and briefing process repeated each time the researcher first met the NZC teams and SAC teams. If the officers had not previously received the personal briefing or signed the ICF, time was taken to provide the briefing and complete the ICF. Throughout the research, all officers who had been nominated agreed to participate in the research. All participating officers signed the ICF.

As noted previously, it was originally conceived that all officer participants were to be interviewed. However, only a proportion of officers were interviewed. This approach is consistent with mixed-method sampling protocols. Morse (1991) explains that sub-sampling is effective when ‘good’ participants are selected rather than participants selected at random. Good participants are described as those who are the “most experienced and articulate” (Morse 1991, p.155). In the present case, an effort was made to select research participants who provided a gender balance with diverse levels of operational experience.

### *Demographics*

The research involved 91 officers from the two research sites. Table 4.4.2 indicates rank, sex, ethnicity, and age range of the sample. Most officer-participants were of the rank of constable (NZC=97.8%, SAC=87%). NZC had a slightly higher proportion of female officers than SAC (NZC=24.4%, SAC=19.6%). SAC had a slightly higher proportion of White/European officers than NZC (NZC=91.1%, SAC=95.7%). Ages ranged from 21–59 years or more. The Mann-

Whitney *U*-test found that the age range of officers was not significantly different in the two samples,  $U(n_1=45, n_2=46)=13,065$ , two tailed  $p=0.079$ . On average, SAC officers were involved in more encounters in the quantitative study ( $M=6.04$ ,  $SE=0.668$ ) than in NZC ( $M=5.73$ ,  $SE=0.623$ ). This difference  $-0.310$ , was not significant  $t(89) = -0.339$ ,  $p = 0.994$ , and the effect size was small,  $r = 0.036$ .

Table 4.4.2. Basic demographic information of officers ( $N_{NZ}=44$ ,  $N_{SA}=40$ )

		New Zealand City		South Australia City	
		N	%	N	%
Officer rank	Constable <sup>22</sup>	44	97.8	40	87.0
	Sergeant	1	2.2	5	10.9
	Senior Sergeant	0	0	0	0
	Inspector	0	0	1	2.2
Sex	Male	34	75.6	37	80.4
	Female	11	24.4	9	19.6
Ethnicity	White	41	91.1	44	95.7
	Maori	4	8.9	0	0
	Asian / Indian	0	0	1	2.2
	Other	0	0	1	2.2
	Aboriginal	0	0	0	0
Age Range	21–29	11	24.4	5	10.9
	30–44	30	66.7	34	73.9
	45–59+	4	8.9	7	15.2

### Psychometrics

Officer-participants were invited to complete the BFI questionnaire. The response rate was 80% ( $n=36$ ) at NZC and 76% ( $n=35$ ) at SAC. The BFI comprises of five personality factors: extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to experience. The test scores for each site are shown in Table 4.4.3. There were no statistically significant differences between the officers at NZC and SAC.

Table 4.4.3. Personality test scores for NZC officers ( $n=46$ ) and SAC officers ( $n=35$ )

	New Zealand City		South Australian City		t-value	df	p (two-tailed)
	M	SD	M	SD			
Extraversion	3.52	0.750	3.61	0.782	0.494	69	0.623
Agreeableness	3.99	0.500	3.80	0.617	-1.434	69	0.156
Conscientiousness	3.87	0.451	3.78	0.486	-0.805	69	0.424
Neuroticism	2.14	0.660	2.16	0.627	0.097	69	0.923
Openness	3.35	0.519	3.41	0.545	0.441	69	0.660

Officer-participants were also asked to identify levels of physical resistance experienced during encounters with citizens throughout their police career. Resistance was measured us-

<sup>22</sup> Unlike New Zealand Police, South Australian Police have several ranks within the constable rank: constable, senior constable, senior constable first class. The South Australian ranks have been grouped together under the 'constable' rank.

ing Wilson and Brewer's Resistance Questionnaire which used a six-point scale with options consisting of: *no contact with the offender* (1) (i.e., offender fleeing or fled vicinity or false alarm), *contact but no resistance – full compliance* (2), *verbal resistance* (e.g., abuse, argument) (3), *some minor struggling* (4), *assault police (no weapon)* (5), and *assault police with a weapon* (6) (Wilson & Brewer 1993). As proposed by Wilson and Brewer, the first option in the scale *no contact with the offender* was rescored from 1 to 0. Responses from officers are shown in Table 4.4.4. The response rate was 87% ( $n=39$ ) at NZC and 87% ( $n=40$ ) at SAC. After incomplete responses were removed (NZC=1, SAC=5) the final sample for analysis dropped to 84% ( $n=38$ ) at NZC and 76% ( $n=35$ ) at SAC.

The incident count is the sum of answers indicating that an officer had attended one of the 32 patrol activities. This statistic provides a basic measure of an officer's level of experience. The injury score indicates the level of injuries received by the officer associated with the patrol activities. Injury was measured on a four-point scale with options consisting of: *no injury* (0), *minor – self-administered first aid* (1), *minor – seen by paramedic* (2), or *serious – hospitalised* (3). The *resistance score* is the sum of the resistance levels reported by the officer per patrol activity.

Table 4.4.4. Resistance scores for NZC officers ( $n=38$ ) and SAC officers ( $n=35$ )

	New Zealand City		South Australian City		t-value	df	p (two-tailed)
	M	SD	M	SD			
Incident count	22.61	5.52	21.86	6.80	0.518	71	0.606
Injury score	0.53	1.06	0.63	1.00	-0.423	71	0.674
Resistance score	49.00	17.16	49.00	18.34	0.000	71	1.000

There were no significant differences between the two sites in the means of the three measures. The differences between the means of the *incident count*  $M_{NZ} = 22.61$  ( $SD_{NZ} = 5.52$ )  $M_{SA} = 22.86$  ( $SD_{SA} = 8.80$ ) were non-significant  $t(71) = 0.518$ ,  $p = 0.606$ . The mean range (range<sub>SA</sub>: 3–32, range<sub>NZ</sub>: 11–31) indicates that the least experienced officers from NZC had experienced a higher number of patrol activities (starting at 11 incidents) than the least experienced officers from SAC (starting at three incidents). The differences in the means of the *injury score* were non-significant  $t(71) = 0.518$ ,  $p = 0.606$ . There was no difference in the *resistance score* means.

### *Summary*

When comparing officers from NZC and SAC, there were no significant differences in officer age range, personality, levels of operational resistance, operational injury, or operational experience. There were a greater proportion of White/European SAC officers than NZC officers. NZC had a slightly greater proportion of female officers than SAC. SAC officers were involved in a greater number of encounters per officer than NZC officers, but this difference was not statistically significant.

#### 4.4.4 CITIZENS

The qualitative study involved 358 citizens across the two research sites ( $N_{NZ}=183$ ,  $N_{SA}=175$ ).<sup>23</sup> Unlike the sampling protocol for officers, it was impossible to predetermine or select a citizen's involvement in the research. Consequently, when a PCE commenced data was collected on the basis that citizens would have the opportunity to 'opt-out' of the research. Citizens who were assessed as being under the influence of illicit drugs or alcohol, those who displayed behaviour that indicated they were suffering from a mental illness or disorder, and those citizens who were not of adult age (as determined by legislation) were assumed to be unable to provide informed consent. Despite the lack of ability to confer informed consent, data from these citizens were incorporated into the dataset. As the present research sought to examine the interactions between officers and citizens who were intoxicated, mentally disordered, or otherwise vulnerable, it was deemed necessary to include (and counterproductive to exclude) encounters in the dataset.

Similarly, it was not deemed practical, nor safe in some cases, to administer psychometric tests to participant-citizens. As such, there was an absence of citizen personality data or detailed histories of prior interactions with police. Some citizen demographics (Table 4.4.5) and situational factors (Table 4.4.6) were coded by the observer at the completion of each encounter: age, ethnicity, and sex were assessed visually by the researcher; citizen role reflected the officers' actions; and degrees of intoxication, mental state, suicidal or self-harm indicators, physical injuries were coded on the basis of visual or behavioural cues. The level of the officers' knowledge of the citizen was determined at the end of the PCE.

---

<sup>23</sup> This excludes two citizens who refused to provide consent by opting out.

### Demographics

There were variations in citizen demographics between the two research sites. The SAC sample comprised of a higher cohort of suspects (37.1%) and enforcementees<sup>24</sup> (49.6%) than the NZC sample (17.5% and 33.9% respectively). The NZC sample had a higher proportion of victims (36.6%) and witnesses (6.6%) than the SAC sample (5.7% and 0% respectively). Citizen roles were attributed based on the final disposition made by officers. For instance, a citizen reporting a crime was classified as a *victim* or a *witness*. Citizens who were investigated, such as at a stop and search or vehicle stop, but were not warned or proceeded against were coded as a *suspect*. Citizens who received a criminal justice sanction, such as an arrest, warning, or issued with an instant fine, were coded accordingly. In some cases, citizen roles changed as the encounter progressed. In these situations, the citizen is coded according to the final classification. For instance, a citizen may have been initially classified initially as a suspect but after an investigation classified as a victim.

Table 4.4.5. Basic demographic information of citizens ( $N_{NZ}=183$ ,  $N_{SA}=175$ )

		New Zealand City			South Australia City		
		N	Sample Percentage	Census Percentage	N	Sample Percentage	Census Percentage
Citizen role	Victim	67	36.6		10	5.7	
	Witness	12	6.6		0	0	
	Suspect	32	17.5		65	37.1	
	Associate	10	5.5		9	5.1	
	Bystander	0	0		4	2.3	
	Enforcement	(62)	(33.9)		(87)	(49.6)	
	Field arrest	38	20.8		23	13.1	
	Field action	6	3.3		34	19.4	
	Field warning	18	9.8		30	17.1	
Sex	Male	96	52.5		142	81.1	
	Female	87	47.5		33	18.9	
Ethnicity	Caucasian (White/European)	148	80.9	83.2	129	73.7	83.8
	Māori	27	14.8	7.0	0	0	0.1
	Asian / Indian	5	2.7	2.7	6	3.4	8.1
	Pacifica	3	1.6	1.6	0	0	0.1
	Other	0	0	0	15	8.6	1.1
	Aboriginal	0	0	0	25	14.3	0.1
Age Range	12–16	10	5.5		7	4.0	
	17–20	13	7.1		25	14.3	
	21–29	58	31.7		69	39.4	
	30–44	28	15.3		31	17.7	
	45–59	65	35.5		43	24.6	
	60+	9	4.9		0	0	

<sup>24</sup> The Enforcement category is a combination of arrested, field action, and field warning categories. The frequencies and percentages in parenthesis are the combined totals of these three categories.

The proportion of citizen-participants' sex was more balanced at NZC (male=52.5%, female=47.5%) whereas at SAC there was a higher proportion of males (male=81.1%, female=18.9%). The apparent ethnicity of the citizens was predominately White/European at each site. Ethnicity at NZC was Caucasian (80.9%), Māori (14.8%), Asian/Indian (2.7%), and Pacifica (1.6%) whereas the ethnicity at SAC was Caucasian (73.7%), Aboriginal (14.3%), Middle Eastern (8.6%), and Asian/Indian (3.4%). The citizens' age range was 12–60 years or more. The Mann-Whitney *U*-test found that the age range of citizens in the NZC sample was significantly older than the SAC sample,  $U(n_1=183, n_2=175)=13,065$ , two tailed  $p=0.002$ .

### *Variables*

Citizen-participant variables are shown in Table 4.4.6. Fewer citizens at NZC displayed intoxicated behaviour than those at SAC. The measurement scale relied on a subjective assessment, where the researcher considered visual or behavioural indications of impairment.<sup>25</sup> At NZC, 69.4% of citizens displayed no degree of behavioural impairment due to intoxication (including when there was evidence of consumption), 14.8% were slightly impaired, 15.3% were strongly impaired, and 0.5% ( $n=1$ ) was unconscious. This differed at SAC where 32.6% of citizens displayed no degree of behavioural impairment, 50.3% were slightly impaired, 16% were strongly impaired, and 1.2% ( $n=2$ ) were unconscious.

Table 4.4.6. Citizen characteristics ( $N_{NZ}=183$ ,  $N_{SA}=175$ )

		NZC		SAC	
		N	%	N	%
Indication of intoxication (drugs or alcohol)	Nil	116	63.4	40	22.9
	Indication of consumption – no impairment	11	6.0	17	9.7
	Slight impairment	27	14.8	88	50.3
	Strong impairment	28	15.3	28	16.0
	Unconscious	1	0.5	2	1.1
Indication of Mental Illness		25	13.7	11	6.3
Displayed Suicidal behaviour		9	4.9	1	0.6
Indication of physical injury	nil	175	95.6	172	98.3
	minor	7	3.8	3	1.7
	serious	1	0.5	0	0.0
Indication of self-harm	reasonable suspicion	4	2.2	1	0.6
	evidence	3	1.6	0	0.0
Officer prior knowledge of citizen	No knowledge – stranger	144	78.7	140	80.0
	Recognises or knows (not detailed)	11	6.0	5	2.8
	Knows by name	14	7.6	9	5.1
	Knows well	1	0.5	1	0.6
	Knows very well, circumstances, offences etc.	13	7.1	20	11.4

<sup>25</sup> It was not possible to measure citizens' breath or blood alcohol level.

NZC had a higher percentage of citizens who behaved as if they had a mental illness, admitted having had a mental illness, or officers were aware that they had a mental illness (13.7%) than those at SAC (6.3%). Similarly, NZC had a higher percentage of citizens who displayed suicidal behaviour (NZC=4.9%,  $n=9$ ; SAC=0.6,  $n=1$ ) and those who self-harmed (NZC=3.8%,  $n=7$ ; SAC=0.6,  $n=1$ ). NZC also had a higher percentage of citizens who were injured (NZC=4.3%,  $n=8$ ; SAC=1.7,  $n=3$ ). In both research sites, most citizens were not known to officers (NZC=78.7%, SAC=80%).

### *Summary*

There was a greater variety of characteristics and demographics between the NZC and SAC citizens. At NZC there was more witness- and victim-encounters than at SAC whereas SAC had a greater proportion of suspect- and offenders-encounters. NZC also had a greater number of citizens with apparent mental health illnesses, more than twice that of SAC, and a greater number of citizens who had self-harmed. The proportion of the citizen's sex was more balanced at NZC, whereas at SAC only 19% of citizens were female. The citizens at NZC were statistically significantly older than the citizens at SAC. There was less variance among the apparent ethnicities. The proportion of Caucasian citizens was similar at both research sites (NZC=81%, SAC=74%) as was the proportion of indigenous peoples (Māori at NZC=15%; Aboriginal at SAC=14%).

## 4.5 Reliability and validity

### 4.5.1 PRACTITIONER-BASED RESEARCH

The present research comes from an interpretivist philosophy with a twist of a practitioner's perspective. While Waddington's (1999) critique of research about police culture provides a useful reminder to consider the bias of non-practitioner research, Creswell (2014) draws attention to the importance of being aware of how any researcher's personal background and experience may affect their research. This last section of the chapter includes a brief reflection about the role of practitioner-research research within the present research.



### *Piercing the protective shield*

Debate exists among researchers about the value of practitioner-led research. Practitioner-led research is common outside of policing, such as in education, health-care (e.g. Reed & Procter 1995) and social work (e.g. Broad & Fletcher 1993). Incongruent with the positivist philosophy, practitioner-led research may indeed discover alternative descriptions of phenomena to those constructed by non-practitioners.

Divisions between practitioner-led and non-practitioner-led research about the police and police practice are apparent in the research literature. Non-practitioners have commented on the difficulty of conducting police research, particularly in obtaining access to conduct research and overcoming sensitivities of ‘occupational secrecy’ (van Maanen 1978), but also reflecting on the utility and relevance of research objectives (Cain 1973) which then may survive scrutiny (Waddington 1999), and dealing with ethical conundrums (van Hulst 2013; Norris 1993; Punch 1979). Practitioner researchers also encounter challenges. Holdaway (1983) and Young (1991), both sworn officers at the time of their research encountered resistance from police supervisors, who questioned the relevance of their research and their suitability to conduct research of their peers in the field.<sup>26</sup> Yet Holdaway and Young were able to ‘dig deep’ into police practice and reveal insights into police ‘work’ that may have been unobtainable by non-practitioners. Holdaway’s work documented how the lower ranked uniform officers understood and carried out that work. As a police supervisor, conducting covert ethnography, he reflected that he was able to “pierce [the] protective shield” held by officers so that he could develop an understanding their occupational culture of ‘common sense’ (Holdaway 1983, pp.2-5). Young, too, was able to explore the workplace norms of detective constables. He extolled the importance of ‘inside analysis’, squaring criticism at the previous ethnographers of police practice noting their failure to discern data that was “locked away in the heads of police officers” (Young 1991, p.19).

As such, it is important to consider the validity of their research with a degree of scepticism. Conclusions drawn from the policing literature oeuvre need to be tempered with an appreciation of the researcher’s background, experiences, and level of penetration into ‘police society’. As the very nature of policing is interpretative—officers interpret their environs and make decisions based on their interpretations—so too is the study of policing: the interpreta-

---

<sup>26</sup> Both Holdaway and Young pursued degrees in sociology and anthropology, not legal degrees which the police hierarchy attributed greater legitimacy and utility to (Holdaway 1983; Young 1991).

tion of an interpretative activity can surely lead to misinterpretation and false interpretation. Cockcroft (2013) notes that a large amount of policing research suffers as a result of the failure of the researcher to understand their own political or cultural bias, or even how their life experience affects their ethnographic experience.

#### 4.5.2 RELIABILITY OF THE PRESENT RESEARCH

As noted above, the present research approach originates from an interpretivist philosophy, where the description and measurement of behaviour rely on the investigator's interpretation of behaviour. Interpretivists assume that reality is socially constructed and suggest that interpretation is shaped by the background of the researcher (Bloomberg & Volpe 2015). When designing the research, it was anticipated that a mixed-method design would provide a mechanism—through triangulation—to reduce the risk of researcher bias and researcher misinterpretation. The design also provided a balanced analytical framework: inductive qualitative inquiry contextualised with a quantitative assessment of behaviour.

The design was a cross-sectional, non-experimental descriptive study. It was intended to detect any variation of behaviour between the research sites, if variations existed, rather than to test a hypothesis. The internal validity of non-experimental designs is susceptible to threats from extraneous variables (O'Dwyer & Bernauer 2013, p.163). Potential threats to the present study included the risk of sampling officer-participants who had worked in both research sites, cultural differences between research sites, and the repeated observations of officers. A further challenge for the research was to ensure that any advantage afforded to the researcher due to a membership role (i.e. privileged access to data or the ability to 'pierce the protective shield') remained balanced to limit researcher bias.

One consequence of the cross-national design of the study provided an opportunity for the researcher to consider any implicit advantage afforded as an 'insider-insider' within the New Zealand Police, with the 'outside-insider-ish' relationship within the South Australian Police. This was apparent by the limitation of patrol mode during the fieldwork. While the choice of the station within each research site was limited to the availability of a suitably-sized station, the ability to conduct fieldwork at SAC was constrained by operational concerns. As a result, fieldwork at SAC was limited to beat patrols. At NZC, fieldwork incorporated beat and vehicular patrols thus complicating comparative data analysis. For instance, comparisons with the encounter dataset were hampered by disparities of encounter types (e.g. *investigative* vs

*enforcement* encounters) and SAC encounters did not include a sufficient quantity of victim-encounters. These disparities reduced the ability for corroboration of the presence of controlling behaviours in the NZC encounter dataset.

### *Observer bias and data corruption*

Spano (2005) suggested that observational research of police may suffer from observer bias: confusion and error as a result of culture shock; error and cutting corners due to fatigue and burnout; losing objectivity through going native. Furthermore, the presence of the observer in the police environment may change the normal behaviour of the research subjects due to reactivity (Spano 2006). It is assumed that these risks have been somewhat mitigated in the present research as it practitioner-led. Harvey *et al.* (2008) provide a degree of assurance that the live coding of human behavioural can be robust, although reactivity is common in studies that include direct human observation, it's "impact on validity is often minimal" (2008, p.19), and that reactivity can have very little impact on the measurement of behavioural data.

The issue of data accuracy was considered at the time of research design. The triangulation of data methods (see Krefting 1991, p.219) was used to strengthen the external validity of the research. Similarly, it was hoped that by employing more than one data collection method would mitigate any inherent deficiencies. In the present study, data of behaviour was collected in two ways. The quantitative study used statistical analysis to describe officer behaviour and was sufficient to identify variations in behaviour between the sites. The behaviour of the research participants was analysed in two ways: the frequency of occurrence and the duration of behaviours. The qualitative study incorporated systematic social observation and participant observation to complement the quantitative data.

The literature suggests that the potential effect that that observers have on research participants diminishes over time (e.g. Harvey *et al.* 2008). Simply put, officers become acclimatised to being observed and either 'forget' they are being observed or fails to continue to 'pretend' to behave in the manner they wish to portray to the observer. During the present research, there were no obvious changes in participant behaviour that were called into question that behaviours were deliberately being altered for the purposes of the research. During discussions with research participants and their first line supervisors at SAC, comments were alluded to that officers had become accustomed to being observed through an increase in ad-hoc filming of officer behaviour by citizens, the extensive CCTV facilities in the entertainment

zone (often used by officers as an investigative aid), and a present trial of body-worn cameras occurring at the station. Surveillance of officers from NZC station was less sophisticated. Although officers were accustomed to being filmed by citizens, they appeared more cautious of being observed than the officers at SAC.

### *The pilot*

The pilot study had two key objectives. The first was to test if the ‘Braithwaite model’ and other software applications would provide a sufficient platform to detect variances of officer-participant behaviour between the two research sites. After reviewing the initial pilot data, it was found that the taxonomy (after modification) was sufficient for such an analysis.<sup>27</sup> Second, it provided an opportunity to improve researcher capability, including building familiarity with the research sites, their environments, and data collection techniques.

The data collection tools proved effective and robust: no data was lost during the pilot (or the proper study). In some encounters, officers separated to speak to different citizens. The separation created some definitional difficulties for the researcher. The immediate dilemma was to decide which of the two officers should be followed to code. This became problematic when officers were dispatched to a verbal domestic incident between two citizens. In most cases, it was determined to observe the person who was *most likely* to have the greatest potential for conflict. In practicality, a very quick decision was required to choose which citizen to observe. Often the decision was made on the basis of which citizen might be the most emotional of those present during the encounter, or a citizen who was identified as the suspect or offender.

## 4.6 Research Ethics

The present research followed the ethical principles for research set out by the British Society of Criminology and were approved by the Institute of Criminology Research Ethics Committee.

---

<sup>27</sup> During the pilot, two further behavioural states (*inactive* and *absent*) were added to the coding schema. While these states are not truly active conflict resolution behaviours, their omission caused difficulties during the live coding process using the *Observer XT* system.

### *Informed consent*

Two protocols were adopted when obtaining informed consent from research subjects. While the involvement of officers could be predetermined before a shift commenced the identification of citizens was not apparent until an encounter had begun. This ‘opt-in’ process for officers followed British Society of Criminology guidelines. Efforts were made by the researcher to ensure that participation was voluntary, officers were provided with accurate information about the research and were given the opportunity to consent to participate. Officers were afforded the opportunity to read the project brief and Participant Information Sheet<sup>28</sup> before beginning the shadowed patrol. Data collected during encounters comprised of actions and behaviour of officers and citizens. These data were collected to measure and describe *how* officers resolve conflict. Interviews and questionnaires were used to identify a context for *why* officers might behave in particular ways. As such, the collection of data from officers had the potential to be more intrusive than data from citizens. This distinction is not an attempt to minimise the experience of citizens being observed during an encounter, merely a reflection that the process of data collection is more involved, time-consuming, and riskier for the officer.

Primary data sourced from citizens was limited to their behaviour during police-citizen encounters. Secondary data related to situational characteristics of citizens, based on how citizens *appeared* to the researcher and officer-participants. It was impossible to follow an ‘opt-in’ process; it was also impractical, and in some cases unsafe, to pre-empt officers to receive informed consent from citizens before the start of an encounter. Furthermore, pre-alerting citizens to the research may have increased the occurrence of observer reactivity. As such, an ‘opt-out’ process was adopted to allow citizen-participants to choose at the culmination of an encounter for their data not to be included in the dataset.

There was also a concern about the citizen-participants who might lack the ability to provide informed consent, such as citizens who were mentally impaired, intoxicated, or drug affected. Thus, if citizens appeared impaired, intoxicated, or drug affected the researcher did not follow the opt-out protocol. Similarly, citizens who were under the age of adult criminal responsibility (18 years-old in South Australia<sup>29</sup>, 17 years-old in New Zealand<sup>30</sup>) were deemed

---

<sup>28</sup> See Appendix.

<sup>29</sup> See *Young Offenders Act 1993* [SA].

<sup>30</sup> See *Child, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989* [NZ].

to be unable to provide informed consent. Despite the inability to provide consent, data from these participants were added to the research dataset.

### *Confidentiality*

The identity of all research participants remained confidential. Officer names and identifiers were stored electronically in a password-protected master-list. The only personal or identifiable information stored on the master-list were participant's name and contact email address. The names of citizen-participants were not recorded but were assigned an ID reference for use on research documentation.<sup>31</sup>

### *Data security and integrity*

Procedures were put in place to maintain participant confidentiality and data protection. The master-list was password protected and stored in the researcher's password protected encrypted laptop and was not shared. Names of officer-participants were not written on any of the paper instruments or used in any of the computer programs or mobile applications. Paper forms were annotated *in situ* and scanned electronically for storage on the password encrypted file server and were kept in a locked steel file cabinet in the researcher's offsite research office. Data recorded *Qualtrics Research Suite*, and *Qualtrics Surveys* were protected by Qualtrics's secure website technology. The behavioural data coded in *Pocket Observer* was stored on a password and fingerprint-protected hand-held device. After the *Pocket Observer* data had been imported into *Observer XT*, on the researcher's laptop at the end of shift, it was then deleted from the hand-held device. At the completion of the research, the hand-held device was reformatted to factory settings.

Audio recordings of interviews were recorded on a password and fingerprint-protected smartphone device. Once recorded, it was not possible for anyone to access the audio file without entering the researcher's password or using the researcher's fingerprint. At the completion of the interview, the audio data was transferred to the researcher's secure data server<sup>32</sup> and deleted from the hand-held device.

---

<sup>31</sup> IDs were formatted with a letter denoting their 'role' (O for Officer and C for Citizen), a letter denoting their geographic location (N for New Zealand and A for Australia) and a number denoting their sequence in the research (i.e. ON03 or CA45). During the analysis, officer IDs were reallocated on a random basis to appear as ZXX for New Zealand officers and AXX for South Australian officers. This provided a further opportunity to afford participant confidentiality (as officers had often shared their IDs amongst themselves) and reduce the risk of researcher bias.

<sup>32</sup> The researcher maintained a secure website server through Dropbox.

## 4.7 Data analysis

Embedded mixed-method designs—such as the QUAN(qual) approach taken in the present research—collect data concurrently but do not merge quantitative and qualitative data together (Creswell 2014). In this manner, embedded designs function similarly to convergent designs where data are collected simultaneously and analysed separately. This creates opportunities to affect timely, efficient, and cost-effective data collection (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011). Once analysed, the quantitative and qualitative data are pieced together like a puzzle to provide an answer to the research questions (Morse 1991, p.155). In the present case, a mixed-method approach was taken to address different sub-research questions. The quantitative study staged to measure differences between RAP and RUP was embedded into the broader qualitative study designed to gather an understanding of how and why officers resolve conflict.

### 4.7.1 QUANTITATIVE STUDY

Analysis of the data from the quantitative study followed simple descriptive statistical procedures. Data was grouped into sets according to the number of participants present during the encounter and the type of encounter. Data were also divided by research site. Two analytical statistics were computed using data extracted from the PCE event logs. The first measured the duration of each behavioural tactic during the encounter as a percentage of the overall total behaviour. These percentages were conflated into a ‘group’ score: for encounters with two officers and one citizen ( $O_2C_1$ ) the percentages of both officers were combined to form a ‘patrol’ score. The second statistic was calculated as the average frequency of the occurrence of a behavioural tactic per encounter. These two statistics—duration and average frequency—provided an opportunity to compare the range of behaviours among different encounter types (e.g. investigative and enforcement) and between the two research sites. Due to the small sample sizes, however, it was not possible to use statistical significance testing.

### 4.7.2 QUALITATIVE STUDY

The analysis procedure for the qualitative study followed a grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss 1999; Corbin & Strauss 2014) which incorporated formal and informal coding approaches. The process of informal coding or categorisation occurred throughout the study,

where emergent themes of officer-participant practice during encounters were notated in contemporaneous field notes. These themes ‘floated’ in the mind of the researcher, triggering spontaneous, informal interviews with officer-participants when appropriate, plus the writing of memos that alluded to theoretical insights.

Formal analysis occurred upon the return from the field following the constant comparative method detailed by Glaser and Strauss (1999). In brief, this analytical approach takes form over four stages: comparison of incidents according to the category; integrating categories and properties; delimiting theory; and writing theory (Glaser & Strauss 1999). Case narratives, memos, and interview transcripts were utilised as source material during the analysis. Interview material was transcribed by a third party from the audio recordings of each interview. Once transcripts were approved<sup>33</sup> they were imported, with the other source documents, into the qualitative data analysis computer program *MAXQDA* (VERBI GmbH 1995). This computer program had a functionality to enable each document for review and the assignment of codes. Coding followed an inductive process; although some content of the transcript was known prior to the coding procedure. While field notes complemented the interview material, they were more descriptive of the observed encounters and thus used to support and verify the themes emerging during the post-field analysis. At the completion of the coding process, the theory writing began. This involved collecting the broad themes emergent from the analysis and structuring them into a collection of theoretical propositions.

---

<sup>33</sup> Some interviewees had indicated that they wished to receive a copy of the transcript of their interview. For those interviewees, copies were sent prior to data analysis.



## 5

---

# Police-citizen interactions

---

This is the first of three chapters to focus on the research findings, and it focuses on the quantitative study. The first section of this chapter discusses the characteristics of the encounters observed during the quantitative study in detail: it compares interactions according to citizen-role (e.g. victims), durations and sources, and event-types. Analysis reveals that each research site had a different distribution of event-types. This may be explained by the different mode of officer patrol: vehicular-based patrol at NZC vs foot-based patrol at SAC. Therefore, it is prudent to be cognizant of this when making comparisons between the two research sites. Participant behaviour during encounters with two officers and one citizen, and two officers and two citizens from both research sites are also analysed. The second section analyses differences in the behaviour between investigative encounters and enforcement encounters between the research sites. The last section discusses the findings in the context of the first two research questions. Two themes emerge from the analysis: the high occurrence of control behaviour present during victim-encounters at NZC and the greater occurrence of control behaviours used by officers at SAC in comparison with NZC.

## 5.1 Interactions between police and citizens

### 5.1.1 ENCOUNTER BEHAVIOURS

The quantitative study measured the type of behaviour used by officers during police-citizen encounters to discern variation in behaviour between the groups of officers in the two research sites. The behaviours of officers and citizens were coded according to a modified taxonomy of Braithwaite's conflict resolution behaviours (Table 5.1.1). For the present analysis, several of Braithwaite's categories were conflated into new analytical categories<sup>1</sup>; these are shown in the first column of the table with the original categories in the adjacent column.

#### *Encounter categories*

The present research sought to improve upon Braithwaite's (1998) approach to consider variations of conflict resolution behaviour among different encounter categories. Previous research of the police use of force has focused on citizen-suspects or indeed those who have been arrested for an offence (e.g. Alpert & Dunham 2004). However, in the present case conflict was not defined to be limited to physical actions.

Data were organised into two sets: *investigative* which included encounters with people categorised as victims, witnesses, associates, bystanders, and suspects; and *enforcement* encounters which included field arrests, field actions and field warnings. Categories were assigned at the end of the encounter according to officers' final classification. If the citizen played several roles during the encounter, such as starting as a suspect but ending as an arrestee, the encounter was coded according to the citizen's final role. A *field arrest* was made when an officer believed there was sufficient evidence that a citizen was guilty of an offence and the circumstances of the offence warranted taking the citizen into custody.<sup>2</sup> A *field action* (e.g. a cease and loiter order in SA) differentiated from an arrest in that while an officer had determined some degree of culpability or criminal liability on the citizen's part, the citizen was not taken into custody. The *field action* might cause a citizen to be removed from a place, prevented from re-entering a place or prevented from having contact with a person. Similarly,

<sup>1</sup> Braithwaite (1998) adopted a similar approach, combining information seek and information give into *information exchange* and combining the verbal control statements together.

<sup>2</sup> This decision to arrest differs to an arrest made pursuant to an arrest warrant. Valid arrest warrants are issued when the Court determines that there is sufficient evidence to make an arrest.

some encounters featured of a *field warning* where officers had determined a degree of guilt but chose to warn instead of arrest.

Table 5.1.1. Braithwaite's Modified Taxonomy of Conflict Resolution Behaviours

Simplified code for analysis	Braithwaite's original category	Description
<b>Officer behaviours</b>		
<i>Information exchange</i>	Informational seek	Questions that elicit information about the parties involved, events that have taken place, or proposed solutions
	Information give	Information provided in response to a question
<i>Verbal affirmation</i>	Support Statement	Statements which communicated empathy towards the citizen, positive reinforcement, or compliments
	Accept statement	Statements which indicated acceptance of the citizen or agreement with the citizen
<i>Verbal control</i>	Control statement affect	Changing the affective state or emotional behaviour of the citizen
	Control statement conversation	Statements which directly controlled the flow of conversation
	Control statement environment	Statements that attempted to change the environmental setting of the interaction
<i>Verbal refutation</i>	Reject statement	Statements that the other party's position is not accepted
	Threat statement	Insulting or derogatory remarks that were more extreme than reject statements and statements threatening negative consequences or warnings about future behaviour
<i>Physical control</i>	Physical act	Any physical touching or handling of the citizen
<b>Citizen behaviours</b>		
<i>Information exchange</i>	Informational seek	Questions that elicit information about the parties involved, events that have taken place, or proposed solutions
	Information give	Information provided in response to a question
	Information refuse	Verbalised statement refusing to give information or no comment made in response to an <i>Information seek</i>
	Information excuse <sup>3</sup>	Defensive statements that justified or provided excuses for citizen behaviour
<i>Refuse verbal control</i>	Refuse control	Actions, statements or behaviours when the citizen refuses or ignores the control statements behaviour used by officers
<i>Verbal abuse</i>	Verbal abuse	Verbally aggressive statements that were insulting, derogatory or undermining. Also included shouting or threatening statements.
<i>Physical abuse</i>		Any physical action directed at or against officers.
<b>Officer and Citizen behaviours</b>		
<i>Inactive</i>		Present during the encounter but not exhibiting any of the above behaviours
<i>Absent</i>		Not present during the encounter

The quantitative study comprised of 278 encounters ( $n_{NZ}=136$ ,  $n_{SA}=142$ ); these are shown in Table 5.1.2. Encounters were almost equally distributed between enforcement encounters ( $n=133$ , 48%) and investigative encounters ( $n=142$ , 52%). The most frequent encounters were suspect-encounters ( $n=84$ :  $n_{NZ}=30$ ;  $n_{SA}=54$ ), followed by field-arrest-encounters ( $n=56$ :  $n_{NZ}=34$ ;  $n_{SA}=22$ ) and victim-encounters ( $n=46$ :  $n_{NZ}=41$ ;  $n_{SA}=5$ ). Encounters at NZC were long-

<sup>3</sup> Braithwaite called this behaviour "self defence" but it has been changed in the present research so that not to be confused with a physical action of self-defence.

er in duration ( $M_{NZ}=18:27$   $SD_{NZ}=17:07$   $Mdn_{NZ}=15:35$ ) than those from SAC ( $M_{SA}=8:21$   $SD_{SA}=8:17$   $Mdn_{SA}=5:23$ ). Arrest-encounters were the longest ( $M_{NZ}=25:05$ ,  $M_{SA}=15:56$ ) followed by suspect-encounters ( $M_{NZ}=15:17$ ,  $M_{SA}=8:14$ ). When compared with encounters involving a field warning ( $M_{NZ}=13:08$ ,  $M_{SA}=6:11$ ), encounters involving a field action were shorter at NZC ( $M_{NZ}=10:57$ ) but longer at SAC ( $M_{SA}=6:55$ ).

Table 5.1.2. Frequency and duration of encounters

	New Zealand City					South Australia City				
	<i>n</i>	Mean (mm:ss)	<i>sd</i>	median	Range (h:mm:ss)	<i>n</i>	Mean mm:ss	<i>sd</i>	median	Range (h:mm:ss)
<b>Investigative</b>										
Victim	41	19:50	23:28	17:42	0:50–2:24:22	5	12:33	13:02	07:19	1:50–33:08
Witness	6	10:29	12:12	5:34	1:06–33:14	0				
Associate	3	9:23	3:42	9:14	5:46–13:10	1	5:57	-	-	-
Bystander	0					2	4:23	1:33	4:23	3:17–5:29
Suspect	30	15:17	10:27	13:46	0:52–38:44	54	8:14	9:29	4:14	0:24–48:45
<b>Enforcement</b>										
Fld Arrest	34	25:05	16:31	22:21	8:21–1:38:34	22	12:56	9:40	10:47	3:16–34:26
Fld Action	6	10:57	7:29	11:15	2:12–23:34	32	6:55	5:41	4:48	2:03–29:20
Fld Warning	14	13:08	8:32	11:59	0:37–30:16	25	6:11	4:25	4:33	0:37–17:06
Other	2	22:30	10:36	22:30	15:00–30:00	1	2:29	-	-	-
Total	136	18:27	17:07	15:35	0:37–2:24:22	142	8:21	8:17	5:23	0:24–48:45

### Encounter initiation

Table 5.1.3. Encounter initiation sources

	New Zealand City		South Australian City	
	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%
Dispatched (call for service)	98	72.1	22	15.5
Officer initiated	21	15.4	94	66.2
Supervisor directed	10	7.4	4	2.8
Request by another officer	4	2.9	3	2.1
On-scene citizens	3	2.2	17	12.0
Other	-	-	2	1.4
Totals	136	100	142	100

Encounters were categorised either as citizen-initiated (where they occurred because of a call for service) or officer-initiated (where there was no call for service). Table 5.1.3 shows that there was a difference in the method of initiation between the two sites. Encounters at NZC were most frequently initiated by citizen calls for service ( $n_{NZ}=98$ ) whereas encounters at SAC site were most frequently initiated by officer interventions ( $n_{SA}=94$ ). The frequencies of the second-most common method of initiation were in reverse order: officer-led interventions at NZC ( $n_{NZ}=21$ ) and citizen-led calls for service ( $n_{SA}=10$ ) at SAC. On scene citizen requests for

service were prominent at SAC ( $n_{SA}=17$ ) but not at NZC ( $n_{NZ}=3$ ). Supervisor-directed encounters were prominent at NZC ( $n_{NZ}=10$ ) but not so prominent at SAC site ( $n_{SA}=4$ ).

### *Encounter event-types*

Encounters originated because of different problems or purposes. Frequently, encounters may initiate as one event-type or problem but conclude as a different type. Table 5.1.4 shows the frequency and percentage of problem-types in three columns. The first shows the frequency and event-type of encounters as they were categorised and dispatched to a patrol. ‘Dispatched’ categories are determined by police dispatchers using information provided by the person who initiates the call for service, such as a victim or witness. The second column shows the categories assessed by the officers when they begin an encounter. Event-type categories can change from the initial dispatched status. For instance, an event where two people are seen arguing in public may initially be categorised as ‘disorder’ but re-categorised as an ‘assault’ on arrival of the attending officers. This data is equally important in the present study, as it records the event-type of non-dispatched encounters (i.e. those which were initiated by officers). The third column shows the event-type determined by officers at the end of the encounter. For instance, the initial disorder event, categorised as an assault, may be classified as a ‘domestic violence’ event if it established that the citizens involved are in a domestic relationship.

Analysis of the event-types reveals several differences between the research sites. The first relates to the proportionality of non-dispatched encounters: at NZC 19% ( $n_{NZ}=26$ ) of encounters were not dispatched from calls for service, whereas at SAC 78% ( $n_{SA}=111$ ) of encounters were not dispatched. Consequently, the frequency of event-type change between the research sites reflects the high incidence of non-dispatched events at SAC. At NZC the final event type differed from dispatch for 44% ( $n_{NZ}=60$ ) of encounters compared to 89% ( $n_{SA}=126$ ) at SAC. Possible explanations for this disparity are discussed later in chapter 8. The frequency of change between the start and end of events was consistent: 18% ( $n_{NZ}=25$ ) at NZC and 22% ( $n_{SA}=31$ ) at SAC. Second, there is a difference in the most frequent event-types at each research site. At NZC, the three most frequent event-types were domestic violence (13%), minor assault (13%), and investigative enquiries (7%). At SAC the most frequent event-types were disorder (21%), liquor offences<sup>4</sup> (11%) and traffic offences<sup>5</sup> (11%). Conclusions drawn from the compari-

<sup>4</sup> Liquor offences relate to breaching liquor bans, including drinking in a public place.

<sup>5</sup> Traffic offences include pedestrian and jay-walking offences.

sons should be treated with caution as the distribution of event-types differed for each research site.

Table 5.1.4. Encounter event-types at dispatch, arrival, and end of encounter

	Dispatched				Beginning				End			
	NZ		SA		NZ		SA		NZ		SA	
	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%
Arrest warrant					1	0.7	1	0.7	1	0.7	3	2.1
Attempted suicide	7	5.1	1	0.7	7	5.1	1	0.7	6	4.4	1	0.7
Breach bail	2	1.5			3	2.2	7	4.9	4	2.9	10	7.0
Burglary	2	1.5			2	1.5			2	1.5		
Civil dispute	2	1.5			3	2.2			3	2.2		
Court Order	1	0.7			3	2.2			3	2.2		
Disorder	12	8.8	11	7.7	12	8.8	35	24.6	6	4.4	30	21.1
Domestic Incident	4	2.9	1	0.7	2	1.5	3	2.1	3	2.2	3	2.1
Domestic Violence	19	14.0			20	14.7			18	13.2		
Drugs (cannabis)							4	2.8			5	3.5
Drugs (not cannabis)							7	4.9			4	2.8
Drugs (search)							2	1.4			2	1.4
Enquiries					10	7.4			10	7.4		
Escort (custody)					2	1.5	1	0.7	2	1.5	1	0.7
Intimidation	5	3.7	1	0.7	5	3.7	3	2.1	5	3.7	2	1.4
Intoxicated person	3	2.2	1	0.7	4	2.9	4	2.8	3	2.2	5	3.5
Liquor offences			1	0.7			15	10.6	1	0.7	16	11.3
Lost property							1	0.7			1	0.7
Mental Health	1	0.7			1	0.7	1	0.7	2	1.5	3	2.1
Minor assault	9	6.6	3	2.1	12	8.8	5	3.5	17	12.5	2	1.4
Missing person	4	2.9	1	0.7	3	2.2	2	1.4	2	1.5	1	0.7
Obstruction					1	0.7	4	2.8	3	2.2	3	2.1
Offensive weapon	1	0.7			1	0.7	1	0.7	1	0.7	2	1.4
Preventative task	2	1.5			6	4.4			6	4.4		
Property damage	3	2.2	2	1.4	4	2.9	2	1.4	4	2.9	1	0.7
Public relations	4	2.9			4	2.9			4	2.9		
Serious assault	1	0.7	1	0.7	1	0.7	1	0.7	1	0.7	1	0.7
Sexual affronts	3	2.2			3	2.2	1	0.7	2	1.5	1	0.7
Silent emergency call	4	2.9			1	0.7						
Suspicious behaviour	3	2.9	1	0.7	3	2.2	9	6.3			7	4.9
Theft	6	4.4	5	3.5	7	5.1	5	3.5	6	4.4	6	4.2
Traffic offences	2	1.5			5	3.7	16	11.3	6	4.4	16	11.3
Trespass	3	2.2			3	2.2	2	1.4	4	2.9	2	1.4
Vagrancy			2	1.4			6	4.2			6	4.2
Vehicle crash	2	1.5			2	1.5			2	1.5		
Weapon offences	2	1.5			2	1.5			1	0.7		
Weapons search (random)							3	2.1				
Youth incident	3	2.2			3	2.2			3	2.2		
<i>Nil offence</i>									5	3.7	8	5.6
<i>Not dispatched</i>	26	19.1	111	78.2								
Total	136		142		136		142		136		142	

### 5.1.2 EXCHANGE AND CONTROL

The most frequent encounters were those comprised of two officers and one citizen (O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub>) ( $n=195$ :  $n_{NZ}=83$ ;  $n_{SA}=112$ ) and those of two officers with two citizens (O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>2</sub>) ( $n=69$ :  $n_{NZ}=47$ ;

$n_{SA}=22$ ). Together these cases accounted for 95% of the dataset. The remaining cases were excluded from the analysis in this chapter, including encounters between one officer and one citizen ( $O_1C_1$ ) ( $n=9$ ;  $n_{NZ}=4$ ;  $n_{SA}=5$ ), one officer and two citizens ( $O_1C_2$ ) ( $n=2$ ;  $n_{NZ}=0$ ;  $n_{SA}=2$ ), and two officers and three or more citizens ( $O_2C_{3+}$ ) ( $n=3$ ;  $n_{NZ}=2$ ;  $n_{SA}=1$ ).

### *Encounter analysis*

*Pocket Observer* created an event log for each encounter. Using data from the event log, the *Observer XT* programme calculated a summary of the time each participant had been coded a specific behaviour. This summary was used to provide two statistics. The first was the duration of each behaviour type coded during the encounter; this was displayed as a percentage of the total behaviours used during the encounter. The second counted the occurrence of each behaviour type coded during the encounter.

For the purposes of the present analysis, the duration of behaviours expressed as a percentage of overall behaviour type and the average frequency of behaviour type's occurrence are compared between the research sites. The duration percentages are shown as a 'group' score. For  $O_2C_1$  encounters, each participant's behaviour percentage was divided by three. This allows for the three participants' behaviour to be expressed as a percentage value; the sum of which would total 100. In the case of  $O_2C_2$  encounters, each participants' behaviour percentage was divided by four. However, in the subsequent analysis tables, the officers' behaviours are combined and shown as a patrol statistic. Similarly, in the analysis of  $O_2C_2$  encounters, the citizens' behaviours are shown as a combined statistic. The second statistic is the average frequency of the occurrence of participants' behavioural tactic per encounter. The average frequency is calculated by taking a count of each occurrence of a participant's behaviour from the event log then dividing it by the total number of encounters in the dataset. These two statistics provide an opportunity to infer an understanding of participants' behaviour during encounters.

### *Encounters with two officers and one citizen*

$O_2C_1$  encounters comprised of 83% of the dataset ( $n=195$ ) and were almost equally split between NZC ( $n_{NZ}=83$ ) and SAC ( $n_{SA}=112$ ). However, there were significant differences between the sites. The first related to the count of citizen-initiated events (including those dispatched as a result of a call for service) and officer-initiated events: more than three-quarters of events at NZC were citizen-initiated (77.1%) compared with one-quarter at SAC (25.6%). It is likely

that the disparity was a result of the mode of officer patrol. For NZC, the most frequent event-types were minor assault (12%,  $n_{NZ}=10$ ), domestic violence (12%,  $n_{NZ}=10$ ) and routine investigative enquiries (7%,  $n_{NZ}=8.4$ ). Whereas at SAC, the most frequent events were ‘street offences’ disorder (23.2%,  $n_{SA}=26$ ), pedestrian and traffic offences (12.5%,  $n_{SA}=14$ ) and liquor offences (10.7%,  $n_{SA}=12\%$ ).<sup>6</sup>

O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> behaviours observed during encounters are shown in Table 5.1.5. Analysis of duration and frequency are separated according to research site. The first analysis column shows the behaviour duration percentages NZC for each party across both sites. The second analysis column shows the average frequency of behaviour per PCE. The behavioural rows show the percentage and average frequency of each behaviour. The analysis table also shows the mean of encounter durations for each site. Within each site column, statistics for the two participant sets are shown: the first is that of the *patrol* behaviour (abbreviated as O<sub>2</sub>) with the *citizen* scores adjacent (abbreviated as C<sub>1</sub>).

Encounters at NZC were longer in overall duration than those at SAC ( $M_{NZ}=16:14$ ,  $M_{SA}=12:40$ ); the difference was statistically significant  $t(193) = 4.34$ ,  $p = 0.000$  and it did represent a medium-sized effect,  $d = 0.60$ . The most frequent behaviour and that which amounts to the highest duration was *information exchange* for both encounter participants at both research sites. The next most frequent officer behaviours were coded as *inactive* and *verbal control* for officers.

Table 5.1.5. Analysis of behaviours during all O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> encounters

Analysis	Duration of behaviours for participants expressed as a percentage of overall behaviour				Average frequency of behaviour occurrence per PCE			
Research site	NZC (n=83)		SAC (n=112)		NZC (n=83)		SAC (n=112)	
Mean dur. (mm:ss)	16:52		8:28					
Participants	O <sub>2</sub>	C <sub>1</sub>	O <sub>2</sub>	C <sub>1</sub>	O <sub>2</sub>	C <sub>1</sub>	O <sub>2</sub>	C <sub>1</sub>
Behaviours ↓	(67%)	(33%)	(67%)	(33%)				
Information Exc.	30.63	27.07	26.88	25.81	8.65	6.53	7.29	6.59
Verbal affirmation	1.77	-	2.48	-	1.46	-	1.41	-
Verbal control	3.55	-	10.98	-	2.48	-	4.39	-
Verbal refutation	0.08	-	0.18	-	0.12	-	0.12	-
Physical control	1.11	-	3.53	-	0.49	-	0.99	-
Refuse verbal control	-	0.53	-	1.98	-	0.45	-	1.04
Refuse phys. control	-	0.16	-	0.26	-	0.07	-	0.08
Verbal abuse	-	0.48	-	1.35	-	0.37	-	0.72
Inactive	15.96	4.02	11.97	3.17	3.14	0.94	2.34	0.63
Absent	12.86	0.21	8.58	0.09	1.23	0.08	0.65	3.00

<sup>6</sup> A complete list of event-types is shown in the Appendix – Table A5.1.



Comparison between the research sites of the behaviours reveals variation in officer practice and citizen response in the datasets. The most prominent differences appear in the frequency and duration of *verbal control* and *physical control*. Officers used both to control citizens. *Verbal control* behaviours at SAC were almost twice as frequent (NZC=2.48; SAC=4.39) but three times as long (NZC=3.55%; SAC=10.98%) as at NZC. Similarly, *physical control* behaviours at SAC were twice as frequent (NZC=0.49; SAC=0.99) but three times as long (NZC=1.11%; SAC=3.53%) as at NZC. Variation in citizen behaviour between the sites can be seen in the average frequency and proportional duration of *refuse verbal control* and *verbal abuse*. In both cases, the average frequency was twice that in SAC than NZC.

Further analysis reveals differences between the two research sites where behaviour *has* or *has not* been coded. In Table 5.1.6, occurrence frequency of all control and all resistance behaviours during encounters are summarised, showing the count of encounters where at least one instance of a control behaviour (verbal or physical), refuse control behaviour, or verbal abuse has been coded.

Table 5.1.6. Occurrence of control behaviours during all O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> encounters expressed as a frequency and percentage

		NZC		SAC	
		<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%
Verbal behaviour	Verbal control (officer to citizen)	61	73.5	93	83.0
	Refuse verbal control (citizen)	20	24.1	51	45.5
	Verbal abuse (citizen to officer)	14	16.9	35	31.3
Physical behaviour	Physical control (officer to citizen)	14	16.9	40	35.7
	Refuse physical control (citizen)	2	2.4	7	6.3

This analysis shows the incidence of control and resistance behaviours across the O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> encounters. It is apparent that the occurrence of control behaviour was more frequent at SAC than NZC, but this may be due to the different distribution of event-types. *Verbal control* was used during 83% of encounters at SAC ( $n_{SA}=93$ ) and 74% at NZC ( $n_{NZ}=61$ ). This was not the case for citizen behaviour; *refuse verbal control* and *refuse physical control* occurred at almost twice as many encounters at SAC than NZC. *Refuse verbal control* occurred during 46% of encounters at SAC ( $n_{SA}=51$ ) and 24% at NZC ( $n_{NZ}=20$ ). Similarly, *verbal abuse* by citizens towards officers occurred during 31% of encounters at SAC ( $n_{SA}=35$ ) and 17% at NZC ( $n_{NZ}=14$ ). The occurrence of *refuse physical control* was relatively infrequent: 6% of encounters at SAC ( $n_{SA}=7$ ) and 2% at NZC ( $n_{NZ}=2$ ).

*Encounters with two officers and two citizens*

O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>2</sub> encounters were more frequent at NZC than SAC ( $n_{NZ}=47$ ;  $n_{SA}=22$ ) and accounted for 25% of dataset ( $n=69$ ). The mode of encounter initiation differed significantly between the two sites. At NZC 85% of encounters were dispatched ( $n_{NZ}=40$ ) whereas at SAC 91% of encounters were officer initiated or citizen street calls for service ( $n_{SA}=20$ ). The most frequent NZC O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>2</sub> event-type was domestic violence at 17% ( $n_{NZ}=8$ ) followed by minor assault at 15% ( $n_{NZ}=7$ ), intimidation at 6% ( $n_{NZ}=3$ ), and civil dispute at 6% ( $n_{NZ}=3$ ). In contrast, the most frequent SAC O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>2</sub> event-types were disorder at 14% ( $n_{SA}=3$ ) and theft at 14% ( $n_{SA}=3$ ), followed by suspicious behaviour at 9% ( $n_{SA}=2$ ) and liquor offences at 9% ( $n_{SA}=2$ ).<sup>7</sup> The mean duration of NZC was 21:38 whereas for SAC it was 7:18. The difference was statistically significant  $t(67) = 4.03$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ,  $d = 0.44$ .

Table 5.1.7. Analysis of behaviours during all O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>2</sub> encounters

Analysis	Duration of behaviours for participants expressed as a percentage of overall behaviour				Average frequency of behaviour occurrence per PCE			
Research site	NZ ( $n=47$ )		SA ( $n=22$ )		NZ ( $n=47$ )		SA ( $n=22$ )	
Mean dur. (mm:ss)	21:38		07:18					
Participants	O <sub>2</sub>	C <sub>2</sub>	O <sub>2</sub>	C <sub>2</sub>	O <sub>2</sub>	C <sub>2</sub>	O <sub>2</sub>	C <sub>2</sub>
Behaviours ↓	(50%)	(50%)	(50%)	(50%)				
Information Exc.	25.55	28.22	20.50	27.03	12.62	12.51	6.59	8.09
Verbal affirmation	1.68	-	2.93	-	2.30	-	1.14	-
Verbal control	2.73	-	7.31	-	3.51	-	3.59	-
Verbal refutation	0.05	-	0.04	-	0.15	-	0.05	-
Physical control	0.40	-	3.87	-	0.47	-	0.68	-
Refuse verbal control	-	0.61	-	4.16	-	0.79	-	1.41
Refuse phys. control	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.09	-	0.14
Verbal abuse	-	1.03	-	1.68	-	0.85	-	1.00
Inactive	10.75	7.31	6.26	6.13	4.49	2.51	1.77	2.00
Absent	8.49	9.73	6.87	4.60	1.40	1.85	0.95	0.45

Of the encounters observed, O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>2</sub> encounters shared similar behavioural characteristics with O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> encounters. First, *information exchange* was the most frequent behaviour for officers and citizens. But in the case of patrol behaviours, the frequency of *information exchange* at SAC was approximately half the rate of NZC. The disproportionality was less extreme when comparing the total proportion of time during the encounter; patrol *information exchange* made up a quarter of all encounter durations at NZC whereas it comprised of a fifth of all encounter durations at SAC (NZC=25.6%; SAC=20.5%). The frequency disproportionality may

<sup>7</sup> A complete list of event-types is shown in the Appendix – Table A5.2.

be a result of the difference in the mean duration of encounters: shorter encounters provided fewer opportunities for participants to change from one behavioural state to another.

The second similarity with O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> encounters relates to the difference in the use of controlling behaviour. Like in the O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> encounters, SAC patrols used *verbal control* more frequently and proportionately longer during O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>2</sub> encounters in the dataset. While the variance of frequency in O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>2</sub> encounters is minimal (NZC=3.51; SAC=3.59) the difference in proportional duration is significant (NZC=2.73%; SAC=7.31%). Likewise, SAC patrols used *physical control* more frequently and proportionally longer than NZC patrols in their respective encounters.

Analysis of the occurrence of control behaviours during the O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>2</sub> encounters shows similarities with O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> encounters (Table 5.1.8). There is a high incidence of the occurrence of *verbal control* used by officers: 86% of encounters at SAC ( $n_{SA}=19$ ) and 73% at NZC ( $n_{NZ}=34$ ) compared with 83% and 74% respectively. Similarly, the occurrence of *physical control* during encounters was twice as frequent at SAC than NZC: 23% of encounters at SAC ( $n_{SA}=5$ ) and 11% at NZC ( $n_{NZ}=5$ ) *cf.* 36% and 17% respectively. However, in the case of O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>2</sub>, the occurrences of physical control were about two-thirds that of O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> encounters.

Table 5.1.8. Occurrence of control behaviours during all O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>2</sub> encounters expressed as a frequency and percentage

		NZC		SAC	
		<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%
Verbal behaviour	Verbal control (officer to citizen)	34	72.3	19	86.4
	Refuse verbal control (citizen)	23	48.9	11	50.0
	Verbal abuse (citizen to officer)	12	25.5	8	36.4
Physical behaviour	Physical control (officer to citizen)	5	10.6	5	22.7
	Refuse physical control (citizen)	2	4.3	2	9.1

There were differences between citizen behaviour between O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> and O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>2</sub> encounters. In the case of O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>2</sub> encounters there was a higher rate of occurrence of *refuse verbal control*: 50% of encounters at SAC ( $n_{SA}=11$ ) and 49% at NZC ( $n_{NZ}=23$ ) *cf.* 46% and 24% of O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> encounters. There were also more O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>2</sub> encounters with *verbal abuse*: 36% at SAC ( $n_{SA}=8$ ) and 26% at NZC ( $n_{NZ}=12$ ) *cf.* 31% and 17% respectively of O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> encounters.

### 5.1.3 SUMMARY

Analysis of all participant behaviours revealed the high frequency of *information exchange* by both officers and citizens. The use of *verbal control* by officers was frequent (>1 average frequency per PCE), and the use of *physical control* was infrequent (<1 average frequency per

PCE). There was variation between the research sites in the use of *verbal control*. When examining O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> encounters, the average frequency of verbal control per encounter was twice that at SAC (4.39) than at NZC (2.48). The duration as a percentage of overall behaviour was also different: 10.98% at SAC *cf.* 3.55% at NZC. This pattern was similar regarding physical control: the average frequency per encounter at SAC was 0.99 *cf.* 0.49 at NZC. The duration as a percentage of overall behaviour was 3.53% at SAC *cf.* 1.11% at NZC. This pattern was less apparent during O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>2</sub> encounters. While the average frequencies of verbal control and physical control per encounter were similar between the sites, the duration as a percentage of overall behaviour differed. Verbal control amounted to 7.31% at SAC *cf.* 2.73% at NZC with physical control amounting to 3.87% at SAC *cf.* 0.40% at NZC.

There are two probable causes for the differences between the research sites in use of control behaviours in the dataset. This could have been a result of the variance of encounter duration. Encounters in SAC—in the case of O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> and O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>2</sub> encounters—had statistically significant differences in mean duration. This may be because of the high incidence of non-dispatched encounters in SAC. For an officer to initiate an encounter, they have identified sufficient cause to affect an intervention (i.e. an enforcement action). This contrasted with encounters originating from a citizen call for service; as in these cases, officers had to collect sufficient information to form a suspicion (i.e. investigate). Second, the mode of travel and geographical spread is likely to have influenced the distribution of encounter event-types for each site. Officers in NZC mostly used vehicular transport and therefore had a greater ability to travel outside the central business district. In contrast, officers from SAC conducted foot-patrols, and therefore limited to dealing with ‘street’ offences.

## 5.2 Differences of investigative and enforcement encounters

In the previous section, the analysis revealed that officers from SAC used verbal and physical control behaviours at a higher frequency and for a greater proportion of time during the encounter than officers from NZC. It is difficult to establish if the use of behaviours were associated with the different distributions event-types or related to the mode of officer patrol. Here, further analysis considers officer behaviour during investigative and enforcement O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> encounters. Two types of investigative encounters were examined: victim-encounters ( $n_{NZ}=27$ ;  $n_{SA}=3$ ) and suspect-encounters ( $n_{NZ}=13$ ;  $n_{SA}=41$ ). Witness-encounters were not included as

there was an insufficient quantity ( $n_{NZ}=4$ ;  $n_{SA}=0$ ). This is followed by the three types of enforcement encounters: field-arrests ( $n_{NZ} = 26$ ,  $n_{SA}=21$ ), field-actions ( $n_{NZ} = 6$ ,  $n_{SA}=27$ ), and field-warnings ( $n_{NZ} = 5$ ,  $n_{SA}=18$ ).

### 5.2.1 O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> INVESTIGATIVE ENCOUNTERS

#### *Victims*

The majority of O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> victim-encounters came from NZC ( $n_{NZ}=27$ ;  $n_{SA}=3$ ). While the small quantity of SAC victim-encounters may not be representative, the SAC data is, nonetheless, included in these findings. The most frequent event-types at NZC (as determined at the end of the encounter) were domestic violence ( $n_{NZ}=4$ ) and mental health<sup>8</sup> ( $n_{NZ}=3$ ). The remaining encounters were coded as routine enquiries (not relating to a specific event-type), officer-led preventative tasks, and minor offending.<sup>9</sup> The mean encounter duration was greater at NZC ( $M_{NZ}=16:14$ ,  $M_{SA}=12:40$ ). It should be noted that one NZC victim-encounter was an outlier (the search for an attempted suicide lasted 2 hours 24 minutes).

The low quantity of SAC victim-encounters risks the reliability of a comparison with NZC victim-encounters. Nonetheless, the most frequent behaviour and the largest duration of overall behaviour for all parties was *information exchange*. For the NZC encounters, the second most frequent active behaviour was *verbal control* both as a percentage of overall duration (4.20%) and the average frequency per encounter ( $\text{freq}_{NZ}=2.44$ ).<sup>10</sup> Both these statistics were higher than those from the 3 SAC victim-encounters. However, when comparing the NZC victim-encounters with all NZC O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> encounters it is curious to note that the duration of *verbal control* during victim-encounters (4.20) is higher than the accumulated duration of all encounters (3.55) while the frequencies are almost identical. This suggests that officers were spending a greater proportion of their time using *verbal control* when dealing with victims. Furthermore, analysis of the occurrence of patrol control behaviour is shown in Table 5.2.1. Among the NZC victim-encounters, 70.4% ( $n_{NZ}=19$ ) featured officers using *verbal control* on at least one occasion during the encounter. Citizen responses included *refuse verbal control* in 25.9% ( $n_{NZ}=7$ ) of the victim-encounters. Citizens were coded giving *verbal abuse* in 11.1% ( $n_{NZ}=3$ ) of victim encounters. There was one occurrence of *physical control* used by a patrol.

<sup>8</sup> These included responses to attempted suicide and other mental health incidents

<sup>9</sup> A complete list of event-types is shown in the Appendix – Table A5.3.

<sup>10</sup> A complete list of victim-encounter behaviours is shown in the Appendix – Table A5.4.

Table 5.2.1. Occurrence of control behaviours during O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> victim-encounters expressed as a frequency and percentage

		NZC		SAC	
		<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%
Verbal behaviour	Verbal control (officer to citizen)	19	70.4	2	66.7
	Refuse verbal control (citizen)	7	25.9	1	33.3
	Verbal abuse (citizen to officer)	3	11.1	0	0
Physical behaviour	Physical control (officer to citizen)	1	3.7	0	0
	Refuse physical control (citizen)	0	0	0	0

### Suspects

There were more suspect-encounters at SAC than at NZC ( $n_{SA}=41$ ;  $n_{NZ}=13$ ). NZC suspect-encounters had a longer mean duration ( $M_{NZ}=13:55$ ,  $sd_{NZ}=9:56$ ,  $R_{NZ}=29:48$ ) than SAC suspect-encounters ( $M_{SA}=8:29$ ,  $sd_{SA}=10:33$ ,  $R_{SA}=48:21$ ). The event-type of the encounters were more varied than victim-encounters and more events were officer-initiated; more than one-third of NZ suspect-encounters were not dispatched ( $n_{NZ}=5$ , 39%) whereas more than two-thirds of SAC suspect-encounters were not dispatched ( $n_{SA}=29$ , 71%). The most frequent SAC end problem-types were disorder ( $n_{SA}=9$ , 22%), suspicious behaviour ( $n_{SA}=5$ , 12%), and dealing with an intoxicated person ( $n_{SA}=3$ , 7%). Of the SAC suspect-encounters, 17% were coded as a ‘nil offence’ ( $n_{SA}=7$ ).<sup>11</sup> As with the previous analyses, *information exchange* was the most frequent behaviour at both sites for the patrol (NZC=7.15, SAC=6.10) and citizen (NZC=4.62, SAC=5.34). Likewise, *information exchange* had the highest durations for patrol (NZC=33.48, SAC=28.59) and citizen (NZC=26.75, SAC=25.66).

There was a notable variation in the duration and frequency of *verbal control* when comparing datasets from the two sites. The frequency mean of *verbal control* per encounter was approximately double at SAC ( $M_{SA}=2.68$ ) than NZC ( $M_{NZ}=1.31$ ). But more intriguing is that the total proportion of time of *verbal control* at SAC was over five larger than at NZC (NZC=1.33%, SAC=7.63%). The disparity between the occurrence of *physical control* among the sites was also apparent. The frequency mean of *physical control* per encounter was greater in SAC ( $M_{SA}=0.51$ ) than NZC ( $M_{NZ}=0.15$ ) and the total proportion of time of *physical control* was greater in SAC (2.33%) than NZC (0.12%).

There were also some variations of citizen behaviour between research sites. The frequency mean of *refuse physical control* per encounter was higher in SAC ( $M_{SA}=0.61$ ) than NZC

<sup>11</sup> A complete list of event-types is shown in the Appendix – Table A5.5.

( $M_{NZ}=0.31$ ). The total proportion of time of *refuse physical control* was also greater in SAC (2.33%) than NZC (0.26%). Likewise, the frequency means of *verbal abuse* (directed to officers by citizens) were higher in SAC ( $M_{SA}=0.54$ ) than NZC ( $M_{NZ}=0.08$ ) and the total proportion of time of *verbal abuse* was greater in SAC (1.38%) than in NZC (0.06%).<sup>12</sup>

Further analysis of the occurrence of patrol control behaviour is shown in Table 5.2.2. Among the suspect-encounters, 54% ( $n_{NZ}=7$ ) involved patrols using *verbal control* on at least one occasion during the encounter at NZC whereas the occurrence of *verbal control* during SAC encounters was 66% ( $n_{SA}=27$ ). Patrols in SAC used *physical control* in 34% of the encounters ( $n_{SA}=14$ ) whereas patrols in NZC used *physical control* in 8% of the encounters ( $n_{SA}=1$ ). The occurrence of citizen *refuse verbal control* was similar between the two sites: 39% at NZC ( $n_{NZ}=5$ ) and 27% at SAC ( $n_{SA}=15$ ). Additionally, there was a difference in the occurrence of citizen *verbal abuse* towards the patrol; 8% at NZC ( $n_{NZ}=1$ ) and 25% at SAC ( $n_{SA}=10$ ).

Table 5.2.2 Occurrence of control behaviours during O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> suspect-encounters, expressed as a frequency and percentage

		NZC		SAC	
		<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%
Verbal behaviour	Verbal control (officer to citizen)	7	53.8	27	65.9
	Refuse verbal control (citizen)	5	38.4	15	36.6
	Verbal abuse (citizen to officer)	1	7.7	10	24.4
Physical behaviour	Physical control (officer to citizen)	1	7.7	14	34.1
	Refuse physical control (citizen)	0	0	1	2.4

### Summary

Analysis of behaviour during victim-encounters and suspect-encounters present two insights. First was the higher incidence of *verbal control* behaviour used by officers during victim-encounters than with suspect-encounters. During NZC victim-encounters, the occurrence rate of *verbal control* was at 70% and the average frequency per encounter was at 2.44. The occurrence of *verbal control* behaviour by officers during suspect-encounters was 54% at NZC and 64% at SAC with the average frequency of use per suspect-encounter of 1.31 at NZC (and 2.68 at SAC)<sup>13</sup>.

Second, is the variance in the degree of control behaviours with suspects. SAC officers used *verbal control* behaviours at a higher frequency than NZC officers. Similarly, *verbal control*

<sup>12</sup> A complete list of suspect-encounter behaviours is shown in the Appendix – Table A5.6.

<sup>13</sup> Although the SAC average frequency per encounter of verbal control for victim-encounters was lower than that of suspect-encounters, the sample size of SAC victim-encounters was  $n=3$ . As such any comparison may lack statistical integrity.

behaviour was longer in duration at SAC when compared with other behaviours as a proportion of the total time of the encounter. This might be a result of the shorter in duration of SAC suspect-encounters (7.63%) when compared with NZC (1.31%). However, the average frequency of *verbal control* at SAC (freq.M<sub>SA</sub>=2.68) was double that at NZC (freq.M<sub>NZ</sub>=1.31). This variance was also evident with *physical control*. The frequency mean of *physical control* per encounter was greater in SAC (freq.M<sub>SA</sub>=0.51) than NZC (freq.M<sub>NZ</sub>=0.15) and the total proportion of time of *physical control* was greater in SAC (2.33%) than NZC (0.12%). Thus, these findings reinforce the earlier analysis that during the encounters observed the research, SAC officers used control behaviours at a higher frequency and for a higher proportion of duration than NZC officers.

### 5.2.2 O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> ENFORCEMENT ENCOUNTERS

#### *Field Arrests*

Field arrests were the most common enforcement encounter in the O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> dataset ( $n_{NZ} = 26$ ,  $n_{SA}=21$ ). The majority of NZC encounters were dispatched (81%,  $n_{NZ}=21$ ). The most frequent problem-types at NZC were domestic violence (15%,  $n_{NZ}=4$ ), followed by minor assaults, sexual affronts, theft, or trespass. These encounters resulted in arrests for minor assault (23%,  $n_{NZ}=6$ ), followed by attempted suicide, breach of bail, theft, and trespass. The encounters at SAC were mostly non-dispatched (62%,  $n_{SA}=13$ ). The most common SAC arrests observed were made for breach of bail, followed by disorder, liquor offences, offensive weapons, and warrants to arrest.<sup>14</sup>

NZC arrest-encounters were longer in mean duration (M<sub>NZ</sub>=23:12, sd<sub>NZ</sub>=11:02, R<sub>NZ</sub>=41:10) than SAC arrest-encounters (M<sub>SA</sub>=12:57, sd<sub>SA</sub>=9:54, R<sub>SA</sub>=31:10). The difference in durations may be a consequence of the mode of patrol. NZC patrols were exclusively vehicle-based. Thus, any arrested citizen being transported to the police custody suite was conveyed in the same vehicle by the arresting patrol officers. This allowed communication between citizens and officers to continue during the journey. However, as most SAC patrols were foot patrols, arrestees were transported in a custody vehicle with a secure ‘caged’ area for the citizen. This made communications impractical between citizens and officers and coding ceased at the time

---

<sup>14</sup> A complete list of event-types is shown in the Appendix – Table A5.7.



of the arrestee being secured in the vehicle. Coding of encounters occurred until the ‘arresting’ officers ceased to maintain the cognitive focus of attention (see Goffman 1961). Handing over arrestees to custody officers (as in the case of NZC) or passing over the arrestees to another crew to transport to custody, or even securing the arrestees in the rear of the custody transport vehicle severed the cognitive focus.

As with the previous analyses, *information exchange* was the most frequent behaviour during field arrest-encounters at both sites for the patrol (NZC=10.5, SAC=10.5) and citizen (NZC=10.3, SAC=9.9).<sup>15</sup> Likewise, *information exchange* had the highest durations for patrol (NZC=25.1%, SAC=22.3%) and citizen (NZC=25.2%, SAC=23.6%). In the same fashion as suspect-encounters, there was a notable variation in the duration and frequency of *verbal control* between the two sites.

The frequency mean of *verbal control* per encounter was higher at SAC (freq.M<sub>SA</sub>=7.59) than NZC (freq.M<sub>NZ</sub>=3.63). However, the total proportion of time of *verbal control* was over three times greater (NZC=4.1%, SAC=14.2%). This variation between the two sites was also evident with *physical control*. The frequency mean of *physical control* per encounter was greater at SAC (freq.M<sub>SA</sub>=3.62) than NZC (freq.M<sub>NZ</sub>=1.38) and the total proportion of time of *physical control* was greater in SAC (7.45%) than NZC (2.40%). A further variation between the two sites related to *verbal affirmation*. The frequency mean of this behaviour per encounter was higher at SAC (M<sub>SA</sub>=2.19) than NZC (M<sub>NZ</sub>=1.23).

There were also variations between the research sites of citizen behaviour. *Refuse verbal control*, *refuse physical control*, and *verbal abuse* was more frequent and comprised a higher proportion of time in SAC than NZC. The frequency mean of *refuse verbal control* per encounter was three times higher in SAC (freq.M<sub>SA</sub>=2.14) than NZC (freq.M<sub>NZ</sub>=0.69). The total proportion of time of *refuse verbal control* was greater in SAC (1.89%) than NZC (0.77%). The frequency mean of *refuse physical control* per encounter was higher in SAC (freq.M<sub>SA</sub>=0.38) than NZC (freq.M<sub>NZ</sub>=0.19). The total proportion of time of *refuse physical control* was greater in SAC (0.76%) than NZC (0.30%). Likewise, the frequency means of *verbal abuse* (directed to officers by citizens) was higher at SAC (freq.M<sub>SA</sub>=1.48) than NZC (freq.M<sub>NZ</sub>=0.81) and the total proportion of time of *verbal abuse* was greater in SAC (1.90%) than in NZC (0.69%).

---

<sup>15</sup> A complete list of arrest-encounter behaviours is shown in the Appendix – Table A5.8.

Further analysis of the occurrence of patrol control behaviour is shown in Table 5.2.3. The occurrence of patrol *verbal control* during the field-arrest-encounters was at 92% in NZC ( $n_{NZ}=24$ )<sup>16</sup> and 100% in SAC ( $n_{SA}=21$ ). This is to be expected due to the controlling nature of an arrest procedure. There were more occurrences of citizen *refuse verbal control* at 71% at SAC ( $n_{SA}=15$ ) compared to 23% at NZC ( $n_{NZ}=6$ ) and for citizen *verbal abuse* with 67% at SAC ( $n_{SA}=14$ ) compared to 27% at NZC ( $n_{NZ}=7$ ). The occurrences of patrol *physical control* and citizen *refuse physical control* was higher in SAC compared with NZC.

Table 5.2.3 Occurrence of control behaviours during O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> field-arrest-encounters, expressed as a frequency and percentage

		NZC		SAC	
		<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%
Verbal behaviour	Verbal control (officer to citizen)	24	92.3	21	100
	Refuse verbal control (citizen)	6	23.1	15	71.4
	Verbal abuse (citizen to officer)	7	26.9	14	66.7
Physical behaviour	Physical control (officer to citizen)	12	46.2	17	80.9
	Refuse physical control (citizen)	2	7.7	5	23.8

### Field Actions

A field action was an enforcement sanction that did not involve making an arrest or a charge. For such an action to be taken an officer had to believe that a citizen is culpable or guilty of an offence, local ordinance, or by-law. The action may have involved issuing a notice of infringement fine for minor offences like the breach of alcohol regulations, illicit drug regulations or road regulations. Alternatively, the actions involved an order to prevent a specific behaviour, such as the issue of trespass (NZC) or barring orders (SAC) which bans the person from a private property, the service a police safety order (NZC) to prevent a person in a domestic relationship contacting their partner, or cease loiter order (SA) to prevent a person from loitering in a particular location after the presence of a disorderly event. Legislation conferring police with powers to issue a prevention order also includes a provision for the officer to make an arrest if the citizen fails to comply with the order.

Fewer field actions occurred at NZC ( $n_{NZ}=6$ ) than at SAC ( $n_{SA}=27$ ). Most SAC encounters were not dispatched (93%). Of the encounters, 41% were traffic incidents<sup>17</sup> ( $n_{SA}=11$ ), 30% were

<sup>16</sup> The two field-arrest-encounters without *verbal control* featured *physical control*. This indicates that the arrest procedure was physical in nature.

<sup>17</sup> Traffic incidents included pedestrian offences such as crossing against a red pedestrian light.

disorder ( $n_{SA}=8$ ) and 26% were liquor offences<sup>18</sup> ( $n_{SA}=7$ ). Of the NZC encounters, 50% related to traffic incidents albeit a small quantity ( $n_{NZ}=3$ ).<sup>19</sup> NZC field-action-encounters were longer in mean duration ( $\text{dur.M}_{NZ}=10:57$ ,  $\text{sd}_{NZ}=7:29$ ,  $R_{NZ}=21:22$ ) than the SAC encounters ( $\text{dur.M}_{SA}=6:08$ ,  $\text{sd}_{SA}=4:01$ ,  $R_{SA}=14:46$ ).

*Information exchange* was the most frequent behaviour during encounters at both sites for the patrol (NZC=8.5, SAC=7.0) and citizen (NZC=6.2, SAC=5.8). Likewise, *information exchange* had the highest durations for patrol (NZC=34.6%, SAC=33.4%) and citizen (NZC=26.1%, SAC=28.5%). While there was a notable variation in the duration and frequency of *verbal control* during arrest-encounters between the two sites, the frequency mean of *verbal control* per encounter was approximately half of that of arrest-encounters. It is not clear if the variation is a result of the different distribution of event-types. The total proportion of time of *verbal control* was nearly seven times longer (NZC=1.3%, SAC=8.7%). There was an absence of *physical control*, *refuse verbal control*, *refuse physical control*, or *verbal abuse* during encounters at NZC. The frequency mean of *physical control* per encounter for SAC encounters was 0.21 and the total proportional of time was 0.97%. The citizen behaviours had similar low values: *refuse verbal control* ( $\text{freq.M}_{SA}=0.43$ ;  $\text{duration}_{SA}=0.535$ ), *refuse physical control* ( $\text{freq.M}_{SA}=0.04$ ;  $\text{duration}_{SA}=0.03$ ), and *verbal abuse* ( $\text{freq.M}_{SA}=0.46$ ;  $\text{duration}_{SA}=0.69$ ).<sup>20</sup>

Table 5.2.4 Occurrence of control behaviours during O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> field-action-encounters, expressed as a frequency and percentage

		NZC		SAC	
		<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%
Verbal behaviour	Verbal control (officer to citizen)	5	83.3	23	85.2
	Refuse verbal control (citizen)	0		8	29.6
	Verbal abuse (citizen to officer)	0		4	14.8
Physical behaviour	Physical control (officer to citizen)	0		5	18.5
	Refuse physical control (citizen)	0		1	3.7

Further analysis of control behaviour is shown in Table 5.2.4. Like arrest-encounters, the occurrence of *verbal control* was high. However, the occurrence of *physical control* was low: 0% at NZC and 19% at SAC ( $n_{SA}=5$ ). Levels of citizen resistance were also lower than during arrest-encounters. There was no occurrence of resistance during NZC encounters. At SAC the

<sup>18</sup> Liquor offences included drinking alcohol in a public place.

<sup>19</sup> A complete list of event-types is shown in the Appendix – Table A5.9.

<sup>20</sup> A complete list of arrest-encounter behaviours is shown in the Appendix – Table A5.10.

occurrence of *refuse verbal control* was at 30% ( $n_{SA}=8$ ), verbal abuse at 15% ( $n_{SA}=4$ ) and refuse physical control at 4% ( $n_{SA}=1$ ).

### Field Warnings

A field-warning comprised a warning given to a citizen in the field (i.e. not after an arrest or detainment<sup>21</sup>). Like field-actions, field-warnings were given to citizens because an officer determined the citizen's guilt or culpability for an offence. More field-warnings were given at SAC ( $n_{SA}=18$ ) than at NZC ( $n_{NZ}=5$ ). In most cases the encounter problem-type related to minor offences: the most frequent was disorder at 40% in NZC ( $n_{NZ}=2$ ) and 33% at SAC ( $n_{SA}=6$ ). NZC field-action-encounters were longer in mean duration ( $\text{dur.M}_{NZ}=13:45$ ,  $\text{sd}_{NZ}=11:27$ ,  $R_{NZ}=28:15$ ) than SAC field-action-encounters ( $\text{dur.M}_{SA}=6:24$ ,  $\text{sd}_{SA}=4:14$ ,  $R_{SA}=15:59$ ).<sup>22</sup>

Consistent with the other encounters, *information exchange* was the most frequent behaviour during encounters at both sites for the patrol (NZC=9.2, SAC=7.0) and citizen (NZC=6.2, SAC=7.2). *Information exchange* during the field-warning-encounters had higher durations than arrest-encounters for both patrol (NZC=26.3%, SAC=24.2%) and citizen (NZC=28.9%, SAC=26.2%) participants. Consistent with the previous encounters, there was a notable variation in the duration and frequency of *verbal control* between the two sites. The frequency mean of *verbal control* per encounter was higher at SAC ( $\text{freq.M}_{SA}=7.0$ ) than NZC ( $\text{freq.M}_{NZ}=3.2$ ). The total proportion of time of *verbal control* was over four times longer ( $\text{duration}_{NZ}=4.2\%$ ,  $\text{duration}_{SA}=17.1\%$ ). There was a greater frequency of citizen *refuse verbal control* at SAC ( $\text{freq.M}_{SA}=1.8$ ) than at NZC ( $\text{freq.M}_{NZ}=1.0$ ). The total proportion of time was greater in SAC ( $\text{freq.M}_{SA}=3.9\%$ ) than NZC ( $\text{duration}_{NZ}=1.5\%$ ).<sup>23</sup>

Table 5.2.5 Occurrence of control behaviours during O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> field-warnings-encounters, expressed as a frequency and percentage

		NZC		SAC	
		<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%
Verbal behaviour	Verbal control (officer to citizen)	4	80	18	100
	Refuse verbal control (citizen)	2	40	11	61.1
	Verbal abuse (citizen to officer)	3	60	6	33.3
Physical behaviour	Physical control (officer to citizen)	0	0	4	22.2
	Refuse physical control (citizen)	0	0	0	0

<sup>21</sup> For example, warnings in the format of a formal Pre-Charge Warning (in NZC) or police caution were excluded from this category as the warning phase of the process was authorised by another member of police (such as a Custody Sergeant) not present during the initial stages of the PCE.

<sup>22</sup> A complete list of event-types is shown in the Appendix – Table A5.11.

<sup>23</sup> A complete list of arrest-encounter behaviours is shown in the Appendix – Table A5.12.

Further analysis of the occurrence of patrol control behaviour is shown in Table 5.2.5. The occurrence of patrol *verbal control* during the field-warning-encounters was high at 80% at NZC ( $n_{\text{NZ}}=4$ ) and 100% at SAC ( $n_{\text{SA}}=18$ ). These encounters had a higher level of occurrence of refuse verbal control and verbal abuse than the field-action-encounters.

### Summary

There were notable differences in the use of officer control behaviours among the categories of enforcement encounters. As the event-type profiles were likely to have been influenced by the mode of officer deployment, inferences must be measured against the risk of research site access-related bias. Nonetheless, the average frequencies of the occurrence of *verbal control* during field-arrest PCEs ( $\text{freq.M}_{\text{NZ}}=3.6$ ;  $\text{freq.M}_{\text{SA}}=7.6$ ) and field-warning PCEs ( $\text{freq.M}_{\text{NZ}}=3.2$ ;  $\text{freq.M}_{\text{SA}}=7.0$ ) were twice that of field-action PCEs ( $\text{freq.M}_{\text{NZ}}=1.5$ ;  $\text{freq.M}_{\text{SA}}=3.3$ ). A similar pattern was found with duration; when compared with other behaviours as a proportion of the total time of the encounter the mean duration of *verbal control* field-arrests ( $\text{duration}_{\text{NZ}}=4.1\%$ ;  $\text{duration}_{\text{SA}}=14.2\%$ ) and field-warnings ( $\text{duration}_{\text{NZ}}=4.2\%$ ;  $\text{duration}_{\text{SA}}=17.1\%$ ); and field-actions ( $\text{duration}_{\text{NZ}}=1.3\%$ ;  $\text{duration}_{\text{SA}}=8.8\%$ ). This suggests that less *verbal control* (in frequency and proportional duration) was required by officers during field-actions in comparison with field-arrests and field-warnings. While this conclusion is subject to the vulnerability of small data sub-sets at NZC, it does pose an interesting question: is less control required during a field action than an arrest or warning? Analysis of *physical control* fails to provide any further insight into this question.

Differences between the two research sites, evident in the analysis of investigative encounters, were also present during the enforcement encounters. Variances between the frequency and proportionate duration of *verbal control* are evident in the paragraph above. During field-arrests, the average frequency of officer control behaviour (*verbal control* and *physical control*) at SAC was twice that of the average frequency at NZC. Similarly, the proportional duration of officer control behaviour at SAC was more than three times that of NZC. This trend was similar when examining the use of *verbal control* during field-actions and field-warnings. However, this was not the case for *physical control*. There was no recorded incidence of *physical control* by officers at NZC and minor use by officers at SAC. The average frequency of occurrence of *physical control* per field-arrest was lower at NZC than at SAC ( $\text{freq.M}_{\text{NZ}}=1.4$ ;  $\text{freq.M}_{\text{SA}}=3.6$ ). The occurrence of *physical control* during SAC field-actions ( $\text{freq.M}_{\text{SA}}=0.2$ , du-

ration<sub>SA</sub>=1.0%) and field-warnings (freq.M<sub>SA</sub>=0.5, duration<sub>SA</sub>=1.0%) were minimal. There was no recorded use of *physical control* at NZC field-actions or field-warnings.

## 5.3 Discussion

This research has highlighted deficiencies in utilising data on police use of force to address a question of conflict resolution. While police agencies may methodically collect self-report use of force data from officers, the omission of data on the use of control or coercive verbal communication, often absent from ‘use of force reporting’, prevents a comprehensive analysis of conflict resolution during officer-citizen interaction. Thus, the merit of the present study was that it measured *all* communicative behaviour to provide a descriptive analysis of conflict resolution behaviour. During the quantitative study, the predominant method of interaction between officer and citizen was the conversational-style *information exchange*. This was the case for both O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> and O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>2</sub> datasets of investigative and enforcement encounters. The dataset comprised of events where SAC officers used controlling behaviour more often, and for a longer proportion of time during encounters, than NZC officers. The analysis of O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> investigative and enforcement encounters revealed variations in the frequencies and durations of control behaviours.

The analysis of investigative encounters revealed that NZC officers used *verbal control* more frequently than during suspect-encounters. (This was not revealed with SAC officers.) This poses the question of whether the increased frequency is a result of perceived necessity or personal preference of the officer. Previous research has found that officers develop personal preferences for conflict resolution behaviour (Wilson & Gross 1994; Abrahamsen & Strype 2009). Similarly, a person’s degree of rationality may affect their ability to interact with officers (Reisig *et al.* 2004). As the intoxication levels of the participating citizens were generally higher at SAC than at NZC, it is possible that officers believed it was necessary to use more control behaviour with citizens at SAC than at NZC.

### 5.3.1 OFFICER BEHAVIOUR AT NZC

The first research question seeks to gain an understanding of how routinely unarmed officers behave when resolving interpersonal conflict. The analysis of the usage of active conflict resolution behaviours (all behaviours excluding officer absence or inactivity) of NZC officers

revealed that *information exchange* comprised 83% of the total duration of patrol behaviour during O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> encounters and 81% of O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>2</sub> encounters. Control behaviour—including coercive and forceful physical actions—was used by officers from NZ in the minority. *Verbal control* amounted to 9.3% in total duration of O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> encounters and 8.8% of O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>2</sub> encounters. *Physical control* behaviour occurred in 3% of total duration for O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> encounters and 1.3% of O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>2</sub> encounters. Although usage varied slightly among investigative or enforcement encounters, the patterns form a consistent narrative: *Most conflict-prone encounters comprise of information exchange (81–83%) between officers and citizens, relatively frequent use of verbal control (8.8–9.3%) by officers and infrequent use physical control (1.3–3%) by officers.*

### Citizen role

The ratio of average frequencies per encounter of *information exchange* to *verbal control* and *information exchange* to *physical control* according to citizen role are instructive. If the occurrence of control behaviour indicates conflict between an officer and citizen, a ratio with a greater consequent compared with another ratio, indicates a greater use of control. Ratios of behaviour by NZPOL officers, categorised by citizen-role, are shown in Table 5.3.1.

Table 5.3.1. Ratio of the frequency of information exchange to verbal control and physical control at NZC

		NZC	
		ratio	n
Information exchange – verbal control ratio	All O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> encounters	1:0.29	83
	All O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>2</sub> encounters	1:0.27	47
	<b>Investigative encounters</b>		
	O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> Victim-encounters	1:0.29	27
	O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> Suspect-encounters	1:0.18	13
	<b>Enforcement encounters</b>		
	O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> Field-arrest-encounters	1:0.34	26
	O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> Field-action-encounters	1:0.18	6
	O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> Field-warnings-encounters	1:0.38	5
Information exchange – physical control ratio	All O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> encounters	1:0.06	83
	All O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>2</sub> encounters	1:0.04	47
	<b>Investigative encounters</b>		
	O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> Victim-encounters	1:0.01	27
	O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> Suspect-encounters	1:0.02	13
	<b>Enforcement encounters</b>		
	O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> Field-arrest-encounters	1:0.13	26
	O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> Field-action-encounters	1:0.00	6
	O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> Field-warnings-encounters	1:0.00	5

The highest consequent of verbal control (to *information exchange*) occurred with *arrest-encounters* (1:0.34) and *warning-encounters* (1:0.38). This was expected as the act of arrest is a highly controlling behaviour and the verbal nature of warnings is also highly controlling. The

high consequent of *verbal control* ratios was not reflected in the *information exchange* to *physical control* frequency ratio. The highest consequent occurred during arrest-encounters which, like verbal control, was expected. Arrest-encounters regularly included officers touching the citizen to apply handcuffs or to conduct a ‘pat-down’ search.

### *Conflict during citizen encounters*

It is notable that that *victim*-encounters had the greater consequent of *verbal control* (1:0.29) than *suspect*-encounters (1:0.18). This appears to be counterintuitive; it would be expected that victims would display less resistance to officers than victims and thus require less control behaviour. The policing literature on conflict resolution and use of force consider *overt* conflicts such as those between officers and suspects or ‘wrong-doers’ (e.g. Abrahamsen & Strype 2009) rather than overt conflict with victims. However although Sykes and Brent (1980) consider how officers use verbal control to regulate behaviour, and that their analysis is limited to encounters between police and suspects, it could be applied to understand encounters with victims. They posited that officers use regulation (in this instance control behaviour) to achieve four encounter goals: collect information; assert or maintain order; achieve respect from citizens; and achieve an acceptable resolution. The distinction between interpersonal conflict arising from goal blockages and that from incivilities is important to this argument. Of the victim-encounters, verbal abuse occurred in 11% ( $n=3$ ).

## 5.3.2 CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON

The analysis of the usage of active conflict resolution behaviours of NZC officers revealed that *information exchange* comprised 83% of the total duration of patrol behaviour during O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> encounters and 81% of O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>2</sub> encounters. The same analysis of the active behaviours of SAC officers shows that *information exchange* comprised of 61% of the total duration of patrol behaviour during O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> encounters and 59% of O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>2</sub> encounters. Proportionally, SAC officers spent less time using *information exchange* during the encounters than NZC officers. SAC officer use of *verbal control* amounted to 24.9% in total duration for O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> encounters and 21.1% for O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>2</sub> encounters. *Physical control* behaviour occurred in 8.0% of total duration for O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> encounters and 11.1% for O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>2</sub> encounters. While it can be concluded that *SAC officers in the research spent less time during conflict-prone encounters using information exchange (59–61%) between officers and citizens than NZC officers (81–83%), used more verbal control (21–*



25%) than NZC officers (8.8–9.3%), and more physical control (8–11%) than NZC officers (1.3–3%), the generalisability of these findings is limited due to the potential for bias associated with limitations associated with research access.

### Control behaviours

Analysis of frequency data revealed variations in the use of conflict resolution behaviours by officers from SAC and NZC. These differences are summarised in Table 5.3.2. As with the caveat above, the reported ratios of the average frequency per encounter of *information exchange* to *verbal control*, and the average frequency per encounter of *information exchange* to *physical control*. Except for NZC victim-encounters, the ratios of both control behaviours (*information exchange* to *verbal control* and *information exchange* to *physical control*) were higher at SAC than at NZC. This pattern was consistent for both O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> and O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>2</sub> encounters.

For suspect and enforcement encounters, the consequents of SAC *information exchange* to *verbal control* ratios were 2 to 2.5 times greater than those of NZC. The variation of physical control was less consistent when O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> encounters were separated according to type. Suspect-encounters at SAC had consequents of *information exchange* to *physical control* ratios 8 times greater than those at NZC. The consequents of field-arrest-encounters at SAC *information exchange* to *physical control* ratios were 2.5 times greater than those at NZC. There were no instances of physical control used at NZC during field-action- and field-warning encounters.

Table 5.3.2. Ratio of the frequency of information exchange to verbal control and physical control

		NZC		SAC	
		ratio	n	ratio	n
Information exchange – verbal control ratio	All O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> encounters	1:0.29	83	1:0.60	112
	All O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>2</sub> encounters	1:0.27	47	1:0.54	22
	<b>Investigative encounters</b>				
	O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> Victim-encounters	1:0.29	27	1:0.23	3
	O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> Suspect-encounters	1:0.18	13	1:0.44	41
	<b>Enforcement encounters</b>				
	O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> Field-arrest-encounters	1:0.34	26	1:0.72	21
	O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> Field-action-encounters	1:0.18	6	1:0.47	27
	O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> Field-warnings-encounters	1:0.38	5	1:1.00	18
Information exchange – physical control ratio	All O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> encounters	1:0.06	83	1:0.14	112
	All O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>2</sub> encounters	1:0.04	47	1:0.09	22
	<b>Investigative encounters</b>				
	O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> Victim-encounters	1:0.01	27	1:0.00	3
	O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> Suspect-encounters	1:0.02	13	1:0.08	41
	<b>Enforcement encounters</b>				
	O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> Field-arrest-encounters	1:0.13	26	1:0.34	21
	O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> Field-action-encounters	1:0.00	6	1:0.03	27
	O <sub>2</sub> C <sub>1</sub> Field-warnings-encounters	1:0.00	5	1:0.07	18

These differences illustrate that while *information exchange* was the predominant behaviour used during encounters, officers from SAC used controlling behaviour more frequently than those from NZC.

### 5.3.3 RELIABILITY OF FINDINGS

The quantitative study mostly comprised of the analysis of O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> encounters. Furthermore, the sample sizes of the analysis of investigative and enforcement encounters were small—there were few SAC victim encounters, and few NZC field-action- and field-warning-encounters. Similarly, some citizen variables were different between the research sites, as was the distribution of encounter event-types. As such, these analyses must be treated with some caution.

Differences in the demographic variables between the two samples of citizen-participants may have affected the data collected during the present research. Terrill and Mastrofski's (2002) analysis of the POPN data found that males, non-whites, poor, and young suspects were treated more harshly by officers than suspects from other groups. Another study found positive relationship between alcohol impairment and the use of force: Kaminski *et al.* (2004) found that perceived levels (by officers) of suspect judgement impairment increased the odds of the use of harsher levels of force. Their findings are consistent with the increased use of controlling behaviour in the present study. The SAC citizen sample comprised of a higher proportion of males (81.1%) than the sample at NZC (52.5%). Likewise, the age range of citizens was statistically significantly different, with citizens at SAC younger than at NZC. There was also a higher proportion of citizens displaying signs of impairment due to alcohol intoxication at SAC (67.5%) than at NZC (30.6%). Officers at SAC were interacting with more males, who were younger in age, and more frequently intoxicated, than the officers at NZC. Sex, age, and levels of impairment are relevant to the police use of force literature.

The demographics of NZC and SAC officer-participants were similar. The majority of officer-participants were at the rank of constable and ranged in age from 21–59. There was a slightly higher proportion of female officers at NZC (NZC=24.4%; SAC=19.6%) and White/European officers at SAC (NZC=91.1%; SAC=95.7%). However, on average, SAC officers were involved in more encounters in the study than NZC officers, but the difference was not significant, and the effect size was small. Officers who responded to the psychometric tests showed no statistically significant differences in the five personality factors, incident count, or injury score. There was no difference in the resistance scores.

### 5.3.4 EMERGENT ISSUES

Analyses from this chapter highlight two issues relevant to the present research. First, can an explanation be found to explain the high incidence of control behaviour during investigative encounters? This is particularly apparent in the dataset of victim-encounters from NZC. Could the explanation be that this phenomenon is a *systemic* response to situation (i.e. it is necessary to do so when dealing with victims) or, is it possible that the control behaviour was a result of cultural pre-disposition to interaction with victims? Second, can an explanation be found for the higher incidence of control behaviours used by SAC officers? Could the explanation be associated with the differing encounter event-type profiles?

The next two chapters present the research findings from the qualitative study. Chapter 6 analyses encounter case narratives and officer responses from interviews to consider officer decision-making prior to and during police-citizen encounters. The findings suggest that officers follow a diagnostic and treatment procedure when involved in encounters. Chapter 7 considers these narratives to examine how officers respond when faced with conflict during an encounter. Together the analysis and findings present a context for the quantitative findings in this chapter.



## 6

---

# Officer decision-making during police-citizen encounters

---

The previous chapter considered officer behaviour during PCEs, particularly focusing on the use of *information exchange*, *verbal control* and *physical control*. The analysis outlined in the present chapter considers the decision-making behaviour of officers when they attempt to achieve officer-goals, how officers progressed through the encounter and how they dealt with disturbances.

### 6.1 Intervention: the perceived harm, legality and acceptability

The police officer's workspace consisted of two distinct zones. The public-facing zone was the operational environment where officers and citizens had the potential to interact; and where there was an expectation that any actions of the officer were made in an official 'police' capacity. This was the environment where police-citizen encounters were most likely to originate. Punch (1979) referred to this as the 'frontstage'; officers referred to this environment as the 'street'. In contrast, the non-public-facing zone incorporated areas where citizens were normally excluded from and where officers did not expect to engage in police-citizen encounters. It was the zone where officers did not necessarily behave in an official 'police' role (except when conducting telephone or computer-based enquiries) and where officers were not required to come face-to-face with citizens. In this zone, officers behaved differently to that of the public-facing zone; they behaved as any person might behave in any office-based occupa-

tion. This was the ‘backstage’ (Punch 1979): officers had the freedom to move seamlessly between the frontstage and backstage whereas citizens did not. During the qualitative study, all PCEs occurred in public-facing zones.<sup>1</sup> The PCE began when a police officer and a citizen became engaged in a focused gathering: a ‘visual and cognitive focus of attention’ (Goffman 1961, p.17).

Encounters were triggered in one of two ways. The first was the result of a call for service where someone, somewhere had sought the assistance from police. It was routine for these calls to be relayed and dispatched to officers through the police command structure. Once dispatched, officers would arrive at a location and seek out the citizen who was the subject of the call for service. In the present research, 72.1% of PCEs at NZC were dispatched whereas only 15.5% of PCEs were dispatched at SAC. Other calls for service included a directed action or tasking from a supervisor or requests from other officers. In these cases, officers were forewarned before initiating contact with a citizen; the officer followed a process to gather more information about circumstances which have prompted the call for service.

The second trigger occurred when officers observed a situation where the officers believed that an intervention was necessary. These situations were not necessarily an illegal or dangerous act: sometimes there was no obvious harm or wrong-doing, and sometimes officers thought that an infraction *might* occur. In the study, 15.4% percent of PCEs were officer-initiated at NZC whereas at SAC 66.2% were officer-initiated.

The officers’ decision to initiate an encounter appeared to be influenced by three factors. The first was a consideration of the harm, if any, that had occurred, or any harm that may be caused if an intervention was or was not initiated. The second considered the legality or illegality of behaviour observed in the situation. Officers evaluated the available information to establish if the behaviour or circumstances were contrary to law. If there was *prima facie* evidence to suggest that an offence had occurred, consideration was given to the severity of that offence and the degree to which the officer could tolerate the deviance. The third consideration related to the social acceptability of the situation. Questions of acceptability related to whether the behaviour was acceptable to the social values of the community perceived by the officer, or those to the values held by the officer. Together, these three considerations formed

---

<sup>1</sup> While PCEs only occurred in the public-facing zone during the research, it was possible that PCEs could occur within the private-facing zone. For instance, if a citizen infiltrated into a non-public zone a PCE may well have occurred. Such a zone would then become public—for the purposes of the encounter—and revert to a private location at the completion of the encounter.

the officer's intervention test: officers considered the perceived harm, legality and social acceptability of the situation before initiating an encounter.

### 6.1.1 PERCEIVED HARM

The perception of harm was constructed by officers in a variety of circumstances. When interviewed, officers often discussed harm to be the product of physical action between two or more people. Constructs of harm also encapsulated self-harm, such as the act of a person inflicting physical injury on their body. Self-harm might include situations where a person makes deliberate attempts to commit suicide or makes non-life-threatening injuries to their person. Harm was not necessarily measured by an objective criterion; officers perceived harm as a physical act that may hurt or injure a person.

But constructions of perceived harm were not limited to physical assaults or injuries. In the following extract, the officer indicates that harm can also be seen as certain 'wrongful behaviours' committed by a person. Here, Officer Z89 discusses how harm can manifest from victimisation:

#### Case 6.1.1 Wrongful behaviour (Z89)

If I saw a person being wronged by another person, whether it's someone stealing something from their shop, someone's verbally intimidating or abusing someone else, I'd stop. If there was an argument, like if there is a physical argument. [...] I would stop if it felt like I can do something to help or help was needed by, by me, whether as a... I mean in the execution of work, if I could make a difference or... I should be making a difference. (Interview transcript Z89)

As such, the wrongful behaviour of one person is a sufficient trigger for police intervention. Harm was also perceived in situations which fell outside a 'wrongful behaviours' construct or a criminal justice paradigm. In the example below, officers perceived harm in the circumstances of a citizen behaving in an odd manner.

#### Case 6.1.2 Woman at bus stop needing care (PCE0139)

This incident came as a result of a member of the public calling police to say that a woman had been waiting at a bus-stop for several hours, not taking any passing buses. It was now raining and she was getting wet. On arrival police found a 50-year old woman who appeared not to be in distress. After speaking to her, Officer Z07 quickly determined that she suffered from a mental health disorder. He used a combination of information seek and support statements to ascertain that CN156 was in need of immediate care. When detained CN156 was completely compliant. (Field note 10/04/15)

After speaking to the citizen, the officers established that the citizen required mental health assistance. They believed that actions of the citizen were those of a person who was maybe mentally disordered, and as such were harmful. Similarly, a person suffering from a physical injury or a medical emergency can prompt an intervention.

#### **Case 6.1.3 Officer abandons assault investigation to attend to a medical emergency (A88)**

I suppose a good example is the other night when we were out, you were with us at the time actually. We went to identify somebody in a night club who had been involved in an assault, but at that time a lady was brought out of the club having collapsed with breathing problems. So my attention immediately went to her, so, because obviously that's a life and death situation or could possibly be. So I left the assault guy with someone else and I prioritised her. (Interview transcript A88)

Perceived harm, therefore, was conceptualised by officers to have occurred from a direct physical action of one person to another, or the behaviour of one person to another, or the individual actions of a person.

Other perceptions of harm were constructions influenced by the personal circumstance of the officer. For instance, the presence of an intoxicated and dishevelled teenage girl, with her clothing positioned in such a way that made her brassiere visible, was taken aside by a senior female officer who quietly helped her adjust her clothing. The harm identified by the officer was not because of any wrongful act by another person, but a concern for the 'appropriateness' of the dress of the person. The demonstration of harmful constructs was influenced by the environment or task assigned to the officers. In the context of the present research, the 'operational theatre' was dominated by entertainment and suburban zones. As such, officers were influenced by harm originating from 'street' offences: public order, personal safety, minor criminal offending, but not necessarily responding to 'non-street' offending such as corporate fraud, terrorism, national security.

### **6.1.2 ASSESSMENT OF LEGALITY OR ILLEGALITY**

In addition to considering perceived harm, officers evaluated the legality or illegality of citizens' actions that they observed. As a part of the evaluation, they considered their suspicion or belief that an offence had occurred. For instance, when an officer observed one person assaulting another person, a belief was formed that an assault had occurred. Similarly, when an officer smelt the odour of cannabis from a person a belief was formed that a drug offence had occurred. When illegal acts were not observed by the officer, information was collected to cor-



roborate their suspicion. During the qualitative study, an officer discovered a male lying on the ground with a bloody face. This discovery caused the officer to suspect that the person had been assaulted but the possibility could not be ruled out that the person had fallen over or suffered a medical event.

Officer-led interventions relied on the severity of the illegality of the behaviour. The greater the level of perceived severity of an offence encountered by officers the greater the likelihood of intervention. When interviewed officers explained that when they were faced with a situation involving a physical assault, they would intervene immediately. However, when officers discussed the likelihood of initiating an encounter to address minor offences, responses were more varied.

Reluctance to respond to minor illegalities such as traffic offences, pedestrian offences, or other ‘technical’ offences is described below by Officer A38. When asked to describe the type of situations he might ignore, the officer replied:

#### Case 6.1.4 Ignoring technical offences (A38)

[Technical] offences that generally are of no consequence or the public wouldn't consider it to be an issue. You'd probably cause yourself more embarrassment while taking action than by not taking action. I'll quite often ignore those ones, too. [...] Oh, for example, oh, you know, skateboarding down a footpath, you know, walking against a flashing red man.<sup>2</sup> I guess we're talking traffic offences again, but those kinds of things. And it's victimless and most people don't have a problem with it. You'd probably just bring negative comment upon police for being seen to do something. There are times when you do need to do something, but I certainly wouldn't take action in every instance, yeah. (Interview transcript A38)

Officer A38's perspectives were not held by all officers. Consider the following response by Officer Z69:

#### Case 6.1.5 The small things can get me (Z69)

...I'm quite pedantic, I'm quite pedantic about things **[laughter]**. And small things can get me. Like, just cars, police cars, things like that. Yeah, no, I'm big on communication, appearance, public perception of what we do. That's all big things for me. [...] And, I already know where my threshold is, to be honest, if it's really against the law, I'll stop. I guess, you look at, say, traffic with people not wearing helmets. I'll still beep my horn or say: "Okay, excuse me, you should be wearing your helmet." (Interview transcript Z69)

The reluctance of some officers to initiate encounters to address minor illegalities illustrates the complexity of officer initiation decisions. Some officers tolerated certain types of minor illegal behaviour where others did not. For instance, minor traffic infractions or pedestrian

<sup>2</sup> A 'red man' was the term for a do not cross pedestrian traffic signal.

offences occurred unchecked in plain sight of some officers.<sup>3</sup> Despite the variability in response to minor illegalities, officers were more consistent when confronted with serious offences—those of which perhaps appear to be more *harmful*—than those which are deemed to be minor or technical in nature.

### 6.1.3 ACCEPTABILITY

Officers also considered the acceptability of citizen actions when initiating an encounter. Acceptability appeared to be measured by officers in two ways. The first tested the acceptability of the situation based on an officer's perception of how it might be viewed by the citizenry. In other words, officers considered how a 'law-abiding citizen' might view a situation and would use this to guide their decision to intervene.

Officers explained how their decisions to intervene were guided by observations of bystander responses to the behaviour of other citizens. In the first two comments below, officers discuss how changes in 'bystander' behaviour may trigger an officer-led intervention.

#### Case 6.1.6. Officers observing the reactions of citizens

If it's causing disturbance, if it's causing members of the public to take notice and, and stand and watch then I think we definitely have to do something. So, yeah, I don't like to drive past that. I mean, it can be a minor thing. [...] [Anything] that makes the public stop and stare, I think. (Interview transcript A16)

You can also judge it by public's reaction around the people that are acting up. You know, a bunch of people acting like idiots on footpath. A bunch of kids maybe jump around on their skateboard, you can see people going by, they are irritated. (Interview transcript Z43)

The presence of bystanders was not essential for officers to consider the impact of the observed behaviour. Officers said that they would intervene in situations in the absence of bystanders, but on the basis that if there had been, how the bystanders might have reacted. In this case below, Officer A66 reflects on the influence of citizen feedback on officer behaviour. In this situation, an offence constituting a minor illegality is perceived as being strategically important; it directly relates to citizen demand.

<sup>3</sup> It was difficult to examine the variability in officer decision-making during the qualitative study. It was impractical to systematically define officer non-responses to minor offences, as it was impossible to establish if an omission was deliberate or accidental. On several occasions during the research, offences visible offences were not acted on. In some cases, they appeared outside the officers' field of view but in other cases they appeared inside the officers' field of view. Some offences were 'technical' in nature, such as road traffic offending, and in these cases, it was difficult to establish if the officers were ignorant of the offence or ignoring the offence.

**Case 6.1.7 Prioritise, not ignore (A66)**

No, I'm, I'm not one to ignore. I'll prioritise. I'll prioritise. If someone's walking across a red pedestrian light and somebody else down the road is yelling, I'll ignore the pedestrian light and go see what people are yelling at. But if there's something there that's blatantly obvious, even if it is a, a basic traffic offence, I'll always stop and speak to them, more so for the fact that the public need to see that we're actually speaking to people for these things. I would get more comments for stopping and speaking to people walking across a pedestrian light and saying, "Oh, thank you for doing that," than... I get positive comments whereas if I didn't speak to them. I've actually, we've actually received complaints from members of the public because we've actually done nothing, not me personally, but police in general. So I always think even if you just stop and say, "Hey, look, you know, what are you doing? Like I'm standing here, that's pretty obvious," type thing. So I'll, I'll always at least have a chat, yeah, even if it's just a friendly chat to just reinforce that, "Do you think you're doing the right thing?" (Interview transcript A66)

However, in some cases officers argued that intervening in socially unacceptable behaviour can be counterproductive. Officer Z81 describes below that the presence of police in itself may be a sufficient deterrent to controlling behaviour.

**Case 6.1.8 Police presence sufficient (Z81)**

There are, there are times where police intervention doesn't help, and I think if guys are just being boisterous, simply seeing police might be enough as a reminder just to keep it in check. (Interview transcript Z81)

Similarly, some offences, which might be socially unacceptable, were best ignored:

**Case 6.1.9 Ignoring socially unacceptable behaviour**

For example, we have, a lot of disorder at night where people would abuse police, who'll potentially pull the fingers<sup>4</sup> as an example, and we don't tend to stop and deal with that. We potentially should, but that is something that I would ignore, because we always have [other things to worry about]. (Interview transcript A66)

The second dimension of acceptability encompasses the degree to which the actions are acceptable or unacceptable to the personal perspective of police officers. For instance, discovering a male in a commercial location after dark would be regarded as suspicious by police officers, but not necessarily by the citizenry. Such actions are not illegal, nor are they physically harmful, but to an officer, they may be unacceptable given the circumstances.

In the narrative below, Officer A66 discusses how his determination of unacceptable behaviour initiates a contact:

**Case 6.1.10 Suspicious male**

We were driving along on G Street where we've had a series of, of recent break-ins. Saw a male who just looked a little out of place. For no other reason other than the fact that he looked out of place, stopped and spoke to

---

<sup>4</sup> 'Pull the fingers' is an obscene hand gesture.

him. Turns out his last lot of history was for the exact same thing. And on Monday morning he got arrested after a DNA hit. So we prevented a break-in just because we saw somebody that looked out of place. (Interview transcript A66)

### When asked why he ‘looked out of place’ he explained:

He was virtually a long way from anywhere that was open. There was nothing open in that stretch of street at the time. He was in all dark clothing. He was standing right next to an Asian restaurant in which we’ve had a series of break-ins similar. There was a metal plate from a grill in the ground leaning against a window. And as soon as he saw us he looked very nervous. So my instinct was we need to figure out what this guy’s up to.

From the moment we spoke to him nothing added up. You know, “I, I’ve been drinking. I’m, I, I’ve just had a vomit.” “Well, where did you vomit? There’s no vomit anywhere, mate. I can’t, like, I’ve had a look around. No vomit. Why, why are you here?” “Oh, I was just getting some air.” “Where have you been drinking?” So he’d been drinking a long way from where he was now, couldn’t account for why he was there. Just the whole circumstances added up to the fact that we needed to speak to him. (Interview transcript A66)

Officer A66’s explanation describes how he determines the acceptability—from the police’s perspective—of the male’s actions. This differs to the assessment or prediction of a bystander response: not all bystanders would consider the presence of a person in or near a location unacceptable.

Officers often assessed citizen actions according to a ‘time-place-circumstance’ construct. Similar to Epp *et al.*’s “out of place” construct (2014, p.70), this assesses that the degree of acceptability in the context of the time of day, the type of place, and the circumstances in which citizen actions occur. For example, the conduct of the male described above in Case 6.1.10 was believed to be suspicious because of the time of day (outside of business hours) the place (a restaurant which was closed) and circumstances (he was behaving ‘suspiciously’). In another example, New Zealand officer Z39 explains that even illegal actions can be subject to a reasonableness test.

#### Case 6.1.11 Urinating in public

Driving around the street, that’s not right heartland CBD, it’s slightly suburban and there’s maybe a party somewhere and it’s a couple of guys having a piss on a tree off the footpath. Yeah, that’s fine. Yeah. If it’s on a... shop sign or a door or on a footpath on the main street, that’s not fine. *Time, place, circumstance* stuff. (Interview transcript Z39) (Author’s emphasis)

In law, both instances of public urination are illegal in New Zealand (*Summary Offences Act 1981* [NZ], S.32) yet the officer considers the location of the offence—suburban verses central business district—to assess the degree of acceptability. Officers discussed other examples of illegal actions that were tolerated without intervention.

In the example below, Officer A22 said that certain actions might be acceptable in one geographical location but unacceptable in another. When asked what type of behaviours he might ignore, Officer A22 responds:

**Case 6.1.12 Ignoring yelling and swearing (A22)**

As far as what you ignore... I don't know if you can ignore. Out on [Location] street you ignore people yelling, screaming, and swearing all the time because it's the norm on the street. (Interview transcript A22)

Another officer explains how citizen actions in one location are permissible despite the illegality of the action perceived by the officer.

**Case 6.1.13 Tolerance of Swearing (A82)**

Or even just sort of the odd loud mouth, walking down the street, swearing at their mate further up the road, you know. It's offensive to swear but not really important to stop everyone from swearing and that sort of thing, you know. (Interview transcript A82)

Assessing the acceptability of an action, therefore, was a construction of the officer's assessment of the perceived or actual bystander response to a citizen action, together with, or in some cases alternatively to, an officer's belief of the acceptability of the action. The reasonableness test—also described as the *time-place-circumstances* test—appeared to be independent of the legality or illegality of the citizen's actions.

## 6.1.4 DISCUSSION

Officers made several assessments to determine if citizen actions warranted an officer-initiated intervention. Officers explained that their decision-making took into account their perceptions of harm, the legality/illegality, and/or the acceptability of the citizen's actions.

Sampson and Bartusch (1998) proposed that there is a “distinction between the tolerance of deviance and cynicism about the applicability of law” (1998, p.784). Their thesis suggests that “ghetto” areas within larger cities “displayed elevated levels of legal cynicism, dissatisfaction with the police, and tolerance of deviance”, where there are “cognitive landscapes where crime and deviance are more or less expected and institutions of criminal justice are mistrusted” (Sampson & Bartusch 1998, p.800). They argue that in circumstances where there are communities that tolerate deviance and turns a cynical eye towards the law, that these are not necessarily linked to racial groups.

Neither of the cities which were the subject of the research (NZC and SAC) had “ghetto”-type communities or locales. There were obvious ‘quarters’ within the station jurisdiction that attracted heightened calls for service distinct from the ‘normal’ commercial, urban, or suburban ‘business as usual’ demand: NZC’s ‘student quarter’ and SAC’s ‘entertainment zone’ drove demand for police response to alcohol-related events such as disorder, (eviction and trespass from licenced premises, fighting), breach of alcohol regulations (drinking or possessing alcohol in an alcohol-free zone). The closest area resembling such places were the parkland areas at SAC where small groups of Aboriginal peoples congregated to consume alcohol. Yet, the activities of the Aboriginal groups resulted in fewer calls-for-service than the mostly white/European groups populating the NZC ‘student quarter’ and SAC ‘entertainment quarter’.

Epp *et al.* (2014) examined officer-initiated police-citizen encounters in the United States and concluded that officers are prone to implicit intergroup bias. They found that American officers were influenced by negative racial and social serotypes, particularly towards African American and other ethnic minorities. This was not borne out in the present research: officer-participants did not display any *explicit* indicators of racial stereotyping. For instance, there were no verbal indicators or cues that intimated that officers were targeting zones within their geographical jurisdiction because they would find a specific ethnic minority there. But there were indicators of stereotypical bias towards social groups within the cities. Officers were aware that some geographical zones were prone to alcohol-related disorder, such as the NZC ‘student quarter’ at NZC and the SAC CBD ‘entertainment quarter’<sup>5</sup>. Consequently, officers heightened their observation of ‘students’ and ‘revellers’ in response to their perception that members of these groups were problematic. Other social groups associated with ‘community problems’ received heightened surveillance. For instance, street beggars were highlighted as being problematic at several SAC patrol meetings. Similarly, NZC officers were aware of ‘student’ event planned in the ‘student quarter’.

Concluding that officers within the present study displayed racial bias is problematic. Analysis of SAC officer-initiated encounters shows an over-representation of Aboriginal people. Although the population of Aboriginal people was 0.1% of the population at SAC, they comprised 15.2% ( $n=21$ ) of the citizen sample. However, during officer-initiated detoxification

---

<sup>5</sup> The naming of these “quarters” was given by the researcher to aid the anonymity of each research site. Officers did not refer to these areas using this nomenclature.

events intoxicated citizens were taken to ‘sobering-up centres’. At times, those who were intoxicated would passively wait outside or near the SAC station, and while actively initiating an encounter, there was a suspicion that they were seeking the assistance of the police for transportation to the sobering-up centre. While there were fewer officer-initialled encounters at NZC ( $n=21$ ), the majority related to white citizens (96.4% of citizens,  $n=27$ ); Maori were under-represented at 3.6% of citizens ( $n=1$ ).

Factors that influenced an officer’s decision to intervene and enforce minor offences (described as misdemeanours in American jurisdictions, summary offences or traffic offences in New Zealand) have been discussed in the literature. Brown (1981) discussed that minor violations are often ignored for rational reasons: the seriousness of the violation, the difficulty in initiating an encounter (such in a busy traffic environment), or the personal preferences of the officer (whether they are focused on detecting felony-level crimes). Brown’s analysis appears similar to the ‘time-place-circumstances’ construct evident in the present research.

Herbert (2006) described that officers face a complicated role within modern society: they are expected to offer *subservience* to individual and community demand for service, be *separate* from society to faithfully and independently regulate the criminal code, and to be *generative* to improve society, within a ‘liberal’ context which espouses personal freedom. Thus, the decision for an officer to initiate an encounter with a citizen, or intervene in a situation, is informed by the construct of *necessity*. In the present study, necessity was determined by the officer’s opinion of the perception of harm, the socially acceptability of the observed behaviour (taking into their own personal and professional beliefs and those of the ‘good citizen’ or the ‘law abiding citizen’) as well as the determination of the legality or illegality of citizen behaviour.

## 6.2 The diagnostic phase

This next section outlines the ‘diagnostic phase’ of the encounter. Borrowing from a medical procedure, an officer worked through a diagnostic process to construct an incident narrative (IN) before determining a course of action (CoA). The IN relied on the officer to collect information relating to the role of the citizens present (or not present but related to the incident) and establishing the ‘facts’ about the incident subject to the diagnosis.

### 6.2.1 ENCOUNTER INITIATION

#### *Triggers*

Police-initiated encounters occurred as the result of two triggers. The first was because of a dispatch (NZC) or a tasking (SAC) instruction from the departmental chain of command. In most cases, officers received these instructions from a central police communications centre that managed the police response to citizen calls for service. Alternatively, instructions were conveyed to officers by their field supervisors, sometimes independent of the communications centre. In both cases, instructions included limited details of the incident: a location, a description of relevant parties, and/or brief circumstances. These details formed an initial *précis* of the incident.

Sometimes officers received instructions to conduct a preventative patrol in a geographical area. These types of instructions did not include a focus on a specific event or person; rather they were given to officers to be present at a specific place and at a time. They specified the type of problem that the patrols were designed to prevent. Consequently, officers were not investigating an event that had occurred—there was no initial *précis* to refer to—but they were instructed to look for a specific type of behaviour.

It was often the case that no explicit officer goal was provided with the instructions. Calls for service were dispatched by code. For instance, at NZC a patrol was dispatched to a “IX” (incident code for suicide attempt) or at SAC a patrol was dispatched to a “101” (incident code for disorder). Associated goals were implicit. Other than responding to the initial tasking instruction, patrols were expected to formulate their response plan for the incident without the input, coordination, or control from a field supervisor or the communications centre.

The second trigger for police-initiated encounters occurred when an officer discovered citizen actions or incidents that they believed required a police response. In these circumstances, officers were alerted to the behaviour by their sensory triggers: sight, sound and smell. However, as outlined in Section 6.1, the awareness of the citizen actions did not necessarily lead to an officer-led intervention. In some cases, officers chose to ignore or avoid citizen actions. When it became apparent that officers had decided against initiating an encounter, their reasons were justified because of prioritisation (for example see Case 6.1.7) or the belief that the actions were acceptable at the particular *time, place and circumstance* (see Case 6.1.11).



### *Cognitive preparation and awareness*

Officers prepared themselves before initiating an encounter by constructing a narrative of the citizen actions they had observed or those that had been reported. At the beginning of this process, the narrative focused on the information that justified the initiation of the encounter (i.e. a ‘police response’). For instance, narratives contained information about the type of citizen actions observed and the roles of the citizens involved in an incident. Officers who were instructed to respond to an incident relied on the instructions dispatched to guide their awareness and collected more information to expand the narrative *en route* to the incident.

Officers had a greater advantage when initiating non-dispatched officer-initiated encounters. As they were aware of the reason for the encounter, there was less information seeking than when attending a dispatched incident. Officers had already established the guilt or culpability of citizens present at the incident; circumstances were no longer a product of suspicion, more of belief (as the officer had witnessed the implicating citizen actions). This was evident at encounters starting as a stop and search. For instance, New Zealand legislation provides officers with the power to conduct a road traffic stop of any driver on a road at any time (*Land Transport Act 1998* [NZ] S.113, S.114). For such a stop to be legal, officers must decide to stop a vehicle for the purposes of enforcing transport legislation. If officers have witnessed a traffic offence, then *belief* is formed. Officers initiate the encounter armed with the belief that an illegal act has been committed.

### *Citizen disadvantage*

When an officer initiated an encounter, the citizen may suspect the officer’s reason behind the initiation but they lacked certainty on this until the officer advised the citizen of the reason. Citizens appeared to be disadvantaged by the uncertainty of not knowing the reason for the encounter. They searched for reasons why an officer initiated the encounter. Frequently, citizens would start conversations with questions as “Is there a problem officer?” or to pre-empt an officer explanation by exclaiming “I’m sorry for my speed, I was in a hurry”.

Citizens were sometimes able to guess why an officer had initiated contact. In one case when officers at NZC were called to a family violence incident they found two citizens—a male and female—in separate parts of the dwelling. Both citizens said that they knew why the officers had arrived. Similarly, a two-person beat unit at SAC were waiting at a pedestrian crossing controlled by a red ‘do not cross’ light. Standing on the opposite side of the crossing

were two males. The males ignored the do not cross sign and ran across the crossing. The males did not initially appear to be aware of the officers until they were several metres from the officers: they saw the officers at the intersection they slowed and stopped in front of them. One of the males spoke to an officer and asked, “am I going to be fined”?

In both examples, the citizens displayed an awareness of the situation they found themselves in and suspected that they might receive a criminal justice sanction, but they were unable to determine the officers’ objective—would they receive a fine for their behaviour? This placed the citizen at a disadvantage: the citizen was subordinate to the officer. Similarly, when officers were the subject of citizen-initiated encounters they found that there were unable to immediately determine the purpose of the encounter or the citizen’s objective. In these cases, officers were subordinate to the citizen: they did not know *why* the citizen had initiated the encounter. This occurred frequently when officers were patrolling. For instance, SAPOL officers walking through the shopping precinct or when NZPOL officers were driving in the entertainment precinct on a Saturday night.

#### *Power interactivity*

Citizen-initiated encounters had different power-relationships between officers and citizens. As officers were unaware of the citizen’s motivations, they were momentarily *held captive* by the citizen. The focus of the encounter at that point—visual and cognitive attention (see Goffman 1961, p.7)—was entirely on the citizen as the officer attempted to elucidate the citizen’s motivation. As the officer formed an understanding of the citizen’s objective, the power positions changed: the officer moved from a subordinate position to a superordinate position.

The transference of power was aided by the construction of an incident narrative. An officer could retrieve the power once sufficient information was gained from the citizen. The power reversal marked the transition from ‘information seeker’ to ‘action decider’. For instance, it was routine for officers at SAC, who were patrolling by foot, to be stopped by citizens. Citizens stopped to ask the officer for directions or to advise officers of citizen actions or an incident. Once the officer had gathered a sufficient quantity of information from the citizen to determine a course of action, the officer had the power to end the encounter. Similarly, officers at NZC were on vehicular patrol were ‘flagged down’ by a witness who had seen a male seen forcing a young person into a car. While the citizen recounted a description of what he had seen, the officers were captive; they did not wish to leave until they had heard a suffi-

cient detail of the citizen's report. Officers waited until the point of gaining a key piece of new information (or in fact at the point where they decided that the citizen had no useful new information).

### 6.2.2 NARRATIVE DIAGNOSIS

Once officers initiated an encounter, their attention focused on the construction of an incident narrative (IN). The IN had utility; it was the repository of information gleaned from various sources pertinent to the incident. It acted like a script for a film, establishing the key characters of the story, the plot and back-story. It helped the officers to determine criminal liability and formulate a course of action (CoA).

#### *Citizen roles*

Officers classified citizens according to the role that citizens played in the incident. Classifications were dependent on how citizens represented themselves at the encounter but changed if officers discovered information that conflicted with the citizen's initial representations. For instance, a citizen who identified themselves as a victim was treated by officers as a victim until officers determined otherwise. Likewise, a citizen who presented as a suspect will be treated as a suspect unless the officer determined to be of another role such as a victim or witness. Citizen-roles also affected officer-citizen interactions. When officers interacted with victims or witnesses, they were investigating by obtaining information to establish or corroborate the occurrence of an offence. When officers interacted with a suspect they were establishing if there was evidential sufficiency and a necessity to make an arrest.

For the present analysis, a typology of citizen-roles is arranged in two groups (see Table 6.2.1). Primary roles were those instrumental in the creation of the IN. They were based on definitions sourced from customary police practice and legislation. Most criminal legislation was drafted on the basis that there is a person (or group of people) who suffers harm from a person who inflicts that harm. The *Victims' Rights Act 2002* [NZ] establishes these, respectively, as victim and offender.<sup>6</sup> The Act defines an offender as a person who has been convicted of an offence. However, as PCEs occur prior to conviction, the roles in this thesis have been sep-

---

<sup>6</sup> In fact, section 4 of the New Zealand *Victim Rights Act 2002* has a broader interpretation of a victim: this includes a parent or legal guardian of a child victim, and a member of the immediate family of a person who dies or is incapable. For the purposes of clarity, however, the meaning of victim in present research relates to the first subsection (a)(i) "a person against whom an offence is committed by another person" (New Zealand Parliament 2002, p.8)

arated into suspect or arrestee. Witnesses were persons who observed a piece of relevant evidence.<sup>7</sup> These four citizen roles played a primary role in INs. Victims and witnesses described how the actions of a suspect (and arrestee) affected them in some way. Likewise, suspects (and arrestees) provided information about their own actions during a time or event.

Secondary roles related to people who did not contribute information to the IN but were present at the time of the encounter. Unlike primary roles, secondary roles are not derived from legislation. An *associate* was a person who appeared to have had some personal connection with a primary citizen but did not play a primary role in the construction of the IN. A *bystander*, like an associate, was nearby during an encounter but had no personal connection with a primary citizen. In some encounters, persons approached officers without seeking a call for service for officers to act in some official capacity. Such situations included when a citizen approach an officer for directions or to give advice. The citizen played no formal role and as such was categorised as a *casual*.

**Table 6.2.1 The role of citizens during encounters**

Primary citizen-role	Primary officer-goal
Victim	Obtain information to establish offence
Witness	Obtain information to corroborate offence
Suspect	Obtain information to establish sufficiency/necessity to arrest
Field Arrest	Control behaviour and take into custody
Field Action	Control behaviour, non-custodial
Field Warning	Control behaviour through warning
Secondary citizen-role	Primary officer-goal
Associate	Control to avoid contamination or interference
Bystander (non-witness)	Disperse from scene
Casual	Engage

Officer encounter goals were related to citizen roles. The connection between citizen roles and primary officer goals are shown in the second column of Table 6.2.1. The primary officer-goals for victim-, witness-, and suspect-encounters were investigative—the collection of information. These citizens were the most significant contributors of information to the IN. Citizens who played secondary roles did not directly contribute information to the IN; their involvement or presence at an incident was seen to have the potential to interfere with the col-

<sup>7</sup> This definition differs from that described in the New Zealand Evidence Act 2016 as it does not include the condition that a witness must “be able to be cross-examined in a proceeding” (New Zealand Parliament 2006, p.16).

lection of information. As such, the officer-goals associated with these citizens focused on protecting the integrity of the IN from inadvertent or deliberate contamination. In some cases, associates provided contradictory information (or false information) to officers to reduce the clarity of the IN. Similarly, some associates attempted to extricate suspects from the scene or intervene in the arrest. As such, officer-goals for associates or bystanders related to control or dispersal of citizens (as discussed in Case 6.2.7).

### *Role assignment*

Citizen roles influenced officer goals, and thus influenced how an officer determined the best course of action (CoA) to resolve an incident. Chapter 4 showed that officer actions towards citizens varied depending on an officer's assessment of the citizen's behaviour. However, the present analysis explores how an officer's diagnosis and treatment plan was influenced by citizen's role in the encounter. In some cases, citizen roles were apparent to officers before the construction of the IN. For example, dispatched activities such as to take a report from a victim of a historic incident lead officers to expect to speak to a 'victim'.

In Case 6.2.1, citizen roles were presupposed by a witness, thus influencing the officer prior to the commencement of an encounter. Presupposition was reinforced by the actions of the field supervisor who instructed the officers to speak to the 'victim' to see if she would make a complaint.

#### **Case 6.2.1 Female denies being victim of assault (PCE0133)**

This encounter related to a victim welfare check. A member of the public had made a statement saying that the female CNI46 had been crying and bleeding in the street the previous evening and said that "he'd hit me". This encounter was to make contact with the citizen and to establish what had happened. On arrival police the door was answered by the suspected offender CNI47. He was initially gruff to the contact officer Z49. Z49 asked to speak to CNI46. When CNI46 came to the door she was dismissive of the claim outlined in the statement. She said the witness may have made a mistake. She also said that the reason for the blood was that she "fell over". It was clear that she did not want to make an allegation against her boyfriend (CNI47) who was inside. At one point she said that she didn't want CNI47 arrested; acknowledgement that if she made a complaint he would be arrested. After several minutes of discussion, she continued to deny any offending. This was clearly overt conflict – both parties were aware of each other's competing goals – the officer's desire to illicit an allegation and the victim's desire to prevent making such an allegation. At that point Z49 asked to speak to the male present. He came to the door, followed by CNI46, and also denied that he'd hit CNI46. They both stood together in solidarity denying the allegation. At this point Z33 came forward and put the allegation directly to both of them asking them to explain how Z33 had suffered a blood injury and why would the victim make something up like saying CNI47 had said "he had hit her". Neither changed their excuses. In the end police left commenting that they believed that CNI46 had been assaulted by CNI47. It was clear that [both officers] were frustrated at the outcome; it was unclear whether they were frustrated by the fact that they weren't able to make the arrest (the intervention) or whether they were frustrated at being lied to. (Field Notes 8/4/15)

In this instance, the officers' encounter goal was to collect information to establish if an offence had occurred (see Table 6.2.1). While officers may have come away with a view that it was likely an offence had occurred, they were unable to elicit sufficient information (a claim or formal statement) to establish that an offence had been committed and to establish sufficient evidence to support the prosecution of the offence (to make an arrest).

The situation also posed a definitional question: had, in fact, an offence occurred? Officers approached the encounter to obtain a statement from a 'victim' on the assumption that an assault had occurred. However, without collecting documentary information to support this assumption, officers were not able to initiate a prosecution or in fact record the offence as an assault. Officers amended the IN to include that although a witness had suspected an offence had occurred, there was insufficient evidence to support an arrest or prosecution.

In some cases, role assignment and fact-finding occurred simultaneously. In the case below (Case 6.2.2) Officer A58 discusses how officers must make a superficial assessment of citizen roles while implementing a course of action before establishing a comprehensive IN.

#### **Case 6.2.2 Work out offence, handcuff, and arrest**

Yeah, there's been a few where I knew as soon as I got there that [unclear], you know, fight in public, where people are fighting, straight away I'm just, you're just handcuffing people sort of thing just to protect yourselves, because they're just bashing the crap out of each other. But then, then there's the other extreme where you, where you go to a situation where someone's just really sort of full on angry and is it worth negotiating with these people straight up? No. You are just going to restrain them straight away, you know, work out the offence, handcuff and arrest them, go away, and then start trying to calm them down. And I've been in, I guess, several situations where, you know, as soon as you get up to it you know straight away I'm not going to start talking to this person, because he's, he's, whatever he's done, he's, you know, he's just bashed someone or whatever or he's got, you know, some guy had a glass bottle in his hand, for example, you know. I'm yelling straight away, "Get on your knees. Drop the bottle. Get on your knees. Drop the bottle." You know, bang, handcuff, into the paddy wagon, out of there to the cells. (Interview transcript, A58).

But in other cases (such as Case 6.2.3), the construction of the IN is dependent on the correct assignment of citizen-roles.

#### **Case 6.2.3. Domestic Violence incident (PCE0125)**

This incident arose when police attended a domestic incident which came through as a male and female physically fighting. On arrival Z39 dealt with the male party CNI34 and Z85 dealt with the female CNI37. The male was agitated and required some time to explain his position. At the same time the female party (who was outside) was trying to get inside the house where the male was. Z85 and the Acting Sergeant spent most of their time during the encounter preventing the female from entering. During the conversation with CNI34 inside the house Z39 initially started speaking to him as he might be the offender on the incident. It transpired that the incident [became] aggravated by the female threatening to take an overdose of tablets. CNI34 stated that his motivation was to keep [his] partner safe and this is what the conflict related to. At this point the 'tone' of the

encounter changed when Z39's questioning changed from trying to establish criminal offending to welfare and care of CN137. The incident ended when CN134 prepared to leave the house. (Field Notes 2/4/15)

Case 6.2.3 also illustrates how Officer goals can change during IN construction because of establishing citizen roles. Initially, officers responded to a 'domestic incident' which was reported to involve a male and female physically fighting. In this case, the property at the incident location belonged to the female citizen (CN137) and the male citizen was a visitor (CN134). As the incident was reported as a domestic, Z39's goal was to establish if the male's actions amounted to criminal behaviour. During the IN construction, the officer (Z39) listened to the male's account of the circumstances while observing the female's behaviour. Both parties were intoxicated. The male admitted that they had had an argument and a physical confrontation, but this was concerning a threat that the female had made to take an overdose of prescription medicine. When the officer realised that the physical nature of the encounter could have been explained as an act of self-defence (preventing the female from taking an overdose) his demeanour towards the citizen changed. His questioning changed from an attempt to establish any illegality of the actions of the male, to collecting corroborative accounts of the actions of the female. The officer's goal also changed: the male was no longer being treated as a suspect.

This incident differs to that described in Case 6.2.1 where officers determined that a crime had *probably* occurred, but they lacked sufficient evidence to make an arrest. In that situation, the male party was still a suspect, but the final course of action (no arrest) was influenced by a lack of sufficient evidence as opposed to a change of roles in the IN. However, in Case 6.2.3 officers determined that a crime had *probably not* occurred as the male 'offender' had been acting in self-defence. The incident changed from a domestic assault to a medical event.

### *Narrative construction*

The construction of the incident narrative was a sub-process of the greater diagnostic process. At the beginning of an encounter, officers attempted to establish 'facts' about an incident by observing people and the surrounding locations and collecting verbal statements from citizens. As seen in Case 6.2.1, the aim of this process was to determine what had occurred so that a CoA could be formulated. If the CoA required an intervention, then it became a 'treatment'.

Not all information presented to officers was in a logical or sequential order of events. Snippets of information were received from different human and electronic sources. Officers

assembled and rearranged information into a correct temporal order to establish a reliable timeline of citizen actions to identify if a relevant problem existed and if the problem required a police ‘treatment’. Officers filtered out information that was not from trusted sources. Officers initially sought information from victims, independent witnesses, other officers, or CCTV footage. Indeed, officers sought information from these trusted sources first before considering less trustworthy sources. Officers were wary of information from suspects, associates, and bystanders. Similarly, information from citizens who appeared to be intoxicated was treated with suspicion.

At times the information was contradictory. Consider Case 6.2.1 where officers followed up the report made by a witness who located a female who’d claimed to have been assaulted. When officers spoke to the female, she denied that she had been assaulted. Case 6.2.4 further illustrates how the IN shapes the police CoA. Officers were dispatched to attend an incident which had been reported as a ‘verbal domestic’ by a neighbour of the people of interest. Officers arrived with the knowledge that the witness had heard the argument. As the investigation progressed, officers established that a technical offence of trespass had occurred; the female had asked the male to leave, but he had not.

#### **Case 6.2.4 Verbal domestic incident (PCE0138)**

This job related to a verbal domestic reported by a neighbour. Police arrived and found the female inside the house and a male CN155 outside sitting on a sofa. He smelt of alcohol. Z17 spoke to the male CN155 while Z67 went inside to speak to the female. During the conversation with CN155 Z17 enquired about the background to his relationship with the female and what had occurred prior to police arrival. His questioning style had a conversational tone; he used a combination of information seek and supportive statements. CN155 was behaving in a placated and compliant manner. He gave the impression of being relaxed and ‘go with the flow’; he stated that he had had an argument with his partner and she had told him to go outside to cool down. This changed when Z67 returned from the house. She spoke briefly to Z17 about the request for CN155 to leave the premises. At this point CN155’s demeanour changed completely from compliant to argumentative. He believed that it was unfair that he had to leave. (This was despite that he was a guest at his ex-partner’s house and that she was caring for their young child). He became argumentative and abusive. Both officers attempted to reason with him; pointing out that as he was the ‘guest’ and was not caring for a child, therefore it was not fair to ask her (the other party) to leave on this occasion. Z17 gave him the option that he could leave voluntarily or they would seek a Police Safety Order. (Field note 09/04/15)

This case shows the construction process. First, the officers arrived with short *precis* of the event (based on the neighbour’s initial call). In some cases, officers are told (or able to view on their devices) the police histories of the parties at the location during the initial dispatch. On arrival, officers made their observations of the incident: an intoxicated male sitting outside the house in silence with a female inside. One of the officers spoke to the male (CN155), and the



other spoke to the female. Each officer gleaned information their respective citizen. When the officers reconvened, they conferred to establish what had occurred and to agree on the CoA. Together, the officers jointly contributed their gleaned information to the IN and agreed upon the CoA.

While some officers noted information in their notebooks, many officers relied first on verbal communication. In cases where there was a likelihood that an arrest or prosecution would be made during the encounter (such as if a suspect was present at the time), officers made notes of the information collected. In other cases, officers formulated decisions based on the willingness of victims or witnesses to participate in making formal statements. Formal signed documentation was not always required to trigger an arrest. If the victim indicated that they would make a statement, officers made an arrest and collected statements later.

### *Course of Action*

#### **Case 6.2.5. What action do I take?**

So, they're, they're my little three, when I tell someone, oh, what's it like being a police officer, you know, sort of thing, they're my little three, you know, first the, first the emotional, the anger, you know, second like 'what the hell is going on here?' sort of thing, and then third you just, you know, is there a law broken, who's done it, and, you know, who do I arrest sort of thing or what, what action do I take? (Interview transcript, OA31)

The final stage of the narrative diagnosis phase of the PCE occurred when officers had constructed the IN to a level sufficient to allow an appropriate police response. A variety of actions were available to officers when choosing an appropriate CoA and were dependent on the citizen's role in the encounter. During a victim- or witness-encounter, officers had the option to take an official statement, but this depended on the level of perceived evidential sufficiency. For instance, in Case 6.2.1, officers had been tasked to speak to a potential victim about a case of domestic assault. The witness, who made an initial statement, provided sufficient evidence to warrant further enquiries but insufficient to make an arrest. At the time of speaking to the potential victim, officers were unable to gather sufficient evidence to take further action. Had the potential victim corroborated the witness's account the officers would have had the choice to commence a criminal justice process (arrest, interview, and charge). However, in this case, the CoA was to cease the investigation.

Offences of different severity resulted in different approaches by officers. It was clear that officers behaved with greater discretion when dealing with minor offences, such as 'technical offences' or 'victimless offences'. There was greater variability in responses to traffic offences,

pedestrian offences, and alcohol-related offences: not all citizens who breached the legislation were formally penalised.

CoAs for these minor incidents were normally made by the officer present at the incident, without conferring with other officers.<sup>8</sup> Similarly, when an officer took a victim or a witness statement from a person—to submit the account for further enquires, to record the incident for reporting purposes, or to advise the victim or witness that no further police action was to be taken—the CoA was decided by the attending officer.

However, there was less discretion used when investigating more serious offences, such as domestic-related assaults or stranger-related injury assaults. For these incidents which were more complex, officers conferred with other officers, present or not present, and in some cases, officers sought guidance from a field supervisor. This was routine for cases where officers were dealing with both a suspect and a victim (or witness) at the same time.

Like the collaborative approach to the constructing of the IN (see Case 6.2.4), officers collaborated when deciding the CoA. If an officer interacted with a suspect, the decision to disengage, detain or arrest was dependent on the information relayed from another officer who had spoken to a victim or witness. In these situations, officers discussed their interpretation of the information collected. In the cases where officers received spontaneous admissions or had witnessed the illegal action, officers were less reliant on information from other officers and thus made CoA decisions independently.

This collaborative approach can be further illustrated by the following case (see Case 6.2.6). The IN and CoA were constructed in collaboration with other officers, including officers of another agency monitoring the street-based CCTV system.

#### **Case 6.2.6 Male suspected of assaulted another male with a pole (PCE3037)**

This incident was dispatched to police by Ambulance after a call of a male who had been assaulted by a stranger with a pole. Police arrived and spoke to the victim (for about 20 minutes while waiting for the ambulance to arrive) and shortly before the ambulance arrived the victim identified a male [nearby] as someone who might have been involved in the attack. A26 ran after the male, I followed, and missed the initial beginning of A26 catching up to him (they rounded a corner). But shortly after I saw A26 bring him back, compliantly, back to the scene of the assault. From there A26 went on to question him about the assault. The conversation starts out as a routine information exchange; the officer has difficulty understanding CA67 when he was spelling his name (the male was of African descent) and CA67 was also deliberately vague about giving his address and phone details. During this process the male started to 'act up' stating that the only reason he was being stopped was because 'he was black'. A26 commented to him that this was not the case, that the victim himself was of African descent

---

<sup>8</sup> In some cases, inexperienced or probationary officers did refer to their field training officer or senior officer for guidance.

and that the victim had pointed him out as a possible offender. During this exchange CA67 continued to protest his innocence, reciting that he had nothing to do with anything and it was unfair that he was being held by the police. During this process other units arrived, and the ambulance, and the victim was transported to Hospital. Descriptions were sought from CCTV. This conversation went on repeatedly during which time the officer had to control the citizen, from either leaving or providing accurate details or an account of events leading up to the incident. The male CA67 was still being vague, argumentative and less than forthcoming with details; all of which A26 had to contend with. At one point, officer A24 came over to the suspect and said that CA67 looked very familiar. [...] This didn't go down very well. CA67 denied this and became quite annoyed (bordering on angry) at the suggestion. I think it further fuelled CA67's "just because I am black" premise. After some time, the male was released as he did not match the description seen on CCTV. (Field note 04/07/15)

The officer's CoA to disengage from the PCE was because of an inability to gather sufficient information to attribute responsibility or culpability.

Courses of action were also influenced by the citizen-role assigned to citizens by officers. The narrative below (Case 6.2.7) shows that the officer's CoA was to prevent the bystander contamination of the existing investigation and preventing him from being arrested.

#### Case 6.2.7 Efforts to prevent bystander from interfering with encounter (A58).

So, you know, I was able to talk... [...] And he was just, had way too much to drink. So at the point, there, there was, negotiations had to stop because I wasn't getting anywhere. He was just simply going to get arrested for failing to cease loiter, but I was able to, the other mate I could see I, I was winning with him, so I said, "Grab him and go. Get in a taxi. Get in a taxi now. Here, taxi!" So I hailed a taxi, bang, they're gone. So whilst I didn't negotiate with the person I wanted to—I wasn't going to be able to—I could negotiate with a friend. [...] He didn't need to be locked up. He would have been and quite rightly so, because he, he was just causing... Of course, as soon as he causes a—all of a sudden there's more people mobbing us, you know, and it was just, it's out of control. So the cease loiter, that's where the cease loiter works perfectly, because you just need to get people out of there really quick. But they don't listen. They think they're helping their mate. They don't want to leave him by himself. So I guess that, that's one instance where I thought I negotiated well by preventing someone who didn't realise they were breaking the law, but their only, their only intention was, his only intention was to protect his mate. He, you know, saying, oh, look, this, this, that, doesn't matter. We, he wasn't even a witness to it anyway. We had witnesses. We had, we had the offender. It was all going to be resolved, everyone walks away, you know. Sure, his mate gets arrested, but that's, that's the law. Did this guy need to get arrested? No. So that's why I made a beeline for him. I thought I can just get him out of here, he goes home as opposed to two hours' time he's sitting in a cell thinking what the hell has just happened to me, which I've seen as well where a guy's thinking, wait, I, I've never been arrested, why am I arrested? (Interview transcript, A58)

Officer A58's expressed that his primary goal was to control the bystander to prevent interference in the original encounter, for which the offender and witnesses had already been established. The secondary goal was to prevent the arrest of the bystander. By classifying the

<sup>9</sup> This section of the field notes has been redacted. It related to how the officer believed that he knew the offender and redacted to protect the anonymity of the officer. After the encounter, I spoke to the officer and asked whether his belief was genuine and his explanation appeared plausible.

male as a bystander, the officer had predetermined the course of action—prevention of interference and dispersal from the scene.

## 6.3 The treatment phase

The final phase of the PCE began when one party initiated a course of action (CoA) to conclude the encounter. For most PCEs in the present study, the concluding actions were determined by officers. During investigative encounters, officers had the decision to initiate a criminal justice process where the citizen did not: officers had the power to report an incident as a crime, issue an infringement notice, or detain or arrest a suspect. These actions were treatments; they were the solution prescribed by officers to resolve a problem. Citizens could conclude PCEs in some situations. These situations included PCEs which were citizen-initiated and which did not involve an investigative or enforcement component. For instance, sometimes citizens initiated PCEs for social reasons or to ask a question or direction.

### *Potential for conflict*

Once an officer had formulated a CoA, it was conveyed to the citizen. It was at this stage of the PCE where overt conflict was most prone to emerge. In most cases, such as PCEs with victims or witnesses, CoA were conveyed verbally without any physical actions. Typical CoAs included officer responses to the merit of the victim's or witness's report that an offence may have occurred. If the officer accepted the citizen's claim, then the PCE continued so that further information was collected, or new police processes were commenced. However, if the officer rejected the merit of the claim, then the officer progressed to the disengage from the PCE. Rejections were often justified based on a lack of evidential sufficiency, unreliability (where the victim or witness was intoxicated or mentally ill), or that the reported problem was not a police matter (problems which were related to breaches of civil law). The rejection or disengagement was a source of conflict in some of the PCEs.

Enforcement encounters were more likely to include physical actions than investigative encounters. Some investigative PCEs included a physical search of the citizen (such as SAPOL weapons searches). Enforcement encounters which included the arrest of the citizen featured physical actions. Officers at NZC would not necessarily handcuff all arrestees, but each arrestee was searched before entering the police patrol vehicle. Most officers handcuffed arrestees at SAC. Handcuffing or searching of citizens acted as catalysts for those citizens who

were agitated or unwilling to comply with the arrest. Similarly, some compliant arrestees became uncompliant when handcuffed or searched; some did not want to be touched by officers.

Conflict also arose when there were no physical actions. When an officer advised a citizen that a formal criminal justice sanction would be initiated (such as the issue of an infringement notice, the service of a safety order, or cease loiter notice). These CoA's were delivered verbally by officers without coercive physical actions. Conflict arose in these circumstances, however, when the citizen rejected the legitimacy, legality, or efficacy of the CoA. Conflict in this context was expressed verbally; there were no physical actions committed by citizens.

### 6.3.1 CITIZEN RESPONSE TO THE COA

A citizen responded to officer CoA's in three ways: acceptance, negotiation, or rejection. If the citizen chose to reject the CoA, then officers chose to enforce the CoA or in some circumstances accept the citizen's rejection.

#### *Acceptance*

Investigative PCEs with a victim or witness ceased when sufficient information was collected to establish that an offence had occurred or when it was determined that there was insufficient information to continue an investigation (e.g. Case 6.2.1) provided that the citizens *accepted* the officer's CoA. In an example of acceptance, Case 6.3.1 shows the citizen accepts the officers' determination and CoA.

#### **Case 6.3.1 Male urinating in alley way (PCE3024)**

This encounter eventuated as the patrol unit were walking past an alley way and found a male urinating against the wall of a building. They started walking up the alley way, about 50 metres away, in a slow pace. The male urinating stopped and turned around. He saw the two police officers (and me) and dropped his head. It looked as if he had realised that he'd been caught. The male didn't run away. He could have, and he probably would have gotten away had he chosen to run. A86 took the lead. He asked for the male's details, which he gave without problem (and presented his ID – a driver licence). There was no overt conflict, CA49 admitted to the offence and was polite. A86 advised that he would be issuing a penalty notice, explaining that there was a zero-tolerance policy towards public urination. The male said that he was "caught short and had to go". (Field notes 27/6/15)

Acceptance of a CoA does not, however, necessarily result in a satisfactory resolution. In the case below (Case 6.3.2), the officer issues a warning for verbal abuse (the CoA) which results in the citizen disengaging but only to find another officer to report an incident.

**Case 6.3.2. Abusive male storms off (A92)**

We went to a job where a male and female were having some kind of dispute. We spoke to them, spoke to another witness, resolved the issue. This gentleman comes back around the corner ranting and raving at us, abusing us for not doing our job, like completely off, just completely going off his head. And we were like, “Well, if you’ve seen something you need to tell us, because we, we don’t know. You haven’t said anything to us.” And he just went off his head. He was just ballistic, calling us fuckwits and saying we’re fucking useless and, “No wonder people don’t go to the police. You’re all fucking useless pricks.” And we were nice with him and tried to get him to tell us what he had seen so that if there was something that we could do then we would, but it ended up he just went off his head, saying we were fuckwits, and abused us. And I had to step up at that stage and say, “Look, mate, you need to stop swearing at us and stop abusing us.” I said, “It’s not tolerated. You don’t, you don’t have the right to come round the corner and abuse four of us, telling us we’re not fucking doing our jobs when we’re giving you the opportunity to tell us what you had seen, and all you can do is abuse us.” And he wasn’t happy with that and just stormed off. So that’s, that’s one scenario where he’s trying to, where he said like, “What’s your name?” and “I’m going to go speak to your sergeant about this. It’s not right what you’ve done,” and trying to make us feel uneasy about what we’ve done. (Interview transcript A92)

Shortly after this encounter, the citizen located Officer A92’s supervisor and attempted to report the assault again and complain about the actions of initial police response (Case 6.1.1).

**Case 6.3.3 Citizen complaining about police response to incident**

Oh, well, so there was an incident allegedly, an incident on Monday where my crew stumbled across this incident as it was being called over the radio. So they actually weren’t tasked, they just stumbled upon it. And the allegation was that a male was beating up a female and was intervened by a male witness. So this is the allegation. So they’ve dealt with the situation, and there was no assault, and neither party would report to police or provide their details or... So there was no ‘victim’. However, the male witness who intervened wasn’t happy with that, so he marched down here to make a complaint. And he wanted to submit a statement in relation to the witness, to the assault that he’d witnessed. And we tried to explain to him that there was no offence, because there was no victim, and that the assault as he described it is not what happened, because it was captured on CCTV, but he became extremely argumentative and belligerent and arrogant and was telling me how I should do my job and what I should and shouldn’t be doing. So, after trying to be diplomatic I lost patience and stopped talking basically. So someone else was talking to him, so that was okay, but he would not listen to reason from me, so he left eventually. And he came back yesterday and he was speaking to another officer, and I overheard, so I went, and I went to speak to him. And I said, “I spoke to you yesterday.” “No, you didn’t.” “Yes, I spoke to you.” “No, I didn’t talk to you.” “You didn’t talk to me. You stood there and barked at me.” (Interview transcript A60)

This case illustrates the conundrum that despite the officers having the authority and ability to end encounters, citizens retain the ability to initiate a new encounter with other officers.

*Negotiate*

Case 6.3.2 and Case 6.3.3 illustrate how citizens negotiated with officers to alter the CoA. This also occurred with those citizens suspected of a transgression such as a traffic offence where citizens attempted to pre-empt an officer’s decision. For instance, some citizens stated to officers that “you don’t need to give me a ticket”. These attempts to negotiate the officer’s decision

were not necessarily effective and, in some cases, were a precursor to conflict between the citizen and the officer.

Negotiation often occurred when citizens appeared to be intoxicated or emotionally distressed. In Case 6.3.4, officers were called to an incident where an intoxicated female was causing problems at a private address. On arrival, officers instructed the female that while they were investigating the incident—and checking on the welfare of her child—that she was not allowed to speak or interact with her child. After several attempts to negotiate with the officer to see her child, the citizen was arrested.

#### **Case 6.3.4 Female arrested after domestic incident (PCE0047)**

Police were called to a domestic/disorder incident at a house on [S street]. Communications reports that a female in the house is yelling and causing disorder at the house. On arrival police are welcomed by an intoxicated male who suggests that the offender - the female CN23 - is inside causing a problem and is 'probably the soberest person there'. When we enter the house we find CN23 in an emotional state in the hallway. It appears that she is trying to get into a room. She explains to the officers that she is wanting to say goodnight to her 3-year-old child (who she has custody of) and who is sleeping in the room off the hallway. There are about 3-4 other people in the hallway preventing CN23 from entering the room. Police officer Z67 tries to calm the female down and explain to her that she needs to talk to them outside. Z67 makes a couple of attempts to explain this to CN23 but CN23 is unable to comprehend Z67's requests. At this point Z67 forces (gently) CN23 into the lounge-room and on to the sofa. Z41 remains and talks to the people in the hallway and those caring for the 3-year-old child. Over the next 3-5 minutes Z67 attempts to explain again to CN23 why she needs to explain what is going on so that police can help with the situation. CN23 repeatedly asks to say good night to her child. At one point CN23 suggests that Z67 ask the 3-year old who she would like to be with tonight. This elicits a strong verbal rebuke from Z67 that it is inappropriate to attempt to manipulate young children like that. CN23 is moderately intoxicated. Her dress is ripped on one side indicating that she has been in some sort of fight. Her nose is dribbling with mucus and she asks for a tissue to wipe her nose. [I go and ask Z41 if he could find some toilet paper to help]. He returns with some toilet paper. Over the next several minutes Z67 attempts to glean information from CN23 about what has happened prior to the arrival of police. CN23 does not provide any useful information at this point, just repeatedly asking to see her daughter so she can say goodnight. Z67 has to use conversational control techniques to advise that CN23 must stay with her for the time being and that she can't see her daughter right now. It is a difficult situation as Z67 has no legal power to do this at this stage (CN23 is not under arrest at all). However, it appears that Z67's motivation is to keep CN23 under some sort of control so that Z41 can investigate further what is going on AND to try to keep the situation calm. A short time later Z67 leaves CN23 to sit on the sofa so that she can speak to Z41. She instructs CN23 to remain seated and not to go near the bedroom. She leaves. [I remain] After about 20 seconds CN23 stands up and goes to the hallway. At this point she is met by Z41 and Z67 who were trying to speak about what Z41 had gleaned from the situation. CN23 refused to go back to the lounge and tried to push past the officers. She was then arrested by Z67. She started to resist and Z67 attempted to handcuff her. She got one handcuff on and then struggled. Z41 then assisted with the handcuffing. She was cuffed behind her back and taken to the patrol car. (Field note 20/02/15)

Case 6.3.4 also illustrates how officers attempt to control citizens during encounters. Control was used twice at this encounter for two different purposes. During the diagnostic phase of the encounter, Z67 sought to control CN23 by occupying her in one part of the residence so

that the officer Z41 could gather information from other citizens present and to check on the welfare of CN23's young child. This process of information collection was for the purposes of the construction of the IN. The goal for both officers was to collect sufficient information, through the formation of the IN, to form a course of action (CoA<sub>1</sub>). However, this was incompatible with CN23's desire to see her child (CoA<sub>2</sub>). While Z41 sought information from witnesses, Z67 sought information from CN23. The second use of control was at the end of the encounter when CN23 was arrested; the arrest enforced the officers' CoA.

CN23's arrest was preceded by negotiation. Negotiation was common during encounters with citizens who were suffering from a psychiatric condition or behaving in a suicidal manner. In Case 6.3.5, Officer A20 negotiated with the citizen for 25 minutes to encourage him to consent to the psychiatric process. Negotiation occurred despite officers having the legislative power to use physical force to initiate the process.

#### Case 6.3.5 Negotiating with suicidal male (PCE3058)

This incident arose after a call from a friend that CA92 had threatened to hang himself in his backpacker's room. [...] On arrival police met with CA92 in his room. CA92 was initially dismissive of the need for police intervention, and spent a considerable amount of time at the beginning expressing concern that police presence was going to get him evicted from his room. A20 took the lead during this incident. For some time the discussion was concerned with the fact that CA92 was depressed but he wasn't going to do anything to harm himself. (This was despite there being a belt secured to the bunk bed and tied in a noose.) CA92 continued to deny that there was any chance of harm until A20 said that police were not going to leave without providing some sort of intervention or get some help. He expressed that the only way to do this was to take him to the hospital and get him assessed. [Section 57 SA Mental Health Act 2009] At this point the conversation changed to how the male didn't want to be assessed and taken to the hospital by police. He recounted a previous incident where he had been handcuffed and assaulted by police. A20 mentioned that he didn't know about the circumstances of the previous incident however this was different circumstances. When asked directly about how he was going to hurt himself, and being asked why the belt had been tied up on the bed as it was, CA92 went silent and after a few moments (10-20 seconds) changed the subject. Ultimately the police officers managed to convince the male to take the control of the situation and go with the ambulance to be assessed. He agreed and an ambulance was called for. At this point CA92 asked if he could have a cigarette in his room while he waited. The officers agreed. This gave a relative pause in the encounter, and something which seemed to put CA92 at ease. After about 15 minutes of waiting the officers suggested that it would be quicker to transport to the hospital by police car, rather than by ambulance. The officers let the male have another cigarette on the street before he was transported. Conflict was overt: it was clear that the officers wanted to take CA92 to get assessed—this was the end goal—however CA92 wanted to be left alone. The situation was concluded by discussing and persuading CA92 (in his own time) to agree to be assessed. It was clear, though, that at some point police would have forced an intervention if CA92 failed to come to agree. (Field notes 17/7/15)

In this encounter, the officers established the CoA (a psychiatric assessment) within minutes but spent a considerable amount of time negotiating with the citizen. Because the officers decided not to use force, negotiation with the citizen prolonged the duration of the encounter.



### *Rejection*

Rejection of the officer's CoA was most frequent during arrest situations. Often rejection would eventuate as passive or verbal resistance—such as an arrestee proclaiming some degree of innocence or injustice—yet not accompany physical resistance. The example of Case 6.3.3 illustrates that rejection of a CoA can result in a disgruntled or dissatisfied citizen initiating a new encounter. Similarly, rejection can be evidenced by verbal and physical resistance such as in Case 6.3.4.

In some instances, citizen negotiation and rejection can result in the same outcome. Case 6.3.6 shows how a citizen attempted to negotiate with the officer to change the CoA (that being of waiting at the scene for an alcohol breath test) but then rejecting the officer's CoA resulting in the citizen's arrest.

#### **Case 6.3.6 Male driver arrested for obstruction (PCE0013)**

As we were walking towards the witnesses we heard a vehicle, in the distance, conducting a burnout in the car-park at Countdown. We [...] conducted a traffic stop. CN19 was in the driver's seat and immediately began to protest at the conduct of the officers (that they had stopped him as he was driving out of the car-park onto the road). [...] Z27 attempted to commence alcohol breath screening procedures and was able to administer the first stage of the breath test (i.e. the passive screen). When he attempted to continue to the second stage, the breath screening test, he was unable to find a breath tube. This caused some delay in the procedures. Z01 decided to walk to the station to get a tube, and this left Z27 to deal with CN19. [The station was about 150 metres from the location of the traffic stop.] After some time CN19 started [...] threatening to leave. Several times he alighted from the driver's seat, despite Z27's instructions for him to remain at the vehicle. Z27 was using assertive and calm instructions in order to maintain control of CN19. During the conversation, CN19 showed signs of being affected by alcohol. He repeatedly asked Z27 if he could move the car. He asked this a number of times despite being told by Z27 that he could not move the car and that he was to remain in the driver's seat. The nature of the discussion was circular, CN19 asked if he could move the car, Z27 told him that he couldn't, CN19 would then complain that he wasn't allowed to leave the car where it was as it was blocking the car-park exit. In addition, CN19 made patronising comments to Z27 about "how he must be a new police officer 'cos you are doing this all wrong". After about 2-3 minutes, with Z01 about 50 metres away, CN19 gives up his discussion with Z27 and walks away from the car. Z27 follows him and arrests him for obstruction. (Field notes 22/01/15)

This case also illustrates how officer goals can change during an encounter. At the beginning of this encounter, the officers' goal was to establish criminal liability relating to an offence. Their interaction with the citizen began on that basis: to establish sufficient information to make an arrest relating to the 'burnout' (O<sub>1</sub>). However, during the process to establish O<sub>1</sub> a second objective was formed: establish the criminal liability for driving under the influence of alcohol (O<sub>2</sub>). Tension emerged between the citizen and officer due to the delay in administering the evidential test (as Z01 went to retrieve a breath screening tube). This results in the third objective (O<sub>3</sub>), to maintain control of the citizen to achieve O<sub>2</sub>.

The challenging behaviour of CN19 was a negotiation: he repeated requests to move to car to change the officer's CoA. At the point when he walked off from the car, the challenge became a rejection of Z27's CoA (now being O<sub>3</sub>) which resulted in Z27 physical enforcement of O<sub>3</sub>.

Rejection of the officer's CoA caused officers to face the same *accept-negotiate-reject* response that citizens experienced when officers advised their course of action. Officers had to decide whether to accept the citizen's rejection (seen in Case 6.3.3), negotiate with the citizen (e.g. Case 6.3.5), or enforce the CoA (e.g. Case 6.3.6). Each decision was a response to conflict. Case 6.3.6 further illustrates the enforcement decision-making process: Z27 had to decide to either accept the citizen's action (walking away from the vehicle), negotiate with the citizen (discuss or encourage him to return), or enforce the officer's course of action (arrest). In each of these cases, officer actions were prompted in response to the citizen's behaviour. Had CN19 not started to walk off then Z27 would not have had to make an arrest to enforce the course of action.

## 6.4 The police-citizen encounter – the officer's procedure

Deconstruction of the police-citizen encounter into the diagnosis and treatment phases shows the procedural approach officers observed during the present research. This procedure is illustrated in the diagram (Figure 8) as a simple linear sequence, starting with the diagnostic phase, comprises of procedural sub-stages of *role assignment*, *narrative construction*, and determining a *course of action*. In some instances, the stages of the diagnosis occurred in a different order or indeed simultaneously. However, in most instances officers moved through the procedure to progress to the treatment phase. Officers were reliant, at the treatment phase, on the citizen's response: would they accept, negotiate, or reject the 'police' CoA.

Disruptions to the progression from one stage to the next prevented officers from moving through the procedure. Disruptions included interruptions, contradictory or false information as these frustrated officer attempts to construct an adequate IN. In some cases, these disruptions resulted in goal blockage (as evident above in Case 6.2.1) where officers were unable to progress from the diagnostic phase to the treatment phase. During investigative and enforcement encounters, the inability to adequately form the diagnosis prevents the officers from moving to the treatment phase.

Sykes and Brent (1980; 1983) explained that PCEs are regulated by officers' desire to achieve four essential goals: seek information; establish control over any disorder; obtain respect from the citizens involved in the encounter; and achieve an appropriate resolution. In the present study, it was evident that in some fashion, officers sought to collect information (i.e. construct the IN), establish order, and achieve an appropriate resolution. However, it was not evident that officers routinely *sought* respect. In some PCEs compliance and deference occurred without proactive officer demands: this was common during interactions with victims, witnesses, and in some cases suspects and arrestees. However, officers did not overtly demand deference from non-compliant citizens: officers exerted control behaviours.




Figure 8. The PCE as a diagnostic and treatment process

The goals or objectives found in the present research are summarised below in Table 6.4.1. In Section 6.2 of this chapter, it was proposed that officer-goals were associated with the perceived citizen-role (see Table 6.2.1). However, in the present research, it was also evident that officer behaviour was influenced by the encounter event-type. As such, these different encounter event-types are shown with a corresponding officer encounter-goal. Officer goals for investigative encounters were associated with the investigation of an incident or an offence: officers would seek information from citizens relating to events by asking questions or collecting other physical or electronic information. Investigative goals transformed to enforcement goals in the cases where officers had decided that there was sufficient information to action a

criminal justice sanction. Officer goals for rescue encounters were less investigative but more interventional. This included rapid response, searching, initiating medical interventions (such as psychiatric or medical). Social encounters featured very little investigative or interventional behaviour. They were characterised by more general conversational behaviour and sharing of personal anecdotes.

**Table 6.4.1. PCE-types and officer-goals**

Officer-initiated PCEs	Officer encounter-goal
Enforcement	Investigate a complaint or offence and then enforce by taking action against the 'wrong-doer'
Investigative	Investigate an offence or solve a community problem
Protect	Care and/or protection of a vulnerable person (i.e. child or elder)
Rescue	Rescue a vulnerable person or initiate a medical intervention
Social	Interact with citizens to achieve positive community relations
Citizen-initiated PCEs	Officer encounter-goal
Complaint	Take a complaint and assess suitability for an investigation
Social	Interact with citizens to achieve positive community relations

There was some cross-over with citizen-initiated PCEs. When approached by citizens who sought to make a complaint, officers used similar investigative behaviours to that of officer-led investigative encounters. Similarly, citizen-led social encounters shared the behaviours of the officer-led social encounters. However, a difference between the two was that citizen-led social encounters were more likely to include questions from citizens, such as geographical questions or legal questions.

### 6.4.1 SUMMARY

This chapter has explored the process that officers followed when they conducted PCEs. It has been presented as a preamble to an understanding of the cause of control behaviour evident in the quantitative study. The analysis of the observational data of this study suggests that officers followed a procedure when interacting with members of the public: intervention (self-initiated or call for service), diagnosis, treatment. It has become apparent that control behaviour was the common response to conflict; but in the cases observed, the conflict originated from interruptions, frustrations or goal blockages experienced by officers who followed the 'encounter procedure'. The next chapter will include a further discussion how conflict originates from 'procedural disturbances' and how officers respond to this type of conflict.

# 7

---

## Conflict and conflict resolution during police-citizen encounters

---

In the previous chapter, police-citizen encounters were viewed as a procedure. PCEs comprised of diagnostic and treatment phases, and each phase comprised of a series of stages that participants progress through to achieve a particular goal. Chapter 7 examines how conflict occurs from procedural problems such as goal blockages and procedural frustrations. It proposes that when conflict arises between officers and citizens, this creates a procedural problem. The analysis is contextualised in Sykes and Brent application of general systems theory to PCEs (1980) and general strain theory (Agnew 1992). Whereas Sykes and Brent used general systems theory to explain how officers behave to regulate and control PCEs, the present analysis considers general systems theory and general strain theory to explain how conflict occurs between officers and citizens.

These discussions are informed by analysis of the empirical observations of PCEs and reflections from officers drawn from the interview data. The first section of the chapter considers conflict as covert and overt. It suggests how 'procedural conflict' can be explained as one party becoming frustrated by the other when their goals or aspirations are blocked. The second section considers how officers responded to procedural disturbances. It discusses how officers take a proportionate approach to conflict resolution and limit physical actions to situations where it is necessary. The third section examines the factors that influence how officers attempt to resolve conflict. This includes a discussion on how officer preferences, skills and abilities, affect their decisions to use physical force to overcome procedural disturbances. The

section also discusses the use of pre-emptive actions taken by police officers. These discussions are summarised in the fourth section.

## 7.1 Procedural conflict

‘In general systems theory a distinction is made between “regulation” and “control” (Ashby, 1956; Buckley, 1968). Control is the choice of goals. A disturbance is any event which blocks realization of chosen goals. Regulation is preventing disturbances from blocking goal realization. Taking charge is a mode of regulation. Taking charge is not an end in itself, but a means to an end.’ (Sykes & Brent 1980, p.183)

Existing narratives in the policing literature which discuss interpersonal conflict tend to consider conflict arising from a demonstration of resistance. Typically, these are framed in a theoretical construct which examines how citizen resistance is met by force from an officer, namely physical actions ranging from trifling force through to fatal force, and analyses which explore the necessity and proportionality of that force used by officers (e.g. see Alpert & Dunham 2004). Unfortunately, such studies may not examine encounters which involve non-physical conflict, which is characterised by a lack of physical resistance or the use of force by police. Non-physical police actions, such as the use of controlling verbal communication discussed in Chapter 4, fall outside the common definitions of ‘force’ in policing contexts (Alpert & Dunham 2004).<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, unlike the mandatory reporting of physical force by police agencies, the use of verbal control behaviour is not reported unless it is used in conjunction with the use of non-trifling physical force. While the occurrence of abusive verbal behaviour by officers may be reported through police complaint mechanisms, there is no such system to record non-abusive verbal control behaviour methodically. Consequently, official datasets may exclude the magnitude of encounters involving non-physical conflict and any subsequent resolution.

Empirical studies which focus on the police use of force take a suspect- or offender-centric approach (e.g. Terrill *et al.* 2003). As a result, they do not necessarily allow for the examination of conflict during witness or victim encounters. As discussed earlier, the existence of verbal control behaviours during victim-encounters during the behavioural study indicates the existence of the occurrence of conflict outside of the suspect or offender framework. The existence of such conflict is supported by Turk’s proposition that conflict (norm resistance) is

---

<sup>1</sup> Alpert and Dunham suggest that empirical studies of the police use of force rely on three major data sources: official records from police departments, observational data from police observers, and citizen complaints (Alpert & Dunham 2004, p.23).

probable between officers and citizens when they are behaving in manners according to their cultural norms (Weidner & Terrill 2005).

Conflict observed during the qualitative and quantitative studies of PCEs with victims, witnesses, and bystanders, arose from non-physical procedural disturbances where citizens appeared to be distracted or when they unknowingly behaved in a manner which was incompatible with officer-goals. Victims who were emotionally distressed were not always aware that their behaviour frustrated officer attempts to collect adequate information. While the citizens' actions were not malicious, they led to officer frustration. Equally, citizens who behaved distractedly during an encounter also created difficulties for officers. This type of conflict occurred *covertly*; it manifested as an internalised problem in the mind of one individual (Buehler *et al.* 1998). In these circumstances, conflict/frustration emerged because of citizen distress or distraction which disrupted the ability of officers to achieve an encounter-centric goal.

The conflict that arose from citizen disobedience, such as the occasion where a suspect refused to provide information, developed into a more overt form of conflict. *Overt conflict* differs from covert conflict as it manifests as “hostile behaviours and affect which indicate direct manifestations of negative connections between [individuals]” (Buehler *et al.* 1998, p.121). Thus, conflict was overt when an officer and citizen were aware of the conflict.

### *Overt conflict*

Conflict was overt when both the citizen and officers were aware of the conflict. It was not dependent on the occurrence of physical resistance. In the following encounter between two officers and a slightly intoxicated youth (Case 7.1.1), conflict occurred because of the youth failing to provide his identification particulars to the officers.

#### Case 7.1.1 Male refuses to provide identification (PCE0025)

CA08 was “cocky”, he had consumed some alcohol (this was evident), but he was highly charged, antagonistic and belligerent. When the officers asked him for identification and contact details he was semi-compliant: he said that he didn't want to give his home address to police. He then asked police for their identification. When the officers pointed to their uniform (clearly identifying themselves as police), he asked to see their identity cards. Officer A88 took the lead with the male. She informed him that he was under a legal obligation to provide his identification details and would be arrested if he failed. CA08 then noticed me (as I was in about 2 metres proximity) and I became the target of his attention. He demanded that I move away from his location. Officer A88 moved CA08 away, about 7 metres away, to de-escalate the situation. I was able to continue to monitor the information exchange (although not being able to hear the words mentioned). (Field note 11/02/15)

Conflict occurred because of a procedural blockage: CA08 did not provide his personal identification information to the officers. He justified his refusal on the basis that police had not identified themselves to him—in the same manner that he was expected to identify himself—and that as an observer was nearby, he did not wish to provide his private address details to someone who was not a police officer.

CA08's actions also constituted a separate offence under South Australian law (*Summary Offences Act 1953* [SA] S.74A). While this offence was relatively minor,<sup>2</sup> CA08's actions prevented the officer's ability to progress through the diagnostic phase. His behaviour disrupted the officer's ability to complete the narrative construction and formulate a course of action. This caused frustration for the officer. Consequently, the officer used coercive tactics (the threat of arrest) to alter CA08's behaviour. Once CA08 had provided the details, the officer was able to continue with the remainder of the procedure: the completion the IN and formulation of the CoA.

In another example, overt conflict developed when a citizen bystander (CA03) approached officers at SAC to express dissatisfaction with their involvement with an incident she had witnessed (Case 7.1.2). The bystander was not directly involved in the original encounter, however, when she began to speak to the officers dealing with the original encounter, another two officers commenced a new encounter with her (Case 7.1.2).

#### Case 7.1.2 Citizen complains to police about their behaviour (PCE0027)

Two officers (A06 and A50) were attending to an incident of a suspected stolen bicycle. The second set of officers (A76 and A80) were nearby the scene of that incident and decided to walk over to see what was occurring. On arrival, we found saw that A06 and A50 were speaking to a male and about to conduct a search of his property. It appeared that they had discovered [he was using a knife] to cut through a bike lock. The officers and male were on the road side (in a gutter) [where] a clear plastic sheet divided a street-side cafe style set of tables. There were about 10 people seated at the tables. It was obvious that the members of the public were observing the officers and the male. After about 30 seconds from when we arrived, a female CA03 who had been seated in the cafe approached the police officers. From her perspective, she could see five police officers (she counted me as an officer) dealing with someone who clearly did not look like a bicycle thief. She took the position that police were being unnecessarily oppressive in the way they were dealing with him. At this point, A80 asked CA03 to one side. In discussing this with A80 afterwards, it was his goal to remove the CA03 from the immediacy of the main event (i.e. dealing with the suspected bicycle thief). A80 listened to CA03's concerns, and then he advised her for the reasons of why there were four police officers. He advised that I was a researcher and said that he and his partner (A76) had come to the scene to assist and check that there was nothing needed doing. He also explained that they had the right to search him, as they did, and that they had the right to investigate the male as the circumstances were suspicious; a male using a knife to cut a bicycle look (without using a key). The female did not accept the legitimacy of A80's explanation and rejected the need for

<sup>2</sup> The penalty described in the *Summary Offences Act 1953* [SA] S.74A(3) amounts to a maximum fine of \$1,250 or maximum three-month term of imprisonment.



there to be as many police officers present. The officer tried to explain again, but the female started to speak over him. At this point, A80 attempted to take control of the situation [with] assertive comments such as: “we’ll I have explained the circumstances to you, and, that is why police are doing what they are doing”, and, “to us we have the responsibility to investigate suspicious situations, and this is suspicious as most owners would have a key to unlock their bike”. CA03 ignored these controlling statements and continued to challenge the legitimacy of the presence of the police. After a short time, she left and went back to her drink. At the culmination of the incident, when A76 and A80 decided to leave I made contact with the female CA03. I explained the reasons for my presence. She asked if I was interested in hearing her perspective, which I said that I was, and she told me that she thought that the officer was not listening to what she was trying to say. I asked her how many glasses of alcohol she had consumed and she said that she had consumed two tall glasses (pints?) of beer. (Reflecting on the observation of her encounter I thought that it was clear that she was not listening to what the officer was trying to say. I did not tell her this, but I thought the situation was rather ironic). (Field note 12/02/15)

Case 7.1.2 illustrates how a procedural disturbance may originate from the interference of parties outside the initial encounter. In this case, the bystander (CA03) approached the officers to challenge their behaviour she had observed. Her initial goal appeared to intercede in the original encounter to alter the officers’ interactions with the ‘bike thief’. The bystander believed that the male in question did not appear to be a bicycle thief and the presence of five officers dealing with the male was excessive.

The conflict in this situation was overt: interference with the officers’ response to the bicycle thief. Officers acted to resolve this conflict by relocating the interference so that the remaining officers could complete their investigation with the bicycle thief. However, this action caused further overt conflict. When officers explained the reasons for their actions (that the male was acting suspiciously, and the additional officers had only arrived to assist), the citizen responded by stating that officers were not listening to her concerns. Her frustration increased on the basis that she was not being listened to (although she probably meant that officers did not accept her point of view) and that she was unable to modify the officers’ behaviour. This further conflict was also procedural in nature. CA03 failed to accept the merit of the officer’s argument and their CoA: to do nothing about her concerns about the manner the bicycle thief was being treated.

It was apparent (from the observer’s perspective) that despite A80’s attempt to convey to CA03 his reason for the increased level of police presence, CA03’s advocacy of her position confused her ability to recognise the merits of A80’s explanation. As a result, she formed a view that she was being ignored. This behaviour blocked both party’s abilities to communicate and to form an understanding of each other’s perspective. In this situation, both parties were aware of the competing goals—A80 wanted to prevent CA03 from interfering with the origi-

nal encounter whereas CA03 wanted to prevent officers present during that encounter from behaving in a particular way—and as such the conflict was overt.

In both cases, the actions of one party frustrated the actions of the other. Officer A88's goal was to identify CA08, a reasonable request (as well as a legal obligation) and one which was commonplace in police practice. The refusal of CA08 frustrated the procedure; it caused a strain on the interactions between A88 and CA08. The strain continued until the officer was able to adjust the surroundings and coerce the citizen to provide the information. Similarly, CA03's initial actions towards officers dealing with the bike thief interfered with, by distraction, their investigation. This hindered the officers' ability to achieve their goal: the investigation of the incident.

### *Covert conflict*

While overt conflict was easily detectable, the covert conflict was less obvious to the observer and thus difficult to identify. It was challenging during the present research to recognise situations that might suggest the presence of the covert conflict but it was possible by watching for specific indicators. In Case 7.1.3, covert conflict was signalled by the officer's subtle displays of frustration while conducting an interview with a victim. The conflict—in this case, the frequent interruptions caused by the victim serving customers—was experienced by the officer and appeared unknown to the victim. The encounter occurred because of a theft at a busy retail store. Some details of the offence had been reported by the victim using a telephone to police communications. As a result, a patrol had been dispatched to collect further information from the victim in person: a signed statement and CCTV footage that could be used to help the investigation of the offence. On arrival, one officer spoke to the shopkeeper (the victim CN29) to collect information to construct an incident narrative.

#### **Case 7.1.3 Taking a statement from a shopkeeper (Z71)**

Officers arrived and located CN29 and a member of the public, who had witnessed the incident. After taking initial information, the officers split up. Officer Z71 spoke to CN29. No overt conflict between occurred citizen and the officer. [...] The citizen was serving customers during the encounter, and this interrupted the flow the statement details. Also, Z71 had to control the conversation so that he could take a fluid statement. Officer's opening demeanour supportive. Many supporting statements and control statements [that] indicate control of conversation. [After the encounter] we had an interesting conversation about conflict. I suggested that conflict could (and did) occur when Z71 was attempting to take a statement. Z71 had to take control several times [during] the interview so that he could maintain control of the conversation in order collect a reliable statement (to establish the correct order, facts and sequence of events). I made this comment [but] Z65 thought that there wasn't any conflict—he saw conflict in a negative sense—where one might be engaged in an argument, not necessarily in a positive sense. [...] I suggested that if a person has to use controlling techniques in a situation,

then there would have to be a case of conflict, i.e. an incompatible set of goals. He took the point (although I am not sure if he agreed and just conceded for politeness.) (Field note 19/02/15)

The actions of the victim—serving customers while the officer was attempting to gain a statement—interrupted the officer’s attempt to fulfil his encounter goal of collecting information. Each interruption caused the victim to stop answering questions. When questioning was resumed, the officer sometimes needed to recast or repeat his questions to prompt the victim to respond with the desired information. The officer permitted the interruptions nonetheless. While he did not express this frustration to the victim, nor did it seem that the victim became aware of his frustration, the actions of the victim disturbed and frustrated the officer’s procedure.

The officer experienced other impediments. When the victim was attentive, the officer encouraged her to recall and narrate the circumstances of incident in a logical and sequential order. As the officer wrote the citizen’s statement by hand, he did not have the ability to amend or elaborate details of the statement once it was written down on the page of his notebook. As such, the officer attempted to solicit information ordered in a particular way so that the statement would follow a logical and time-ordered structure. But information was written down in the order that was given by the victim. When the victim made comments or clarifications, which related to events that had already been written about in the notebook, Officer Z71 had to reframe the existing written notations to reflect the new information. The encounter was further frustrated as the victim was not native to New Zealand and was not fluent in English. As a result, Officer Z71 had to repeat some questions, and then explain the meaning of his questions in simplistic terms.

The disturbances experienced in this PCE *appeared* to frustrate the officer at the time of the encounter. This internalised frustration was confirmed during a later discussion with the officer: frustration at the inability to capture the victim’s attention without interruption; the difficulty experienced in creating a sequentially-ordered account of events; and the difficulty of communicating with the victim because of the different skill-level of English communication. These frustrations illustrate the notion of covert conflict: conflict experienced by one party that is invisible to (or without the knowledge of) the other, an *intrapersonal* conflict arising from *interpersonal* interaction (see Deutsch 1973, p.10), which differs from covert conflict behaviours such as passive-aggression or hostility (e.g. see Buehler *et al.* 1997). In the present case, goal blockages emerge from the officer’s frustrated effort to glean information in

a procedurally-helpful manner. Deutsch posits that “conflict exists whenever incompatible activities occur” (1973, p.10), so despite the victim appearing not to be aware of the officer’s frustration incompatible activities have occurred. Indeed, she too may have experienced frustration. She appeared to display frustration at not being able to communicate with the officer in her native language. The officer did not indicate that he was aware of any the difficulties she was experiencing other than commenting that she was trying to be as helpful as possible while also trying to manage her business.<sup>3</sup> In the same way that the victim appeared unaware of the officer’s difficulties in achieving his primary goal, her difficulties did not appear to be obvious to the officer. These difficulties were apparent to the researcher during the observation. The same cues displayed by the officer were apparent in the behaviour of the victim: the inability to devote sufficient time to provide an adequate period of time to answer the officer’s questions; and the frustration of not being able to serve customers due to her requirement to answer the officer’s questions.

In this case, these frustrations were mitigated with different variants of control behaviour. In applying general strain theory (Agnew 1992), the frustration shared by both the officer and citizen occurred because each party was unable—during that particular moment in time—to achieve their positively aligned goal. The officer sought to collect sufficient information to progress the investigation; the citizen attempted to provide that information sought by the officer while at the same time selling products to her customers. According to the GST, the frustration was the negative emotion, and the participants’ attempts to wrestle control during the situation were corrective actions.

### *Summary*

In the examples above, the presence of conflict was detected in circumstances that did not involve physical actions. Furthermore, each circumstance was resolved in a manner that would not ordinarily be reported or recorded as a citizen complaint about police actions or through a use-of-force report routinely submitted by police officers. The examples illustrate that conflict does occur in ways that frustrate the ability of the officer to progress through the encounter procedure.

Procedural conflict, therefore, occurs during police-citizen encounters when the intentional or unintentional actions of a citizen interferes, frustrates, or blocks the officer’s ability to

---

<sup>3</sup> Private communication, 11 April 2016

achieve a *procedural goal*. Procedural conflict can occur at any stage of the encounter. As the officer progresses through each encounter-stage, blockages, or disturbances (such as citizen resistance, citizen distraction) will impede the officer's ability to progress to a new stage or phase of the encounter. The blockages or disturbances lead to conflict.

These procedural conflicts differed from conflict that arose from non-civil behaviour. The most common type of non-procedural interpersonal conflict was expressed as verbal abuse between officers and citizens. While infrequent verbal abuse, including swearing and insults, redirected the attention of officers. During investigative encounters, incivilities (see Bottoms 2006) moved the topic of verbal exchange from an investigative frame to an enforcement frame or controlling frame. For instance, the focus of officer questioning ceased to be related to construction of an IN to that related to dealing with the incivility. This did have a negative effect on the progression through the encounter procedure

Most verbal abuse directed towards officers did not constitute an offence, but it was clear that it was an annoyance. It was common to hear people calling out “Fuck the Police” or “Pigs”. In some cases, officers tolerated the behaviour and simply ignored it. Most officers refrained from initiating an encounter when hearing abuse from afar. When abuse occurred during encounters officers used verbal control behaviour to respond or admonish the citizen. Verbal control behaviour was not necessarily used to clear procedural blockages, except in the case where abuse was used to delay, distract, or interfere with the encounter procedure.

## 7.2 Responses to procedural disturbances

When officers were confronted with procedural blockages they faced a choice to take a corrective action to attempt to clear the blockage or disengage from the procedure. Controlling behaviour was used by officers to overcome disturbances. For example, the actions of officer A88 threatening to make an arrest during Case 6.1.1 or officer Z71 using less overt verbal tactics to control the flow of information from citizen CN29 during Case 6.1.3. In these cases, controlling behaviour was used in proportion to the type or degree of procedural disturbance, and it was only used when it was necessary. It was used during the ‘diagnosis’ phase to facilitate the collection of information to form the incident narrative, as well as implementing the treatment plan through advising and enforcing of the ‘police’ course of action.

### *Proportionality and necessity*

A recurring theme during discussions with officers throughout the qualitative study and interviews was the self-perception that their actions during encounters were influenced by the actions of citizens. This was also evident in the observation of officer behaviour as they interacted with citizens: vocal tone, style of language, and use of controlling behaviour was for the most part responsive to the behaviour of citizens. This position is consistent with many studies on the use of force in the literature (e.g. Terrill & Mastrofski 2002). Polite or compliant citizens received polite and friendly behaviour from officers whereas citizens who were abusive and non-compliant received controlling and forceful behaviour from officers.

Officers from both research sites discussed that they took a ‘proportionate’ approach when initiating contact with citizens in conflict-prone encounters. Officers said that their responses were of a similar ‘level’ to that of the procedural disturbances or disruptions caused by the citizen. Use-of-force policies at NZPOL and SAPOL stipulate that any force used by officers against citizens should follow a graduated model based on the premise that only the minimal amount of force should be used to overcome resistance. In simple terms, both policies state that the use of force used to overcome resistance should be necessary and proportionate to the resistance offered (New Zealand Police 2016b).

Officer perspectives towards conflict resolution were influenced by departmental use of force policies. Common among many police agencies, use of force continua provide a framework for officers to conceptualise what type of tactic or what level of force *may* be appropriate to overcome citizen resistance or assaultive behaviour (Alpert & Dunham 2004). The continua did not dictate an ‘eye for an eye’ approach. They did not suggest that force necessarily *should* be used, nor specify that the level of force used to overcome resistance be *equal* to the resistance posed. The continua provide a visual model for officers to use when deciding what tactic or technique it *may* be appropriate to use.

One of the important components of the NZPOL continuum is the explicit recommendation that communication may have utility at all levels of threat (New Zealand Police 2016b). For instance, the model indicates that when faced with situations where officers feared death or grievous bodily harm, while it might be appropriate to use a potentially lethal option such as firearms, it may still be appropriate to use communication tactics at the same time. While there might be some situations where it may be appropriate for the immediate use of lethal

force, it is the expectation that lethal force is not the only tactic available or applicable in such encounters.

While it is possible that any PCEs might require an officer to use force, and in some cases, the level of citizen resistance may justify the use of force by an officer, it is necessary to consider the necessity to do so. This important distinction is encapsulated in the NZPOL operational threat assessment acronym TENR: threat, exposure, necessity, and response (New Zealand Police 2016b). The presence of a weapon during a PCE does not necessarily indicate the willingness of the citizen to use the weapon. As such, it is incumbent on the officer to judge if the citizen is likely to use the weapon against the officer and if so to consider what is the likely harm that might be associated with the use of the weapon. It is conceivable that any item within reach of a citizen could be used as a weapon of opportunity, such as an item of furniture. Equally, it is conceivable that a citizen may use their own body to exert force. As such, while an action by an officer may be proportionate in nature, it may not always be required.

While use of force continua relate to the use of force, officers in both research sites applied similar principles of proportionality and necessity when considering their use of controlling behaviour. In case 6.2.1, officer Z23 describes below how he takes a ‘low’ approach when faced with a conflict situation.

#### **Case 6.2.1 Officer discusses taking a proportionate response**

I like to, I guess, start low by just talking and to resolve conflict. Other people might go at a whole lot higher with options, tactical options to resolve situations, and so I'm probably, I don't know, depending on what information I've got would dictate how I kind of get my mind set up to tackle situations. But I like to talk to people. I mean, that's probably your best tool you've got. And then you can always go up from there, can't you? (Interview transcript Z23)

Officer Z71 discusses how his use of verbal or physical control behaviour is modified by his perception of a citizen's actions.

#### **Case 6.2.2. Citizen actions dictate the response (Z71)**

When they dictate the situation. So they've got weapons, they've got guns, they've got or they are physically assaultive. There's time for talking, there's time for acting. If a situation depicts that we need to take action to stop from hurting someone or hurting us or hurting themselves, then we just have to do it. (Interview transcript Z71)

Themes of proportionality and necessity were also present in the reflections of SAPOL Officers. For example, A80 comments below about his preference on how to initially approach conflict situation.

**Case 6.2.3. KEEPING CALM (A80)**

I try to keep things as calm as possible for as long as possible. But if the person's not reacting to that, well, then I do sort of bring the level up. (Interview transcript A80)

A80's response also illustrates his/her perspective that the response may increase in severity if the circumstances require it.

Evidence of officers adopting a proportionate approach is not necessarily surprising. Such evidence is consistent with Sykes and Brent's systems theory dictum that officers will use 'regulation consistent with the disturbance' when attempting to overcome a disturbance (Sykes & Brent 1980, p.188). It is pertinent to note, however, that officers from both sites aspired to a proportionate response. It has been posited that officers who are routinely armed (SAPOL in this case) may display more aggressive behaviour towards citizens (Buttle 2010; Locke 2008). It is notable that during the behavioural study, SAPOL officers were using controlling behaviour (including physical control) more frequently and for a longer proportion of time during encounters than the NZPOL officers. Notwithstanding, officers from both sites who were interviewed *believed* or *stated* that they took a proportionate approach when overcoming resistance. As such, it can be concluded that officers attempted to use reasonable and proportionate control behaviour when attempting to resolve procedural blockages or disturbances. Proportionality, however, relied on how the citizen responded to control behaviours.

*The intoxicated and mentally ill*

While officer behaviours recorded during the observational study appeared to be mostly influenced by citizen behaviours, citizen behaviours did not always appear to be influenced by officer behaviours to the same degree. Furthermore, officers believed that their actions were ultimately governed by those of the citizen: as Officer Z71 remarked 'the actions of the citizen dictate the situation' (Case 7.2.2). This was true in both how officers were deployed to encounters (such as in Case 7.1.2 where officers responded in larger numbers because of the presence of a suspect with a knife) as well as influencing how officers behaved during a PCE.

When officers interacted with citizens who were highly intoxicated or mentally ill, their behaviours did not always appear to influence the citizen. For instance, at times officers



endeavoured to maintain dominance of the conversation when the citizen was intoxicated but were not always successful. Intoxicated citizens seemed less able to accept the reasoned explanations from officers (Case 7.1.2). The problems associated with dealing with intoxicated or disordered citizens were reflected in officer comments during the interviews: they were difficult to interact with. Consider the following comment from officer A40 who describes the difficulties he has experienced with alcohol- or drug-affected citizens, particularly those related to the changeability of an affected citizen's mood and their lack of responsiveness to verbal communication.

#### Case 7.2.1 Drug-affected people are difficult

For instance, you know, drunk people or drug-affected people are very difficult, because their moods will change. Immediately they're telling you everything and apologising for their actions. Next thing, I don't know whether it's confidence or whether it's, what it is, but something comes from somewhere and they just completely change. It doesn't matter how much I talk to them. Sometimes it's better just to, to close the door and let them sit for a while, and then attempt it again later because it doesn't matter. You, you, you start an argument and it just keeps getting higher. It's better just to let give them some time, so, yeah. (Interview transcript A40)

In this instance, A40 advocates disengagement as opposed to perseverance. But disengagement is not always appropriate in all instances when interacting with disobedient citizens. In the case below, citizen disobedience resulted in physical action after the citizen refused to drop a pair of scissors after using them to self-harm.

#### Case 7.2.2 Female cuts herself with scissors (PCE0007)

Officer Z37 attempted to speak calmly to both females but was unable to maintain control through verbal communication. CN09 continued to be audibly upset, yelling and complaining that she didn't want her friend to leave. CN08 was also belligerent and appeared to be competing for attention. She continually yelled about wanting to kill herself. Most of the attention was being directed towards CN09 at this stage. When the parents of CN09 arrived, the mother began to insist that her daughter's boyfriend had to leave. This further encouraged conflict. During the encounter, the four citizens moved in and out of the property. It was difficult to maintain control. [While Z37 was] speaking to the parent of CN08, CN09 picked up a pair of scissors and started to cut herself on her right wrist. Officer Z37 observed this and attempted to retrieve the scissors. She was very loud and continued to yell at everybody. He asked her to drop/pass the scissors but she refused. At this point, he took hold of her arm and forced her to the ground while holding the scissors. She was arrested for possession of an offensive weapon. Z37 was struggling to hold the scissors and managed to take them from CN09. At this point I took the scissors from Z37 for safety purposes. Once on the ground the female calmed sufficiently. She was lifted from the ground and taken to the police car. Once in the car, she was taken to [hospital] where her cuts were assessed. She was then taken to [the mental health service]. (Field note 15/01/15)

The officer explained that in this case, there was a necessity for an intervening action. Before CN09 started to self-harm, Z37 attempted to address the conflict between the parties present

through dialogue. Additionally, Z37's first attempt to control CN09's behaviour (to drop the scissors) relied on verbal commands. When this approach was ineffective, he resorted to physical action.

This case illustrates how an officer's actions during a PCE appear to be influenced by those of a citizen. The officer's verbal command to drop the scissors and the resulting physical retrieval of the scissors were because of CN09's disobedience. Furthermore, Z37's case shows how the actions of the officer do not necessarily affect the actions of the citizen: the citizen ignored the initial verbal command to drop the scissors, which caused the officer to use physical control to retrieve the scissors.

These examples illustrate how an officer's decision to acquiesce to, resist or overcome any blockage was dependent on the officer's perception of the severity of the harm that might occur if the officer did not overcome the blockage. In this way, the greater the severity of perceived harm, the greater the necessity to overcome the blockage. In the first case of the drug-affected male (Case 7.2.1), the officer described how in some instances it could be beneficial not to take direct action and to ignore a particular citizen behaviour. In the second case of the female with the scissors (Case 7.2.2), the officer took immediate action to stop the self-harming behaviour and secure a weapon.

In another case, officers were dispatched to locate a male who had a behavioural and learning disorder who had absconded from a residential care facility. The patient CN86 was being followed by care workers who were not permitted to use force to bring him back into custody. When officer Z57 located the patient, he attempted to begin the encounter. In the narrative below, the first paragraph is extracted from field notes and the second is from an interview with Z57 after the event.

#### Case 7.2.3 Absconding male assaults officer (PCE0091)

Police were called to assist IHC<sup>4</sup> workers as a male in-patient had walked out of the house. Two care workers were following the IHC patient CN86. [While driving searching for CN86 a] police patrol saw CN86 walking towards them when they entered the target street. One officer alighted from the vehicle quickly and walked towards CN86. He asked for the male by his name to stop but the male continued to walk. CN86 threw a punch at Z57 in response. Z57's approach was not confrontational; his tone was neutral. At this point, Z57 immediately restrained the male. This resulted in a scuffle, with Z57 pushing CN86 against a fence and then onto the ground. CN86 continued to thrash and attempt to escape from Z57. (Field note 14/03/15)

We pulled up to a guy that was walking down [a road] and he was being followed by two staff members and he was intellectually handicapped. He was under a compulsion to reside at an address and he'd left, so the staff

<sup>4</sup> IHC New Zealand was formally known as Intellectually Handicapped Children.

members called for our assistance to detain him I suppose, so he could be put into appropriate care. I've seen him walking down the street, he was quite a large male and fat size and really was quite short, he was shorter than me. We pulled up saw the male, pulled up on the side of the road, he was walking towards the patrol car so I jumped out of the patrol car, I think my partner jumped out at the same time. His name was [Brian]<sup>5</sup>. I said "[Brian] stop there mate." He said "No", carried on walking, sort of walked beside him and towards him and said, "[Brian] you need to stop, we need to chat to you." He said "No." At that point you could tell that, we already knew he had intellectual disabilities but you could tell by looking at him that he was quite agitated, especially by looking in his eyes. Although he didn't show any signs of aggression towards me, he was just continuing walking so he was only passively resistant. Or actively resisting, he didn't appear assaultive at that stage. So I didn't want him to continue walking, I didn't know what could happen from there or where he could go from there or what he's capable of so I stood in front of him. I'm very non-confrontational at all. I stood in front, put my arms up, I can't remember I might have placed one hand on his chest. I said, "[Brian], stop there." and then he took a swing towards my head a couple of times. I don't think he got a proper shot on but I restrained him from there and pinned him on the ground and once he was on the ground he was compliant and handcuffed. I didn't have any problems with him from that point on. (Interview transcript Z57)

In this encounter, the initial actions of Z57 (asking CN86 to stop) did not result in obedience; the disobedience created a procedural blockage. To overcome the blockage, Z57 moved to an enforcement action, using physical control to detain CN86.

### *Summary*

At both research sites, officers described that their approach to the use of controlling behaviour (including verbal and physical tactics) were governed by the principles of proportionality and necessity. Control behaviour would be used in a proportionate manner and would only be used when it was necessary to do so. The attitudes and behaviours of officers at NZC appeared to reflect the departmental policies of TENR and the Tactical Options Framework. However, officers from both sites relied on verbal control behaviours unless physical control was required. Physical control was not used in situations unless citizen actions dictated. However, it was also apparent that the utility of communication (verbal exchange and verbal control) was diminished if the citizen was intoxicated, mentally ill, or intellectually challenged. When dealing with this group of citizens, officers were less reliant on verbal communication and more reliant on physical actions.

## 7.3 Variances in verbal and physical control behaviour

Officers have explained how their actions were influenced by the actions or disposition of citizens. Responses to citizen-led procedural conflict were seen by officers as being proportionate

---

<sup>5</sup> The patient's name is substituted to maintain anonymity.

and necessary. But while officers explicitly believed that their own actions were ‘dictated by the citizen’, officers also acknowledged that their actions, their preferences, or skill set, had an instrumental effect on the citizen’s behaviour and thus their ability to resolve conflict.

### *Use of force continua*

The NZPOL and SAPOL use of force policies assume verbal and physical actions as legitimate levels of ‘police’ force. In fact, verbal communication is intertwined with the use of force: warnings or threats of force act as explicit signals that non-compliance may result in the use of force, as do less coercive officer requests where citizens may feel obliged to comply in order to avoid more coercive actions. During the quantitative and qualitative studies, most physical force used by officers against citizens was trifling (at force level 2 according to Alpert and Dunham’s Suspect Resistance and Officer Force Level schema<sup>6</sup>). These lower levels of physical force were often carried out during routine police activities when officers conducted physical searches, applied handcuffs, or escorted citizens who were in custody. Physical actions used during ‘stop and search’ were limited to facilitating a rub-down or pat-down search of a citizen’s body and/or the search of citizens’ possessions. Physical actions were also used during an arrest procedure. Some arrests (or detainments) occurred without the use of handcuffs. In these cases, officers relied on their physical presence to control the behaviour of citizens. While these physical actions occurred regularly, officers displayed no level of emotion or frustration. The actions appeared casual, natural, and routine.

When more advanced levels of force were used, such as open-handed strikes, pain compliance, OC spray (pepper), or takedown techniques, the actions appeared less casual and more calculated. These actions were precipitated by citizen actions who resisted arrest, attempting to evade capture or deliberate assaultive actions towards officers. In these situations, force was used in a more assertive manner to combat citizen resistance. Officer verbal communication during these situations was also more assertive: instructions were more commanding than those used during routinized arrest actions and less verbose. Officers also used less eloquent language, regularly swearing at citizens who were struggling or resisting.

The use of force at these higher levels was infrequent (at force levels 3–5 according to Alpert and Dunham’s Suspect Resistance and Officer Force Level schema). It was evident that all officers were aware that they were accountable for their actions and their decisions to use

---

<sup>6</sup> Suspect Resistance and Officer Force Level Scale (Hickman *et al.* 2015).

force. Certain levels of force appeared to be routinized: handcuffing, touching, or searching occurred regularly without comment or discussion among other officers. These actions were regarded as routine behaviour when taking a citizen into custody. As such, it appeared that officers appeared to confer less significance to these actions than the more *direct* actions such as applying force for pain compliance, using physical strikes against a citizen, or using of non-lethal weapons or chemical agents.

### 7.3.1 VARIANCES OF OFFICER SKILL AND PREFERENCE

Several of the interview questions invited the participants to comment on how their own practice differed from their colleagues. But this process also occurred outside of the context of the present research. It was commonplace for officers to reflect on their practice using informal comparisons with other officers. Narrative accounts of encounters were often shared among colleagues informally. The phenomenon of police ‘storytelling’ has been documented elsewhere (see Waddington 1999; van Hulst 2013).

At times officers would share narratives in a boastful enterprise. But there was some degree of utility in taking account of discussions where officers provided their own opinion of others’ accounts, sharing their own narratives and continuing discussions about how they might have resolved the original situation similarly or differently. During these informal discussions, officers’ ‘reputations’ were formed: for instance, officers might be classified as *talkers*, *hot heads*, a *chicken*, a *cool operator*, *heavy-handed* or a *loose unit*.

During the formal interviews for the present research, officers were invited to reflect about their personal capacity to resolve conflict. Officers were prompted to discuss how they assessed the appropriateness and necessity of the actions they had used or witnessed during encounters where conflict occurred. These discussions were aimed at gleaning insight from officer responses to overt procedural conflict.

#### *Expertise, temperament, and physiology*

Some officers reflected about the efficacy and utility of their expertise when using conflict resolution techniques. Officer Z13 commented that verbal control communication is preferable to physical control, but it may not always be effective when dealing with a citizen who is emotionally or physically aroused. Z13 also discussed how the self-assessment of her abilities shapes the way she interacted with some types of citizens.

**Case 7.3.1 Female officer reflects about her ability to deal with aggressive people (Z13)**

**Officer Z13** [In] some situations by the time we get there, [are] so amped up that [communications] aren't necessarily going to work and you need to go on with the stronger approach, and perhaps the physical, restraint or the handcuffing would initially be required to bring that person down, and then you could use [communication]. Definitely sometimes [communication], specifically if alcohol is involved do not work, and I've been in that situation where I've tried and there's no point at all. Often people too are a bit confused as to, if you're yelling, for example, at them who it is that's yelling as well. So you are best to get in if they need to be handcuffed or dealt with, keep the situation under control and then use [communication].

**Interviewer** And have you a specific example in mind that you can recount?

**Officer Z13** Often if it's a situation like that then I would be with someone else. And the men would potentially go in and deal with the person with it, and I may assist with it. And if it was my arrest for example, I'd get the person back to the car and then used [communication] in the car and say, you know: "Everything's fine, let's calm down, take a deep breath." Cause, again, I don't have that strength. If the person was volatile, the person I'm working with generally would be male, and they would take the arrest and deal with them. I may be left to speak with the victim, which is totally fine, and I have, I have had that situation many times where I'll be left at the scene to deal with the victim. And it's fine, if the person is aggressive and it's not appropriate, I don't deal with them. But it's also been the other way around where you can start with [communication] and everything's going fine and next thing something might happen. You might say something that they don't like and straight away the situation is amped up, and, again, [communication] may not work. It's always my first option, but I do know when it's not an option as well, I can see that straight away. Yeah. And most of the times, I'm not going to jobs by myself where I need to get in and be physical. There'd always be someone there to assist. (Interview transcript Z13)

Another female officer Z03 made a comment about her physical ability:

**Case 7.3.2 Officer reflects on physical abilities (Z03)**

I don't have the physical strength to go on a rugby tackle with someone straight away. I have to talk. In my last resort, that's to have to be physical. I have to talk to them. If that's calming people down by taking the piss out of myself or joking or say: "Hey, you don't want to look like a tool in front of the girls." Or... That works. Some times. (Interview transcript Z03)

In both examples, Z13 and Z03 indicated that when faced with a citizen who challenged their ability to control behaviour, due to physical reasons, their solution was to use a different tactic at the same force level, rather than choosing a tactic at a higher level. In other words, when faced with citizen resistance, their action was not to increase the level of force.

The consideration of comparative physical stature was not limited to gender nor research site. Male officers who were of slight build had the same approach to the importance of communication. For instance, here officer A82 discusses his awareness of relative size and strength to citizens he may interact with.

**Case 7.3.3 Male officer aware of his size (A82)**

You know, I'm only a small fellow. I might be working with another small one [and] we're approaching a 6 foot 8, 150-kilo person. (Interview transcript A82)

Furthermore, officers who were of larger stature shared similar views of the importance of communication and remaining calm. In this example, officer Z69 indicated how he regulates his own behaviour when dealing with aggressive or confrontational citizens. Rather than increasing the response force level, he opts to disengage from the confrontation.

#### Case 7.3.4 Intoxicated person in custody area

[If] someone comes in in a high level of, of aggression or confrontation I generally either meet them or go above it. And then you'll find these situations where you're just screaming at each other. To me that's untidy, especially on the watch-house<sup>7</sup> when you're in, you know you're not gonna win. You best just put them in there and let them cool down. And I see that with police officers, especially on the watch-house counter where they try and dominate and you just are not gonna win. You know, especially when you've got someone who's intoxicated and.... They don't really care. They know, they know they're in custody. All the questions in the world, they're not prepared to answer. There's no use yelling at them, and it just, to me, it looks like we lose composure when we start yelling at them. But, yeah, but generally with a bully or someone who's like that or I'll try and meet them at that level. I might not be using, I might not be using my voice commands so much that my actions, my physical actions where I'm not backing down, I guess, will hopefully show. I'm 6ft, fraction over 6ft. Not... I'm reasonably solid-ish build, so I guess that sort of helps me as well. (Interview transcript Z69)

While Case 7.3.4 relates to a custody situation where officers can easily disengage from a confrontation by closing a cell door, disengagement from verbal confrontation can be more difficult. During the behavioural study, Z69 and his partner were dispatched to a domestic incident in a residential area. On arrival, they were confronted with an argumentative male who challenged their authority and lauded his gang history and affiliation, to intimidate the officers.

#### Case 7.3.5 Charming male threatens officers (PCE0080)

Police were called to this address by neighbours of the occupants of a house which was having a party. The occupants had family staying due to a family wedding that day. The neighbour who called was concerned at the presence of one particular male. The neighbour thought that the male was behaving in a threatening manner to one of the people in the house. The male who was the subject of the neighbour's concern was standing on the deck on the opposite side of the driveway. As a result of this police walked around the exterior of the house and found the subject of the incident CN72 standing on a deck. He was speaking in a loud voice expressing concern that he had lost his wallet down the side of the deck between the deck and large shrub. Police officers attempted to help him search for the wallet but could not see it. The group at the house were making a moderate amount of noise. The attending police officers asked the occupants to keep it quiet and encouraged some to leave the address (some were staying at another address). After a short amount of time some did leave and others quietened down. Police left. They decided to stay in the patrol car, which was parked in a carpark about 50 metres from the house. After a few minutes a member of the family at the house and asked police to return as

<sup>7</sup> The 'watch-house' is a term used by New Zealand officers to denote to custody area of a police station.

the male CN72 was abusive and they wanted him to leave. On return the male CN72 was in a completely different state of mind. He was no longer “charming” as he had been previously. He swore loudly at the police officers and made gang-style chants. He was large. Officer Z69 stood about 5 metres from the male. After a number of control statements from police, and verbal abuse from CN72, Officer Z69 were able to de-escalate the level of conflict from the male. He eventually calmed down after being told that he was not going to be arrested, just that he was being encouraged to leave and that police would not leave until he did. This took approximately 15 minutes before he eventually left. As he did he wanted to shake hands with both officers (and me) and said that he was from the North Island and the “cops up there aren’t as respectful as the cops in [South City]”. (Field note 7/5/15)

This incident illustrates how an officer may de-escalate a conflict encounter with a suspect by using clear and effective verbal communication. However, when discussing this incident during an interview afterwards, Z69 commented that during his verbal communication with the male, he was considering what level of force would be appropriate if an arrest had to be made.

We’ve turned up and there’s been quite a lot of hostility from this man towards the police. He’s made it quite clear that he’s from up North, he’s gang affiliated and he would have a crack at police, and just sort of started off softly, softly, talking about to him and trying to find out what’s going on. And he got quite to a, sort of, a high level where I thought things were going to turn quite physical with him. I just didn’t back down really. I had a taser in my possession. It was absolutely pouring down rain, so we were getting horribly wet. I sort of levelled with them to some degree where I didn’t go, I didn’t... too involved into that, someone may have been assaulted or there was a domestic incident. My thoughts were as it, we’re not gonna get anywhere with that, and I just wanted to get away from the property, really. So while I was keeping an eye on him, I was trying to, to arrange for someone to come and pick him up and to get him out of the... I sort of if it can be his friend as such and he trust me to a certain degree, then it’s not gonna kick off. Cause, really, all I could think was they would be locking him up for is him assaulting police. It was what, what my thoughts were. Yeah, I think, because I didn’t back down to him, but the way I sort of said: “Look, you know, if you’re gonna come towards me, I’m not gonna back down.” I think he sort of backed away a bit. I think that’s where the conflict was resolved, I guess. Which... yeah, I, I believe that it was probably more to it. You know, the guy is saying he’s lost his wallet, I don’t believe that was, that it even had happened. And to say again, he had a couple of hundred dollars in his wallet I don’t believe that either. (Interview transcript Z69)

When asked to comment on how he thought his behaviour was effective in resolving the conflict, Z69 replied that it was his statement that he wasn’t going to ‘back down’ if a fight began.

I think the effective thing is that he was threatening to have a go at us, and I basically said: “If you do that, you know, I’m not gonna back down. And if you come down those stairs, and assault police or take it any further, then I won’t back down.” So for his threats and her telling me about his reputation and “I’ve bitten people’s ears off” and all that sort of stuff didn’t scare me. I wasn’t frightened. I think he probably knew that, I think he was expecting a different reaction from me or others, and he didn’t get it. Not that I wanted to fight with him, but if it happened that... I was more worried that if it did happen others at the address might have jumped in. That was probably my big concern, that I would be in a position where I would have been fighting for survival. I had a female partner who was very new, and I knew that she was a bit intimidated by this male. So it was my, my concern. If I was going one on one with this guy, I wouldn’t have a problem, but it was the other younger guys at the address which I was 50/50, really. ... He didn’t worry me, but others [did]. And we were, sort of, in a reasonably confined space in the back, back part of the property. (Interview transcript Z69)



This encounter was notable in the mind of the researcher, too. The conduct of CN27 signalled a looming danger that he may well engage in a physical assault. It was apparent by the positioning and body language displayed by the less experienced officer that she was feeling intimidated. The pressing circumstances in this situation was that Z69 had determined that he could not walk away from the conflict; the presence of CN27 was posing a risk to the order and safety of those remaining at the house.

Officers from SAC also talked about the importance of calmness and communication during conflict encounters. Officer A02 below indicated that his preference was to always start at a 'low level' and adjust as appropriate. In the second extract, officer A82 discusses his preference to use calming behaviour when dealing with citizens.

**Case 7.3.6 SAC Officers discuss taking a 'low' approach to conflict (A02, A82)**

I'll always try to attempt first with, I suppose, just calming something down or just seeing what you can do to resolve it initially, and then from there so you have to escalate upwards, but it also depends on what's happening. If it's something, you know, that's physical, then you have to be physical straight away. (Interview transcript A02)

Yeah, absolutely. I mean, I've had quite some time on the road as a police officer, not simply just in SAPOL. I mean, it's only been a short period here, but also in [another force]. My approach initially is that communication basis, to go in there, try and resolve the matter using one of those tactical options of communication. I will judge that person as to how, what level of tone that I would use before approaching that person and assessing on that basis. It may mean that I have to intervene a little more strongly in terms of the way I communicate with that person or it may simply mean I can just calm that person down by talking to them softly and ascertaining what's going on. So I'll always take that approach. You know, others may see it as a different means, but it's been fortunate in my policing career thus far that that approach has, has allowed me to, to continue, without too many incidents. (Interview transcript A82)

However, while all officers discussed the importance of effective communication, it was clear during the observational study, and during the interviews, that officers observed differences in style, ability, and effectiveness among other officers in their team. Officer A92 indicated that some officers had a more aggressive style when speaking to citizens than he does.

**Case 7.3.7 Taking a calm approach (A92)**

I guess there are some officers that will go in to an incident starting way up here, like quite aggressive, quite in their face like that, whereas I like to go in, speak to people, assess the situation and work out what level I need to speak to that person to decide whether, all right, I can speak nicely and calmly to them, just have a good chat, find out what's going on, and then there's times obviously where I've got to be more direct and firm, not so much aggressive, but I, I will be aggressive if somebody starts abusing me and yelling at me. ... So, yeah, there are, there are people that start high and work their way down, whereas I like to come in, give everyone a chance to speak nicely, make sure the situation is calm and go from there. (Interview transcript A92)

Officer Z57 also indicates an awareness of variability among team members.

**Case 7.3.8 Officer is more patient than other officers (Z57)**

I think I might be at times, not all the time, but at times a little bit more patient than some officers. As an example last night we went to a party and a couple officers were quite keen and get in and move the party on-wards, could have been quite confrontational but I thought if we left it for as long as possible then the party would disperse itself, which is sort of did. There are times we do have to go and do that sort of thing but I suppose sometimes I am more patient than others. (Interview transcript Z57)

In contrast, officer Z81 remarked on the utility of a direct approach.

**Case 7.3.9 Officer with more direct approach (Z81)**

**Officer Z81** I have a more direct approach. I feel for me that works. And I appreciate all different perspectives. Every officer will approach a situation differently, and I don't think one is right or wrong over another, and different people bring different strengths. And I said, the direct approach – I'll be straight up with people, and if they're being foolish, I'll tell they're being foolish. But I'll approach someone with, what's the best way to put it, I'll approach someone, even if I've met them before, with an open mind and on even ground and give them a chance to explain themselves and explain the situation.

**Interviewer** So you used the word “direct.” You have a direct approach. Does that mean you observe other people being indirect or how, how is what you do different to, to other people?

When, when I say “direct” I guess, I cut to the point or can cut [to] the point sooner than some other officers. And, once again, no one way is right or wrong, but rather than... skirting around an issue, I'll go straight to an issue. (Interview transcript Z81)

The discussion of ability and practice among officers did not differ between the two research sites. Officers from both sites reflected on their personal preferences, their physiology, and their ability to resolve conflict. There was no apparent explanation for any cultural or personality factors might have influenced the variation in control behaviour evident in the behavioural study.

### 7.3.2 PRE-EMPTIVE ACTIONS

One notable operational difference between the two research sites was the impact of preventative actions. A common theme emerging from the comments of SAPOL officers—and seen during the observational study—was the tactic of taking direct pre-emptive actions to avoid potential victimisation or offending. This ethos seemed to pervade across all patrol workgroups at the SAC station in a stronger manner than at the NZC station.

The legislative triggers for detaining an intoxicated citizen differed between the two sites. The *Public Intoxication Act 1984* [SA] specified that an intoxicated person may be detained if they are “in a public place, under the influence of a drug or alcohol and that by reason of that fact the person is unable to take proper care for himself” (Parliament of South Australia 1984, p.3). In New Zealand, the *Policing Act 2008* [NZ] specified that an intoxicated person may be detained if found “in a public place or intoxicated while trespassing on private property” and is “incapable of protecting himself or herself from physical harm, or likely to cause physical harm to another person, or likely to cause significant damage to any property” (New Zealand Parliament 2008, p.22).

It was a regular occurrence for SAC officers to detain intoxicated citizens and transport them to a ‘sobering-up centre’<sup>8</sup>: it was common for some citizens to wait outside the SAPOL station and ask to be taken to the sobering-up centre. In the following example (Case 7.3.10) officers located the intoxicated citizens at the commencement of their shift within metres of the station.

#### Case 7.3.10 Transporting woman to detox centre (PCE0030)

Intoxicated female (Aboriginal) drinking alcohol outside police station. When the unit walked out [of] the station they came across a group of three intoxicated females within 5 metres of the station. The female struggled to spell and enunciate her name due to the state of her intoxication. She was able to stand and walk unaided but looked sleepy and slurred and mumbled her words. The officers attempted to take her details three times. They were extremely tolerant. After the third attempt they took her into the police station front counter so that they could use the counter computer terminal rather than [their handheld] mobile device. Her name was checked and verified. She was not wanted. Due to her level of intoxication she was detained for public intoxication to be transported to the local detox centre. At that point her two other friends were offered a ride to the detox centre. They agreed. There was no disagreement between any of the other citizens and the officers. Any sense of conflict arose would possibly have existed through frustration of the officers being unable to get the citizen's details. (Field note 13/02/15)

The legislation that provided police powers to detain for intoxication was similar in the two research sites. Both required that officers were to take detained intoxicated citizens to places of safety, however despite the legislation, no “sobering-up centre” or “temporary shelter”<sup>9</sup> existed at NZC. As a result, NZC officers were faced with the choice of transporting an intoxicated citizen to the citizen’s home or to the police custody area.

<sup>8</sup> See section 7(3) of the *Public Intoxication Act 1984* [SA].

<sup>9</sup> See section 36 of the *Policing Act 2008* [NZ].

Officers from both sites took pre-emptive action against citizens who were intoxicated to a lesser degree than the “being unable to take care of themselves” threshold. For instance, officer A16 comments on the wisdom of preventative actions against intoxicated ‘idiots’:

**Case 7.3.11. Take an idiot off the street early (A16)**

I'm certainly more inclined to, to stop for anything that's happening there and then. If you can prevent it then we save ourselves a lot of work, we save people a lot of grief. ... Certainly when it's busy and there's, and there's plenty of police on then your tolerance is, is lower. Take an idiot off the street early; it saves him becoming a, a bigger idiot later, I think. (Interview transcript A16)

The officer also suggested that this was a common approach taken by other teams at the SAC station as it is seen as preventing work later during a busy shift:

**Case 7.3.12 Saving work for yourself (A16)**

I think there's a mentality that if you get in there quick and nip it in the bud then you're saving yourself work, you're saving people hassles, so I think everybody is of a similar mind here in that if it's, if it's go in, then intervene. You don't necessarily have to arrest, but if it means pushing people away and that kind of thing then I think everyone on my team is pretty much the same. There's no one who'd shy away from it. So I don't think there's much difference in the way that we deal with conflict. (Interview transcript A16)

NZC officers shared this perspective. When asked what would cause this officer to stop and initiate a PCE, officer Z23 replied:

**Case 7.3.13 Getting someone off the street before something happens (Z23)**

Yeah, well, I mean it could be, it could be a broken down car, and you stop to help to get them back on the road, get the car going, right through to an assault taking place or potentially someone that could start an assault that you would get off the street before that happens. (Interview transcript Z23)

The pre-emptive action to remove intoxicated, vulnerable, or troublesome citizens from ‘the street’ appears to be rooted in the situational crime prevention approach. Both routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson 1979) and opportunity theory (Clarke 2012) are constructed on the basis that crime can be prevented if the presence of a victim or offender can be eliminated from a location. But while the officers’ approach was not necessarily about conflict resolution—it was perhaps more about conflict prevention—it shows that officers were concerned with both the wellbeing of potential victims and to minimise the potential for citizens to offend.

## 7.4 Discussion

Procedural conflict occurred during police-citizen encounters when the intentional or unintentional actions of a citizen interfered, frustrated, or blocked the officer's ability to achieve a procedural goal. Procedural conflict can occur at any stage of the police-citizen encounter. The conflict was covert or overt. It occurred during investigative and enforcement encounters. Procedural conflict differed from interpersonal conflict that arose from incivilities, such as insults, verbal abuse, or physical abuse. While procedural conflict originated from the frustration that one party may feel when prevented from attaining their goals, incivility-based conflict was more adversarial; it affected the emotional state of individual.

### *Responses to conflict*

Officers who cleared goal blockages used controlling behaviour to overcome the resistance or interference. The use of controlling behaviour was proportionate to the level of resistance or type of interference. Officers used controlling behaviour when it was necessary to clear a blockage but also used controlling behaviour as a pre-emptive tactic to prevent the occurrence of victimisation or offending.

Verbal communication and physical actions were used by officers in both sites in response to conflict to overcome citizen resistance. While the officers who were interviewed indicated a preference for taking a calm approach (or starting 'low'), they indicated that this was not necessarily the case for *all* other officers they had worked with. Nonetheless, these findings indicate that officers from both sites *prefer* a calm approach. In addition, most physical actions of officers observed during the observational study were at a 'low' level. The actions of touching, searching, handcuffing were routine, if not normative. In the occasions where greater force was used (at levels 3–5 on the Alpert and Dunham score), officers appeared to be less relaxed in their demeanour. This is indicative of the infrequency of these types of actions: they appeared less rehearsed. The utility of communication (verbal exchange and verbal control) was diminished if the citizen was intoxicated, mentally ill, or intellectually challenged. When dealing with this group of citizens, officers were less reliant on verbal communication and more reliant on physical actions.

When some officers perceive themselves to be 'weaker' than a citizen in a conflict situation, or those who doubt their level of skill, they do not necessarily rely on higher levels of force to overcome any resistance. There was no evidence of threshold creep or weapon substitution—

i.e. the use of weapons to overcome the perceived lack of ability. Both male and female officers, from each research site, indicated that their preference was to use and that they relied on verbal communication to overcome resistance. Similarly, the preference to engage with verbal communication was shared by those officers who had a larger physical stature. These views reinforce the existence of proportionality and necessity: force was used when required but not relied on as the only method to resolve a conflict.

There were no significant differences between the responses from SAPOL and NZPOL Officers who were interviewed during the observational study: officers from both sites discussed the importance of proportionality and necessity when dealing with citizen resistance. However, it was notable that there were more transportations of intoxicated citizens for detoxification at SAC than at NZC. NZPOL officers were more reluctant to use their powers to detain intoxicated citizens. SAPOL officers extended the pre-emptive approach to those who were less intoxicated (those who were capable of looking after themselves) but assessed as ‘likely’ to offend or become victimised, as evidenced in the comments from officer A16: “Take an idiot off the street early, it saves him becoming a ... bigger idiot later” (Interview transcript A16). This officer’s remarks represented an ethos held by other members of the SAC station (Case 7.3.12) and illustrated how officers believed that environmental and situational factors influenced their practice.

#### 7.4.1 SUMMARY

Findings from the quantitative study (Chapter 5) sought an explanation for the observed variance in the frequency and proportionate duration of control behaviours between the two research sites. To address this question, observational data were analysed to explore if there was a systemic explanation for the variance. The concept of procedural conflict was proposed as an explanation for the frustration and strain evident during the observation of officers. In the present chapter, definitions of overt and covert conflict were explored in relation to procedural conflict. In the forthcoming chapters, the findings reported in the preceding chapters are discussed in the context of the central research questions.

---

## Discussion and Conclusion

---

### 8.1 How do routinely unarmed police behave during police-citizen encounters?

The findings of the present study point to the significance of the decision-making process used by officers to initiate a police-citizen encounter. During the quantitative study, officers at NZC mostly (72.1%) initiated encounters in response to calls for service; the decision to initiate an encounter was influenced by a victim or witness to an event. But when officers self-initiated encounters (15.4%), they followed a decision-making process to consider: (1) the level of perceived harm that had been inflicted or that might occur if there was no intervention; (2) an assessment of the legality or illegality of an action, behaviour, or event; and (3) the level of social acceptability of an action, behaviour, or event. The decision to intervene was not reliant on all three triggers; one trigger may be deemed sufficient.

Officers commented that their peers had different ‘thresholds’ at which they would engage with a citizen. In many cases, officers tolerated citizens who displayed incivilities, insults, or aggressive behaviour directed towards them. Such behaviour was not ignored—officers were indeed aware that these behaviours had occurred—but intervention was not deemed necessary or having merit. In some cases, officers would comment that they noticed a behaviour but did not initiate any action. Epp *et al.* (2014) proposed that officers can be prone to implicit intergroup bias when choosing whom to stop when conducting self-initiated encounters. Epp *et al.* drew on bias towards ethnic minorities. In the present research, there was no indication of

over-representation of ethnic minorities (compared to census data of Māori at the NZ site, although there was an over-representation of 0.9% of Aboriginal people<sup>1</sup>) compared with an over-representation of 0.2% of Caucasian/White/European people<sup>2</sup>. However, there was evidence of some stereotypical bias towards social groups within the cities: officers were aware that some geographical zones were prone to alcohol-related disorder, such as the ‘student quarter’ and the CBD ‘entertainment quarter’. At different times of the shift, the focus of officers transformed from crime control to order maintenance with the ‘student’ and the ‘drunk’ becoming the ‘symbolic assailant’ (see Skolnick 2011).

### 8.1.1 NECESSITY AND PROPORTIONALITY

Factors that influence an officer’s decision to intervene and enforce minor offences<sup>3</sup> have been discussed in the literature. Brown (1981) discussed that minor violations are often ignored for rational reasons: the seriousness of the violation, the difficulty in initiating an encounter (such in a busy traffic environment), or the personal preferences of the officer (whether they are focused on detecting felony-level crimes). In contrast, policing strategies such as zero-tolerance policing, often synonymous with broken-windows policing popularised by Wilson and Kelling (1982) and Bratton (1998), advocated the merit of acting against offenders of all minor offences. While the occurrence of officer-initiated encounters during the NZ phase of quantitative study was low (15.4%)<sup>4</sup>, those officers interviewed described how their decision-making process for initiating an encounter was shaped.

Three triggers (perceived harm, legality or illegality, and social acceptability) were identified as instrumental in the decision-making process. The consideration of these factors by officers suggests that officers were influenced by the principles of necessity and proportionality. Officers explained that they considered the views of the wider community, or cues from an individual when assessing the acceptability of a citizen’s behaviour in public. For instance, one officer said that they take the reaction of bystanders as an indication of the necessity to inter-

<sup>1</sup> See Table A8.1 in the Appendix for a complete comparison. The population of Aboriginal people was measured by Census at 0.1% of the population; the population sample for the present study was 14.3%; and the percentage of ethnic groups for officer-initiated encounters was 15.2%. Waddington *et al.* (2004) identify the risk of calculating racial proportionality using census data and advocate the utility of measuring ‘available population’. In the present study, no measurements of available populations were made, nor available, and as such, the present analysis relies on comparison to census data.

<sup>2</sup> The population for White/European people was measured by Census at 83.8% of the population; the population sample for the present study was 73.7%, and the percentage of ethnic groups for officer-initiated encounters was 73.9%.

<sup>3</sup> Minor offences would be described as misdemeanours in American jurisdictions, summary offences or traffic offences in New Zealand.

<sup>4</sup> The proportion of citizen-initiated compared to officer-initiated varies in the literature. Finstad’s study of the Norwegian police found that 42% of observed police encounters were police-initiated (Finstad cited in Hølgård 2011).



vene. This ‘situation testing’ suggests that officers were taking a ‘community-centric approach’ to determining the civility or incivility of behaviour, officers were indeed testing against a ‘law abiding’ citizen’s measure of acceptability.

Brown’s (1981) construction of police officer operational styles considered how *aggressively* an officer pursues the goal of crime control and how *selectively* the officer behaves when enforcing the law. In the present study, the officer’s aggressiveness and selectiveness appear to be informed by the victims’ or bystanders’ reaction to an antisocial or criminal behaviour: necessity was defined as a product of the officer’s perception of how the citizen’s behaviour impacted the community. In this respect, the officers at NZC leaned towards Muir’s ‘professional’ officer model, behaving as “a mouthpiece for someone else’s soul” (1977, p.100). However, selectivity was influenced by the severity of the citizen’s behaviour and situation of the place. The necessity to intervene during a behaviour occurring in a public place (‘the street’) differed to those cases that had occurred in private places. Even in situations where victims received similar physical injuries, such as a ‘street fight’ between two intoxicated males or a ‘domestic assault’ between two intoxicated intimate partners, different responses were elicited from officers; the perceived severity of the latter outweighed the perceived severity of the former.

Officers’ constructs of the necessity to use force in the present study can be gleaned from occurrence of controlling behaviour during encounters. For instance, while there was a high rate of the occurrence of *verbal control* during arrest-encounters (92.3%), the occurrence rate of *physical control* was half the rate of verbal control (46.2%): from these data, it can be inferred that not all citizens who were arrested were handcuffed or searched. Thus, the use *physical control* was not arbitrary; it was only used in circumstances when it was deemed necessary. Similarly, there was no occurrence of *physical control* during field-warning and field-action encounters. The occurrence of control behaviours during suspect-encounters, the occurrence rate of *physical control* is very low (7.7%).

The *degree* of physical force used by officers during encounters was not measured during the quantitative study. Consequently, it was not possible to establish a quantifiable measure of the degree of force used in response to the resistance experienced such as a force factor paradigm (see Wolf *et al.* 2009), but it is instructive to observe that officers interviewed during the qualitative study identified the importance of proportionate intervention in response to citizen resistance. This indicated a self-awareness that their behaviour could affect the behaviour

of the citizen but also that their behaviour had to be appropriate in the circumstances, and it demonstrated professionalism.

Herbert (2006) outlines the inherent complexity of how competing police-community relationships may shape notions of police legitimacy by the community. Conflict emerged, and thus threatened the legitimacy of the police when community problems or calls for service were ignored, or their utility dismissed. Herbert draws attention to officers' preference to attend 'dangerous' or 'serious' incidents, but his thesis omits any reference to granular ranking of the importance or necessity of police action. In the present research, the conflict between liberalistic and democratic applications of law was apparent. Greater tolerance and neutrality towards citizens occurred when officers responded to street incidents (such as public disorder or fighting) compared with incidents involving property offences (such as theft or shoplifting) or offences at private locations (such as domestic-related harm).

### 8.1.2 PREVALENCE OF CONTROL

As previously noted, while the findings from one jurisdiction may not naturally be generalizable or transferable to another, cross-national comparisons of police agencies can be illuminating. The American POPN study provides one such opportunity to compare with the findings of the present study. Of conflict-prone police-citizen encounters,<sup>5</sup> almost 60% (58.4%) involved some level of verbal or physical force on at least one occasion during the encounter with 50.3% of encounters involving only verbal force (Terrill 2001). Terrill defined verbal force as "acts that threaten ... physical harm on citizens" (2001, p.2). The present study used a broader construction of verbal control where statements made by officers did not have to overtly refer to physical harm to be categorised as 'control'. Control statements made by NZC officers at least once in the absence of physical control occurred in 56.1% of encounters<sup>6</sup>. Terrill concluded that the POPN encounters indicated that force—albeit verbal—occurred frequently during police-citizen encounters with suspects. Regarding the present data from NZC, verbal control was prevalent in *all types of* encounters (regardless of the citizen type).

Terrill makes three observations that are pertinent to the present study. First, he comments—with surprise—that there was no difference in the rates of coercion used by patrol

---

<sup>5</sup> These were encounters which had "the greatest potential for use of force" (Terrill 2001, p.53) involving suspects and 'disputants' (such as those citizens who were unable to be classified as being either a victim or suspect).

<sup>6</sup> This includes 89 encounters from NZC but excludes victims, witnesses, and the 'other' category.

officers and community-policing officers: “the view of community policing as noncoercive is more a misperception than reality” (2001, p.235). This observation is instructive as while the present study was limited to ‘patrol’ research subjects, Terrill’s analysis suggests the present findings might have a wider generalisability across different workgroups. Second, officers in the POPN study did not, on average, respond with force to disrespectful citizens or incivility. This observation validates the present study; officers tended to tolerate incivilities or verbal abuse from citizens. Third, Terrill recommends that police agencies attempt to curb officer reliance on taking a “command nature” when interacting with citizens in the absence of “citizen resistance, threat to personal safety and no threat to citizen safety” (2001, p.230). In other words, he advocates that officers should adopt a less verbally coercive/control demeanour when interacting with citizens. Terrill’s recommendation, however, assumes that ‘citizen resistance’ is overt in nature. The present study demonstrates that conflict may also manifest covertly, which may lead to procedural conflict (e.g. an emotionally distraught victim, or a confused witness).

As previously noted, interview responses indicated that officers at NZC were influenced by a doctrine of proportional coercion. Control behaviour was not used arbitrarily or exclusively. *Verbal control* was more common than *physical control*. This approach was consistent with the preference expressed by a cohort of routinely unarmed Norwegian officers who preferred to use conciliatory tactics when attempting to resolve conflict (Abrahamsen & Strype 2009) but at odds with some studies involving routinely armed officers (e.g. Bayley & Garofalo 1989). It is pertinent to draw attention to Muir’s construct of the ‘professional’ officer: coercion is used only when necessary as the “professional response characteristically involved teaching through talk” (1977, p.145). In other words, control/coercion is used only when necessary and is only used in a proportionate manner. In contrast, Muir’s construct of an enforcement approach is less flexible or responsive to the circumstances of relating to the citizen’s “head and heart” (*ibid*), behaves with greater impatience and aggression, but uses words as “weapons or to incite, [but] never to probe the soul” (*ibid*).

### 8.1.3 SUMMARY

From the outset, this research has proposed deficiencies in applying ‘police use of force’ data to illuminate conflict resolution. While police agencies may methodically collect self-report use of force data from police, the omission of data on the use of control or coercive verbal

communication, often absent from ‘use of force reporting’, prevents a comprehensive analysis of conflict resolution during officer-citizen interaction. Thus, the present study measured *all* communicative behaviour to provide a descriptive analysis of conflict resolution behaviour: *Control behaviour was mostly used to overcome procedural conflict—resistance that blocked officer-goals—rather than in direct response to civilian incivilities.*

In summary, the present study provides the following insights to the first research question. First, most police-citizen encounters at NZC occurred because of citizen calls for service (72.1%). In the instance of officer-initiated encounters, there was an under-representation of Maori involvement. This finding is at odds with Epp *et al.* (2014) who concluded that American officers were prone to intergroup bias towards ethnic minorities. This was not evident in the sample of officer-initiated encounters. Second, when engaged in PCEs, officers mostly used information exchange, frequently used verbal control behaviour, and infrequently used physical control. This indicated that control behaviour was used when officers believed it to be necessary. Third, officers used control behaviour during interactions with citizens: this suggested that conflict did not necessarily originate from incivilities; control behaviour was used to address systemic conflict (i.e. procedural conflict).

Conclusions drawn from the present research must be considered in the context of the scope of the research. The research of routinely unarmed police was cross-sectional and limited to one research site (NZC). The research was also limited to the study of front-line first response officers: officers from other policing workgroups including road policing, community policing, or criminal investigation, did not contribute to the dataset. Differences in attitudes and workplace practice among different police workgroups have been previously documented (Ingram *et al.* 2013). Similarly, while Harvey *et al.* (2008) posit that observer reactivity diminishes over time, the conspicuous absence in the present research of unprofessional officer behaviour in reaction to citizen incivilities requires some consideration. Some factors may also have influenced officer behaviour. Officers were aware that their actions were routinely captured by CCTV in the entertainment zones and they were aware of ad-hoc videoing by citizens. Likewise, some SAC officers were trialling body-worn cameras during the research. Further research of officers in settings where CCTV was absent would be enlightening.

## 8.2 Do routinely unarmed police officers behave differently to routinely armed police officers?

This second question is addressed by comparing the behaviour of officers from NZC and SAC. Two explanations for the differences were found in the frequency and duration of control behaviours used by NZC and SAC.

### 8.2.1 DIFFERENCES IN LAW

One explanation for the variance in the frequency and duration of conflict resolution behaviours might be a result of legislative differences between the jurisdictions. In South Australia, police had a general power under the *Summary Offences Act 1953* [SA] S.74A to require a person to provide their name, date of birth, residential address, business address, and location of any place that person works<sup>7</sup> where an officer has:

reasonable cause to suspect—(a) that a person has committed, is committing or is about to commit, an offence; or (b) that a person may be able to assist in the investigation of an offence or a suspected offence (Parliament of South Australia 1953, p.8).

Consequently, many encounters at SAC began with the officer asking for identification of the citizen, such as asking the question “do you have something with your name on it?” This style of communication was coded as *control statement conversation* or *control statement affect* (later conflated in the present analysis as *verbal control*) as it caused the citizen to present their identification or provide their personal details. In New Zealand, there is no such general power; the power to demand identification of citizens is limited to specific statutes (e.g. *Land Transport Act 1988* [NZ] or the *Sale and Supply of Liquor Act 2012* [NZ]) and only of those who are suspected of committing offences. Similarly, there is no general power for those who are suspected of committing criminal acts (codified under the *Crimes Act 1961* [NZ]) or witnesses to any offence. Consequently, officers at NZC gleaned details of witnesses or victims in a less controlling or direct manner to SAC officers; posing questions such as “What was your name?” Without ‘demanding’ or ‘requiring’ the presentation of an item of official identification, the style of questioning at NZC was more *definitional* regulation than *imperative* regulation (Sykes & Brent 1980, pp.184-185) and thus coded as *information exchange*.

---

<sup>7</sup> The location of any place a person works is subject to suspicion of sexual offences relating to children (S.74A(4)(f)).

### *Working personalities*

Comparison leads to a hypothesis that SAC officers were more attuned to ‘demanding’ citizen identification than NZC officers. Unlike the officers at SAC, NZC officers did not tend to begin encounters with questions that related to identity; they tended first to advise citizens of the reason they were present and why they had been called. An alternative explanation for this variation might originate from the higher proportion of dispatched events (81%) attended by NZC officers compared to that of SAC officers (22%); knowledge of a citizen’s name may have been known to officers prior to commencement of the encounter and a lesser necessity for NZC officers to ask for identification at the beginning of encounters. Nonetheless, should the former hypothesis be correct, then this cross-national observation provides new insight into existing policing theory. Skolnick’s theory of the police officer’s working personality (2011) draws on how the social and occupational environment affects the officer personalities and how they behave in the occupational setting. Skolnick’s chief influencers on personality are danger and authority, which are fuelled by police culture, social isolation, and solidarity. However, the present research suggests that legal capacity may influence officer behaviour: the restriction or freedom to use legal powers to execute police processes affects how officers collect information and consequently interact with citizens.

### *Quantity of law*

Officers from South Australia made use of two other legal powers that were unavailable to those from NZC. South Australia law allowed officers to conduct searches for weapons in or near a licensed premises (*Summary Offences Act 1953* [SA] S.72A, S.72B) and to use drug detector dogs in public places (*Controlled Substances Act 1984* [SA]). This legislation provides police with the power to conduct random searches of citizens in public places and venues. The ‘stop and search’ for weapons allowed officers to detain citizens at random to conduct a search for weapons using an electronic detector wand. Drug detector dogs were deployed in public areas and an illicit drug ‘stop and search’ would commence if the detector dog gave a positive indication. Stop and search powers available to NZC officers required a higher burden of suspicion. Searches for firearms or weapons required officers to suspect that the person was in possession of a weapon, whereas officers had to believe that a person was in possession of illicit drugs before a search (*Search and Surveillance Act 2012* [NZ]). Consequently, stop and

searches for drugs and weapons at NZC relied on some level of evidence, unlike the random searches at SAC, and were thus less frequent.

Black (2010) suggests that ‘law’ is quantifiable. Legislatively, the thresholds to conduct drugs or weapons stop and searches were lower at SAC than NZC (due to the ability to conduct random searches) which appears to be associated with the frequency of stop and search encounters: it was ‘easier’ for an officer to conduct a search in SAC than at NZC. The application of Black to the present research suggests that the quantity of law was greater at SAC than at NZC. Black proposes that “law varies inversely with other social control” (2010, p.6) and predicts that societies with higher levels of law have lower levels of other social controls. If one accepted that SAC had a higher level of law than at NZC, then the present cross-national research provided an opportunity to observe the influence of high law on officer behaviour. Thus, the present research might lead to an initial hypothesis that a higher level of law is positively associated with higher levels of officer control behaviour. As such, the variance in law may explain the variance in officer behaviour, as opposed to attributing the variability of routine armament.

## 8.2.2 SITUATIONAL DIFFERENCES

### *Mode of travel*

A key difference between the two research sites related to the mode of patrol deployment. As outlined earlier, SAC officers predominantly travelled to incidents within their patrol zone on foot as beat patrols, whereas NZC officers were predominantly vehicular-based. This was a limiting factor for SAC officers, as they were only able to attend events within 10–15 minutes walking distance from the SAC station<sup>8</sup>. Similarly, the location of the SAC station—within the shopping and entertainment precinct—influenced the type of events available to contribute to the data set. These were mostly disorder, alcohol offences, and traffic offences, which mostly began at an outside location. Almost all SAC encounters occurred at a public place (outside = 85.2%; inside = 13.4%) with only a small number of encounters occurring in private premises (outside = 0%; inside 1.4%). In contrast, NZC officers had a wider geographic reach; they were not limited to events within walking vicinity of their patrol station. Consequently, the most

---

<sup>8</sup> In some limited circumstances, beat patrols used prisoner vehicles to transport arrestees to the custody suite or transport victims or witnesses to residential locations outside their patrol zone.

frequent events at NZC related to domestic violence, minor assaults, and investigative enquiries. There was also less of a disparity of *beginning* location with most encounters being at private premises (outside = 17.2%; inside 38.8%) compared with those at public places (outside = 29.1%; inside = 14.9%).

Limitations of the mode of patrol travel may explain the disparity in the frequency of investigative and enforcement encounters. Encounters at SAC were predominantly enforcement encounters (55.6%), compared with investigative encounters (43.6%). This was not the case at NZC: three-fifths of the encounters were investigative (58.8%), and two-fifths were enforcement encounters (39.7%).

Another compelling disparity between the two sites relates to the quantity of officer-initiated encounters. At SAC, 66.2% of encounters were officer-initiated whereas only 15.4% of NZC encounters were officer-initiated. The SAC encounters related to liquor offences, disorder, traffic offences and suspicious behaviour events which were relatively minor and did not rely on a witness or victim to make a complaint. Terrill's (2001) analysis of encounters with suspects from the POPN data found that officers who were involved in self-initiated encounters were more likely to use verbal control than physical control. Physical control was more likely when officers responded to citizen-initiated encounters as officers had anticipated the need to use physical control, according to the information available at the time, before the commencement of the encounter.

### *Duration*

In all instances, the mean duration of encounters was shorter at SAC than NZC. One explanation previously discussed (Chapter 5) relates to the transportation of arrestees. At NZC arrestees were transported to custody by the arresting officers in a sedan patrol vehicle (where officers and citizens were able to freely able to continue to communicate) whereas at SAC arrestees were transported to custody in a secure 'cage' vehicle, unable to be in contact with the arresting officers. Consequently, coding of SAC arrest-encounters concluded when the citizen was secured in the cage vehicle, whereas coding for NZC arrest-encounters ended once the citizen arrived at the police custody centre. While this provides an explanation for arrest-encounters it does not explain the difference in mean durations across other encounter types. The most extreme difference was found between investigative encounters: SAC suspect-encounters were almost half the mean duration of NZC suspect-encounters ( $M_{NZ} = 15:17$ ;  $M_{SA}$



= 8:14). The same pattern, while not as extreme, was found in mean durations of the encounter-types. Officers observed these offences *in situ* and they were able to proceed without an investigation. Accordingly, this reduced the duration of the encounter diagnostic phase and officers were able to move quickly on to the treatment phase.

It is probable (but not proven) that the difference in mean durations correlates with the high proportion officer-initiated encounters at SAC. As officers did not have to collect information to construct the IN for witnessed offences to the same degree as non-witnessed offences, officer-initiated encounters devoted less time (or in some cases no time) to the investigative phase and moved directly to the treatment phase.

### 8.2.3 SUMMARY

During conflict-prone encounters observed during this research, SAC officers spent less time engaged in *information exchange* than NZC officers did with citizens, used more *verbal control* than NZC officers, and more *physical control* than NZC officers. The present research could not attribute a single explanation for the disparity. While legislative differences between the two sites (such as the power to demand identification, conduct random weapons and drugs searches) are the most likely explanation for the increase in the frequency of controlling behaviour at SAC, they do not account for the variation in the proportion of control behaviour. It is more feasible that environmental factors influenced officer behaviour. The SAC station was positioned within the centre of a night-time entertainment district, and catered to victims, suspects, and offenders of alcohol-related ‘street’-offences: disorder, minor assaults, pedestrian offences, and breaching liquor-free zones. There were other SAC stations (not participating in the present research) that had the responsibility for calls for service from residential areas within the city. Alternatively, the disposition and demeanour of citizen-participants may have affected officer behaviour. Citizen-participants at SAC were younger in age, were more frequently of White/European ethnicity, and had a greater proportion of male sex than those in the NZC sample. As discussed above, citizens with these characteristics are more prone to experience police officer use of force.

SAC officers were not dealing with the same distribution of encounter event-types as those by NZC officers. The effect of this was also borne out during the proportion of diagnostic to treatment phases of encounters. SAC encounters required less initial investigation during the diagnosis phase (witnessing a pedestrian or traffic offence required less time than investigating

a domestic assault) thus increasing the durational proportion of the treatment phase. This was a consequence of restrictions placed on the research access at SAC City which ultimately shaped the profile of event-types available for observation during the research. Indeed, the findings may have been different if the research access had included SAC station vehicular patrols.

### 8.3 How do we explain how conflict resolution is managed by routinely unarmed police officers?

The final research question seeks to understand how routinely unarmed police seek to resolve conflict. The quantitative study found that there were significant differences in the use of control behaviour between routinely unarmed and routinely armed officers. The qualitative study considered the process that officers followed during encounters: diagnosis (role assignment, narrative construction, course of action) and treatment (outcome advised, acceptance, negotiation/enforcement or rejection/enforcement, disengagement). The qualitative study also found how *officer encounter goals* influenced officer behaviour. Encounter goals were associated with the type of encounters. For instance, officers were motivated to investigate an incident during *investigative* encounters; rescue a vulnerable person or initiate a medical intervention during *rescue* encounters; form positive relationships with communities during *social* encounters; or make an arrest or another type of enforcement action during *arrest* encounters. Blockages, or frustrations, that interfered with these goals created conflict for officers as they were prevented from or impeded in achieving these goals. Blockages occurred because of deliberate resistance actions from citizens as well because of non-deliberate actions, accidental actions, or impairment. Conflict arose *overtly* and *covertly*.

The concept of a procedural conflict—a type of interpersonal conflict—originated from observing how blockages or frustrations prevented the realisation of an officer's procedural goal. It differs from other more personal interpersonal conflict, such as those arising from incivilities or abuse directed at the officer. Observations during the present research revealed that in most instances officers ignored or tolerated verbal abuse or incivilities directed at them by citizens (*cf.* Sykes and Brent, 1980). Such abuse and incivilities occurred at both research sites, and officer response to these circumstances was similar. But unlike verbal abuse, officers responded to procedural conflict by adapting their behaviour to overcome procedural

blockages. Their style of communication changed from non-controlling (*information exchange*) to the more coercive behaviour of *verbal control* or *physical control*. *Verbal control* behaviour included statements aimed at controlling the behaviour of the citizen, the conversation between the officer and citizen, and the immediate physical environment where the encounter occurred. Physical control included any physical application of force by the officer to the citizen, including searches, handcuffing, defensive tactics or use of weapons. Procedural conflict became resolved once the conflicted officer overcame the goal blockage. In some cases, officers dealt with citizens who did not have the cognitive capacity to understand officers or empathise with their encounter goals. Control behaviour during encounters with impaired citizens (intoxicated) or mentally ill citizens relied more on physical control than verbal control.

### 8.3.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

Various theoretical frameworks have been applied to previous research of police-citizen encounters to explain officer behaviour. Below, several relevant frameworks are discussed to establish how they relate to the concept of procedural conflict.

#### *Regulation, control, and authority*

Sykes and Brent (1980) proposed that officers regulate (control) PCEs through an initial establishment of their authority, and then at subsequent times during the encounter if disturbances eventuate that block the achievement of four officer goals. Definitional regulation can occur when officers take charge by asking a question thereby assuming the cognitive control. Imperative regulation includes verbal communication behaviour that is not questioning but is used to control the behaviour of a citizen in a non-threatening or coercive manner. Threats or physical actions are regarded as coercive regulation. Regulation enables the officers to achieve four goals: collect information, assert or maintain order, achieve respect from the citizens, and achieve an acceptable resolution (Sykes & Brent 1980). In the present study, information seeking, order maintenance, and resolution goals were present. However, there was no evidence that officers actively sought to be treated with respect. Officers did not directly challenge inci-

vility or abuse; in many cases, this was tolerated without recourse.<sup>9</sup> Notwithstanding, officers referred during the qualitative study (during interviews and informal conversations) to their desire to be treated with respect by citizens between encounters.

Sykes and Brent's application of a general-systems view of encounters holds some merit. It accounts for the transactional nature of police-citizen interactivity: the actions of one affect the actions of the other. This aligns with Tedeschi and Felson's theory of coercive actions which, as described by Terrill: "the use of coercion is part of a rational decision-making process based on 'the expectations of success in achieving outcomes, the values of outcomes, and the expectations and negative values of costs'" (Terrill 2005, p.109). However, the weakness of this approach is that it does not necessarily account for the behaviour of those who may not be able to make a 'rational' decision, such as those are mentally or physically impaired. A 'rational' person may weigh the consequences of arguing about the futility of a traffic notice for a crossing a pedestrian crossing illegally; a citizen with a cognitive impairment is not necessarily able to consider the consequences of disobedience (see case 6.26). This is an important consideration when building a theoretical model to explain police-citizen behaviour during encounters.

Authority maintenance theory (AMT) draws on the work of Sykes and Brent (1980) and is cast as a theoretical framework to understand the police use of force. It examines how the roles of authority and reciprocity differ from non-police-citizen encounters and rests on the assumption that PCEs are a ritual characterised by officers use of authority and the citizen's response to that authority (deference or resistance) (Alpert & Dunham 2004). This approach relies on the citizen having the cognitive ability to make 'rational' assessments during the encounter: "reciprocity breaks down when one or both of the parties determine that their goals are not being realised due to the behaviour of the other" (Alpert & Dunham 2004, p.183).

---

<sup>9</sup> The absence of any evidence that officers actively sought to be treated with respect was curious. Verbal and physical displays of respect were apparent during my own practitioner experience; including witnessing the behaviour by officers and engaging in similar verbal behaviour myself. This was explicitly demonstrated during verbal arguments with non-compliant suspects or arrestees, or in some extreme cases implicit at the end of a foot or vehicle chase where the fleeing citizen was physically apprehended. Statements such as "you don't run from the police" were made while officers engaged in an aggressive or rough physical apprehension. Some officers justified this as "street justice" or simply to "teach them a lesson". The absence of such behaviour at the research sites may be due to observer reactivity, that the social and cultural norms were different (i.e. that this behaviour was localised to the geographical zone of my own practice), or that the phenomenon had ceased to exist.

During one informal conversation with an officer-participant at NZC who had worked in the same geographical district that I had previously worked, the topic of differences between that district and the research district arose. That officer commented that the 'ethos' of the present station was different: it was more relaxed, more informal, and officers were less likely to respond to certain events with the same rigour or speed in comparison with his formal station. Differences were also discussed during the interview of another officer-participant who had previously worked in a different metropolitan station. The officer reflected that at a previous station, officers treated arrestees held in custody with less empathy and 'compassion' than at the present station. Thus, it was difficult to determine—as a researcher and as a practitioner—why there was an absence of this phenomenon.

When reciprocity breaks down, the likelihood of officer use of force or citizen resistance increases. Officers respond to resistance using regulation (controlling behaviour).

Alpert and Dunham's fourth, fifth and sixth AMT theoretical propositions relate to participant expectations, goals, and goal blockages (2004, pp.180-182): one party is less likely to cooperate to the mutual advantage of another party, if in doing so it prevents that party from achieving their goal: the actors abandon mutual benefit or cooperation in preference to achieving personal goals. Yet, central to AMT is authority. While this applies to the encounters where police use-of-force occurs—officers draw on the legal authority to use force—the present research locates conflict in covert circumstances where force is not an appropriate or utilitarian option. The procedural conflict arising from the officer's attempt to write a victim statement from a distracted shopkeeper originated from the requirement to construct a quality and functional document. The goal blockage was associated with three problems. The first related to the interruptions during the encounter so that the victim was able to serve her customers. The lack of deference shown to the officer partially related to the citizen's failure to prioritise her attention to the officer but was not a challenge to the officer's authority. The second and third problems related to the issue of gleaned data in a logical and temporal order and the language difficulty. Once again, neither of these problems related to—or challenged—the authority of the officer. Reciprocity had not broken down: both parties remained committed to the shared goal of making a victim statement.

### *General strain theory*

General strain theory has been proposed to explain goal-driven conflict outside of criminal offending: strains originate from the "failure to achieve positively valued goals" (Agnew 1992, p.51) and procedural blockages that frustrate the achievement of goals are a "disjunction between expectations and actual achievements" (Agnew 1992, pp.51-52).

The present research has illustrated how officers develop strain from procedural blockages. For example, when an officer sought to write a victim statement from a distracted shopkeeper, his efforts were frustrated by the victim's interruptions (tending to customers) and language difficulties. The officer was motivated to construct an accurate, methodical, and correctly-ordered statement promptly. The desire to construct a quality document was linked to the officer's desire to collect a statement that had utility (details of the event in a logical, sequential order). The desire to complete the statement promptly was motivated by the desire to com-

plete the task so that officers could investigate the incident further and equally, complete the task so that they would be able to move to next policing task.

Agnew explains that strains lead to negative emotions. Officers in the present study did not use criminal behaviour as corrective action. Of course, the criminality of controlling action was defined by the status of the officers. Many of the physical control actions used by officers in the study would be deemed to be criminal but for the privileged position that officers have authority to use physical force/control. While citizens are authorised to use force in some situations, they are not authorised to use handcuffs, OC spray, empty hand-tactics, conductive energy devices, or firearms to overcome resistance.

General strain theory also explains the mechanism that disturbs the officer's progression through the encounter procedure. For example, the strain caused by the "disjunction between just outcomes and actual outcomes" (Agnew 1992, p.53) describes the frustration felt by the bystander (CA03) who intervened in Case 6.1.2 due to a perception of unfair police treatment. Like officer corrective actions, the citizen's response to his strain was not a criminal action (at most it amounted to a mild incivility). General strain theory provides an adequate explanation for the behaviour of the cognitively impaired citizen. In Case 6.2.6 the male in-patient (CN86) attempted to evade the officer's initiation of an encounter. This citizen's goal—to maintain his freedom and not return to his secure care facility—was frustrated by the officer's actions.

Agnew suggests that an individual's coping mechanism for strain may fall into one or more of three categories: behavioural, cognitive, and emotional coping strategies (2006, pp.89-92). Behavioural strategies attempt to address the level of strain. These behaviours are designed to "protect or retrieve those things they value, terminate or escape from aversive treatment or achieve their goals" (2006, p.90). Cognitive strategies include those behaviours that are consistent with ignoring or minimising the importance of the strain. Emotional strategies include actions to "alleviate negative emotions" (*ibid*) through medication, drug taking (legal or illegal), exercise, or escapism. In the context of the present research, the modification of officer behaviour during conflict-prone encounters can be seen as a behavioural strategy to overcome the strain of the procedural blockage or frustration.

### *Summary*

The utility of these theoretical constructs can be assessed through their capacity to answer the question: Why did officers in the present research ignore citizen behaviour connected to inci-

vilities but acted to address conflict from procedural disturbances? We can see that general strain theory explains why officers are motivated to resolve conflicts that frustrate or interfere with the process of attaining goals. Conflict originating from incivilities or verbal abuse is tolerated or ignored because while they are unpleasant, they do not necessarily interfere with attainment of procedural goals. In this respect, questions in the present research asking how and why do *routinely unarmed officers* resolve conflict become redundant to some extent; the question becomes how do *officers* resolve conflict. In this analysis, the data has shown that there is no difference in the procedure used by officers to resolve conflict; albeit that the officers from SAC used a greater frequency and proportional duration of control statements.

## 8.4 Conclusion

### 8.4.1 GENERAL FINDINGS

Of the encounters observed, NZPOL officers spent 81–83% of their time using information exchange, 8.8–9.3% of time using verbal control, and 1.3–3% of their time using physical control. The NZPOL officers interviewed believed that the use of control behaviour was proportionate and used only when necessary. This belief was consistent with the observational findings. The behaviour of routinely armed SAPOL officers confirmed the predominance of information exchange during the observed encounters. However, there were disparities between the two research sites in the usage of control behaviour. Significantly, SAPOL officers used control behaviour more frequently and for a longer duration than NZPOL officers. SAPOL officers spent less time during conflict-prone encounters using information exchange (59–61%), used more verbal control (21–25%), and physical control (8–11%).

The research was not able to identify the reason for the disparity; however situational factors and legislative differences may have been contributing factors. There were significant differences with the encounter event-types at both sites. The SAC dataset had encounters that were shorter in mean duration, they were mostly officer-initiated and had a higher proportion of enforcement encounters than the NZC set. Disparities in the use of control behaviour appear to be influenced by the use of verbal control. This was most apparent when SAC encounters were initiated. As SAPOL officers were accustomed to requiring identification at the beginning of the interaction with citizens, and although it was a matter of routine, the ap-

proach came across as being ‘harsher’ and more authoritarian than the approach of the NZC officers.

The presence of firearms did not *appear* to impact the behaviour of SAPOL officers during the research. There were no occasions where SAPOL officers de-holstered their handguns during an encounter, no threats were made that involved reference to firearms—explicitly or implicitly—and there were no allusions made that compliance was necessary because officers were armed. It was not possible to test whether citizen compliance was related to the implicit threat of firearms, but this cannot be excluded from citizen decision-making. Ironically, the only time firearms were drawn were at NZC when NZPOL officers were issued with handguns and semi-automatic carbines prior the arrest of a known gang member. The arrestee had a history of firearm possession and officers took a precautious approach when making the arrest. Even then, no explicit comments were made by the officers that they were armed, although the citizen remarked with surprise that officers were armed when he was first approached.

The present research adopted a cross-national approach to explore the central research question. In most respects this approach in the present study was successful. As Bayley espoused: international comparisons to help describe variation in phenomena, particularly in policing research, as description helps to explain or build criminal justice theory (Bayley 1999). The present research has identified two important phenomena. The first relates to the differences in how officers deal with two types of interpersonal conflict. That officers from both research sites tended to tolerate personal abuse/incivilities directed at them yet actively sought to control situations where procedural conflict arose, this depicts professionalism. Most people within society will have experienced the negative outcomes of receiving unwanted personal abuse from another party, yet officers in the present research actively chose to ignore such abuse. One explanation for this behaviour could relate to observer reactivity. Alternatively, the level of skill involved in managing conflict in demanding situations surely must be a further aspect of police professionalism. Taking control of a demanding situation is not necessarily a skill that most members of society could acquit.

The second relates to the variation in the use of controlling behaviour of officers from the NZPOL and SAPOL. The detection of the variation could only have been established from a cross-national study. However, the utility of the findings might help to identify a mechanism for measuring degrees of professionalism through describing the ‘operational ideology’ and ‘operational style’ of police agencies. For instance, two questions might be posed: to what de-



gree do officers within a police agency tolerate personal abuse before (a) initiating a police-citizen encounter or (b) initiating a criminal justice sanction. These two measures might enhance Brown's construction of *aggressiveness* and *severity* of police action.

The observation of the impact of legislation on officer demeanour during encounters is also notable. The absence of a New Zealand statutory power to demand identifying details from those present at a crime scene has led to officers resorting to alternative methods to collect this information. It was apparent that NZC officers used a different opening 'script' when first speaking to citizens than officers at SAC. Rather than directly asking for a name, NZC officers began the conversation seeking information about the incident itself or asked *why* they had been caused. In another example, the availability of the 'sobering-up centre' at SAC promoted a less rigid approach to detaining a citizen for intoxication. Despite legislation providing the capacity for a facility, there was no such facility at NZC. As such, officer decisions to detain for intoxication were influenced by the likelihood of whether the citizen had a responsible person to care for their wellbeing at a residential address. If not, then officers were faced with bringing the person to police custody and creating an added burden on police custody staff.

#### 8.4.2 LIMITATIONS

##### *Design limitations*

The present study was a cross-sectional, non-experimental descriptive study. It was not designed to test a hypothesis nor suggest causality, but to identify the variation of behaviour between the trans-national research sites. Some aspects of implementing the research design were problematic. While the selection of research sites was made for reasons of practicality, the choice of station within each site was limited to the availability of a suitably-sized station within NZC and within SAC that could provide sufficient security for the researcher to conduct the field research. As a result, patrols from NZC with predominantly vehicular compared with beat patrols at SAC. This resulted in a level of complexity for comparative analysis. Comparisons with the encounter data set were hampered by disparities of event-type and encounter types (e.g. *investigative* vs *enforcement* encounters). The SAC sample did not include a sufficient quantity of victim-encounters. This reduced the ability for corroboration or refutation of the presence of controlling behaviours in the NZC encounter data set.

*External validity, generalizability, transferability, and trustworthiness*

Curry *et al.* (2009) suggest that the concepts of “validity, reliability and generalisability are the essential markers of sound quantitative research” (2009, p.1448) and that these are “analogous to the principles of “credibility, dependability, and transferability, respectively” (*ibid*) for qualitative research. The challenge for mixed methods research is to balance these concepts to generate dependable and rigorous research.

Transferability is the degree to which the research findings from one setting can be applied to another setting (Curry *et al.* 2009; Krefting 1991). Krefting (1991) suggests that the situational uniqueness of qualitative research often complicates its level of transferability. In the present research, the observation of variances in behaviour between officers who are routinely armed (at SAC) and routinely unarmed (at NZC) does not necessarily indicate that such a variance will exist in further comparisons in similar research sites. The present research corroborates the literature, which describes how the behaviour of officers is influenced by the behaviour of citizens, and the qualities of the ecological environment: behaviours in some spaces are not tolerated in other spaces. While the present research poses that procedural conflict is a widespread phenomenon, the study was limited to observations at one station of each agency. With this caveat noted, the broader theoretical claim espoused throughout this dissertation that officers are exposed to procedural conflict during police-citizen encounters and use a combination of information exchange and control behaviour to overcome procedural blockages and frustrations appears robust. This latter principle is founded on the joint analysis of quantitative and qualitative data.

### 8.4.3 FURTHER RESEARCH

The present study poses several questions that would benefit from further empirical research. First, increase the saturation of theoretical sampling. As the present research was staged in police stations with different patrol types—NZC had predominantly vehicular-based patrols whereas SAC was predominantly beat-based—further research at an NZPOL beat-based station would provide opportunities to observe NZPOL officers dealing with a higher proportion of ‘street-level’ event-types, particularly those which were officer-initiated. Similarly, further research at a SAPOL vehicular-based station would provide an increase of opportunities to observe victim-based encounters to corroborate the use of verbally controlling behaviour.

Second, it would be advantageous to observe an alternative Australian police agency, and a further routinely unarmed police agency to provide a wider corroborative basis for discussion. The continuing use of the mixed-method approach to measuring police behaviour (combining the behavioural and observational approaches) may provide a useful protocol to map the behavioural tendencies of other police agencies.

In the last chapter, the theory is explored in more detail through a discussion of ten theoretical propositions. This research has taken a police-centric perspective of police-citizen interaction, conflict, and conflict resolution. Central to this approach has been the reliance of police officers' perspectives. While there were some opportunities to incorporate the experiences of citizens, the 'citizen voice' was not explored to the same extent as the 'police perspective'. As such, further research would provide opportunities to explore how citizen goals affect the procedural conflict model. Equally, further research staged in more aggressive policing environments would provide opportunities to explore procedural conflict in different cultural settings.

#### 8.4.4 FINAL WORDS

At the completion of the fieldwork—before fully exploring the quantitative data—I wrote a diary note suggesting that despite the difference in armed status between the two police agencies, officers from both agencies behaved in the same way in the field. Other than the difference in the questioning script/style of officers (due to legislative differences between the jurisdictions) I could not discern any observable differences between the operational behaviour of the officers from each research site. Officers from NZC behaved the same way as those from SAC when they were resolving conflict: they followed the same diagnostic and treatment procedure during encounters. This was an unexpected conclusion to draw as my previous research had identified that there were operational differences between RAP and RUP officers (Hendy 2014).



---

## Towards a new theory of conflict

---

The purpose of this last chapter of the dissertation is to discuss *procedural conflict theory* in a broader theoretical context. In part, it is a continuation of the narrative from Alpert and Dunham's essay about authority maintenance theory (2004). They proposed that AMT could be applied to understand all police officer behaviour during all police-citizen encounters (including those that lack any police use of force). The present essay addresses this contention. While it incorporates aspects of AMT, the role of strain and general strain theory (Agnew 1992) is significant. Following the examples of Deutsch (1973) and Alpert and Dunham (2004), the theory is now outlined as a series of theoretical propositions. As Alpert and Dunham suggest, new theory ought to be presented first as a general concept, then discussed as a set of theoretical propositions so that logically deduced hypothesis that may be tested (2004).

### 9.1 Procedural conflict theory

PCEs are a special kind of interactional ritual. In the present research, PCEs have been disaggregated into two phases. The first is a diagnostic phase where officers focus their attention to gather information to identify the most appropriate *police* response. The second is the treatment phase where officers implement the response.

In one sense, police-citizen encounters are no different from other diagnostic bureaucratic encounters (i.e. between a government agent and citizen) such as those involving social workers, teachers, medical professionals, or firefighters: officers behave as street-level bureaucrats

acting as agents of their respective police agency (see Lipsky 1980). But police-citizen encounters have one important distinction: actors assume, to the most extreme degree, power roles of *order takers* and *order givers* (Collins 2004). And unlike most other agents of the state, police officers (as construed in the broadest definition) have the legitimate right to use coercive or physical force to achieve their tasks.

Within the modern policing context, officers mix their performance of traditional police functions of order maintenance, crime control, or community safety, with functions such as rescue, medical intervention, or emergency disaster response. While officers might leverage their legitimate authority when engaged in the former (as described through AMT), the latter rely less on the officers' ability to establish a legal or moral authority, but more on attaining utilitarian goals.

Procedural conflict theory (PCT) is proposed to be a substantive theory (Glaser & Strauss 1999). Substantive theories are generated to explain empirical social phenomena within a specific substantive social group. Discussion of PCT within the present research has been cautious thus far. *Procedural conflict* was described previously as conflict which occurs during police-citizen encounters when the intentional or unintentional actions of a citizen interfered, frustrated, or blocked the officer's ability to achieve a procedural goal. Procedural conflict aligns with general strain theory. Procedural blockages (i.e. conflict) frustrate the achievement of goals and are a "disjunction between expectations and actual achievements" (Agnew 1992, pp.51-52). Procedural conflict originates from the strain associated with an officer's inability to achieve their aspired procedural goal. It may occur at any stage of the police-citizen encounter and may be covert or overt.

Procedural conflict differs from other interpersonal conflicts that may arise from incivilities, insults, verbal abuse, or physical abuse directed at an officer. This type of disobedience may be a challenge an officer's sense of authority rather than a citizen's defiance to participate in the encounter. Such incivilities are adversarial and will lead to a non-procedural strain, whereas procedural conflict originates from a feeling of frustration when officers are prevented from attaining their task-orientated goals.

*Proposition 1. Police-citizen encounters are a power ritual, but the role of authority is not central in all police-citizen encounters.*

AMT provides a helpful starting point for understanding the behaviour of officers during police-citizen encounters. AMT is grounded in the Goffmanian-approach to social interaction and ritual (Alpert & Dunham 2004), and it advances the general system theory approach of Sykes and Brent; it incorporates the principles of asymmetry, authority, power, and reciprocity. AMT focuses on the centrality of authority—officers hold both legal authority and traditional authority<sup>1</sup>—and how officers with authority function during police-citizen encounters. Authority influences citizen decision-making to acquiesce or resist officer control. AMT explains why officers may use verbal or physical control to overcome resistance. Although primarily concerned with the use of force, Alpert and Dunham posit that AMT applies to *all* police-citizen interaction: “... police-citizen encounters revolve around the officer’s exercise of authority (coercion) and the citizen’s submission to that authority (deference or resistance)” (2004, p.175).

However, in an increasingly de-specialised public sector, officers are not necessarily only focused on crime control or order maintenance; officers problem-solve when engaged with problem-orientated policing or situational crime prevention (Høigård 2011), disaster emergency crisis response (McLean *et al.* 2012), medical intervention, societal generative initiatives (Herbert 2006), and when acting as producers and disseminators of information for other agencies of the state (Ericson & Haggerty 1997). These functions are the antithesis of Bittner’s construction: “the role of the police is best understood as a mechanism for the distribution of non-negotiable coercive force employed in accordance with the dictates of an institutive grasp on situational exigencies” (Bittner 1991, p.43).

For AMT to function as a general theory, it must explain participants’ behaviour during all police-citizen encounters: force is used by officers to overcome citizen resistance; citizens respond as deferent, because they are aware that officers are permitted use force to achieve their goals and do not pose any resistance, or *become* deferent after their resistance it is overcome by the officer. For AMT to function as the explanation of all citizen behaviour, all citizen behaviour must be a function of the decision to be deferent or resistant. The decision is informed by the degree to which a citizen accepts the officer’s authority and consents to the

---

<sup>1</sup> Alpert and Dunham use traditional authority in the Weberian sense.

officer's objectives. In other words, a citizen must *recognise* that officers are indeed agents of the state with legitimate authority and then choose to be deferent or resistant.

Consequently, AMT relies on a citizen's cognitive capacity to make a 'sensible' decision. That is not too dissimilar from social interactionist theory (Tedeschi & Felson 1994) which describes how an actor considers the efficacy of an action according to the likelihood of achieving a "tangible benefit" (Felson & Tedeschi 1993, p.296). However, as Felson and Tedeschi point out, a temporarily or permanently impaired person has a limited level of 'rationality' to take a decision. Indeed, an impaired citizen—such as someone unconscious due to extreme intoxication or a person suffering from severe mental impairment—is unable to decide to be deferent or resistant cognitively. Moreover, the impairment of person does not revoke the authority conferred to an officer by the state (see de Lint 2014), however, as the impaired person does not have the capacity to recognise authority, a decision to be deferent or resistant cannot be taken. PCT explains conflict between citizens and officers during encounters when the cognitive calculus of 'authority' is absent. In this sense, PCT relies on Sykes and Brent's application of general systems theory (1983) to explain how strains are evident in covert conflict. A general theory of police officer behaviour must incorporate explanations of behaviour from citizens who are incapable of behaving with deference or resistance.

It can be agreed that a lack of deference causes overt conflict; in a PCT framework, this can be resolved with officers' control behaviour. However, with the earlier example of an extremely impaired intoxicated person, any attempts by an officer to interact with the citizen are frustrated by the citizen's impairment. In this situation, the frustration (or strain) is not a function of deliberate 'rational' resistance; *covert* conflict emerges from the officer's frustration at failing to progress through the encounter procedure. In a similar vein, a mentally impaired person who is unable to understand a situation is unable to recognise or interpret authority; thus, is unable to defer or resist authority. While the impaired person's actions may be *overt* resistance, their actions are not necessarily the product of deliberate action. In this manner, the resistance (conflict) is overt.

PCT explains why officers use control behaviour in all police-citizen encounters, unlike AMT's explanation of police-citizen encounters. In this way, PCT provides an alternative explanation of the interaction between officer and citizen. In the context of the PCT framework, control behaviour is not limited to physical control or coercive verbal control. Conflict may



occur when a citizen behaves with deference towards an officer (thereby not a direct challenge to authority) which generates covert resistance.

*Proposition 2. An officer follows a diagnostic and treatment process during a police-citizen encounter: they diagnose the 'problem', construct an incident narrative, determine the roles of any citizen present, and determine a course of action. If treatment is necessary, the officer advises their course of action, enforces the outcome against any citizen rejection or negotiation, then disengages from the encounter.*

PCT assumes that officers are goal-driven, they identify goals to achieve during police-citizen encounters, and subsequently follow a set procedure to realise their goals. All encounters begin with a definitional diagnostic phase. During the diagnostic phase, definitional (Sykes & Brent 1980) and corroborative questioning are used by officers to collect information. Definitional questioning helps to define the 'type' of the event that has caused the encounter to begin, whereas corroborative questioning is used to confirm the circumstances of the event. Together, definitional, and corroborative questioning provides information for the officer to identify if a problem exists, diagnose the type of problem if one does exist, and then determine the appropriate police response. In addition, officers incorporate input from other perceptive senses such as visual, aural and smell.

Officers progress through this *police-citizen encounter procedure* sequentially; their diagnosis informs their treatment. Officers collect information to construct and authenticate an incident narrative which is used to inform a decision as to whether a *treatment* is necessary (or appropriate). If treatment is deemed necessary, it is administered by the officers. If citizens reject or block officers' attempt to treat, or treatment, then officers either enforce the treatment or disengage from the encounter. Blockages or frustrations which impede officers' encounter procedure are *procedural* conflicts. These procedural conflicts are related to procedural and encounter goals.

Officers' progress is influenced by their degree of motivation to attain the encounter goal. Officers who are motivated to provide an elevated level of commitment to achieve the encounter goal will progress through the diagnostic phase with a proactive and probing manner to collecting and corroborating information during the construction of the incident narrative. Officers who are less motivated may not collect information with the same vigour or assertiveness. Officer goals vary according to the type of problem identified during the encounter.

Common officer goals include the investigation an offence, solving a community problem, rescue of a vulnerable person, providing a medical intervention, protecting a person, or protecting property. Sometimes officers may interact socially with a citizen to provide positive community relations. As an officer works through the diagnosis to collect information to *define* the event-type, they also determine the roles of those citizens present at the encounter. Citizen-roles may also influence how an officer will determine the best course of action.

PCT explains how control behaviour is inexorably linked to goal attainment during an encounter. Sykes and Brent (1980) proposed that officers seek four goals during police-citizen encounters: to collect information, assert or maintain order, achieve respect from citizens, and/or achieve an acceptable resolution. In a PCT framework, officer goals are more nuanced as they are dependent on the *type* of encounter. *Enforcement* and *investigative* encounter-types have different goals from *protection* or *rescue* encounters-types. Officer goals for investigative encounters are associated with an attempt to establish and examine the factors of an incident or an offence: officers seek information from citizens relating to events by asking questions or collecting other information. An investigative encounter may transform into an enforcement encounter if the officer determines that sufficient information exists to action a criminal justice sanction. Officer goals for rescue encounters are less investigative but more interventional: rapid response, searching, medical intervention (such as psychiatric or medical). Social encounters featured very little investigative or interventional behaviour. They were characterised by more general conversational behaviour and the sharing of personal anecdotes.

*Proposition 3. Conflict may arise during a police-citizen encounter when the officer's goal is frustrated or blocked by the participating citizen(s). This procedural conflict will be either overt or covert. The conflict will cause the officer strain.*

An officer expects that they will attain their encounter-goal during a police-citizen encounter. When they face difficult circumstances or behaviour from citizens that frustrate their attempts to progress through the encounter, they will develop negative emotions. According to General Strain Theory (Agnew 2006), these negative emotions lead to *strain*. The strain occurs because the officer is unable to continue to progress through the encounter procedure (diagnosis, treatment) and it thus becomes a *procedural* conflict. A goal frustration or blockage may arise with or without the knowledge of the citizen present during the police-citizen encounter.

Covert conflict occurs without the knowledge of the citizen and manifests as an internalised cognitive strain in the mind of the officer. The strain *impedes* the officer's ability to attain their goal. Overt conflict occurs with the knowledge of the citizen. This too creates an internalised cognitive strain in the officer's mind but can also lead to verbal and physical frustrations.

*Proposition 4. An officer uses control behaviour to overcome any goal frustration or goal blockage when non-control behaviour does not work or not deemed to be appropriate.*

*The use of control behaviour as corrective actions occurs when an officer deems it to be necessary.*

Conflict resolution, within the PCT framework, occurs when officers successfully influence, coerce, or use force to overcome a procedural conflict. Officers influence citizen behaviour using control behaviour (including verbal and physical control) and non-control behaviour such as information exchange. Officers may use a combination of these conflict resolution behaviours. As with the use of police force, officers use the different conflict resolution behaviours as corrective actions to overcome a goal blockage or frustration.

Covert conflict necessitates different conflict resolution behaviours to overt conflict. Covert conflict originates from situations where one actor (either officer or citizen) is not aware that their behaviour is causing a strain on the other actor. For instance, the unconscious, intoxicated person who has no means of identification on their person is unaware that those circumstances create a strain for the officer attempting to identify them. Similarly, the emotionally distressed victim of an incident whom an officer is attempting to collect information is unaware that their emotional distress is causing strain on the officer, or indeed that the actions of the officer may exacerbate the victim's distress. In the latter, officers use verbal control behaviour to elicit the required information from the victim; either in the style of questioning or conversational management. This conflict resolution behaviour is quite different to the physical control behaviour used by an officer to control a suspect who is attempting to resist arrest or escaping custody.

*Proposition 5. When citizen-goals compete with officer-goals, citizen actions may impede, frustrate, or block officer-goals (i.e. resistance). The intent of these actions may be to achieve citizen-goals and are not necessarily from mischief or belligerent intent.*

Deutsch (1973) explains that when the goals of the two parties are incompatible, conflict will arise. Like officers, citizens engaged in PCEs are goal-driven. When citizen goals are compati-

ble with officer goals, conflict is less likely to occur. However, when citizen goals are incompatible with officer goals, citizens may experience frustration and take corrective actions to overcome the strain inherent with goal frustration or blockage. However, unlike officers, citizens do not always have the same legal powers to resist or overcome officer goals. For instance, an officer has lawful authority to use force to overcome a citizen attempting to escape an arrest, whereas the citizen does not have lawful authority to use force to resist or evade the arrest (see Alpert & Dunham, 2004, pp.179-182). Citizens' corrective actions in other cases may be lawful and legitimate. Citizens may *negotiate* when an officer conveys a course of action. For instance, an officer may decide that it not in the public interest to intercede in a neighbourly dispute; one citizen may expect the officer to take specific action against the other citizen. The complaining citizen may experience a *strain* and take corrective actions to negotiate with an officer or make a complaint to the police agency of the officer's conduct. Such actions are legitimate.

*Proposition 6. Not all physical or verbal control behaviours are corrective actions.*

PCT provides a framework for classifying some control behaviours as corrective actions. In this model, corrective actions have a function: they are used to overcome procedural conflict. Thus, not all control behaviours are corrective actions; but some *non-corrective* control behaviour can be functional. Control behaviours that do not have any corrective utility (i.e. not used in response to goal frustration or blockage) may still be functional. For instance, the custodial actions of handcuffing, physical escort, and pat-down searches have a clear function.

A control behaviour is non-functional when it is unnecessary or is not a proportional response to the citizen's behaviour. For instance, the use of verbal control behaviour with a person who is not causing procedural conflict is unnecessary; the behaviour is non-functional and thus arbitrary. Arbitrary behaviour may be classified as excessive control behaviour and may also constitute as 'excessive force'. Geller and Toch outline that definitions of excessive force may include "*any* force when *none* is needed" (1996, p.292). Indeed, within the framework of PCT, the definition of *excessive control behaviour*—including undesirable or unlawful behaviour—may include officer use of physical control and verbal control when there is no procedural conflict to overcome.

*Proposition 7. The use of controlling behaviour—both in necessity and proportionality—can vary among different officers, teams, stations, and agencies.*

Because procedural conflict manifests as a strain for an officer, the perceptions of the severity of the strain, and the necessity and proportionality of corrective actions, are subjective. Subjectivity explains why corrective actions may vary from different officers, workgroups, and among other policing agencies. Waddington *et al.* (2009) found that officers from different jurisdictions perceived risks at a different level of severity; perceptions were shaped by social factors prevalent in the occupational environment where officers worked. Euwema *et al.* (2004) found that officers who were suffering from burnout were less dominant during encounters, which the authors proposed positively correlated with an increased effectiveness in conflict resolution. However, Muir's work towards defining a 'good' police officer is instructive: "morally, he has to resolve the contradiction of achieving just ends with coercive means" (1977, pp.1-2). In other words, to be just, the use of coercion/control must be necessary and proportionate.

*Proposition 8. Procedural conflict can be prevented, reduced, resolved without the use of control behaviour if citizens cease to frustrate or block officer goals that lead to the conflict.*

The literature is consistent with support of the transactional nature of police-citizen interaction during police-citizen encounters. Sykes and Brent's social behaviourist approach to general systems theory (1983) and social interactionist theory (Tedeschi & Felson 1994), both advanced through AMT, discuss how the behaviour of one party present at an encounter influences the behaviour of another. Procedural Justice Theory (PJT) approach suggests that citizen cooperation with police can be enhanced if citizens believe that they are treated in a procedurally fair manner as this improves police legitimacy over time (Mazerolle *et al.* 2012; Augustyn & Ray 2016). Implicit in this framework is the expectation for procedural justice to occur, the outcome of an encounter (and enhancement of police legitimacy) relies on the behaviour of the officer to be procedurally fair and just. Thus, success in a PJT framework is achieved through *officer-responsible* actions. This view is somewhat problematic as fairness is subjective determination: the citizen is the arbiter of the fairness, evaluator of the quality of the police decision-making and the quality of their treatment (Augustyn & Ray 2016).

An impaired citizen will lack the cognitive capacity to respond positively to officer non-control behaviour. Citizens who are cognitively impaired—either through illness or intoxication—may not be able to understand or empathise with officer questions or non-coercive

requests. In these circumstances, citizen disobedience originates from a failure of cognitive ability. Rossler and Terrill's (2016) recent analysis of interactions with PMI (persons with mental illness) discovered that officers used higher levels of force during police-citizen encounters (although they were not at an enhanced risk of injury) than those who were not mentally ill. Indeed, Rossler and Terrill suggest that disparity in the incidence of force between PMI and non-mentally ill relates to the inability of the former group to 'correctly' interpret officer cues and behaviour.

Within the framework of PCT, an officer uses control behaviour as a *corrective action* to overcome resistance or to clear a goal blockage that has originated from covert or overt conflict. *Corrective actions* include verbal control statements and physical control actions. The present research indicates that corrective actions are *unnecessary* if an officer's progress through the diagnostic and treatment encounter phases is unimpeded. Thus, corrective actions may be unnecessary if citizen behaviour does not frustrate or block officer encounter-goals. In other words, citizens may avoid being the recipient of corrective actions if their behaviour does not constitute a goal blockage or goal frustration. In this manner, PCT takes an opposite view to PJT: success (the lack of conflict) is achieved through *citizen-responsible* actions. As procedural conflict occurs when citizen actions frustrate or block officer-goals during encounters, a citizen's behaviour can be deterministic of the outcome.

*Proposition 9. Procedural conflict arising from incivilities or personal abuse from the citizen will be tolerated depending on the extent of professionalism of the officer.*

Officers differentiate between their negative emotions arising from incivilities or personal abuse from citizens before or during an encounter from their negative emotions associated with strains from procedural blockages. Tolerance of incivilities and personal abuse will vary among officers and is dependent on their sense of professionalism. Analysis of the behaviour of officers during the present study has revealed differences in how officers respond to these interpersonal conflicts of procedure and incivility. During the present research, officers tolerated incivilities or personal abuse directed towards them—they did not actively respond to such behaviour. It is plausible that officers displayed a greater degree of tolerance to incivilities because they were being observed: they may have believed that tolerance was the *correct* and *expected* response to such behaviour. However, the non-tolerance and active response to procedural conflict to resolve or to overcome *procedural blockages* suggest that the use of non-

controlling verbal communication, controlling verbal communication or controlling physical behaviour was perceived to be legitimate and utilious.

## 9.2 Conclusion

The purpose of this essay was to discuss procedural conflict as a formal theory. PCT provides an alternative social-psychological framework to understand the behaviour of officers during police-citizen encounters. While previous theoretical frameworks have focused on deference (Sykes & Clark 1975), system theory (Sykes & Brent 1980), or authority (Alpert & Dunham 2004), PCT focuses on procedure, strain and goal blockages (Agnew 1992) which may cause a procedural conflict. An advantage of PCT is that it provides a framework to understand police behaviour outside of the usual frames of the use of force (i.e. was the force used reasonable or excessive), professionalism (i.e. was the behaviour polite or rude and were their actions utilious) and fairness (i.e. where the officer's actions fair). PCT provides a framework for understanding the utility and merit of the totality of officer control behaviour (both verbal and physical).

This analytical approach provides a framework to consider covert internalised conflict experienced by officers and overt interpersonal conflict. It also factors in the transactional impact of citizen behaviour. A transactional behaviour approach provides an opportunity to consider how corrective actions may be reduced, limited, or prevented through the modification of citizen behaviour. Recent tensions of excessive police use of force have focused on the proportionality and necessity of officer responses to citizen behaviour. However, as the PCT framework considers how citizen behaviour can be a trigger of procedural conflict, further discussion is warranted to understand how this can be mitigated.

This framework was conceived after observational research of police officers in two highly-democratic liberal societies which experience high levels of public trust and confidence in the police and high levels of police legitimacy. Further research in less stable and more aggressive environments would provide opportunities to test the theory and propositions and provide a deeper exploration of factors that might influence police officer behaviour, especially the interaction of officer perceptions of risk and fear, and how this affects the use of corrective actions.





# End Matter

## Appendix

Table A4.1  
Sample ethnicities

	Census Population				Sample				'Self-Initiated' sample			
	NZ		SA		NZ		SA		NZ		SA	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
White / European		83.2		83.8		80.9		73.7	27	96.4	102	73.9
Māori		7.0		0.1		14.8		0	1	3.6	0	0
Asian / Indian		4.9		8.1		2.7		3.4	0	0	4	2.9
Pacific Peoples		1.9		0.1		1.6		0	0	0	0	0
Middle Eastern / Latin		1.0		1.1		0		0.1	0	0	11	8.0
Aboriginal		0		0.1		0		8.5	0	0	21	0
Other		2.1		6.8		0		0	0	0	0	0

## CHAPTER 5

Table A5.1  
Event-types of all O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> encounters

	Dispatched				Beginning				End			
	NZ		SA		NZ		SA		NZ		SA	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Arrest warrant							1	0.9			3	2.7
Attempted suicide	6	7.2	1	0.9	6	7.2	1	0.9	5	6.0	1	0.9
Breach bail	1	1.2			1	1.2	5	4.5	2	2.4	8	7.1
Burglary	1	1.2			1	1.2			1	1.2		
Court orders	1	1.2			2	2.4			2	2.4		
Disorder	5	6.0	11	9.8	6	7.2	31	27.7	4	4.8	26	23.2
Domestic dispute	1	1.2	1	0.9	1	1.2	3	2.7	2	2.4	3	2.7
Domestic violence	12	14.5			12	14.5			10	12		
Drugs (cannabis)							2	1.8			3	2.7
Drugs (not cannabis)							5	4.5			3	2.7
Drugs (search)							1	2.7			1	2.7
Enquiries					7	8.4			7	8.4		
Escort duty					1	1.2	1	0.9	1	1.2	1	0.9
Firearms offence	1	1.2										
Intimidation	1	1.2	1	0.9	1	1.2	2	1.8	1	1.2	1	0.9
Intoxicated person	3	3.6	1	0.9	3	3.6	3	2.7	3	3.6	4	3.6
Liquor offences			1	0.9			11	9.8	1	1.2	12	10.7
Lost property					1	0.9					1	0.9
Mental health	1	1.2			1	1.2			1	1.2	1	0.9
Minor assault	4	4.8	3	2.7	7	8.4	4	3.6	10	12	1	0.9
Missing person	3	3.6	1	0.9	2	2.4	2	1.8	1	1.2	1	0.9
Obstruction							2	1.8	2	2.4	2	1.8
Offensive weapon							1	0.9			2	1.8
Preventative task	2	2.4			6	7.2			6	7.2		
Property damage	2	2.4	2	1.8	3	3.6	2	1.8	3	3.6	1	0.9
Public relations	4	4.8			4	4.8			4	4.8		
Silent emergency call	2	2.4			1	1.2						
Serious assault	1	1.2	1	0.9	1	1.2	1	0.9	1	1.2	1	0.9
Sexual affronts	2	2.4			2	2.4			1	1.2		
Suspicious behaviour	1	1.2	1	0.9	1	1.2	7	6.3			5	4.5
Theft	3	3.6	3	2.7	4	4.8	2	1.8	3	3.6	3	2.7
Traffic incident	1	1.2			3	3.6	14	12.5	4	4.8	14	12.5
Trespass	3	3.6			3	3.6	2	1.8	3	3.6	2	1.8
Youth incident	1	1.2			2	2.4			2	2.4		
Vagrancy			2	1.8			5	4.5			5	4.5
Vehicle collision	2	2.4			2	2.4			2	2.4		
Weapons search (random)							3	2.7				
Not dispatched	19	22.9	83	74.1								
Nil offence									1	1.2	7	7.3

Table A5.2  
Event-types of all O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>2</sub> encounters

	Dispatched				Beginning				End			
	NZ		SA		NZ		SA		NZ		SA	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Arrest warrant					1	2.1			1	2.1		
Attempted suicide	1	2.1			1	2.1			1	2.1		
Breach bail	1	2.1			2	4.3	1	4.5	2	4.3	1	4.5
Burglary	1	2.1			1	2.1			1	2.1		
Civil dispute	2	4.3			3	6.4			3	6.4		
Court orders					1	2.1			1	2.1		
Disorder	4	8.5			3	6.4	3	13.6	1	2.1	3	13.6
Domestic dispute	3	6.4			1	2.1			1	2.1		
Domestic violence	7	14.9			8	17.0			8	17.0		
Drugs (cannabis)							1	4.5			1	4.5
Drugs (not cannabis)							1	4.5				
Drugs (search)							1	4.5			1	4.5
Enquiries					3	6.4	1	4.5	3	6.4	1	4.5
Escort duty					1	2.1			1	2.1		
Firearms offence					1	2.1			1	2.1		
Intimidation	3	6.4			3	6.4	1	4.5	3	6.4	1	4.5
Intoxicated person					1	2.1						
Liquor offences							2	9.1			2	9.1
Mental health									1	2.1	1	4.5
Minor assault	5	10.6			5	10.6	1	4.5	7	14.9	1	4.5
Missing person	1	2.1			1	2.1			1	2.1		
Obstruction					1	2.1	2	9.1	1	2.1	1	4.5
Offensive weapon	1	2.1			1	2.1			1	2.1		
Property damage	1	2.1			1	2.1			1	2.1		
Silent emergency call	2	4.3										
Sexual affronts	1	2.1			1	2.1	1	4.5	1	2.1	1	4.5
Suspicious behaviour	2	4.3			2	4.3	2	9.1			2	9.1
Theft	3	6.4	2	9.0	3	6.4	3	13.6	1	6.4	3	13.6
Traffic incident					1	2.1	1	4.5	1	2.1	1	4.5
Trespass									1	2.1		
Youth incident	2	4.3			1	2.1			1	2.1		
Vagrancy							1	4.5			1	4.5
Not dispatched	7	14.9	20	90.9								
Nil offence									1	2.1	1	4.5

Table A5.3  
Event-types of O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> victim-encounters

	Dispatched				Beginning				End			
	NZ		SA		NZ		SA		NZ		SA	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Attempted suicide	2	3.7			2	7.4			2	7.4		
Disorder	1	3.7			1	3.7			1	3.7		
Domestic incident			1	33.3			1	33.3			1	33.3
Domestic violence	3	11.1			3	11.1			4	14.8		
Enquiries					5	18.5			4	14.8		
Firearms offence	1	3.7										
Intimidation	1	3.7			1	3.7			1	3.7		
Intoxicated person	2	3.7			2	7.4	1	33.3	2	7.4	1	33.3
Lost property							1	33.3			1	33.3
Mental health									1	3.7		
Minor assault	1	3.7			2	7.4			2	7.4		
Missing person	2	3.7			1	3.7						
Preventative task	2	7.4			3	11.1			3	11.1		
Property damage					1	3.7			1	3.7		
Public relations	3	11.1			2	7.4			2	7.4		
Silent emergency call	1	3.7										
Suspicious behaviour	1	3.7			1	3.7						
Theft	1	3.7			1	3.7			1	3.7		
Traffic incident									1	3.7		
Youth incident	1	3.7			2	7.4			2	7.4		
Not dispatched	5	18.5	2	66.7								

Table A5.4  
Analysis of behaviours during O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> encounters victim-encounters

Analysis	Duration of behaviours for participants expressed as a percentage of overall behaviour				Average frequency of behaviour occurrence per PCE			
Research site	NZ (n=27)		SA (n=3)		NZ (n=27)		SA (n=3)	
Mean dur. (sd)	16:14 (26:54)		12:40 (17:44)					
Participants	O <sub>2</sub>	C <sub>1</sub>	O <sub>2</sub>	C <sub>1</sub>	O <sub>2</sub>	C <sub>1</sub>	O <sub>2</sub>	C <sub>1</sub>
Behaviours ↓	(67%)	(33%)	(67%)	(33%)				
Information Exc.	35.89	28.46	47.10	31.62	8.56	4.89	7.33	4.00
Verbal affirmation	1.86	-	0.75	-	1.74	-	3.67	-
Verbal control	4.20	-	2.89	-	2.44	-	1.67	-
Verbal refutation	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-
Physical control	0.20	-	0.00	-	0.11	-	0.00	-
Refuse verbal control	-	0.29	-	0.63	-	0.37	-	0.00
Refuse phys. control	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00
Verbal abuse	-	0.00	-	0.00	-	0.15	-	0.00
Inactive	14.68	3.32	10.52	0.84	2.52	0.41	3.33	0.00
Absent	9.39	0.03	5.05	0.00	0.78	0.00	1.67	0.00

Table A5.5  
Event-types of O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> suspect-encounters

	Dispatched				Beginning				End			
	NZ		SA		NZ		SA		NZ		SA	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Arrest warrant											1	2.4
Attempted suicide	3	23.1	1	2.4	3	23.1	1	2.4	1	7.7	1	2.4
Breach bail							2	4.9			2	4.9
Court order					1	7.7			1	7.7		
Disorder	1	7.7	5	12.2	1	7.7	14	34.1	1	7.7	9	22.0
Domestic incident							1	2.4	1	7.7	1	2.4
Domestic violence	1	7.7			1	7.7			1	7.7		
Drugs (cannabis)							1	2.4			2	4.9
Drugs (not cannabis)							3	7.3			1	2.4
Drugs (search)											1	2.4
Intimidation							1	2.4				
Intoxicated person	1	7.7			1	7.7	1	2.4	1	7.7	3	7.3
Liquor offences							1	2.4			1	2.4
Mental health											1	2.4
Minor assault	1	7.7	1	2.4	2	15.4			2	15.4		
Obstruction											1	2.4
Preventative task					2	15.4			2	15.4		
Property damage			1	2.4			2	4.9			1	2.4
Public relations					1	7.7			1	7.7		
Serious assault			1	2.4			1	2.4			1	2.4
Suspicious behaviour			1	2.4			6	14.6			5	12.2
Theft			1	2.4			1	2.4			1	2.4
Traffic incident	1	7.7			1	7.7						
Trespass							1	2.4			1	2.4
Youth incident									1	7.7		
Vagrancy			1	2.4			1	2.4			1	2.4
Weapons search (random)							3	7.3				
<i>Not dispatched</i>	5	38.5	29	70.7								
<i>Nil offence</i>									1	7.7	7	17.1

Table A5.6  
Analysis of behaviours during O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> suspect-encounters

Analysis	Duration of behaviours for participants expressed as a percentage of overall behaviour				Average frequency of behaviour occurrence per PCE			
	NZ (n=13)		SA (n=41)		NZ (n=13)		SA (n=41)	
Mean dur. (sd)	13:55 (9:56)		8:29 (10:33)					
Participants	O <sub>2</sub>	C <sub>1</sub>	O <sub>2</sub>	C <sub>1</sub>	O <sub>2</sub>	C <sub>1</sub>	O <sub>2</sub>	C <sub>1</sub>
Behaviours ↓	(67%)	(33%)	(67%)	(33%)				
Information Exc.	33.48	28.59	26.75	25.66	7.15	4.62	6.10	5.34
Verbal affirmation	3.45	-	2.05		2.23	-	0.90	
Verbal control	1.33	-	7.63		1.31	-	2.68	
Verbal refutation	0.00	-	0.14		0.00	-	0.07	
Physical control	0.12	-	2.33		0.15	-	0.51	
Refuse verbal control	-	0.26		2.33	-	0.31	-	0.61
Refuse phys. control	-	0.00		0.00	-	0.00	-	0.00
Verbal abuse	-	0.06		1.38	-	0.08	-	0.54
Inactive	16.60	2.50	14.18	3.20	2.46	0.54	2.37	0.68
Absent	11.13	0.00	12.02	0.14	1.00	0.00	0.59	2.00

Table A5.7  
Event-types of O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> field-arrest-encounters

	Dispatched				Beginning				End			
	NZ		SA		NZ		SA		NZ		SA	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Arrest warrant							1	4.8			2	9.5
Attempted suicide	1	3.8			1	3.8			2	7.7		
Breach bail	1	3.8			1	3.8	3	14.3	2	7.7	6	28.6
Burglary	1	3.8			1	3.8			1	3.8		
Disorder	1	3.8	3	14.3	1	3.8	4	19.0			3	14.3
Domestic violence	4	15.4			4	15.4			1	3.8		
Drugs (cannabis)							1	4.8			1	4.8
Drugs (not cannabis)							1	4.8			1	4.8
Enquiries					1	3.8			1	3.8		
Escort duty					1	3.8	1	4.8	1	3.8	1	4.8
Intimidation							1	4.8			1	4.8
Intoxicated person			1	4.8			1	4.8				
Liquor offences			1	4.8			3	14.3	1	3.8	2	9.5
Mental health	1	3.8			1	3.8						
Minor assault	2	7.7			3	11.5	1	4.8	6	23.1	1	4.8
Missing person	1	3.8	1	4.8	1	3.8	1	4.8	1	3.8		
Obstruction							1	4.8	1	3.8		
Offensive weapon							1	4.8			2	9.5
Preventative task					1	3.8			1	3.8		
Property damage	1	3.8	1	4.8	1	3.8			1	3.8		
Serious assault	1	3.8			1	3.8			1	3.8		
Sexual affronts	2	7.7			2	7.7			1	3.8		
Theft	2	7.7			3	11.5			2	7.7		
Traffic incident					1	3.8			1	3.8		
Trespass	2	7.7			2	7.7			2	7.7		
Youth incident	1	3.8										
Vagrancy			1	4.8			1	4.8			1	4.8
Not dispatched	5	19.2	13	61.9								

Table A5.8  
Analysis of behaviours during O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> field-arrest-encounters

Analysis	Duration of behaviours for participants expressed as a percentage of overall behaviour				Average frequency of behaviour occurrence per PCE			
	NZ (n=26)		SA (n=21)		NZ (n=26)		SA (n=21)	
Mean dur. (sd)	23:12 (11:02)		12:57 (9:54)					
Participants	O <sub>2</sub>	C <sub>1</sub>	O <sub>2</sub>	C <sub>1</sub>	O <sub>2</sub>	C <sub>1</sub>	O <sub>2</sub>	C <sub>1</sub>
Behaviours ↓	(67%)	(33%)	(67%)	(33%)				
Information Exc.	25.14	25.23	22.34	23.62	10.54	10.31	10.52	9.86
Verbal affirmation	1.10	-	2.68	-	1.23	-	2.19	-
Verbal control	4.05	-	14.16	-	3.63	-	7.59	-
Verbal refutation	0.15	-	0.13	-	0.27	-	0.10	-
Physical control	2.40	-	7.45	-	1.38	-	3.62	-
Refuse verbal control	-	0.77	-	1.89	-	0.69	-	2.14
Refuse phys. control	-	0.30	-	0.76	-	0.19	-	0.38
Verbal abuse	-	0.69	-	1.90	-	0.81	-	1.48
Inactive	17.71	5.83	12.39	4.60	4.85	2.04	4.05	1.10
Absent	15.35	0.09	6.31	0.00	1.65	0.04	0.95	0.00

Table A5.9  
Event-types of O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> field-action-encounters

	Dispatched				Beginning				End			
	NZ		SA		NZ		SA		NZ		SA	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Court orders	1	16.7			1	16.7			1	16.7		
Disorder			1	3.7			7	25.9			8	29.6
Domestic violence	1	16.7			1	16.7			1	16.7		
Drugs (not cannabis)							1	3.7			1	3.7
Liquor offences							6	22.2			7	25.9
Minor assault			1	3.7			2	7.4				
Public relations	1	16.7			1	16.7			1	16.7		
Traffic incident	1	16.7			3	50	11	40.7	3	50	11	40.7
Not dispatched	2	33.3	25	92.6								

Table A5.10  
Analysis of behaviours during O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> field-action-encounters

Analysis	Duration of behaviours for participants expressed as a percentage of overall behaviour				Average frequency of behaviour occurrence per PCE			
	NZ (n=6)		SA (n=27)		NZ (n=6)		SA (n=27)	
Mean dur. (sd)	6:08 (4:01)		10:57 (7:29)					
Participants	O <sub>2</sub>	C <sub>1</sub>	O <sub>2</sub>	C <sub>1</sub>	O <sub>2</sub>	C <sub>1</sub>	O <sub>2</sub>	C <sub>1</sub>
Behaviours ↓	(67%)	(33%)	(67%)	(33%)				
Information Exc.	34.56	26.09	33.34	28.51	8.50	6.17	7.04	5.82
Verbal affirmation	0.39	-	2.25	-	0.33	-	1.11	-
Verbal control	1.28	-	8.71	-	1.50	-	3.29	-
Verbal refutation	0.06	-	0.19	-	0.17	-	0.14	-
Physical control	0.00	-	0.97	-	0.00	-	0.21	-
Refuse verbal control	-	0.00	-	0.53	-	0.00	-	0.46
Refuse phys. control	-	0.00	-	0.03	-	0.00	-	0.04
Verbal abuse	-	0.00	-	0.69	-	0.00	-	0.46
Inactive	13.66	1.09	10.62	2.11	2.17	0.50	1.39	0.25
Absent	15.66	3.64	6.07	0.25	1.67	0.83	0.43	1.00

Table A5.11  
Event-types of O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> field-warning-encounters

	Dispatched				Beginning				End			
	NZ		SA		NZ		SA		NZ		SA	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Disorder	1	20	2	11.1	2	40	3	33.3	2	40	6	33.3
Domestic dispute	1	20			1	20	1	5.6	1	20	1	5.6
Intimidation			1	5.6								
Liquor offences							1	5.6			2	11.1
Minor assault			1	5.6			1	5.6				
Property damage	1	20			1	20			1	20		
Suspicious behaviour							1	5.6				
Theft			1	5.6			1	5.6			2	11.1
Traffic incident							3	16.7			3	16.7
Trespass	1	20			1	20	1	5.6	1	20	1	5.6
Vagrancy							3	16.7			3	16.7
Not dispatched	1	20	13	72.2								

Table A5.12  
Analysis of behaviours during O<sub>2</sub>C<sub>1</sub> field-warning-encounters

Analysis →	Duration of behaviours for participants expressed as a percentage of overall behaviour				Average frequency of behaviour occurrence per PCE			
Research site →	NZ (n=5)		SA (n=18)		NZ (n=5)		SA (n=18)	
	13:45 (11:27)		6:24 (4:14)					
Participants →	2 Off.	C <sub>1</sub>	2 Off.	C <sub>1</sub>	2 Off.	C <sub>1</sub>	2 Off.	C <sub>1</sub>
Behaviours ↓	(67%)	(33%)	(67%)	(33%)				
Information Exc.	26.33	28.92	24.16	26.24	9.2	6.20	7.00	7.18
Verbal affirmation	2.84	-	4.10	-	1.00	-	1.88	-
Verbal control	4.17	-	17.10	-	3.20	-	7.00	-
Verbal refutation	0.26	-	0.49	-	0.40	-	0.24	-
Physical control	0.00	-	0.98	-	0.00	-	0.47	-
Refuse verbal control	-	1.52	-	3.94	-	1.00	-	1.76
Refuse phys. control	-	0.56	-	0.00	-	0.20	-	0.00
Verbal abuse	-	0.42	-	1.12	-	1.00	-	0.76
Inactive	12.54	1.66	8.21	1.59	3.6	0.80	1.76	0.53
Absent	19.02	0	9.01	0	2.4	0	0.59	0



## DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

*ESF-EF: Encounter Form*

Cambridge Institute of Criminology: Conflict Resolution Study   Encounter Form			ESF-EF1
<b>Ride Along Code</b>	<b>Encounter Code</b>		
<b>Type of encounter</b>	1 Full encounter 2 Brief encounter 3 No citizens or not applicable	<b>Encounter start time (24 hour)</b>	
		<b>Encounter end time (24 hour)</b>	
<b>General location</b>		<b>Type of location</b>	1 Public - Outdoors 2 Public - Indoors 3 Private - Outdoors 4 Private - Indoors 5 Mass private - outdoors 6 Mass private - indoors 7 Other: _____
<b>Any previous knowledge about the location?</b>	0 No 1 Yes - from briefing 2 Yes - Another officer 3 Yes - Direct experience 4 Yes - Basis unclear	<b>Info</b>	
<b>Information source that led to this encounter</b>	1 Own initiative 2 Dispatch 3 Supervisor or briefing 4 Request by another officer 5 Citizen - On scene 6 Other: _____	<b>Type of second location (if applicable)</b>	1 Public - Outdoors 2 Public - Indoors 3 Private - Outdoors 4 Private - Indoors 5 Mass private - outdoors 6 Mass private - indoors 7 Other: _____
<b>Type of problem</b>	(Enter 900 Code)	<b>Second type of problem</b>	0 No 1 Yes: _____
A. Dispatch	_____	<b>Part of a larger problem</b>	0 No 1 Yes: _____
B. Beginning of encounter	_____		
C. End of encounter	_____		

Cambridge Institute of Criminology: Conflict Resolution Study   Encounter Form			ESF-EF2
<b>Encounter part of longterm plan to deal with the problem?</b>	0 No 1 Yes - specific location or people 2 Yes - General problem 3 Other: _____	<b>Actions to prevent repeat occurrence?</b>	0 No 1 Yes: _____
<b>No. of bystanders/participants</b>	_____	<b>Did the police seek info from another source?</b>	0 No 1 Yes: _____
<b>% of encounter observer</b>	_____	<b>Agency code</b>	_____
		<b>Enter citizen number</b>	_____
		<b>(or type of citizen)</b>	_____
<b>Observer perform any police tasks?</b>	0 No 1 Yes - offered information, advice or an opinion 2 Yes - performed some physical aspect of police work 3 Yes - had more than a casual conversation with citizen(s) 4 Yes - two or more the above		
<b>Type of action taken:</b> (Indicate all that apply)	1 Charge(s) laid 2 Taken into custody 3 Use some degree of force 4 Notify supervisor 5 More than one unit 6 Counsel, advise citizen 7 Provide personal assistance 8 Unfounded call 9 Other: _____	<b>Occurrence number assigned?</b>	0 No 1 Yes
<b>Dispatch &amp; encounter info:</b>	_____		

## ESF-CIF: Citizen Information Form

Cambridge Institute of Criminology: Conflict Resolution Study   Citizen Information Form				ESF-CF1
<b>Ride Along Code</b>	<b>Citizen Code</b>	<b>Encounter Code</b>	<b>Citizen Role Code</b>	
<b>Citizen Sex</b>	1 Male 2 Female	<b>Date of Birth</b>	___ / ___ / ___	
<b>Officer's prior knowledge</b>	0 No knowledge at all; citizen is a stranger 1 Recognizes the citizen or knows reputation; not detailed 2 Knows by name and a little knowledge; not detailed 3 Knows citizen but unclear how well 4 Knows citizen well (personal background, offences) 5 Unknown degree of knowledge	<b>Age Range</b>	1 Preschool (up to 5 years) 2 Child (6-11 years old) 3 12 years old 4 13 years old 5 14 years old 6 15 years old 7 16 years old 8 17 years old 9 Young adult (18-20 years) 10 Twenties (21-29 years) 11 Adult (30-44 years) 12 Middle-aged (45-59 years) 13 Senior (60 years and older) 14 Unknown	
<b>Under the influence</b>	0 No indication of alcohol/drug use; not applicable (no contact) 1 Indication of use but no visible effects on behaviour 2 Slight behavioural indications (slight impairment) 3 Strong behavioural indications (significant impairment) 4 Unconscious; severe impairment (limited communication)	<b>Signs of mental illness?</b> Type (if known)	0 No 1 Yes	<b>Signs of Injury</b>
		0 No 1 Yes - Minor 2 Yes - Serious		
<b>Self-harm</b>	0 No 1 Yes - Reasonable suspicion 2 Yes - Evidence of harm 3 Other: _____	<b>Weapon Present?</b>	0 No 1 Yes	
		<b>1X</b>	0 No 1 Yes	

Cambridge Institute of Criminology: Conflict Resolution Study   Citizen Information Form				ESF-CF2
<b>Citizen summons police</b>	0 No 1 Yes	<b>Citizen requests a charge or arrest</b>	0 No 1 Yes:	
<b>Citizen requests info on how to deal with a problem</b>	0 No 1 Yes	<b>Citizen requests that another person leave the area</b>	0 No 1 Yes	
<b>Officer provides advice or information</b>	0 No 1 Yes	<b>Agency contacted by police</b>	0 No 1 Yes	
<b>Intel Check (NIA) for criminal convictions / traffic violations?</b>	0 No 1 Yes	<b>Offences under investigation</b>	_____ _____ _____	
<b>Confession/admission provided (or victim forthcoming)</b>	0 No 1 Yes - Partial 2 Yes - Complete 3 Not applicable	<b>Prior record</b>	_____ _____ _____	
<b>Disrespect shown towards the officer at any point</b>	0 No 1 Yes	<b>Accused by other citizens</b> Citizen #	0 No / not applicable 1 Yes - description 2 Yes - name and description	
<b>Search conducted (all that apply)</b>	0 No; N/A 1 Not chargeable 2 Person 3 Area immediately around person 4 Citizen's personal possessions 5 Citizen's vehicle 6 Citizen's home 7 Search conducted after an arrest	<b>Citizen restrained</b>	0 No 1 Yes - Cage 2 Yes - Handcuffs 3 Both	
		<b>Formal complaint</b>	0 No 1 This citizen's request 2 Officer request 3 Other citizen	

## Cambridge Institute of Criminology: Conflict Resolution Study | Citizen Information Form

ESF-CF3

<b>Request to leave a person alone or to leave the premises</b>	0 No 1 Citizen request 2 Officer request 3 Both	<b>Request for a person to cease a behaviour</b>	0 No 1 Citizen: this or another 2 Officer: this citizen 3 Officer: other citizen
<b>Request to control (or cease) a behaviour of a person or animal</b>	0 No 1 Citizen request 2 Officer request 3 Both	<b>Officer request to provide info on a person of interest or suspect</b>	0 No 1 Yes - conversational 2 Yes - persuasion 3 Yes - command
<b>Citizen should contact the police again in repeated</b>	0 No 1 Yes	<b>Any conflict with another citizen? (Enter citizen number)</b>	_____
<b>Extent of conflict between citizens</b>	0 No conflictual behaviour 1 Calm verbal disagreement 2 Agitated verbal disagreement 3 Threat of harm 4 Assaulted another citizen 5 Assaulted by a citizen 6 Other _____ 7 Not applicable (e.g. Traffic)	<b>Relationship between parties</b>	1 Strangers 2 Casual acquaintances 3 Neighbours 4 Co-habitate: roommates 5 Co-workers: institutional 6 Friends 7 Boyfriend/girlfriend 8 Relatives 9 Marital/Common-law 10 Not applicable
<b>Emotional state at the start of the encounter (All that apply)</b>	1 Not elevated (calm) 2 Fear 3 Anger 4 Anxiety 5 Unstable; unpredictable 6 Emotionally distressed (sad, crying, remorse) 7 Happy, relieved 8 Belligerent; uncooperative 9 Other	<b>Emotional state at the end of the encounter (All that apply)</b>	1 Not elevated (calm) 2 Fear 3 Anger 4 Anxiety 5 Unstable; unpredictable 6 Emotionally distressed (sad, crying, remorse) 7 Happy, relieved 8 Belligerent; uncooperative 9 Other

## Cambridge Institute of Criminology: Conflict Resolution Study | Citizen Information Form

ESF-CF4

<b>Taken into custody</b>	0 No 1 Yes 2 Not appropriate 3 Not chargeable	<b>Charges laid or ION Issued</b>	1st  2nd  3rd 4th
<b>Action taken with youth</b>	0 No further action 1 Verbal warning 2 Written caution 3 Referral to a community programme 4 Referral to Youth Justice 5 Other means 6 ION issued 7 Charge(s) laid 8 Not chargeable	<b>Action taken with adult</b>	0 No further action 1 Verbal warning 2 ION 3 Charge laid 4 Not chargeable 5 Pre-charge warning
		<b>Sufficient evidence to issue ION etc?</b>	0 No 1 Yes
		<b>Sufficient evidence to lay a criminal charge?</b>	0 No 1 Yes

Citizen and event description

*ESE-SIF: Shift Information Form*

Cambridge Institute of Criminology: Conflict Resolution Study   Shift Information Form			ESF-SIF1
Ride Along Code		Date of shift Shift type Shift Start time (24 hour) Shift End time (24 hour)	
Officer 1 Rank	1 Constable 2 Detective 3 Sergeant 4 Other:	Length of time on patrol in this station (months) Total time on patrol (months)	_____ _____
Sex	1 Male 2 Female	Previous assignments	_____ _____ _____
Years of service (months)	_____		_____
Officer 2 Rank	1 Constable 2 Detective 3 Sergeant 4 Other:	Length of time on patrol in this station (months) Total time on patrol (months)	_____ _____
Sex	1 Male 2 Female	Previous assignments	_____ _____ _____
Years of service (months)	_____		_____
Weather conditions	1 Clear 2 Overcast 3 Light precipitation 4 Heavy precipitation 5 Snow 6 Windy 7 Other:	Temperature	_____

## Officer Participant Information Sheet (NZ variant)



# Understanding How Routinely Unarmed Police Resolve Interpersonal Conflict

— Ross Hendy, PhD Candidate

## Participant Information Sheet – NZ Police Officer

**Before you decide to take part in this study it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. The researcher can be contacted if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.**

### *Research title*

To understand how routinely unarmed first response police resolve interpersonal conflict during police-citizen encounters.

### *Purpose of the study*

The purpose of the study is to gain an understanding of how routinely unarmed police resolve interpersonal conflict during police-citizen encounters. Data about police-citizen encounters will be collected in three ways: by observing encounters as they take place, interviewing officers once the encounters have ended, and measuring the personalities of officers involved in the encounters. The study will take place in two research sites, one in New Zealand and the other in Australia. This is to allow for a comparison between routinely unarmed officers and routinely armed officers. Data collection will occur during 2015 and the findings of the study will be submitted in a research thesis in 2016.

### *Why have I been chosen?*

You have been selected to participate in the research through a non-random nomination process. The researcher has provided the Police Response Shift Manager with a list of available dates which would be suitable for the research to occur. As your workgroup is rostered to work on one of these dates, your supervisor has nominated you as someone who may be willing in taking part of the study.

*Do I have to take part?*

No, participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You may refuse or withdraw your involvement at any time. This will incur no penalty or loss, now or in the future.

*What will happen to me if I take part?*

If you give your consent to participate in the study then your supervisor will assign you, and a second officer who has agreed to participate in the research, to a double-crewed patrol unit. The researcher will accompany you and your colleague during your rostered shift.

Before the shift commences you will be asked to complete two online surveys. This should take between 15 and 30 minutes. You will be assigned a unique key code so that your responses and behaviours are recorded anonymously. Your name will not be recorded on the online surveys. Only the researcher will know your key code.

- The first survey asks you to answer a series of questions designed to describe your personality. For instance, you will be asked whether you agree or disagree (using a scale of 1 to 5) to questions like, “Do you agree that you are someone who likes to spend time with others?”
- The second survey has been designed especially for police officers to measure your exposure to physical resistance during your police service. For example, it asks you to rate the type of resistance you might have experienced when dealing with different types of police incidents.

During the shift, the researcher will accompany you wherever you go. When you engage with a member of the public then the researcher will make a series of notes about the incident. The researcher will also annotate (using a hand-held device) the behaviours used by you and the member of the public. The behaviours will be annotated such as “Information Give”, “Support”, “Threat”, or “Physical”. (Refer to the appendix for the complete list of behavioural categories to be used).

At the end of the shift, the researcher may ask for you to complete a 30-minute interview. The purpose of the interview will be to gain a better understanding of your approaches to conflict resolution and to debrief any conflict-prone encounter you may have had during the shift. A list of possible questions is included in the appendix). This interview will be recorded using a digital audio recorder so that a transcription can be made.

The researcher may also make notes of any relevant informal or casual conversations that occur during the shift.

*What do I have to do?*

If you agree to participate, you may need to come into work about 30 minutes earlier than normal to prepare for the research.

*Are there possible disadvantages and/or risks in taking part?*

You may feel a little strange being observed. This is to be expected. Most people feel uncomfortable when they are being observed.

*What are the possible benefits of taking part?*

You may find it informative discussing your conflict resolution techniques with others.

*Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential?*

The data collected about you (such as the personality survey and resistance survey) will be confidential. It will be stored securely and anonymously. No one other than the researcher will have access to this information. Your supervisor will not have access to the information.

- Your name will not be associated with the electronic record or data. Similarly, when the researcher makes annotations of your behavioural tactics the research your name will not be recorded with the data; neither will your name be used during the audio-recording. These data sources will be stored electronically in password-protected directories. Only the researcher will have access to your name and key code.
- Your supervisor and work colleagues will be aware of your involvement in the study. However they will not have access to the confidential data.
- The members of the public whom you interact with will become aware of your involvement in the research. At the end of an encounter the researcher will speak briefly the person and seek their approval for their data (which is limited to their behaviours during the encounter) to be included in the study. The researcher will not disclose your identity to the member of the public.
- New Zealand Police will not have access to individualized data.

It is important to note that the researcher is bound by the NZ Police Code of Conduct and is therefore obliged to report breaches of the Code.

*What will happen to the results of the research project?*

The research data collected during your shift will be added to an aggregated data set (anonymously) and analysed during the analysis phase of this study. If you have agreed to be interviewed then a transcription of the interview will be made. You will have the opportunity to read the transcript, and make changes or corrections, before it is used for data analysis.

At the completion of the study, the data analysis and research findings will be submitted as a thesis to the University of Cambridge for assessment. The thesis will be deposited in the libraries of the University and the Institute of Criminology. A copy of the thesis will also be submitted to the New Zealand Police and the Australian Police force studied during the research.

Data collected during the course of the project might be used for additional or subsequent research. Once the thesis is submitted the researcher may wish to publish selected parts of the results in academic journals. Any published versions of the data will present aggregated or group data. Should quotations sourced from your interviews be used they will be attributed as “Interviewee X”.

*Who is organising and funding the research?*

The research is being organized and managed by Ross Hendy as a part of doctoral research at the Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge, UK. Dr. Justice Tankebe, University Lecturer in Criminology, is supervising the research. Various bodies have provided funding to support the research: Dawes Trust (UK), Cambridge Institute of Criminology (UK), New Zealand Police (NZ), Smuts Memorial Fund (UK), and Wakefield Trust (UK).

*Ethical review of the study*

The project has received ethical approval from the Institute of Criminology Research Ethics Committee, University of Cambridge.

Contact for further information

Researcher and Principal Investigator:

Ross Hendy, reh81@cam.ac.uk

+44 7557 333 483

[www.ConflictResolution.info](http://www.ConflictResolution.info)



**Encounter Behavioural tactics Coding Schema  
following Braithwaite's taxonomy (Braithwaite, 1998, p.121)**

<i>Dimension</i>	Officer Tactics	Citizen Tactics
<i>Information exchange</i>	Information seek Information give	Information seek Informational give Refuse Self defence
<i>Legitimacy</i>	Support Accept Reject	
<i>Power</i>	Control	Refuse
<i>Anti-social strategies</i>	Threat	Verbal abuse
<i>Coercion</i>	Physical	Physical abuse

### Interview Questions

1. What kinds of incidents give you the most satisfaction as a police officer? What is it about these incidents that makes them satisfying?
2. When you are on patrol, either on foot or in a vehicle, what type of event would cause you to stop and intervene?
3. Do you see any differences in the way you attempt to resolve conflict compared to the way other officers you work with?
4. How did you learn to resolve conflict when dealing with members of the public?
5. Describe an encounter where you witnessed effective conflict resolution tactics being used. (This can be either your own encounter or an encounter you have observed).
6. Describe an encounter where you witnessed ineffective conflict resolution tactics used. (This can be either your own encounter or an encounter you have observed).
7. From time to time, police officers run into situations where someone is a bully. What do you think is the best way to deal with a bully?
8. When thinking about when you attempt to resolve conflict, please provide an example when you think it would be appropriate to use communication tactics (such as talking) and when it would be appropriate to use coercive tactics (such as physical force)?

*Citizen Participant Information Sheet (NZ variant)*



## Understanding How Routinely Unarmed Police Resolve Interpersonal Conflict

— Ross Hendy, PhD Candidate

### Participant Information Sheet – NZ Citizen

**Your encounter with the police has been observed by a researcher who is conducting research on how the police interact with members of the public. It is a normal requirement for research involving human subjects for informed consent to be granted prior to the collection of research data. However for practical and safety reasons the researcher was unable to obtain permission prior to the start of your encounter. This form provides information about the research project in order to explain the reasons for the research and seeks your approval for your behavioural data to be included.**

#### *Research title*

To understand how routinely unarmed first response police resolve interpersonal conflict during police-citizen encounters.

#### *Purpose of the study*

The purpose of the study is to gain an understanding of how routinely unarmed police resolve interpersonal conflict during police-citizen encounters. Data about police-citizen encounters will be collected in three ways: by observing encounters as they take place, interviewing officers once the encounters have ended, and measuring the personalities of officers involved in the encounters. The study will take place in two research sites, one in New Zealand and the other in Australia. This is to allow for a comparison between routinely unarmed officers and routinely armed officers. Data collection will occur during 2015 and the findings of the study will be submitted in a research thesis in 2016.

*Why have I been chosen?*

Your selection to participate in the research project is random; your involvement has arisen from your interaction with the officers being researched. The officers whom you have engaged with have agreed to be part of the research project.

*Do I have to take part?*

Although your behaviour has already been observed, you may refuse for these behaviours to be added to the research data set. This will incur no penalty or loss, now or in the future.

*What will happen to me if I take part?*

Nothing. The researcher has used a hand-held device to record the behaviours used by you and the officer. The behaviours have been annotated such as “Information Give”, “Support”, “Threat”, or “Physical”. (Refer to the appendix for the complete list of behavioural categories to be used). Video footage has not been recorded.

*What do I have to do?*

No further involvement is required. If you agree to participate in the research then you will be asked to provide explicit consent. This can be given in writing or verbally.

*Are there possible disadvantages and/or risks in taking part?*

You may feel a little strange being observed. This is to be expected. Most people feel uncomfortable when they are being observed.

*What are the possible benefits of taking part?*

The most beneficial advantage of taking part is that the encounter you have had with the police will be used to help us understand how conflict is resolved. There is very little research about this topic and most research originates from the United States.

*Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential?*

Yes. The data collected about you will be confidential. It will be stored securely and anonymously. No one other than the researcher will have access to this information.

- Your name will not be associated with the electronic record or data. In fact you don't even have to give your name to the researcher. You will be assigned a unique key code so that your behaviours are recorded anonymously. The code will be similar to 'Citizen NZ123'. New Zealand Police will not have access to your individualized behavioural data collected during the encounter.
- If you have given your name to the police officer and the police officer has undertaken a police computer check (or the officer knows you from previous encounters) then the researcher may gain access to relevant information from your police record. Relevant details from your police

record include whether you have been convicted of any criminal offence in New Zealand.

- You can choose for the researcher not to add this information in the research data set. If you do consent, then the number and type of criminal convictions will be added to the data set. This information will be stored anonymously. For instance, it will be recorded as 'Citizen NZ123 has one conviction for dangerous driving'.

*What will happen to the results of the research project?*

The research data collected during your encounter will be added to an aggregated data set (anonymously) and analysed during the analysis phase of this study. At the completion of the study, the data analysis and research findings will be submitted as a thesis to the University of Cambridge for assessment. The thesis will be deposited in the libraries of the University and the Institute of Criminology. A copy of the thesis will also be submitted to the New Zealand Police and the Australian Police force studied during the research. Data collected during the course of the project might be used for additional or subsequent research. Once the thesis is submitted the researcher may wish to publish selected parts of the results in academic journals. Any published versions of the data will present aggregated or group data.

Individualised data, such as the types and sequences of your behaviour, will be deleted within 12 months of the submission of the thesis. This will also include any consent forms you have signed with your name. The anonymous aggregated research data will be held in an electronic data file indefinitely. The aggregated data will not hold any personal details that could lead to your identification.

*Who is organising and funding the research?*

The research is being organized and managed by Ross Hendy as a part of doctoral research at the Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge, UK. The research is being supervised by the Institute of Criminology. Various bodies have provided funding to support the research: Dawes Trust (UK), Cambridge Institute of Criminology (UK), New Zealand Police (NZ), Smuts Memorial Fund (UK), and Wakefield Trust (UK).

*Ethical review of the study*

The project has received ethical approval from the Institute of Criminology Research Ethics Committee, University of Cambridge.

**Contact for further information**

Researcher and Principal Investigator:

Ross Hendy, reh81@cam.ac.uk

+44 7557 333 483

[www.ConflictResolution.info](http://www.ConflictResolution.info)

Encounter Behavioural tactics Coding Schema  
following Braithwaite’s taxonomy (Braithwaite, 1998, p.121)

Dimension	Officer Tactics	Citizen Tactics
Information exchange	Information seek Information give	Information seek Informational give Refuse Self defence
Legitimacy	Support Accept Reject	
Power	Control	Refuse
Anti-social strategies	Threat	Verbal abuse
Coercion	Physical	Physical abuse

---

# References

---

## BOOKS AND JOURNALS

- Abrahamsen, S. and Strype, J. (2009) Are they all the same? Norwegian police officers' personality characteristics and tactics of conflict resolution. *Policing and Society*, 20(1), pp.99–123.
- Adler, P.A. and Adler, P. (1987) *Membership roles in field research*, Newbury Park: SAGE Publications.
- Agnew, R. (1992) Foundation for a General Strain Theory of Crime and Delinquency. *Criminology*, 30(1), pp.47–88.
- Agnew, R. (2006) *Pressured into Crime*, Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing.
- Akurangi, D.E. and Evans, I.M. (2006) Mitigating distress in New Zealand police officers exposed to children's accounts of traumatic experiences: Emotion-solving versus problem-solving. *Australian Journal of Psychology*, 58(S), pp.108–109.
- Alpert, G.P. and Dunham, R.G. (2004) *Understanding police use of force: officers, suspects, and reciprocity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Alpert, G.P. and MacDonald, J.M. (2001). Police use of force: an analysis of organizational characteristics. *Justice Quarterly*, 18(2), pp.393–409.
- Augustyn, M.B. and Ray, J.V. (2016) Psychopathy and perceptions of procedural justice. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 46, pp.170–183.
- Baker, D. and Hyde, M. (2011) Police have customers too. *Police Practice and Research*, 12(2), pp.148–162.
- Banton, M. (1964) *The policeman in the community*. London: Tavistock Publications.
- Bayley, D.H. (1990) *Patterns of policing*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Bayley, D.H. (1999) Policing: the world stage. In *Policing across the world*. London: UCL Press, pp.3–12.
- Bayley, D.H. (1986) The tactical choices of police patrol officers. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 14(4), pp.329–348.
- Bayley, D.H. and Garofalo, J. (1989) The management of violence by police patrol officers. *Criminology*, 27(1), pp.1–26.

- Bazley, M.C. (2007) *Report of the commission of inquiry into police conduct*. Wellington: Commission of Inquiry into Police Conduct.
- Belich, J. (1996) *Making peoples*, Auckland: Penguin Books.
- Belur, J. (2010) *Permission to shoot?* New York: Springer.
- Bittner, E. (1974) Florence Nightingale in pursuit of Willie Sutton: A theory of the police. In: T. Newburn (ed.). *Policing Key Readings*. Devon: Willan Publishing.
- Bittner, E.: (1991) The functions of the police in modern society. In: Klockars C.B. and Mastrofski S.D. (eds.). *Thinking about Police: Contemporary readings*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., New York: McGraw-Hill
- Black, D.J. (2010) *The behavior of law*. Special ed., Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing.
- Bloomberg, L.D. and Volpe, M. (2015) *Completing your qualitative dissertation*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
- Bottoms, A.E. (2006) Incivilities, offence and social order in residential communities. In: A. von Hirsch and A.P. Simester (eds.). *Incivilities: regulating offensive behaviour*. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
- Bottoms, A.E. and Tankebe, J. (2013) Beyond procedural justice: A dialogic approach to legitimacy in criminal justice. *Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology*, 102(1), pp.1–53.
- Bowling, B. and Weber, L. (2011) Stop and search in global context: an overview. *Policing and Society*, 21(4), pp.480–488.
- Bradford, B. and Loader, I., 2016. Police, Crime and Order: The Case of Stop and Search. In B. Bradford, B. Jauregui, I. Loader, and J. Steinberg (eds.). *The Sage Handbook of Global Policing*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
- Braithwaite, H. (1998) *Behavioural tactics for the successful resolution of conflict*. PhD, Flinders University of South Australia.
- Braithwaite, H. and Brewer, N. (1998) Differences in the conflict resolution tactics of male and female police patrol officers. *International Journal of Police Science Management*, 1(3), pp.276–287.
- Bratton, W. (1998) Crime is down: blame the police. In: N. Dennis, (ed.). *Zero tolerance: policing a free society*. London: IEA.
- Broad, B. and Fletcher, C. (1993) *Practitioner Social Work Research in Action*. London: Whiting & Birch.
- Brough, P. (2005) A comparative investigation of the predictors of work-related psychological well-being within police, fire and ambulance workers. *New Zealand Journal of Psychology*, 34(2), pp.127–134.



- Brown, J. (1996) Police research: some critical issues. In: Leishman, F., Loveday, B. and Savage, S.P. (eds.). *Core issues in policing*. London: Longman, pp. 177–190.
- Brown, M.K. (1981) *Working the Street*, New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Buehler, C., Anthony, C., Krishnakumar, A., Stone, G. and Pemberton, S. (1997). Interparental Conflict and youth problem behaviors: a meta analysis. *Journal of Child and Family Studies*, 6(2), pp.223–247.
- Buehler, C., Krishnakumar, A., Stone, G., Anthony, C., Pemberton, S., Gerard, J. and Barber, B.K. (1998) Interparental conflict styles and youth problem behaviors: a two-sample replication study. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 60(1), pp.119–132.
- Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. (2017) *Local government area crime trends tool*. [online] bocsar.nsw.gov.au. Available at: <http://bocd.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/bocd/cmd/crimetrends/Init> [Accessed March 28, 2017].
- Buttle, J. (2010) *The case against arming the police*. Rethinking Crime and Punishment (RECAP) Newsletter, 82.
- Bynum, T.S., Cordner, G.W. and Greene, J.R. (1982) Victim and offense characteristics: impact on police investigative decision-making. *Criminology*, 20(3-4), pp.301–318.
- Cain, M.E. (1973) *Society and the Policeman's Role*. London: Routledge.
- Carpenter, S.D. (2009) *Te wiremu, te puhipi, he wakaputanga me te tiriti, Henry Williams, James Busby, a declaration and the treaty*. Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal.
- Chan, J.B.L. (1997) *Changing Police Culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cherney, A. and Murphy, K. (2013) Policing terrorism with procedural justice: The role of police legitimacy and law legitimacy. *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 46(3), pp.403–421.
- Clarke, R.V. (2012) Opportunity makes the thief. Really? And so what? *Crime Science*, 1(3).
- Clifford, B.R. and George, R. (1996) A Field evaluation of training in three methods of witness/victim investigative interviewing. *Psychology, Crime & Law*, 2(3), pp.231–248.
- Clyne, R. (1987) *Colonial blue: a history of the South Australian police force, 1836-1916*. Netley: Wakefield Press.
- Cockcroft, T. (2013) *Police cultures*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Cohen, L.E. and Felson, M. (1979) Social change and crime rate trends: a routine activity approach. *American Sociological Review*, 44(4), pp.588–608.
- Collins, R. (2004) *Interaction ritual chain*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Corbin Dwyer, S. and Buckle, J.L. (2009) The space between: on being an insider-outside in qualitative Research. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 8(1), pp.54–63.

- Corbin, J. & Strauss, A. (2014) *Basics of qualitative research*. 4<sup>th</sup> ed., Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
- van Craen, M. & Skogan, W.G. (2014) Trust in the Belgian police: the importance of responsiveness. *European Journal of Criminology*, 12(2), pp.129–150.
- Creswell, J.W. (2014) *Research Design*. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE.
- Creswell, J.W. and Plano Clark, V.L. (2011) *Designing and conducting mixed methods research*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
- Cross, J. and Newbold, G. (2010) Presumptive arrest in partner assault: use of discretion and problems of compliance in the New Zealand police. *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 43(1), pp.51–75.
- Curry, L.A., Nembhard, I.M. and Bradley, E.H. (2009) Qualitative and mixed methods provide unique contributions to outcomes research. *Circulation*, 119(10), pp.1442–1452.
- Dai, M., Frank, J. and Sun, I. (2011) Procedural justice during police-citizen encounters: The effects of process-based policing on citizen compliance and demeanor. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 39(2), pp.159–168.
- Dai, M. and Nation, D. (2009) Understanding non-coercive, procedurally fair behavior by the police during encounters. *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice*, 37(4), pp.170–181.
- de Lint, W. (2014) Police authority in liberal-consent democracies: a case for anti-authoritarian cops. In: R.J. Kane and M.D. Reisig (eds.). *The Oxford handbook of police and policing*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Deutsch, M. (1973) *The Resolution of Conflict*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Engel, R.S. (2003) Explaining suspects' resistance and disrespect toward police. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 31, pp.475–492.
- Engvik, H. and Føllesdal, H. (2005) The Big Five Inventory på norsk. *Tidsskrift for norsk psykologforening*, 42, pp.128–129.
- Epp, C.R.A., Maynard-Moody, S.A. and Haider-Markel, D.P.A. (2014) *Pulled over*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Ericson, R.V. and Haggerty, K.D. (1997) *Policing the risk society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Euwema, M.C., Kop, N. and Bakker, A.B. (2004) The behaviour of police officers in conflict situations: how burnout and reduced dominance contribute to better outcomes. *Work & Stress*, 18(1), pp.23–38.
- Fairburn, M. (1990) Wakefield, Edward Gibbon. *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography*. [online] TeAro.govt.nz. Available at: <http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/biographies/1w4/wakefield-edward-gibbon> [Accessed March 4, 2017].

- Finnane, M. (1994). *Police and government: histories of policing in Australia*. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
- Felson, R.B. and Tedeschi, J.T. (1993) A social interactionist approach to violence: cross-cultural applications. *Violence and Victims*, 8(3), pp.295–310.
- Fletcher, C. (1993) An analysis of practitioner research. In: B. Broad and C. Fletcher (eds.). *Practitioner social work research in action*. London: Whiting & Birch, pp.5–14.
- Geen, R.G. and O’Neal, E.C. (1969) Activation of cue-elicited aggression by general arousal. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 11(3), p.289–292.
- Geller, W.A. and Toch, H. (1996) Understanding and controlling police abuse of force. In: W.A. Geller and H. Toch (eds.). *Police Violence*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, pp. 292–328.
- Glaser, B.G. and Strauss, A.L. (1999) *The discovery of grounded theory* (6<sup>th</sup> ed.). New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Goddard, R. and Jaeger, S., (2005) Policing in New Zealand: A response to Winfree and Taylor’s “Rural, small town, and metropolitan police in New Zealand”. *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, 28(4), pp.654–661.
- Goffman, E. (1961). *Encounters*. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company.
- Greene, J.C., Caracelli, V.J. and Graham, W.F. (1989) Toward a conceptual framework for mixed-method evaluation designs. *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis*, 11(3), pp.255–274.
- Grieco, F., Loijens, L., Krips, O., Zimmerman, P., and Spink, A. (2015) *The Observer XT Version 12.5* (12<sup>th</sup> ed.), Wageningen: Noldus Information Technology
- Hammersley, M. (1992) *What’s wrong with ethnography?* London: Routledge.
- Harvey, S.A., Olórtégui, M.P., Leontsini, E. and Winch, P.J. (2008) “They’ll change what they’re doing if they know that you’re watching”: measuring reactivity in health behavior because of an observer’s presence—a case from the Peruvian Amazon. *Field Methods*, 21(1), pp.3–25.
- Hawkins, G. and Ward, P. (1970) Armed and disarmed police: police firearms policy and levels of violence. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 7(2), pp.188–197.
- Hendy, R.E. (2012) *The strategic impact of routine arming the New Zealand Police*. MSS Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington.
- Hendy, R.E. (2014) Routinely armed and unarmed police: what can the Scandinavian experience teach us? *Policing*, 8(2), pp.183–192.
- Herbert, S.K. (2006) Tangled up in blue: conflicting paths to police legitimacy. *Theoretical Criminology*, 10(4), pp.481–504.

- Heslop, R. (2012) A sociological imagination: Simon Holdaway, police research pioneer. *Police Practice and Research*, 13(6), pp.525–538.
- Heyl, B.S. (2007) Ethnographic interviewing. In: P Atkinson, *et al.* (eds.). *Handbook of ethnography*. London: SAGE Publications, pp.369–383.
- Hickman, M.J., Atherley, L.T., Lowery, P.G., and Alpert, G.P. (2015) Reliability of the force factor method in police use-of-force research. *Police Quarterly*, 18(4), pp.368–396.
- Hill, R.S. (1986) *Policing the colonial frontier*. Wellington: Historical Publications Branch, Department of Internal Affairs.
- Hill, R.S. (1995) *The iron hand in the velvet glove*. Palmerston North: Dunmore Press.
- Hill, R.S. (2012a) Police – Policing a stable society, 1880s to 1960s. *Te Ara – the Encyclopaedia of New Zealand* [online]. Available at: <<http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/police/page-3>> [Accessed 2 March 2017].
- Hill, R.S. (2012b) Police – The earliest police forces. *Te Ara – the Encyclopaedia of New Zealand* [online] Available at: <<http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/police/page-1>> [Accessed 2 March 2017].
- Hochstedler, E. (1981) Testing types: a review and test of police types. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 9(6), pp.145–166.
- Holdaway, S. (1983) *Inside the British Police*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Home Office (2016) *Police workforce, England and Wales: 31 March 2015: data tables*. [online] Gov.uk. [Accessed March 2, 2017].
- Hough, M., Jackson, J., Bradford, B., Myhill, A. and Quinton, P. (2010) Procedural justice, trust, and institutional legitimacy. *Policing*, 4(3), pp.203–210.
- Howard, C., Tuffin, K. and Stephens, C. (2000) Unspeakable emotion – A discursive analysis of police talk about reactions to trauma. *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*, 19(3), pp.295–314.
- Høigård, C. (2011) Policing the north. In: M.H. Tonry and T. Lappi-Seppälä, (eds.). *Crime and Justice in Scandinavia*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- van Hulst, M. (2013) Storytelling at the Police Station: The Canteen Culture Revisited. *British Journal of Criminology*, 53(4), pp.624–642.
- Independent Police Complaints Commission (2015) *The fatal police shooting of Mr Mark Duggan on 4 August 2011*. London: Independent Police Complaints Commission.
- Ingram, J.R., Paoline, E.A. and Terrill, W. (2013) A multilevel framework for understanding police culture: the role of the workgroup. *Criminology*, 51(2), pp.365–397.
- Jick, T.D. (1979) Mixing qualitative and quantitative methods: triangulation in action. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 24(4), pp.602–611

- John, O.P., Donahue, E.M. and Kentle, R.L. (1991) *The big five inventory—versions 4a and 54*, Berkeley: University of California.
- John, O.P., Naumann, L.P. and Soto, C.J. (2008) Paradigm shift to the integrative Big Five trait taxonomy: History, measurement, and conceptual issues. In: *Handbook of personality: Theory and research*. New York: Guilford Press
- Kääriäinen, J.T. (2008) Why do the Finns trust the police? *Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention*, 9(2), pp.141–159.
- Kaminski, R.J., DiGiovanni, C. and Downs, R. (2004) The use of force between the police and persons with impaired judgment. *Police Quarterly*, 7(3), pp.311–338.
- Kane, R.J. & Reisig, M.D. (2014) *The Oxford handbook of police and policing*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Keane, J. & Bell, P. (2013) Confidence in the police: Balancing public image with community safety – A comparative review of the literature. *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice*, 41(3), pp.233–246.
- King, M. (2004) *The Penguin History of New Zealand*. Auckland: Viking.
- Kleinig, J., Wright, M. and Waddington, P.A.J. (2013) *Professional police practice: scenarios and dilemmas*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Klockars, C.B. (1996) A theory of excessive force and its control. In: W. A. Geller & H. Toch (eds.). *Police Violence*. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp.1–22.
- Knutsson, J. & Norée, A. (2010) Police use of firearms in the Nordic countries: a comparison. In: J.B. Kuhns and J Knutsson (eds.). *Police use of force: a global perspective*. Santa Barbara: Praeger, pp.115–123.
- Kraska, P.B. (2001) *Militarizing the American criminal justice system: the changing roles of the Armed Forces and the police*. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
- Krefting, L. (1991) Rigor in qualitative research: the assessment of trustworthiness. *American Journal of Occupational Therapy*, 45(3), pp.1–9.
- Lambert, E.G., Hogan, N.L. and Griffin, M.L. (2007) The impact of distributive and procedural justice on correctional staff job stress, job satisfaction, and organizational commitment. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 35(6), pp.644–656.
- Lanza-Kaduce, L. and Greenleaf, R.G. (1994) Police-citizen encounters: Turk on norm resistance. *Justice Quarterly*, 11(4), pp.605–623.
- Lanza-Kaduce, L. and Greenleaf, R.G. (2000) Age and race deference reversals: extending Turk on police-citizen conflict. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 37(2), pp.221–236.

- Lartey, J. (2015) By the numbers: US police kill more in days than other countries do in years. *The Guardian*. [online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/09/the-counted-police-killing> [Accessed 18 May 2017].
- Link, B.G., Monahan, J., Stueve, A., and Cullen, F.T. (1999) Real in their consequences: A sociological approach to understanding the association between psychotic symptoms and violence. *American Sociological Review*, 64, 316–332.
- Link, N.W., Cullen, F.T., Agnew R., and Link, B. (2016) Can general strain theory help us understand violent behaviors among people with mental illnesses? *Justice Quarterly*, pp.1–26.
- Lipsky, M. (1980) *Street-level Bureaucracy*, New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Lobb, B. and Packman, T. (2005) Exploring the relationship between personality and job performance in the New Zealand police. *Australian Journal of Psychology*, 57(S), pp.136–137.
- Locke, K. (2008) *Policing Bill - Third Reading*, Wellington: Hansard.
- Loftus, B. (2009) *Police Culture in a Changing World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Loftus, E.F. and Palmer, J.C (1996) Eyewitness testimony. In: P. Banyard & A. Grayson (eds.). *Introducing psychological research: sixty studies that shape psychology*. London: Macmillan Education UK, pp.305–309.
- Lynch, J.E. and Tuckey, M. (2008) The police turnover problem: fact or fiction? *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, 31(1), pp.6–18.
- van Maanen, J., 1973. *Working the street; a developmental view of police behavior*. Cambridge: MIT
- Manning, P.K. (1977) *Police work: the social organization of policing*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Manning, P.K. (2011) *Democratic Policing in a Changing World*. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
- Manning, P.K. (2014) Ethnographies and Policing. In: R. J. Kane & M. D. Reisig (eds.). *The Oxford handbook of police and policing*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Marks, M. (2003) Policing ethnography. *Society in Transition*, 34(1), pp.38–69.
- Maruna, S. (2010) Mixed method research in criminology: why not go both ways? In: A. R. Piquero and D. Weisburd (eds.). *Handbook of quantitative criminology*. New York: Springer.
- Mastrofski, S.D. (2004) Controlling street-level police discretion. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 593(1), pp.100–118.
- Mastrofski, S.D., Parks, R.B., Worden, R.E. and Reiss, A.J. (2002) *Project on policing neighborhoods in Indianapolis, Indiana, and St. Petersburg, Florida, Parts 1–4 (Patrol Observational Data)*. Washington: National Institute of Justice.

- Mastrofski, S.D., Reisig, M.D. and McCluskey, J.D. (2002) Police disrespect toward the public: An encounter-based analysis. *Criminology*, 40(3), pp.519–552.
- Mastrofski, S.D., Tal, J., Moyal, S., and Willis, J.J. (2015) Predicting procedural justice in police-citizen encounters. *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, 43(1), pp.119–139.
- Mawby, R. (2011) Models of policing. In: T Newburn (ed.). *Handbook of policing*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Mazerolle, L., Bennett, S., Antrobus, E. and Eggins, E. (2012) Procedural justice, routine encounters and citizen perceptions of police: main findings from the Queensland Community Engagement Trial (QCET). *Journal of Experimental Criminology*, 8(4), pp.343–367.
- McLean, I., Oughton, D., Ellis, S., Wakelin, B. and Rubin, C.B. (2012). *Review of the civil defence emergency management response to the 22 February Christchurch earthquake*. Whakatane: Ian McLean Consultancy Services.
- McTackett, L.J. & Thomas, S.D.M., 2016. Police perceptions of irrational unstable behaviours and use of force. *Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology*, 32(2), pp.163–171.
- Metropolitan Police (2015) *Statement of accounts 2014/15*. London: Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis.
- Moran, M. and Waddington, D. (2016) Back to the Future: Race and Riots in Ferguson, Missouri. In: M. Moran & D. Waddington (eds.). *Riots: An International Comparison*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp.141–170.
- Morse, J.M. (1991) Approaches to qualitative-quantitative methodological triangulation. *Nursing Research*, 40(2), pp.120–123.
- Muir, W.K. (1977) *Police: streetcorner politicians*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mulvihill, D.J., Tumin, M.M. and Curtis, L.A. (1969) *Crimes of violence: a staff report submitted to the National Commission on the Causes & Prevention of Violence*. Washington: US Government Printing Office.
- Murphy, K. and Cherney, A. (2011) Understanding cooperation with police in a diverse society. *British Journal of Criminology*, 52(1), pp.181–201.
- Myhrer, T.-G. and Strype, J. (2010) Police use of guns in a routinely unarmed police force: regulations and practise in Norway. In: J. B. Kuhns & J. Knutsson (eds.). *Police use of force : a global perspective*. Santa Barbara: Praeger, pp. 95–104.
- Nettelbeck, A. and Smandych, R. (2010) Policing indigenous peoples on two colonial frontiers: Australia's mounted police and Canada's north-west mounted police. *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 43(2), pp.356–375.

New South Wales Police Force (2015) *NSW Police Force Annual Report 2014–15*. Parramatta: NSW Police Force.

New Zealand Foreign Exchange Services Limited (2017) *Historical exchange rates*. [online] *Nzforex.co.nz*. Available at: <http://www.nzforex.co.nz/forex-tools/historical-rate-tools/historical-exchange-rates> [Accessed 28 March 2017].

New Zealand Police (2005) *Policing with confidence, the New Zealand way: strategic plan 2010*, Wellington: New Zealand Police.

New Zealand Police (2015a) *Annual report 2014/2015*, Wellington: New Zealand Police.

New Zealand Police (2015b) *NZ Police annual tactical options research report #3: 1 January to 31 December 2014*. Wellington: New Zealand Police. [online] Available at: <http://www.police.govt.nz/sites/default/files/publications/annual-tactical-options-research-report-3.pdf>.

New Zealand Police (2015c) *TASER/Tactical Options Reporting (TOR) data from 22 March 2010 to 31 December 2014*. Wellington: New Zealand Police. [online] *police.govt.nz*. Available at: <http://www.police.govt.nz/sites/default/files/publications/summary-taser-tor-data-mar2010-dec2014.pdf>.

New Zealand Police (2016a) *Annual Report 2015/2016*. Wellington: New Zealand Police. [online] *police.govt.nz* [Accessed 27 March 2017].

New Zealand Police (2016b) *Use of force*. Wellington: New Zealand Police.

New Zealand Police (2017a) *Current ISG deployments*. Wellington: New Zealand Police. [online] *police.govt.nz* [Accessed 27 March 2017].

New Zealand Police (2017b) *Past ISG deployments*. Wellington: New Zealand Police. [online] *police.govt.nz*. Available at: <http://www.police.govt.nz/about-us/programmes-initiatives/isg/past-deployments> [Accessed 27 March 2017].

New Zealand Police Association (2014) Taking the heat in Brisbane. *Police News*, 47(11).

Newburn, T., Diski, R., Cooper, K., Deacon, R., Burch, A. and Grant, M. (2016) “The biggest gang?” Police and people in the 2011 England riots. [online] *Policing and Society*. Available at: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/10439463.2016.1165220> [Accessed 11 October 2017]

Noldus, L.P.J.J. (1991) The Observer: A software system for collection and analysis of observational data. *Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers*, 23(3), pp.415–429.

Norris, C. (1993) Some ethical considerations on field-work with the police. In: D. Hobbs and T. May, (eds.). *Interpreting the Field*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.



- Norris, M., Birkbeck, C. and Gabaldón, L.G. (2006) Social geometry and force: a partial test of Black's theory of law with Mexican, U.S., and Venezuelan police. *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, 22(4), pp.324–346.
- O'Brien, G.M. (1960) *The Australian Police Forces*, Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
- O'Brien, A.J., McKenna, B.G., Thom, K., Diesfeld, K. and Simpson, A.I.F. (2011) Use of tasers on people with mental illness A New Zealand database study. *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry*, 34(1), pp.39–43.
- O'Brien-Olinger, S. (2016) *Police, Race and Culture in the "new Ireland"*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- O'Dwyer, L.M. and Bernauer, J.A. (2013) *Quantitative research for the qualitative researcher*. New York: SAGE Publications.
- Office of National Statistics (2017) Crime in England and Wales: Police Force area data tables. [online] *ons.gov.uk* Available at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/policeforceareadatatables> [Accessed 27 March 2017].
- Office of Police Integrity (2007) *Past Patterns – Future Directions: Victoria Police and the problem of corruption and serious misconduct*. Melbourne: Office of Police Integrity.
- O'Halloran, T.S. (1904) From Adelaide along the River Murray to the Rufus and Lake Victoria. From the Journal kept by T. O'Halloran, Commissioner of Police. In: *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia, South Australian Branch. Session 1903–1904*. Adelaide: Royal Geographical Society of Australasia, South Australian Branch.
- Ostrom, E., Parks, R.B. and Whitaker, G. (2006) *Police services study, phase II, 1977: Rochester, St. Louis, and St. Petersburg*. Ann Arbor: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research
- Peterswald, W.J. (1883) *South Australian Police Manual*. [Unknown publisher].
- Prenzler, T. (1997) Is there a police culture? *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 56(4), pp.47–56.
- Punch, M. (1979) *Policing the inner city: a study of Amsterdam's Warmoesstraat*. London: The Macmillan Press.
- Punch, M. (2011) *Shoot to kill: police accountability, firearms and fatal force*. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Qualtrics Labs, Inc. (2014) *The world's leading research & insights platform | Qualtrics*. [online] Available at: <https://www.qualtrics.com/>.
- Quinton, P. (2011) The formation of suspicions: police stop and search practices in England and Wales. *Policing and Society*, 21(4), pp.357–368.
- Reed, J. and Procter, S. (1995) Practitioner research in context. In: J. Reed & S. Procter, (eds.). *Practitioner Research in Health Care*. London: Chapman and Hall, pp. 3–31.

- Reiner, R. (2010) *The politics of the police*. 4<sup>th</sup> ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Reisig, M.D., Bratton, J. and Gertz, M.G. (2007) The construct validity and refinement of process-based policing measures. *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, 34(8), pp.1005–1028.
- Reisig, M.D. and Kane, R.J. (2014) *The Oxford handbook of police and policing*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Reisig, M.D., McKluskey, J.D., Mastrofski, S.D., and Terrill, W. (2004) Suspect disrespect toward the police. *Justice Quarterly*, 21(2), pp.241–268.
- Reiss, A.J. (1971a) Systematic observation of natural social phenomena. *Sociological Methodology*, 3, pp.3–33.
- Reiss, A.J. (1971b) *The police and the public*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Reiss, A.J. & Black D.J. (1967) *Studies in crime and law enforcement in major metropolitan areas.*, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Robb, M., Close, B., Furyk, J., & Aitken, P. (2009) Review article: Emergency department implications of the TASER. *Emergency Medicine Australasia*, 21(4), pp.250–258.
- Roberts, K. & Herrington, V. (2013) Organisational and procedural justice: a review of the literature and its implications for policing. *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 8(2), pp.115–130.
- Rossler, M.T. & Terrill, W. (2017) Mental illness, police use of force, and citizen injury. *Police Quarterly*, 20(2), pp.189–212.
- Rowe, M. (2009) Notes on a scandal: the official enquiry into deviance and corruption in New Zealand police. *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 42(1), pp.123–138.
- Rubinstein, J. (1973) *City Police*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Sampson, R.J. & Bartusch, D.J. (1998) Legal Cynicism and (Subcultural?) Tolerance of Deviance: The Neighborhood Context of Racial Differences. *Law & Society Review*, 32(4), pp.777–804.
- Sarantakos, S. (2012) *Social Research*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sarre, R. (1996a) *Firearms carriage by police in Australia*. Adelaide: University of South Australia.
- Sarre, R. (1996b) The state of community based policing in Australia: some emerging themes. In: D. Chappell and P. R. Wilson (eds.). *Australian policing: contemporary issues*. Sydney: Butterworths, pp.26–41.
- Schulenberg, J.L. (2012) Systematic social observation of police decision-making: the process, logistics, and challenges in a Canadian context. *Quality & Quantity*, 48(1), pp.297–315.

- Sherman, L.W. (1993) Defiance, deterrence, and irrelevance: a theory of the criminal sanction. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 30(4), pp.445–473.
- Skogan, W.G. (2006) Asymmetry in the Impact of Encounters with Police. *Policing and Society*, 16(2), pp.99–126.
- Skolnick, J.H. (2011) *Justice Without Trial* 4<sup>th</sup> ed., New Orleans: Quid Pro Books.
- Slee, M. (1998) *Service arms of the South Australian police*. Adelaide: Antique and Historical Arms Association of South Australia.
- Snipes, J.B. & Mastrofski, S.D. (1990) An empirical test of Muir's typology of police officers. *American Journal of Criminal Justice*, 14(2), pp.268–296.
- Sollund, R. (2005) Obstacles and possibilities in police research. *Outlines – Critical Practice Studies*, 7(2), pp.43–64.
- Sousa, W., Ready, J. and Ault, M. (2010) The impact of TASERs on police use-of-force decisions: Findings from a randomized field-training experiment. *Journal of Experimental Criminology*, 6(1), pp.35–55.
- South Australian Police Department (1972) *South Australian Police Department: Outline of the history and function*. Adelaide: South Australian Police Department.
- South Australian Police Department (2015). *Annual Report 2014-2015*, Adelaide: South Australia Police.
- Spano, R. (2005) Potential sources of observer bias in police observational data. *Social Science Research*, 34(3), pp.591–617.
- Spano, R. (2006) Observer Behavior as a Potential Source of Reactivity: Describing and Quantifying Observer Effects in a Large-Scale Observational Study of Police. *Sociological Methods & Research*, 34(4), pp.521–553.
- Spano, R. (2007). How does reactivity affect police behavior? Describing and quantifying the impact of reactivity as behavioral change in a large-scale observational study of police. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 35(4), pp.453–465.
- Stephens, C. and Long, N. (1997). The impact of trauma and social support on posttraumatic stress disorder: A study of New Zealand police officers. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 25(4), pp.303–314.
- Stephens, C. and Long, N. (1999). Posttraumatic stress disorder in the New Zealand Police: the moderating role of social support following traumatic stress. *Anxiety Stress and Coping*, 12(3), pp.247–264.
- Sunshine, J. and Tyler, T.R. (2003). The role of procedural justice and legitimacy in shaping public support for policing. *Law & Society Review*, 37(3), pp.513–548.

- Swaine, J. (2014) Michael Brown shooting: "They killed another young black man in America." *The Guardian*. [online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/12/ferguson-missouri-shooting-michael-brown-civil-rights-police-brutality>. [Accessed 18 May 2017]
- Sykes, R.E. and Brent, E.E. (1980) The regulation of interaction by police. *Criminology*, 18(2), pp.182–197.
- Sykes, R.E. and Brent, E.E. (1983) *Policing, a social behaviorist perspective*, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Sykes, R.E. and Clark, J.P. (1975) A theory of deference exchange in police-civilian encounters. *American Journal of Sociology*, 81(3), pp.584–600.
- Tankebe, J. (2012) Viewing things differently: the dimensions of public perceptions of police legitimacy. *Criminology*, 51(1), pp.103–135.
- Taylor, D. (2017) Mark Duggan shooting: court considers appeal against inquest verdict. *The Guardian*. [online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/mar/02/mark-duggan-shooting-court-considers-appeal-against-inquest-verdict>. [Accessed 18 May 2017]
- Tedeschi, J.T. and Felson, R.B. (1994) *Violence, aggression, and coercive actions*, Washington: American Psychological Association.
- Terrill, W. (2001) *Police Coercion*, New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing.
- Terrill, W. (2005) Police use of force: a transactional approach. *Justice Quarterly*, 22(1), pp.107–138.
- Terrill, W. (2014) Police Coercion. In: M.D. Reisig and R.J. Kane (eds.). *The Oxford handbook of police and policing*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Terrill, W. and Mastrofski, S.D. (2002) Situational and officer-based determinants of police coercion. *Justice Quarterly*, 19(2), pp.215–248.
- Terrill, W., Paoline, E.A. and Manning, P.K. (2003) Police culture and coercion. *Criminology*, 41(4), pp.1003–1034.
- Thoreau, R. and Lobb, B. (2005) A reliable and valid measure of occupational stress in the New Zealand Police. *Australian Journal of Psychology*, 57(S), p.114.
- Toch, H. (1969) *Violent men: An inquiry into the psychology of violence*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Turk, A.T. (1969) *Criminality and legal order*. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company.
- Tyler, T.R., Fagan, J. and Geller, A. (2014). Street stops and police legitimacy: teachable moments in young urban men's legal socialization. *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies*, 11(4), pp.751–785.
- Tyler, T.R. and Huo, Y. (2002). *Trust in the law*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Vold, G.B. & Bernard, T.J. (1986) *Theoretical criminology*. 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., New York: Oxford University Press, USA.

Waddington, D. (2012) The law of moments: understanding the flashpoint that ignited the riots. *Criminal Justice Matters*, 87(1), pp.6–7.

Waddington, D.P., Jones, K. and Critcher, C. (1989) *Flashpoints: Studies in Public Disorder*. London: Taylor & Francis.

Waddington, P.A.J. (1988) *Arming an unarmed police: policy and practice in the Metropolitan Police*, London: Police Foundation.

Waddington, P.A.J. (1999) Police (canteen) sub-culture. An appreciation. *British Journal of Criminology*, 39(2), pp.287–309.

Waddington, P.A.J., Adang, O., Baker, D., Birkbeck, C., Feltes., Gerardo Gabaldón, L., Paes Machado, Eduardo., and Stenning, P. (2009) Singing the same tune? International continuities and discontinuities in how police talk about using force. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 52(2), pp.111–138.

Waddington, P.A.J., Stenson, K. and Don, D. (2004) In proportion: race, and police stop and search. *British Journal of Criminology*, 44(6), pp.889–914.

Ward, A. (1999) *An unsettled history*. Wellington: Bridget Williams Books.

Watson, A.C., Swartz, J., Bohrman, C., Kriegel, L.S., and Draine, J. (2014) Understanding how police officers think about mental/emotional disturbance calls. *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry*, 37(4), pp.351–358.

Weidner, R.R. & Terrill, W. (2005) A test of Turk's theory of norm resistance using observational data on police-suspect encounters. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 42(1), pp.84–109.

Wengraf, T. (2001) *Qualitative research interviewing*. London: SAGE Publications.

Westley, W. (2005) Responsibilities of the Police. In: T. Newburn, (ed.) *Policing: key readings*. Abingdon: Willan Publishing.

Westmarland, L. (2002) *Gender and Policing*, Abingdon: Routledge.

Wiley, M.G. and Hudik, T.L. (1974) Police-citizen encounters: a field test of exchange theory. *Social Problems*, 22(1), pp.119–127.

Wilson, C. and Braithwaite, H. (1995) Police patrolling, resistance, and conflict resolution. In: N Brewer and C Wilson (eds.). *Psychology and Policing*. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 7–29.

Wilson, C. and Brewer, N. (1991) *When do patrol officers encounter resistance?* Adelaide: National Police Research Unit.

Wilson, C. and Brewer, N. (1993) Individuals and groups dealing with conflict: findings from police on patrol. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 14(1), pp.55–67.

Wilson, C. and Gross, P. (1994) Police-public interactions: the impact of conflict resolution tactics. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 24(2), pp.159–175.

Wilson, J.Q. (1968) *Varieties of Police Behavior*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Wilson, J.Q. and Kelling, G. (1982) Broken Windows. *Atlantic Monthly*, 249(3), pp.29–38.

Winfree, L.T. (2004) New Zealand police and restorative justice philosophy. *Crime & Delinquency*, 50(2), pp.189–213.

Winfree, L.T. and Newbold, G. (1999) Community policing and the New Zealand Police – correlates of attitudes toward the work world in a community-oriented national police organization. *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, 22(4), pp.589–617.

Winfree, L.T. and Taylor, T.J. (2004) Rural, small town, and metropolitan police in New Zealand – Differential outlooks on policing within a unified police organization. *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, 27(2), pp.241–263.

Wolf, R., Mesloh, C., Henych, M., and Thompson L.F. (2009) Police use of force and the cumulative force factor. *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, 32(4), pp.739–757.

Wolfe, S.E. & Piquero, A.R. (2011) Organizational justice and police misconduct. *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, 38(4), pp.332–353.

Wood, J.T. (2010). *Interpersonal communication*. Boston: Wadsworth.

Worden, R.E. (1996) The causes of police brutality: theory and evidence on police use of force. In: W. A. Geller & H. Toch (eds.). *Police Violence*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, pp. 23–51.

Worden, R.E. & McLean, S.J. (2014) Systematic social observation of the police. In: R. J. Kane & M. D. Reisig (eds.). *The Oxford handbook of police and policing*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 471–496.

Young, M. (1991) *An inside job*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

## LEGISLATION

New Zealand Parliament, 1867. *Armed Constabulary Act 1867*, No 37.

New Zealand Parliament, 1886. *Police Force Act 1886*, No 18.

New Zealand Parliament, 1961. *Crimes Act 1961*, No 43.

New Zealand Parliament, 1981. *Summary Offences Act 1981*, No 113.

New Zealand Parliament, 1989. *Child, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989, No.24*

New Zealand Parliament, 1990. *Bill of Rights Act, 1990 No 109.*

New Zealand Parliament, 1998. *Land Transport Act 1989, No 110.*

New Zealand Parliament, 2002. *Victim Rights Act 2002, No 39.*

New Zealand Parliament, 2006. *Evidence Act 2006, No 69.*

New Zealand Parliament, 2008. *Policing Act 2008, No 72.*

New Zealand Parliament, 2012. *Sale and Supply of Liquor Act 2012, No 120.*

New Zealand Parliament, 2012. *Search and Surveillance Act 2012, No 24.*

Parliament of South Australia, 1953. *Summary Offences Act 1953.*

Parliament of South Australia, 1884. *Police Act 1884*

Parliament of South Australia, 1984. *Controlled Substances Act 1984.*

Parliament of South Australia, 1984. *Public Intoxication Act 1984.*

Parliament of South Australia, 1993. *Young Offenders Act 1993*

## SOFTWARE PROGRAMMES

Evernote Corporation, 2007. *Evernote.*

Noldus Information Technology, 2014a. *Observer XT.*

Noldus Information Technology, 2014b. *Pocket Observer.*

Qualtrics Labs, Inc., 2002. *Qualtrics Research Suite.*

VERBI GmbH, 1995. *MAXQDA.*